There are many factors that contribute to the rapprochement between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Tajik political scientist Parviz Mullojanov believes. In his opinion, there are no insoluble contradictions between the two countries, political will is needed to resolve the problems that have arisen on the border. Much also depends on the civil society of the two countries, which must seek peace and compromise.
At the water festival on the border of Isfara (Tajikistan) and Batken (Kyrgyzstan). Photo: Internews
In recent years, especially after the recent escalation of the transboundary conflict, relations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are portrayed rather in a negative and alarmist way. Judging by the publications in many media and expert publications, it seems that both states are in an acute geopolitical and economic confrontation with each other.
However, is this really the case? To what extent does this perception of Tajik-Kyrgyz relations match reality? Is there a distortion of the real state of affairs and an exaggeration of the conflict potential in relations between these two post-Soviet states? In fact, all these questions are of direct practical importance – both the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the border conflict in the Isfara-Batken zone and the possibility of further strengthening bilateral ties hinged on the answer to them. After all, the more serious the problems that divide the parties, the more difficult the prospect of their happy resolution looks like – and vice versa.
In order to answer these questions, we will analyze Tajik-Kyrgyz relations in three main dimensions – geopolitics, economy, and trade, as well as in the security sector. The consequences of the sharp decay in bilateral relations as a result of the recent aggravation at the border will all be taken into account. All this will allow us to draw a number of preliminary conclusions regarding the prospects for peacebuilding and improvement of Tajik-Kyrgyz relations in the near future.
Geopolitics and security
The specificity of the Isfara-Batken conflict lies in the fact that for a long time it had practically no effect on the state and quality of relations between the two neighboring states and their political elites. Indeed, the border conflict first manifested itself back in Soviet times; however, at the interstate level, in the field of trade and economics, cultural and scientific exchange, there were no serious problems or confrontation between the two post-Soviet republics.
Likewise, cross-border problems practically did not affect interethnic relations – Tajiks and Kyrgyz calmly were crossing borders in both directions, doing trades, and business. Prior to recent times, Bishkek was considered as the most convenient and optimal place in the region for carrying international conferences, in which people from all five Central Asian republics could easily participate. For a generation of Tajik scholars, journalists, and civil society representatives, Bishkek was the most visited foreign city, where they received annual training, seminars, workshops, and conferences. Civil society representatives have initiated, perhaps, the largest number of joint projects and initiatives in the post-Soviet space in various fields, from education to opinion polls.
Of course, in the border area, specifically in the conflict zone, there was tension between local communities, but its grass-roots have always had a socio-economic rather than ethnic character. Probably for this reason, despite the occasional fierce confrontation at the inter-communal level in the conflict zone, the Tajiks and Kyrgyz as a whole maintained a quite friendly and positive attitude towards each other. This is not surprising, because the main cause of the conflict is competition for local water and land resources – or to be more accurate, for their fair distribution, which was extremely difficult to achieve in the conditions of Soviet and post-Soviet realities. In any case, being caused by socio-economic reasons, the Isfara-Batken conflict did not lead to the level of interethnic tension and mutual aversion that is peculiar to the majority of all the transborder and territorial conflicts.
In addition, throughout the post-Soviet period, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan remained geopolitical allies at both the regional and international levels. Geopolitical cooperation began in the 1990s; Bishkek actively participated in the settlement of the inter-Tajik conflict, and thousands of Tajik citizens fleeing the war and destruction received temporary shelter on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Both states are members of the SCO and the CSTO, where they also traditionally adopted similar positions on most regional and international problems.
In particular, both countries adhered to common positions on the region’s water and energy problems. In the 2000s, the dispute over water resources de-facto divided the countries of the region into two camps. Thus, the downstream countries, primarily Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, followed the concept that all water in the region is a common resource. On the contrary, the upper reaches countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, proposed to consider water reserves as a strategic resource, in which all states of the region should invest. Accordingly, the upstream countries believed that maintaining water reservoirs was costly and offered their neighbors to pay for their maintenance in the same way they pay for the supply of energy resources. Another proposed option was the co-financing of Tajik and Kyrgyz water and energy projects, and here Dushanbe and Bishkek also maintained similar attitudes.
The two countries have also collaborated to promote major energy and transport international projects in the region. First of all, we are talking about the CASA-1000 project, which involves the construction of a new high-voltage power transmission system designed to connect four countries in Central and South Asia. Possessing the region’s most significant water resources and strategic energy potential, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are particularly interested in the implementation of this project.
Another large-scale project in which diplomats and politicians from both countries are cooperating in the construction of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. It is assumed that line D of the gas pipeline will be laid from the border of Turkmenistan through the territory of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Its length will be about 1000 km, its transmissive capacity is 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year, which will provide regular income to the state budget of all participating countries.
The main condition for the implementation of such large international projects is political stability both in the whole region and in each post-Soviet republic. Therefore, it is not surprising that the governments of both countries traditionally cooperate in the field of regional security. In particular, we are talking about countering religious extremism, which poses a threat to the entire region.
And although Bishkek and Dushanbe use different approaches to fight religious radicalism, in general, their positions on this issue coincide. Therefore, this involves fairly close cooperation between the relevant bodies for the exchange of information and data; in addition, in recent years, a number of joint scientific, civil, and media projects have been implemented to counter violent extremism.
Economy and trade
Both countries, simply because of geography, have strategic importance for each other. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economy of Kyrgyzstan was built in many ways as a sort of regional trade and transport hub. The reason for this was the country’s advantageous geographical location, its location at the crossroads of communications between China and the West, as well as the north and south of Eurasia. This is the exact spot where the geopolitical and economic interests of Bishkek and Dushanbe intersect.
Thus, for Tajikistan, good relations with the neighboring republic mean another alternative entry into the Chinese market; aside from that, an additional transport route to the Kazakh and Russian markets passes through Kyrgyz territory. For Kyrgyzstan, the prospect of entering transport routes in the southern direction – towards Afghanistan and further to the seaports, trade, and energy markets of South Asia – is of interest.
Of course, due to the instability in Afghanistan, the implementation of large projects in the southern direction will remain a rather distant prospect for a long time to come. At the same time, one should not forget that even now the Central Asian states are actively supplying to the Afghan market various goods and energy resources.
No wonder, that despite the sporadic exacerbation of border issues, official statistics show brisk trade and close economic cooperation between the countries. In particular, Kyrgyzstan exports livestock, eggs, dairy products, processed foods, semi-finished products, potatoes, onions, apples, apricots, and dried fruits to Tajikistan. Construction materials, cotton, fabrics, vegetables and fruits, alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks, clothing, and others are imported from Tajikistan.
For a long time, the indicators of trade and economic cooperation between Bishkek and Dushanbe have been constantly increasing. According to official data, the trade turnover between the two republics reached its peak in 2013 – $186.5 million. In 2015, after Kyrgyzstan’s joining the EAEU, this figure dropped to $79 million, and in 2019 it was $67 million, but in 2020, due to the coronavirus pandemic, it dropped again to $ 37 million.
Meanwhile, most experts believe that official statistics do not reflect the real situation. In their opinion, the volume of trade has not really decreased much – it is just that in the past five years, a significant part of cross-border trade has gone into the shadows. Kyrgyzstan’s joining to the EAEU caused an upsurge in customs tariffs, which made official trade across borders simply unprofitable; as a result, businesses on both sides made most of their cross-border operations illegally.
For example, the export/transit of gasoline and energy resources from Kyrgyzstan to Tajikistan was almost completely moved into the shadows. According to unofficial data, following one of these illegal schemes, Kyrgyz fuel trucks first delivered their goods to gas stations located on Kyrgyz territory, right along the road beyond which the territory of Tajikistan began. At night, Tajik fuel trucks were refueling at the same gas stations, and the flow already quite legally went further through Tajik territory, and possibly further, in transit to Afghanistan. After 2015, apparently, a significant part of other goods was already sold according to such schemes, in which the local business, as usual, showed outstanding ingenuity. Thus, the transit of Chinese goods was often executed from China through Kyrgyz territory to Tajikistan and then delivered back across the border to the Batken region.
As a result of such shadow schemes, the main losses fell on the budgets of both countries, while the real volume of trade, perhaps, not only remained at the same level but even increased. Thus, despite customs barriers, a pandemic and a crisis, the economies of neighboring states remain connected with each other, which leaves hope for a quick recovery and growth in economic cooperation in the future – right after the current difficult period is over.
Consequences of the conflict April 29, 2021
The recent escalation of the conflict in the Isfara-Batken zone has brought serious changes in Tajik-Kyrgyz relations. First of all, because it revealed a number of negative trends that until recently looked insignificant and unlikely.
First, the clashes on the border in April this year suddenly escalated into the largest military confrontation between the two countries in their entire post-Soviet history. This could not but affect the quality of bilateral relations. The April events have had more than ever before a serious public outcry in each of the countries; many media outlets and political groups suddenly began to actively build an image of the enemy in public opinion. Thereafter, the conflict suddenly went beyond the scope of an intercommunal, purely local conflict, moving to the interstate and interethnic levels – which, again, did not happen before.
If we talk about the foreign policy aspect, then there was a serious rift in relations between the two countries, which until quite recently could confidently call themselves close geopolitical allies. Of course, both republics still remain foreign policy partners, cooperating within the framework of the SCO and the CSTO, but there is a serious cooling in their relations.
Secondly, there was a break in economic ties, which hit the interests of both sides. And this is understandable because, in any trading operation, there are at least two sides. In this case, the main losses are borne primarily by small and medium-sized businesses on both sides of the border – as well as the population of the border regions, which suffered from a new surge in inflation. For example, Tajik entrepreneurs, who bought goods in bulk at the Dordoi market in Bishkek, and supplied products from local sewing workshops to Moscow and Tajik markets carried serious losses. Indeed, they were mostly typical representatives of medium-sized businesses – entrepreneurs and shuttle traders, who built their trade chains based on mutual trust and long-term ties since Akaev’s times. Along with them, the same losses are now borne by their local partners – among them traders from local markets, as well as the owners and employees of about 90 sewing shops who were getting orders from Tajik shuttle traders.
Another case is multi-profile large holdings directly connected with political elites. I do not know what guided the leading tandem Japarov-Tashiev when making the decision to close the Tajik-Kyrgyz border: but, apparently, the main goal was to put pressure on the large Tajik enterprises, which, in theory, could lobby for a softening of the position of the Tajik authorities on border issues.
If so, then the end result was more than modest. Tajik big business connected with the authorities did not suffer from border closures; most likely, the possible losses were minimal and have already been reimbursed at the expense of other directions. As far as we know, gasoline supplies from the country (or rather, that part of the supplies that went through Bishkek) were redirected to other routes in May. The supply of Chinese goods has also been reoriented from Bishkek to an alternative direction; now most of them come directly from China.
Sooner or later, when the real state of affairs will be understood by the power elite, the borders will be reopened. Much will be recovered, and of course, will continue to develop. However, many small and medium-sized joint initiatives and business projects, no matter how successful they would have been before, will never recover and won’t get back to their previous level. Many representatives of medium and small businesses, who are already going through hard times, will go bankrupt, and the rest of them will move in to more stable directions. And this, of course, is not the result that the politicians intended to get from the closure of the borders.
Peacebuilding Perspectives
Currently, despite the existing difficulties, there is still much more positive than negative in Tajik-Kyrgyz relations. Therefore, there is much more reason for optimism than it might seem at first glance. First of all, there are still many factors that contribute to the closer relations between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – these are the common Soviet past, geopolitical and economic interests, a common view of regional problems, and so on. Both governments today are clearly interested in speedy resolution of the conflict, realizing that its continuation may turn out to be an unbearable burden for national economies and turn into a threat to internal stability.
“Despite the existing difficulties, there is still much more positive than negative in Tajik-Kyrgyz relations”.
The only truly destructive factor is the Isfara-Batken conflict, which, in fact, is purely local. In addition, despite all its complexity and long-standing nature, this conflict does not seem insoluble. There are many cross-border conflicts in the world that have been much more violent and irreconcilable – and yet have been successfully solved. Everything depends on the political will of those in power; in addition, politicians must understand the inadmissibility of using conflict as a way of earning rating and prestige. Much also depends on the representatives of the intelligentsia and civil society in each of the countries – their efforts today should be aimed not at inciting conflict and creating an image of the enemy, but at finding agreement and compromise. At the same time, the negotiation process can no longer be protracted – in the conditions of half-measures and excessive protracting of the peacebuilding process, the possibility of gradual transition of the conflict into an uncontrollable form increases, when the parties will no longer be able to influence its inclination.
For instance, minor conflicts can escalate into larger confrontations that are much more difficult to resolve and control. An option of forceful settlement is not possible. Both states currently have neither the financial nor the economic resources to conduct large-scale or prolonged hostilities; blitzkrieg of one of the parties is simply impossible due to military parity. Therefore, the parties should develop an effective approach to resolving the conflict as soon as possible – based on international experience and taking into account the specifics of the region.
Particularly, for a successful and final settlement of the conflict, experts and conflictologists propose the following steps:
First, it is necessary to complete the delimitation of the border in the near future, as well as to finally resolve the issue of the status of the bypass road in Vorukh and the distribution of irrigation water in the area of the “Golovnoy” distribution center. First of all, we are talking about the delimitation of disputed areas around the Vorukh enclave and in the area of Khoja Alo and Aksai, where the largest number of clashes take place.
Until the last large-scale conflict in April this year, experts suggested developing new, non-trivial approaches to resolving this conflict. For example, it was possible (even if it was temporarily) to declare the disputed territories a dual jurisdiction zone, withdraw the police and border troops from there, and develop a special mechanism for the joint use of disputed territories, water resources, and road infrastructure.
However, already at that time, it was clear that the seek for non-standard and alternative approaches is practically impossible in conditions when the peace process is limited to a narrow circle of high-ranking officials. Now, after the April conflict, the tension on the border has grown to such an extent that there is less and less time left to search for non-standard solutions. In these conditions, the final and speedy delimitation of the border (first of all, the disputed areas in the conflict zone) looks like the only way out of the situation.
The problem is that even now when the need for a fast delimitation is declared at the highest level, the parties still cannot reach a mutually acceptable compromise. In particular, the issue of laying an alternative road to the Vorukh enclave has not been resolved, and the delimitation of the disputed areas is again in a de-facto frozen state. The reason for this noncompliance is much of an internal political nature; both states are undergoing complex political and socio-economic processes, so governments prefer to avoid excessive political risks.
For example, in Kyrgyzstan, even the most popular politician, in the case of excessive, from the public opinion’s point of view, compliance in resolving territorial issues, seriously risks putting an end to his career. In Tajikistan, political leadership is much less dependent on public opinion; however, it is unlikely that the government will agree to clearly unpopular measures during the time of deepening economic crisis. In addition, the parties are also pressured by the irreconcilable position of local communities, who insist on their own version of the delimitation of the disputed areas.
As a result, the settlement process is again, beneath our eyes, coming to a dead-end, which increases the possibility of a new altitudinous escalation of the situation in the conflict zone.
Secondly, there is a need for non-standard problem-solving methods that involve a wider segment of society in the peacebuilding process. In other words, to get out of the next deadlock, it is necessary to go beyond the framework of official negotiations and involve a wide range of experts (conflict experts, economists), representatives of professional NGOs, civil society, local communities, and informal leaders in a peaceful dialogue. In international peacekeeping practice, this approach is denoted by the term “civic dialogue” or Track II (Second path or second line of the peace process); it is considered to be a necessary and effective addition to formal negotiations (Track-I – First Way).
It is believed that within the framework of civil/informal dialogue, the most sensitive and complex issues can be discussed, which are often not addressed in the course of formal negotiations. In addition, civil dialogue makes it possible to more successfully resolve issues of a technical nature, since the parties are less limited by diplomatic frameworks and can devote more time to working out specific details of peace agreements.
Сivil dialogue tends to be rather broader than expert meetings and a working group, as it includes, in addition to experts and professionals, officials, and informal leaders. Civil dialogue also often involves the creation of several parallel working and expert groups in order to better work out the details of the agreement. As a result, civic dialogue makes it possible to better take into account the interests and needs of all stakeholders – first of all, local communities, which will further avoid discontent and opposition to peace agreements on their part.
Our region already has experience of wide and successful implementation of civil dialogue – in the 90s, during the civil war in Tajikistan. The inter-Tajik peace dialogue began a year before the official negotiations in 1994 and continued in parallel throughout the entire process of national settlement – until 2001. Some members of the Dialogue later became part of the official delegations, which made it possible to maintain constant communication between both levels of the peace process. Many technical issues and approaches to a peaceful settlement were first discussed in the framework of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue – for example, the idea of creating a National Reconciliation Commission.
Unfortunately, for decades, the participation of local communities in the peace process has been limited to friendship festivals, joint concerts, and sporting events. Today it is already clear that such events were of a more propagandistic and demonstrative nature, and for this reason, they could not have a significant impact on the situation in the conflict zone. Time to develop new approaches to resolving the border conflicts has come; today, the negotiation process in nowise should be allowed to come to a standstill again, sooner or later it will lead to a new aggravation of the situation on the border.