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Germany-Central Asia summit: advantages and disadvantages of cooperation with Germany

Central Asian countries need to clearly understand the risks of developing cooperation with Germany according to the formula “raw materials for technology”, as there is a risk of increasing dependence on energy resources, says Eldaniz Huseynov, a specialist in European and international studies of the Heartland Expert Analytical Center, commenting on the results of the last summit “Germany-Central Asia”.


Photo: reuters.com
Photo: reuters.com

Germany, together with France, is the only EU country that has diplomatic representation in all 5 Central Asian countries. This emphasizes the importance of the region for the country compared to other EU countries. The main advantages of Germany in the region are the development of economic ties, in particular trade and investment relations and the development of public diplomacy.

But these two components of German foreign policy in the region also have their drawbacks. The advantages and disadvantages can also be seen at the Germany-Central Asia summit.

Is Central Asia a higher priority partner in the eyes of the Germany?

Before starting to analyze the past Germany-Central Asia summit, it is important to understand the conceptual processes within Germany before the new government in 2021 and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and its impact on German policy.

The bilateral visits of 2022 and 2023 were quite significant for Central Asia-Germany relations. In 2021, after 16 years of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship, the “Traffic Light” coalition was formed in Germany. It was so named due to the alliance of three political parties in the Bundestag: the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Green Party (Die Grüne). Under the slogan “Take bolder steps forward” (“Mehr Fortschritt wagen”), the parties adopted a coalition agreement that defines the priorities and directions of the ruling coalition.

The document contains section 8 “Germany’s Responsibility to Europe and the World”, which lists areas of work in bilateral and regional format. A large number of regions are listed: Middle East, Sahel, Latin America and the Caribbean, and countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Afghanistan, but there is no mention of Central Asia. This is an indication of the fine line between Germany’s foreign policy in Central Asia from the time the new government comes to power until February 24, 2022.

Before the new coalition came to power, the importance of Central Asia for Germany can be noted in another strategic document – the program of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Germany held the Presidency of the Council of the EU from July 1 to December 31, 2020. Among the last 10 presidencies of the Council of the EU, Germany was one of the three countries that included Central Asia in its program. The Presidency plays an important role in organizing and coordinating the Council’s work, particularly in EU foreign policy.

In turn, the adoption of a presidency program usually means a commitment by the presidency to implement the initiatives and priorities stated in the program. That is to say, before the arrival of the new German government, the importance of Central Asia was enshrined, first of all, in the new EU strategy for the region from 2019 and was consolidated by the inclusion of the countries of the region in the program of the German Presidency of the Council of the EU.

Between the formation of the new coalition and the outbreak of war, the role of the region was apparently not adequately reflected in other strategic documents. After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the role of Central Asia was emphasized by bilateral visits. Inside Germany, parallel processes were taking place that influenced the German Federal Republic’s growing interest in the region. The war in Ukraine greatly changed the German government and population’s understanding of foreign policy.

On February 27, 2022, just a few days after the outbreak of the war, Chancellor Olaf Scholz in his speech announced a radical reorientation of German security and foreign policy – within the framework of the so-called “Zeitenwende” (“turn of time”, “beginning of a new era”). This turn primarily concerned defense, economic, and energy policy. Energy policy may have been the basis for Germany’s increased interest in the region. Thus, German Chancellor Scholz said: “… we will do more to ensure a secure energy supply for our country. … And we will change course – we will change course to overcome our import dependence on individual energy suppliers.”.

In addition, Scholz in his statement emphasizes the diversification of partnerships, namely to invest in new ones in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Therefore, one should not be surprised by the growth of Germany’s interest in Central Asia. Similar processes are taking place with Latin America. This region has often been talked about as a forgotten actor with which, since the outbreak of the war, it has again wanted to actively cooperate.

Central Asia did not find its place in Germany’s first national security strategy, which also mentions other countries and regions. Nevertheless, there was news that the German Foreign Ministry had a draft document stating that in order to prevent Russia or China from dominating the region, Germany would pay more attention to Central Asia.

The analysis of strategic documents and speeches makes it clear that Central Asia does not appear as one of the main objects of attention in German foreign policy.

In addition, the problem of interest in the region from “crisis to crisis” becomes more characteristic. The first visit of the new German Foreign Minister Annalena Berbock to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was made on October 31 and November 1 of this year. This was preceded by the visit of former Germany’s foreign policy chief Heiko Maas to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on August 29-30, 2021, because of the situation around Afghanistan.

Thus, Central Asia is not a priority region in German foreign policy, although against the backdrop of discussions on new partnerships, the countries of the region need to conduct a “Zeitenwende” in German politicians’ perceptions of Central Asia in order to avoid a “crisis-to-crisis” approach to German cooperation with the region. Nevertheless, the analysis above identifies priority areas for cooperation, namely energy and economy. Public diplomacy refers partly to the economy, but also to another important area, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. These areas were also enshrined in the joint statement of the Central Asian leaders and the German Chancellor on September 29, 2023.

Germany: technological exports and raw material imports

The factor of economic cooperation between Germany and the Central Asian countries is in fact the leading one. The main advantage of cooperation with Germany in this area is the possibility of attracting investments and with them new technologies and development opportunities. The main disadvantages, however, are the continued predominantly raw material exports of the Central Asian countries and, in parallel, Germany’s continued interest in the resources of the countries of the region.

During their visit to Berlin from September 29 to 30, 2023, the leaders of the Central Asian countries held talks with the Chancellor and the President of Germany and took part in a joint business meeting of the Eastern Committee of the German Economy. At the business meeting, the parties agreed to draw up the “Berlin List” of multilateral projects in Central Asia, which will be jointly selected.

To date, German companies have invested a total of more than ten billion euros in Central Asia, creating more than 35,000 jobs. Already around 900 companies with German capital are producing products and offering services in the region. In addition, many other companies expressed interest in cooperating with Central Asia during the visit.

This is the main advantage of German foreign policy in Central Asia – investing in the development of the region and, at the same time, its technological development. In addition to being ready to invest in the Central Asian economy, Germany is also ready to promote technological development “in a tandem”. This applies both to technology transfer and the opening of educational institutions. In 1997, Kazakhstan and Germany signed an agreement on technical cooperation. This agreement included a commitment by the German government to send specialists, from trainers to scientific and technical personnel, as well as experts. It also provided for the supply of materials and equipment, training and professional development of specialists, management personnel and scientists in Kazakhstan, Germany or other countries.

There are several examples of scientific and educational cooperation between the two countries. The Kazakh-German University, founded in Almaty in 1999, holds leading positions in several Kazakhstani educational rankings. The university offers Kazakhstani students the opportunity to study in Germany through academic mobility initiatives and the Dual Diploma program. A new Kazakhstan-German Institute of Sustainable Engineering Sciences was opened at the Sh. Esenov Caspian University of Technology and Engineering in Aktau. The Kazakh-German University played a significant role in the establishment of this institute. This institute will specialize in training students in areas such as “Logistics” and “Energy and Environmental Engineering”.

At the same time, the Kyrgyz-German Technical Institute (KGTI) has been operating in Kyrgyzstan since 2004. This institute was established on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement signed by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Akaev and Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany G. Schröder. The founders of KSTI were I. Razzakov KSTU and Boit Berlin Technical Institute. Boit. The Institute trains specialists in technical specialties.

in 2004 when KGTI was established, based on the agreement between the Kyrgyz State University of Construction, Transport and Architecture named after N. Isanov (KSUSTA) and the West Saxony University of Applied Sciences, Zwickau (WHZ, Germany), the Kyrgyz-German Faculty of Informatics (KGFI) was opened. In June 2018. KGFI was transformed into an independent educational institution Kyrgyz-German Institute of Applied Informatics KGIPI. Graduates of joint universities with Germany after graduation can find jobs in German companies located in Central Asia. The results of surveys of German companies in Central Asia are also indicative of this. In 2021, more and more German companies were concerned about the shortage of qualified labor compared to 2020.

On the other hand, it may be problematic that during visits at the level of foreign ministers and heads of state, the issue of cooperation in the field of resources from Central Asian countries was prioritized. In addition to being emphasized in the German media, this formulation was enshrined as “raw materials in exchange for technology” by President Tokayev during the visit to Kazakhstan of his German colleague Steinmeier.

The emphasis on the export of resources from Central Asian countries to Germany was also emphasized in a joint statement at the end of the Germany-Central Asia summit: “They agree that the existing cooperation between Germany and the region needs to be strengthened and improved, focusing on four priority areas:

– Economy, Energy and Natural Resources;

– Regional cooperation and sustainability;

– Climate and Environment;

– Direct contacts between citizens”.

Looking at trade statistics, Central Asian countries export mainly crude oil to Germany, with the share of oil exports to Germany in 2022, according to the international trade center, out of the total share of oil exports from Central Asia is about 13%. Overall, the main exporter from Central Asia is Kazakhstan, with its share of Central Asian exports to Germany at almost 97%.

At the same time, German exports in the region are not only oriented towards Kazakhstan (Figure 1). This shows the problem of the one-sided nature of the development of trade relations between Central Asia and Germany.

Share of Central Asian countries in exports from Germany in 2022 in thousand USD

Source: International Trade Center

German exports to Central Asia are mainly represented by technical equipment such as harvesting or threshing machines (33% of German import share), centrifuges (11% of German import share). Particular growth in Germany’s exports to the region can be seen in deliveries of automobiles (almost 600%), tractors (about 200%) and tractor spare parts (about 340%). What is surprising is that Germany has doubled its shipments of petroleum oils and oils derived from bituminous minerals to Central Asia in 2022 compared to 2021. This suggests that some of the raw materials that are shipped to Germany from Central Asia may be returned in the form of finished products.

This leads to the second flaw in the cooperation, namely the preferential export of raw materials from Central Asia to Germany. It is important to add that the German government and German entrepreneurs may have different interests in the region.

For example, Kazakhstan may be interesting for exporting raw materials, Uzbekistan for opening new factories, and Tajikistan for establishing new trade routes. But nevertheless, the formula “raw materials for technology” has been characteristic of the foreign policy of Central Asian countries towards the European Union countries for the last 30 years.

In Kazakhstan in 2008 the program “Path to Europe” for 2009-2011 was adopted and in this program among the main directions of work were noted first: 1. Creation of conditions for establishing technological cooperation; 2. Development of energy cooperation. In reality, in a changing era, Central Asian countries need new technologies for economic development, but the development of unilateral cooperation with important centers of influence such as Germany may reduce the region’s subjectivity. Central Asian countries need to clearly understand the risks of developing cooperation with Germany on a “raw materials for technology” formula, as there is a risk of increasing dependence on energy resources, given the lack of 100% security of transportation routes. On the one hand, these problems are intensified by Russia’s military conflict with Ukraine, on the other hand, there are more and more frequent calls to impose sanctions against Azerbaijan because of recent events. Thus, the Head of the European Affairs Committee of the Bundestag Anton Hofreiter in connection with the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh called on the European Union to impose sanctions on Azerbaijan and revise gas supply contracts with Baku. According to him, we should not repeat the mistakes made in relations with Russia and fall into energy dependence.

Thus, the main advantage of economic relations with Germany is the focus on technology exchange through the opening of new German enterprises in Central Asia. The disadvantage, if we consider the trade and economic plane of cooperation, is the one-sided nature of relations and Germany’s interest mainly in obtaining raw materials from Central Asia.

German public diplomacy: between technology transfer and migration?

As already described above, one of the priority areas of German cooperation with Central Asia is the development of contacts between citizens. This fits in with Germany’s public diplomacy strategy in Central Asia. Especially since the joint statement refers to new opportunities for migration from Central Asia to Germany.

German public diplomacy, along with economic foreign policy, are areas where Germany is making major strides. Research shows that Germany does not use the term “soft power” when referring to achieving its own goals through cultural or educational areas of cooperation. Instead of “soft power” or “public diplomacy” in the foreign policy discourse of the Federal Republic of Germany one can find such concepts as “foreign cultural policy”, foreign educational policy”, or “foreign cultural and educational policy”. This distinguishes Germany from other major powers whose official rhetoric mentions “soft power”.

One of the main goals of such “public diplomacy” of Germany is to attract new “minds” from abroad to fill the shortage of personnel due to demographic problems in the country. It is through the creation of a positive image of Germany as a country of knowledge, education and science that scientists and researchers from all over the world will seek to go there to fulfill their potential. This task is enshrined in the 2011 concept of the Federal Republic of Germany’s foreign cultural and educational policy. The tools for promoting German public diplomacy in Central Asia can be educational institutions such as German language schools, joint universities, German language teaching centers, political foundations close to political parties, humanitarian organizations, etc. Depending on the goals of public diplomacy, Germany may emphasize the development of the German language or the promotion of democratic values, human rights and the rule of law. A special emphasis was placed on German language learning and educational cooperation in the joint statement at the end of the Germany-Central Asia Summit.

The Heads of State confirmed their willingness to continue to support the teaching of German in the educational institutions of the respective partner countries. This includes Goethe Institute programs, language centers and more than 50 PASCH (Schools: Partners for the Future) schools. In total, more than 500,000 schoolchildren in the region are learning German. The promotion of German language learning will play a major role in the development of bilateral relations between Germany and the Central Asian countries, it will also increase population contacts and may increase the number of joint projects. This is the main advantage of cooperation. On the other hand, a positive image of Germany together with the knowledge of the German language may lead to increased migration to Germany and a loss of human capital.

For example, surveys of German language learners in language centers in Kazakhstan show that most of them were inspired to study German by the desire to move to Germany or to continue their studies there. In addition, statistics show an increase in migration from Central Asia to Germany.

Therefore, the development of German public diplomacy in Central Asia through the promotion of German language learning and various educational programs can positively influence the development of bilateral contacts and ties between the two sides, which is an advantage. But on the other hand it may increase migration from Central Asia to Germany and consequently the brain drain.

 

Three advantages, three disadvantages, three recommendations

Taking all of the above into account, the following three advantages of cooperation between the Central Asian countries and Germany can be noted:

  1. Germany has a greater interest in Central Asia after 2022, and accordingly the country seeks to further progressively develop cooperation with the region;
  2. Germany has begun to actively establish trade and investment ties with the region, and new projects have been identified for implementation by German companies, which will accelerate technological exchange;
  3. The parties intend to develop cooperation in education and promote the German language, which should contribute to increased cooperation and interaction between the populations of the parties.

Three current gaps:

  1. Germany’s attention and interest in Central Asia has recently developed “from crisis to crisis”, which may lead to a marked decrease in the intensity of cooperation between Germany and Central Asia once the international situation stabilizes;
  2. Bilateral trade and economic relations between Germany and the countries of Central Asia are characterized by one-sidedness and the predominance of trade in raw materials (in the case of Kazakhstan) by the countries of Central Asia with Germany. This factor can still hamper the development of relations according to the formula “raw materials for technology”, as such a policy in fact some countries of the region have been pursuing for the last 30 years. It is necessary to understand how effective it can be now;
  3. The popularization of the German language and the enhancement of Germany’s positive image through public diplomacy tools may lead to an even greater increase in migration from Central Asian countries to Germany, which may lead to a brain drain. Although the joint statement refers to reforms to support the exchange of professionals, as well as reforming the law on the migration of working professionals to Germany, this issue needs to be improved so that both sides benefit from such processes.

Three recommendations:

  1. Communication at the level of foreign ministries and representative offices between Central Asia and Germany should be introduced in the “Zeitenwende” format; this means a turnaround in the understanding of the region among Germans. Central Asia should not be remembered only in the event of a crisis, but should be kept in the mind as a significant partner. The partnership initiative should not come from Germany alone. Perhaps this will also be a kind of “Zeitenwende” in the Central Asian population’s perception of Germany, when the governments of the region themselves will regularly propose different formats of cooperation to Germany. Many leaders of the region have invited the German Chancellor to visit their countries, so why not invite the President or the Chancellor of Germany as a guest of honor to the next consultative meeting of Central Asian leaders in Astana?
  2. Regarding trade and economic issues, the countries of the region need to talk more often about the opportunities for non-resource exports from the region to Germany, for this purpose we can organize exhibitions of manufacturers, business forums. But at the initial stage it is important to promote in communication between foreign policy bodies that Central Asian countries can increase not only the supply of raw materials, but are ready to develop joint projects for the application of new technologies and production of non-resource products for export to Germany;
  3. Labor migration to Europe, given the content of the general statement, is a process that would probably be difficult to reverse. Then it is important to turn it to favor, it is important to maintain regular contact with citizens of Central Asian countries in Europe and offer them opportunities for cooperation with their homeland. This concerns not only transfers of money from abroad, but also realization of some projects on export of German technologies to Central Asia. It could be about exporting goods from Central Asia to Germany. By the way, in the so-called “CIS” stores, which are very popular in Germany, there are very few products from the region, and in some stores they are absent.

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