In this review, we reflect on the tumultuous yet diplomatically active year of 2023, a period marked by heightened global interest and a flurry of significant agreements and initiatives in Central Asia. As we pivot to 2024, a year potentially less auspicious on the global stage, we anticipate a shift in focus towards the domestic policy priorities of world powers. This recalibration, however, comes with its own set of challenges, given the longstanding unresolved issues in Central Asia. While a temporary lull in international conflicts might offer a reprieve, nations in the region must remain alert and strategically prepare for emerging hurdles. The effective management of internal affairs will be pivotal in ensuring continued peace and stability across the region.
In 2023, the Central Asian landscape was a hotbed of diplomatic activity, with regional leaders convening nearly a dozen times and concluding the year amid a flurry of foreign policy interactions in the “C5+1” format. This intense scrutiny from global players is set to continue into 2024, underscoring the necessity of transforming fleeting interests into enduring alliances.
However, the coming year promises a pivot in international focus, primarily driven by key political events in the United States and Russia. Both nations, preoccupied with their own presidential elections, are anticipated to turn inwards, channeling their energies towards domestic agendas. This shift is partly influenced by the public’s growing appetite for internal stability and governance.
1. Attention to US-Russia competition globally and in Central Asia will diminish due to the elections.
Compounding this change in orientation is the diminishing global fixation on the US-Russia rivalry, particularly in the context of Central Asia. This waning interest is attributed to several factors, including the prolonged Ukraine conflict, which, despite its initial shock value, has gradually receded from the spotlight due to emerging global crises.
The absence of a Central Asia-Russia summit this year, coupled with the unlikely prospect of a Central Asia-U.S. summit in 2024, signals a recalibration of foreign policy priorities. Public opinion polls in the US indicate a growing preference for domestic policy initiatives over foreign engagements. In Russia, post-election strategies are expected to emphasize enhanced regional communications, fostering deeper ties within the broader Eurasian sphere. Meanwhile, the direction of U.S. foreign policy hinges on the election’s outcome: a Republican victory may see a concentrated focus on neighboring regions, whereas a Democratic win could spur increased involvement in Central Asia, especially in response to China’s expanding influence in the area.
2. The prospective expansion of the European Union may inadvertently curtail its engagement with Central Asia.
Positioned beyond the EU’s immediate periphery, Central Asia finds itself overshadowed by closer neighbours with aspirations for EU membership. These aspirants predominantly include Western Balkan states such as Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, alongside Eastern Partnership nations like Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia.
The EU’s recent resolution to commence accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova, coupled with its nod to Georgia’s candidacy, necessitates a reallocation of resources towards these countries to elevate them to EU standards. Simultaneously, the EU faces a pressing need to deepen its investments in the Western Balkans. This requirement stems from the region’s protracted and often arduous journey towards EU accession, marked by a blend of prolonged negotiations and recurrent demands from both the EU and its member states. The accession trajectory in the Western Balkans has been fraught with challenges—epitomized by Serbia’s eight-year-long negotiation process and North Macedonia’s contentious decision to rename itself following disputes with Greece.
The year 2024, a pivotal period of presidential elections in Moldova, the United States, and Russia, further complicates this landscape. Moldova, straddling between pro-Western and pro-Russian factions, gains heightened strategic significance for the EU in the context of ongoing tensions in Ukraine and Transnistria. The country’s recent local elections, which saw the ruling party fall short of a decisive majority, underscore the volatile political milieu. Moldova’s candidacy status and its crucial geopolitical position only amplify the EU’s imperative to intensify its focus and resources on these emerging frontiers, potentially at the expense of its involvement in Central Asia.
3. Reduced trade between the European Union and China will reduce the transit of goods through Central Asia.
The European Union’s foreign policy is increasingly pivoting towards a strategic imperative: diminishing its reliance on major powers like Russia and China. This trend is exemplified by Germany’s shift towards regionalizing economic activities within the EU bloc. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy advises a gradual and measured scaling back of trade ties with China, to mitigate steep initial economic impacts on Germany. A stark severance could slash German GDP by as much as 5%, while a more tempered approach might limit the contraction to 1.5%. Meanwhile, cargo transit from China through Kazakhstan has surged, doubling to 1.5 million tonnes. Yet, despite this uptick, road transport via Kazakhstan represents a mere 0.01% of total freight movements. In stark contrast, China’s maritime cargo dispatch to Europe amounts to a colossal 1.6 billion tonnes, underscoring the lopsided nature of this logistical equation.
4. interest in Central Asian energy resources will decline due to infrastructure constraints and regulatory considerations.
As the European Union seeks to diversify its energy portfolio away from authoritarian regimes, it casts a wider net for oil and gas suppliers, with eyes on nations like the US, Norway, and Nigeria. In a significant move, Nigeria has pledged to furnish Germany with an annual 850,000 tonnes of natural gas, potentially escalating to 1.2 million tonnes, with the first shipments earmarked for 2026. Simultaneously, Central Asian powerhouse Kazakhstan has upped its oil supply to the EU, accounting for 10% in the second quarter of 2023, a rise from 7% in the previous year. However, the trajectory for further augmentation in energy exports remains ambiguous.
Scaling up oil supplies isn’t merely a matter of ramping up production; it demands infrastructural backbone. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, with a capacity of 50 million tonnes, pales in comparison to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s 80 million tonnes, the principal conduit for Kazakh oil. As Azerbaijani analyst Ilgar Velizadeh points out, an uptick in Kazakhstan’s oil output could strain the BTC’s capacity, potentially tilting the balance in favor of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. But capitalizing on this requires Kazakhstan to navigate the Caspian Sea’s shallowing waters, entailing hefty investments in dredging and potentially constructing an undersea pipeline.
Furthermore, as Velizadeh notes, expanding the tanker fleet is a pressing issue, with the development of such infrastructure being a protracted process, impeding rapid adaptation to increased oil transport volumes. Concurrently, the EU’s commitment to renewable energy casts a shadow over projects like the trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan, which may falter amidst the bloc’s shift from hydrocarbons.
In examining recent diplomatic activities, the heightened interest in Central Asia can be attributed to several key factors:
- Geopolitical Alignments: The region’s strong connections with Russia and China are significant in the context of these nations’ global rivalry with Western powers. The nature and depth of these ties are critical in understanding the shifting geopolitical landscape.
- Security Dynamics: The ongoing situation in Afghanistan and the potential for water-related conflicts in the region are of high relevance. Central Asia’s proximity and response to these issues are pivotal in regional stability considerations.
- Energy Supply: The export of energy resources from Central Asia is a crucial element, given its rich reserves of oil and gas. This positions the region as an important player in the global energy market.
- Trade Connectivity: Central Asia’s strategic location as a transit point for goods moving between Asia and Europe enhances its significance in global trade networks.
- Regional Development: The stable development of Central Asia is a factor in itself, as it contributes to broader regional and international stability.
Understanding these drivers in detail is essential for continued and future engagement with the region.
West focuses on Central Asia to counter Russia
In the broader context of the West’s strategic rivalry with China and Russia, Central Asia garners heightened interest, particularly due to its more pronounced ties with Russia. For many Western nations, including the United States, Russia looms as a significant national security threat. A review of the national security strategies of the US, Germany, France, and Japan reveals a common thread: except for Japan, Russia is more frequently cited as a concern than China, Iran, or the DPRK. This is notably evident in the security strategy under Joe Biden’s administration, where Russia and Iran are referenced as often as China. Meanwhile, Japan’s strategy places even greater emphasis on Russia compared to France and Germany, highlighting the perception of Russia as a principal security challenge.
This trend indicates that, over the next 2-3 years, these countries are likely to prioritize addressing the Russian threat over the Chinese in their national security agendas. Concurrently, there are efforts to mitigate the deterioration of relations with China, partly to prevent a closer alliance between Beijing and Moscow. High-level discussions between the US and China on resuming military contacts exemplify this, as reported by the Financial Times, citing a 2023 meeting between Pentagon Deputy Assistant Michael Chase and Chinese military attaché Liu Zhan. Additionally, statements made in October 2023 by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to US Secretary of State Blinken about stabilizing China-US relations underscore this strategic balancing act. Consequently, Western countries are expected to intensify their focus on Russia and its immediate sphere of influence. This perspective is explicitly articulated in Germany’s national security strategy, which identifies contemporary Russia as the primary threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region.
In contrast, the narrative surrounding China adopts a nuanced tone: “Some states seek to reshape the existing international order through their lens of systemic rivalry. Within this global context, China emerges as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival.” This distinction underlines a different perception towards Russia and China; while Russia is directly viewed as a threat, China is regarded as a rival—a stance that doesn’t inherently imply an immediate threat, allowing for a more measured response.
Amidst this geopolitical backdrop, Central Asian countries gain prominence. The constriction of Russia’s European economic and trade avenues has led to an increased redirection of Russian business towards Central Asia, a trend visibly manifesting in the growing number of Russian foreign businesses registering in Kazakhstan. This shift has not gone unnoticed by the EU, Japan, and the UK, who perceive it as a potential expansion of Russia’s influence in Central Asia, thereby posing a risk to the collective West’s economic interests in the region. Consequently, it has become increasingly common for Western nations to articulate, both verbally and in strategic documents, their intent to diminish or altogether sever their “dependence on China and Russia” in Central Asia.
This Western stance could, in turn, prompt Russia to intensify its engagement in the region to safeguard its interests. Russia might view Western activities in Central Asia with suspicion, aligning with its national security concept that posits certain countries as instigators of disintegration within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), undermining Russia’s connections with its traditional allies. This scenario sets the stage for a complex interplay, where Russia’s actions could be both a reaction to and a catalyst for escalating tensions with the West. This dynamic, coupled with the impending elections in Russia and the US, may inadvertently lay the groundwork for a diminished interest in the region. Furthermore, the upcoming elections in Taiwan could redirect China’s attention predominantly towards the Pacific, adding another layer to the evolving geopolitical chessboard.
Water crisis threatens stability and resource supply
The European Union’s approach to Central Asia is strategically crafted to address critical crisis issues, with a particular focus on the region’s water challenges. This strategy, however, is shaped by resource limitations, which become evident in the context of infrastructure project competition with China. Previous analyses have highlighted the EU’s comparative lag behind China in executing infrastructure projects, both in Central Asia and on a global scale. In response, the EU has launched “Global Gateway,” a program conceptualized as an alternative to China’s expansive “Belt and Road” initiative. Within Central Asia, the EU’s focus is on transforming the region’s water, energy, and climate landscape. Emphasizing the shift towards a low-carbon economy and a more diverse energy portfolio, the European Union is actively supporting projects and investment initiatives in water and energy management, signifying its commitment to fostering sustainable development in the region.
The European Union is acutely aware of the pivotal role water plays in Central Asia, particularly for countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Despite their considerable natural gas reserves, crucial for energy production and export, these nations are heavily reliant on upstream water flows for agricultural sustainability. Recognizing this, the EU has committed to assisting Central Asian countries in the rational and equitable management of their limited resources.
A study by the Eurasian Development Bank forecasts a looming water scarcity in Central Asia within five years, coupled with a significant surge in electricity demand. This situation is exacerbated by the construction of the Kush-Tepa canal on the Amur Darya River, presenting a dire challenge for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In June 2023, this crisis was palpable in Turkmenistan’s Lebap province, where farmers struggled to irrigate cotton fields due to inadequate water supply. This agricultural impediment has cascading effects on food availability, sparking protests over shortages of government-subsidized food and prompting government intervention in price regulation.
The escalating water crisis harbors the potential to trigger further protests in the coming summer. The Taliban’s initiation of the Kush-Tepa project in March 2022, with about 100 kilometers of the 285-kilometer canal completed, raises significant concerns. The canal aims to irrigate 550,000 hectares of land in northern Afghanistan, diverting 25% of the Amu Darya River’s flow, thereby impacting Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Kunduz Adylbekova’s analysis suggests that in 5-6 years, upon the canal’s completion, Turkmenistan could see its water availability in the middle and lower reaches of the transboundary river plummet from 80% to 65%. Consequently, water crises are set to gain the attention of global powers, not least because of the region’s valuable resources.
Stable Development: Key to Central Asian Transit
The allure of Central Asia as a vital transit nexus has not escaped the notice of external powers, as evidenced by the high-profile “Central Asia – European Union” meeting of Foreign Ministry Heads in Luxembourg on 23 October 2023. The discussions there were broad, spanning the enhancement of the energy sector, the extraction and refinement of raw materials, and the bolstering of security measures and border fortifications. A significant outcome of this assembly was the unveiling of a joint strategic roadmap, charting out the principal domains for pragmatic collaboration between Central Asian nations and the European Union. This collaboration notably zeroes in on integrating Central Asian transport infrastructure with the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), developing critical raw materials, funding environmental initiatives, and broadening cooperation in phytosanitary and veterinary sectors.
Meanwhile, the Russia-Kazakhstan-China route has seen a substantial 69% spike in container transit over the first 11 months of 2023, signaling keen interest from not just the EU but also Russia and China. In Turkmenistan, this growing geopolitical and economic interest was underscored by President Serdar Berdimuhamedow during an expanded Cabinet meeting. He delineated the foreign policy priorities, emphasizing the importance of sustaining relations with neighboring countries and vigorously pursuing broader engagement with Eurasian states, thus reflecting the nation’s strategic positioning and aspirations within this evolving regional landscape.
In a strategic move, the Head of Turkmenistan has advocated for engaging with participants of the Belt and Road Initiative to establish a transport corridor stretching from China to Turkmenistan’s Caspian Sea coast. This initiative is geared towards enhancing regional collaboration and broadening Central Asia’s global partnership network.
The significance of secure transportation routes has been starkly highlighted by the Yemeni Houthis’ attacks on cargo ships transiting the Suez Canal, compelling vessels to navigate around the entire African continent for delivery. In today’s interconnected world, transport routes have become critical arteries of economic progress. Central Asia’s growing prominence is further linked to the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, whose full potential hinges on the continuous development and stability of Central Asian countries.
This aspect gains particular relevance for China and Russia in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. As Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, points out, China, in contrast to Russia, is significantly more vulnerable in conflict scenarios due to its heavy reliance on maritime supplies. With the United States capable of leveraging its military bases and allies in the Pacific to potentially disrupt China’s supply lines, Beijing is increasingly turning its focus towards ensuring the security and stability of Central Asian nations as a strategic counterbalance.
Diplomatic Deluge: 2023’s Year of Summits
Throughout 2023, Central Asian nations actively engaged in diplomatic dialogues, notably in the C5+1 format with key global players including China, the European Union, the United States, Germany, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, along with regular interactions with Japan and South Korea. Many of these C5+1 meetings were unprecedented. The year also saw the Fifth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders, with Azerbaijan participating, alongside various other international forums. Significantly, French President Emmanuel Macron made his inaugural visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, joined by the Presidents of Germany and Italy, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Sergio Mattarella, and the Czech Prime Minister, Petr Fiala. Notably, the region welcomed a new diplomatic partner with the visit of Togolese President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbe to Kazakhstan.
These diverse meeting formats between external actors and Central Asian countries highlight the international community’s growing interest in the region, spurred by its strategic proximity to Russia, China, and Afghanistan, and the allure of its resources and potential for further collaboration. Looking ahead to 2024, it’s anticipated that this engagement will not only continue but potentially expand into new formats, such as an EU-Central Asia leaders’ meeting or a Central Asia-UK dialogue. However, the intensity of this interest may gradually taper off following the establishment of these new cooperative mechanisms and in response to evolving global dynamics and priorities.
In 2023, Central Asian leaders convened in various venues with an unprecedented frequency, marking a record in regional collaboration. They met approximately 12 times, engaging in diverse formats with other state leaders and international organizations, including the CIS, the SCO, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation, the COP-28 climate conference, and during the economic forum of the UN’s Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) week. Notably, all five leaders attended the Victory Day parade in Moscow, and they’re slated to convene again at the year’s end for the CIS and EAEU summits in St Petersburg. Foreign policy leaders, on the other hand, met with even greater regularity.
This surge in attention from external actors towards Central Asia is indicative of an emerging perception of the region as a cohesive entity. This is highlighted by the inaugural Central Asia-China summit, which mirrors the participant composition seen within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Rather than retreating inwards as might have been the case in the early years of independence, these nations are actively engaging with the international community, reflecting a collective resolve to confront contemporary challenges, including those within domestic politics, through robust international cooperation.
Among the most engaged foreign dignitaries are Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev, China’s Xi Jinping, Turkey’s Recep Erdogan, and Hungary’s Viktor Orban. Despite the surge in diplomatic activity, the scope of these engagements remains consistent, suggesting that Central Asian countries are navigating their international relations through traditional partners. This indicates both a reliance on established formats of cooperation, such as the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, security, and trade, and that once these cooperative processes stabilize, the intensity of external engagement with the region might wane.
Seizing the Moment: Central Asia’s Opportunity in 2024
The year 2024 is poised to be a period of relative calm before the potential emergence of new global tumults. In this context, it is crucial for Central Asian governments to rally public support and brace for impending crises. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) new International Conflict Forecasting System, a notable decrease in global conflicts is projected following a peak in October 2023, lasting until May 2024. This trend is characterized by a reduction in conflicts in Ukraine, juxtaposed with escalating tensions in Palestine and Lebanon. This pattern may well be indicative of a preparatory stage for potential new conflicts.
A case in point is Russia’s plan to establish the Leningrad Military District in response to Finland’s NATO accession. This strategic move is complemented by the United States and Finland signing a bilateral defence cooperation agreement on 18 December 2023, granting American troops access to 15 Finnish military bases. The orchestration of Finland’s full integration into NATO and Russia’s strategic response to this development is expected to be a protracted process, setting the stage for a complex geopolitical chess game in the coming year.
Turning to the East, China appears to be strategically avoiding an exacerbation of tensions with Taiwan, keen to sidestep a military conflict. With Taiwan’s elections scheduled for January, any escalation in cross-strait relations might sway the electorate towards a more anti-China sentiment, potentially escalating military cooperation between Taiwan and the United States. Such developments would further heighten tensions in the Pacific. Consequently, a less tense atmosphere is anticipated during and immediately following the Taiwanese elections. Moreover, with the US elections set for November 2024, China is inclined to position Washington not as a foe but as a potential partner. The US election period could see heightened anti-China sentiment, a factor that may adversely affect US-China relations and underscores the need for stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Against this backdrop, it is imperative for Central Asian nations to concentrate on internal and regional issues, bolstering their resilience and ensuring continued stability. Their governments should prioritize community engagement, provide social support, and implement essential reforms to fortify domestic stability.
In summary, while 2024 may witness a temporary ebb in international conflicts, nations should remain alert and geared up for emerging challenges. Effectively addressing domestic issues will play a crucial role in sustaining peace and stability in the region.
Main photo: Nikkei Asia.