The results of the European Parliament elections could be pivotal for the future of the European Union (EU) and its relations with Central Asian countries, conclude Eldaniz Gusseinov, an expert at the Heydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies at Ibn Khaldun University, and independent analyst Sergey Marinin. Amid rising conservative sentiments among EU citizens, centrist parties are increasingly adopting right-wing agendas. This article examines how the new composition of the European Parliament and the potential rise of right-wing parties could reshape the EU’s foreign policy towards Central Asia. Through case studies of EU member states where right-wing politicians have gained power, we explore the impact on their Central Asian policies. Additionally, we delve into the economic trends driving the EU’s growing engagement with the region.
Following the European Parliament elections, the EU’s foreign policy in Central Asia could undergo significant changes, as the region emerges as a zone of geopolitical interest. The EU aims to develop trade and energy corridors bypassing Russia and to enhance access to rare earth metals. Key issues include security, transportation routes, energy diversification, and normative aspects such as democratic reforms and human rights.
The rise of right-wing parties in Europe may shift the focus towards pragmatic cooperation and stricter visa regimes for Central Asian countries. This growing influence of right-wing and Eurosceptic parties could lead to a more fragmented EU approach to Central Asia, while centrist and left-wing parties may continue advocating for comprehensive human rights-based engagement. A notable example of the impact of human rights issues on EU-Central Asia relations is the European Parliament’s refusal to ratify a partnership agreement with Turkmenistan due to human rights violations.
How everything works
The European Parliament, elected directly by EU citizens, plays a crucial role in shaping the leadership of the European Commission. After the elections, the European Council nominates a candidate for the Commission President, reflecting the election results. This nominee must be approved by a majority in the European Parliament. Once confirmed, the President-elect collaborates with Member States to propose a team of Commissioners, including the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This “College of Commissioners” must also gain the European Parliament’s approval. This process ensures that the European Commission is supported by the elected Parliament. The Commission, as the key supranational body of the EU, holds the exclusive right to propose EU legislation.
The European Union and Central Asia are gearing up for their first full-fledged summit, set to take place in Uzbekistan in 2024. According to Saida Mirziyoyeva, an aide to the Uzbek President, this historic EU-Central Asia summit will “open a new chapter in our friendly relations.” It’s still uncertain whether familiar faces like European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council Charles Michel will attend, or if new leaders will emerge following the European Parliament elections.
Additionally, Politico has obtained a draft document with recommendations for the future composition of the European Commission on building international partnerships. Central Asia is highlighted as a key region, urging the new Commission to seize the opportunity to bolster the EU’s influence, counter China’s expansion, and respond to Central Asia’s growing interest in EU cooperation. The document emphasizes the importance of two key EU projects in Central Asia under the Global Gateway initiative, strategic partnerships on essential raw materials, and addressing the environmental crisis of the Aral Sea’s desiccation.
What’s Next for the EU’s Foreign Policy in Central Asia Post-Elections?
“Central Asia was a little bit in the middle of nowhere – and now, you are in the middle of everything”
Josep Borrell at the Investors Forum for EU-Central Asia Transport Connectivity, January 29, 2024.
The European Parliament has marked Central Asia as a significant geopolitical interest for the EU, underscoring its importance in security, transportation, energy diversification, and resource supply. Brussels is keen on developing efficient trade and energy corridors linking Europe and Asia, bypassing Russia. Additionally, the regions share common challenges such as conflict resolution and climate change.
During the last major EU-Central Asia meeting, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell highlighted key topics: reforms, economy and trade, regional interconnectivity, green energy, security, and people-to-people contacts. The rise of right-wing parties in Europe is not new; these parties already govern in several countries, including Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia. By examining these examples, we can better understand how the right-wing approach to Central Asia is evolving.
Gaining access to Central Asia’s rare earth metals and countering the influence of Russia and China are becoming top priorities for the European Union, as it seeks to expand its economic presence through exports. The EU is already the largest importer of raw materials from the region. However, despite efforts to strengthen economic ties, the EU’s internal trade scenario faces difficulties. According to Euronews Business, EU exports and imports of goods are in steady decline. Eurostat data reveals a concerning trend: exports have decreased for three consecutive quarters, while imports have fallen for four consecutive quarters. In the third quarter of 2023, EU exports and imports fell by 1.2% and 4.6%, respectively, compared to the previous quarter.
Despite these challenges, the EU achieved a trade surplus of around €18 billion, compared to a €6.9 billion surplus in the same period in 2021. The decline in imports from outside the EU was driven by lower imports of manufactured goods, machinery, vehicles, and energy. At the same time, exports of machinery and vehicles decreased, while energy and chemicals saw an increase. This trend highlights the importance of opening the Central Asian market to the EU, especially as Russia has closed its market and is vying for economic influence in Central Asia and other regions, such as Africa.
The European Union aims to enter the Central Asian market, home to 80 million people, to gain access to local resources and compete with China and Russia for economic influence in the region. To achieve this, the EU is emphasizing the development of the Trans-Caspian international transportation route.
Amid the rise of right-wing parties and populism in Europe’s ruling coalitions, there is a noticeable trend toward economic protectionism. However, Central Asia is an exception, as the focus is on accessing raw materials and expanding the export of European goods. Currently, Central Asian exports to Europe are heavily centered on raw materials, particularly Kazakhstan’s oil.
Beyond economic cooperation, the European Parliament also emphasizes democratic reforms, human rights protection, and the promotion of the rule of law in Central Asian countries. The Parliament has urged the EU to empower young people in the region by supporting civil society and developing reform roadmaps that lead to visa facilitation for grassroots networking.
While the EU is willing to assist in exchange for democratic transitions, right-wing parties in the European Parliament may prioritize pragmatic cooperation. The current ruling coalition, wary of a stronger Russia and China, is hesitant to pressure Central Asian countries on human rights issues, potentially allowing geopolitical considerations to overshadow democratic ones.
Following the elections, the EU’s foreign policy in Central Asia is set to become more proactive, emphasizing security, transportation routes, energy diversification, and curbing the influence of Russia and China. The EU plans to develop the Trans-Caspian international transportation route and enhance access to the region’s rare earth metals. Despite facing domestic economic challenges, Brussels is committed to supporting democratic reforms and human rights. However, the rise of right-wing parties may shift the focus toward pragmatic cooperation and stricter visa requirements. The examples of Hungary and Slovakia demonstrate that right-wing or populist parties can pivot their approach to Central Asia, prioritizing economic interests over democratic pressures.
The New European Parliament: Right-Wing Surge, Ideology, and Its Implications for Europe’s Future
Migration, economic crisis, and social stratification are the key challenges facing the European Union ahead of the European Parliament elections. In this context, right-wing parties with nationalist, populist, and conservative agendas are gaining traction across Europe, advocating for reduced EU institutional powers and increased member state sovereignty. These parties often support protectionist economic policies aimed at safeguarding domestic industries from international competition and promoting economic nationalism.
Europe is experiencing a significant shift to the right, with far-right parties leading in opinion polls across the continent. In France, the far-right Rassemblement National is polling at over 30%, outpacing President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is second in the polls, vying with the Social Democrats. Notably, the chairman of the Germany-Central Asia interparliamentary group in the German Bundestag is AfD member and Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk native Eugen (Eugene) Schmidt.
Some polls suggest that in the upcoming EU elections (June 6-9), far-right parties could secure more than 30% of the vote, significantly bolstering their presence in the European Parliament. Forecasts even indicate that nearly half of the seats could be filled by MEPs outside the traditional “grand coalition” of centrist groups, potentially leading to a historic majority for a far-right coalition of Christian Democrats, Conservatives, and right-wing MEPs.
Even with the rise of more ideologically moderate political forces in the European Parliament, they will still need to consider the right-wing agenda, which enjoys significant popularity among the European populace. Symbolic gestures by European leaders are already reflecting this trend. A notable example is French President Emmanuel Macron’s viral photo shoot during a boxing class, aiming to portray himself as a defender of Europe ahead of the European Parliament elections.
Despite the popularity of right-wing sentiments among EU voters, right-wing party blocs are ideologically diverse. This heterogeneity makes their prospects for unification unclear, potentially leaving the right-wing agenda to be adopted by centrist parties. Additionally, intra-party contradictions, ideological differences, and image issues among right-wing leaders could undermine these parties’ chances of securing more votes and increasing their influence on EU policy priorities.
What Are Other Parties Bringing to the New Political Season, and What’s at Stake for Central Asia?
The upcoming European Parliament elections could significantly impact EU-Central Asia relations, with political groups prioritizing different agendas. The European People’s Party (EPP), holding 176 seats, focuses on defense and security amid the war in Ukraine, advocating for NATO enlargement, a European Commissioner for Security and Defense, migration limits, and free trade partnerships aligned with the European Green Deal. This security-oriented stance could bolster EU support for Central Asian countries facing regional threats.
The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), with 139 seats, emphasizes social and environmental equality, affordable energy, housing, an inclusive labor market, a stronger defense sector, and expanded international partnerships. Their comprehensive approach could enhance sustainable development and human rights in Central Asia.
The Renewed Europe group, despite losing 16 seats, remains influential with its advocacy for greater pan-European defense capabilities and individual freedoms, such as same-sex marriage. This liberal stance could strengthen ties with civil society and human rights defense in Central Asia.
In contrast, the euroskeptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), predicted to win 17 seats, favor national control over defense policy, strong border security, and controlled migration. This could lead to cooperation with Central Asian states to manage migration flows and ensure regional stability, providing conditional development assistance and market access in return for repatriating unauthorized migrants and enhancing border control.
Similarly, the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, expected to gain 26 seats, promotes nationalist and Euroskeptic policies that could affect the EU’s unified stance on Central Asia.
The Greens/European Free Alliance and the Left, despite anticipated seat losses, focus on climate justice and peace negotiations, potentially influencing EU policy on sustainable development and conflict resolution in Central Asia.
Overall, the rise of far-right and Euroskeptic parties may lead to a more fragmented EU approach to Central Asia, while centrist and left-wing parties might continue advocating for comprehensive, rights-based engagement with the region. To illustrate this, we analyze how Hungary, Slovakia, and Italy’s foreign policies in Central Asia have evolved since right-wing and Euroskeptic parties gained power.
Hungary is open to the East
Since 2010, Hungary has been governed by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, which introduced the “Open to the East” policy, aimed at strengthening cooperation with countries like Turkey, Central Asian nations, and China. Hungary’s primary objective is to expand economic ties with Eastern countries and serve as a bridge between the West and the East. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó announced that Hungary will seek to enhance cooperation between the EU and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) during its EU Council presidency from July 1 to December 31, 2024. The success of Hungary’s “Open to the East” policy can be assessed through political engagements (visits, signed agreements) and economic metrics (trade growth, investments).
Since 2010, Hungary has signed strategic cooperation and partnership declarations with several Central Asian countries. A declaration with Kazakhstan was signed in 2014, with Uzbekistan in 2021, and with Kyrgyzstan in 2020. In 2023, Hungary and Kyrgyzstan further solidified their relationship with a declaration on strengthening and developing their strategic partnership. Notably, Hungary is one of the few European states to have signed such declarations with Central Asian nations, particularly Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. This political cooperation is bolstered by regular meetings on the sidelines of the Organization of Turkic States summits, where Hungary has been an observer since 2018.
Economic cooperation between Hungary and Central Asia has also intensified since 2010. Hungary has established joint investment funds with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan to develop collaborative projects, and the Hungarian government plans to allocate $100 million to the Turkic Investment Fund. Trade relations have seen similar dynamics, with Hungarian exports to Central Asian countries experiencing significant growth since 2010. However, the reciprocal increase in exports from Central Asia to Hungary has not always followed the same trend.
Slovakia's Move: From EU-Aligned to Independent Foreign Policy?
With the new leadership in Slovakia, there is a noticeable shift from pursuing foreign policy interests primarily through the European Union to taking more independent initiatives. This trend could be exacerbated by deteriorating relations between the Slovak government and the EU. While this shift hasn't significantly impacted Central Asian countries yet, Slovakia's elevation of relations with Azerbaijan to a strategic level and the signing of military cooperation agreements signal promising prospects for ties with Central Asia, especially after the European Parliament elections.
Attention has recently focused on Slovakia due to the return of Robert Fico, founder and chairman of the "Direction – Social Democracy" (SMER) party, as prime minister on October 25, 2023. Although Fico and his party are difficult to place strictly on the right-wing spectrum, they have faced criticism for populism. Fico's controversial stance on the war in Ukraine has garnered significant attention and criticism both domestically and internationally, possibly even leading to an assassination attempt. Fico has consistently stated that his government will not provide military aid to Ukraine and has expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the Western strategy regarding the conflict.
Fico, who previously served as prime minister from 2012 to 2018, has brought noticeable changes to Slovakia's foreign policy. In 2018, Slovak political scientists Peter Plenta and Matej Uhlík noted that despite being the smallest country in the Visegrad Four, Slovakia could be considered a superpower in European diplomacy in Central Asia.
In 2014, Slovakia's key strategy for advancing its foreign policy interests in Central Asia was through collaboration with the European Union. Slovak diplomats significantly strengthened relations with Central Asia by holding prominent roles in international organizations. For instance, Jan Kubiš became the EU's first special representative for Central Asia in 2005, Miroslav Jenča led the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia from 2008 to 2015, and Peter Burian was appointed EU Special Representative for Central Asia in 2015. Central Asian countries have also seen the development of relations with Slovakia as part of an enhanced partnership with the EU. In late 2022, Mukhtar Kul-Mohammed, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Defense, and Security, stated, "The development of bilateral cooperation with Slovakia seems important to us in the context of a strategic partnership with the European Union."
Despite Robert Fico's recent return to power, there are already signs of a new approach to Slovakia's engagement in the region. On May 6, Fico visited Azerbaijan for the first time in his political career. During this visit, important agreements were signed, including a declaration on strategic partnership, opening a new chapter in Azerbaijan-Slovakia relations. Fico stated his intention to position Slovakia as a bridge between Azerbaijan and the European Union, a strategy reminiscent of Viktor Orban's actions. Orban has actively pursued strategic partnerships with Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries, positioning Hungary as a bridge between these regions and the EU.
The fact that the parties have signed a declaration on strategic partnership and defense cooperation documents only now and against the background of some tensions between the European Union and Azerbaijan once again indicates that Slovakia may be gradually moving away from the format of promoting its own interests through the European Union to a more proactive approach with the new government. Added to this are the pressing conflicts between EU bodies and Slovakia. In March, European Parliament Vice-President Martin Hojsík told Politico that Slovakia could lose access to EU funds if the Fico government continues its "illiberal" policies, as in Hungary. In September 2022, the European Commission proposed to apply a special mechanism to protect the EU budget from rule of law violations in Hungary, resulting in a €7.5 billion freeze for Budapest.
In conclusion, it is worth adding that Slovakia is the most dependent EU country on Russian energy resources, so cooperation in the field of energy (in particular oil, gas and green hydrogen) with Central Asian countries will become increasingly important for the Fico government. At the moment Azerbaijan and Slovakia are discussing the possibility of supplying Azerbaijani gas to Slovakia, but Azerbaijan also has plans to supply huge amounts of green hydrogen involving Central Asian countries. In May this year, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed a memorandum on uniting the energy systems of the three countries. According to the document, the countries will study the possibility of connecting the energy systems by laying a high-voltage cable under the Caspian Sea and in the territory of other countries with access to European countries.
Italy: The First Far-Right Government Since WWII and Its Own "C5+1" Format
The new government of Italy after the elections on September 25, 2022 is headed by Giorgia Meloni, head of the Brothers of Italy party. This party is often characterized in the media as "extreme right-wing". This government marks a significant shift in Italian politics. As several media outlets have noted, this is the first "far-right" administration since World War II. Meloni's coalition, which includes the League led by Matteo Salvini and Forza Italia led by Silvio Berlusconi, won a significant majority in the 2022 elections.
This Italian government has become significantly more active in Central Asia. The working visit of the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Italy A. Tajani to Astana in September 2023 was a landmark event as it was the first visit of the Italian foreign policy chief to Kazakhstan in 25 years. Tajani to Astana in September 2023 was a landmark event, as it was the first visit of the Italian foreign policy chief to Kazakhstan in 25 years, which contributed to the activation of strategic partnership. A new chapter in the relations between the two countries opened with the official visit of the President of Kazakhstan Kasym-Jomart Tokayev to Italy on January 18-19, 2024. This is the first visit of a Kazakh leader to Rome in 15 years. After 26 years, the visit of the President of Italy to Uzbekistan took place last year. And most recently, the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon made his first official visit to Italy.
Traditionally, Italy has been interested in energy and security issues, and with the new government, interest in cooperation in this area has intensified. Thus, just recently, the third meeting between the foreign ministers of Central Asia and Italy took place. Central Asia presents significant economic opportunities, especially in the energy sector. Italy, in particular through ENI, is actively investing in oil and gas production in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This allows Italy to diversify its energy resources and reduce its dependence on other sources.
Conclusions
The upcoming European Parliament elections mark a critical moment for the European Union's foreign policy, especially in its relations with Central Asia. The expected shift toward a more fragmented political landscape dominated by right-wing and Euroskeptic parties could significantly affect the EU's engagement strategy in the region.
First, the strengthening of right-wing parties in the European Parliament could lead to a more pragmatic and economically driven approach to EU foreign policy. The resource-rich and strategically located countries of Central Asia could become focal points for EU efforts to create new trade and energy corridors, especially those that bypass Russia. This is consistent with the EU's broader goals of energy diversification and access to rare earth metals, which are critical to the green and digital transitions.
However, this shift may also lead to a more transactional relationship where economic interests overshadow normative concerns such as democratic reforms and human rights. Right-wing parties, with their emphasis on national sovereignty and economic nationalism, may prioritize economic partnerships and investment opportunities over promoting democratic standards and governance reforms. This could manifest itself in a potential tightening of visa regulations and a stricter stance on migration from Central Asia, reflecting broader populist sentiments in Europe.
The examples of individual EU member states, such as Hungary, Slovakia and Italy, illustrate the varying degrees of right-wing influence on foreign policy, where human rights and democracy are increasingly underemphasized. Hungary's "Open to the East" policy and Slovakia's emerging independent foreign policy underscore a trend that prioritizes bilateral relations and strategic partnerships. These countries are actively seeking to strengthen economic ties and political cooperation with Central Asia, often positioning themselves as a bridge between the EU and the region.
Italy's active engagement through high-level visits and strategic partnerships underscores the importance of Central Asia in the EU's energy security agenda. The Meloni government's emphasis on energy cooperation reflects the EU's broader interest in diversifying energy sources away from dependence on Russia. At the same time, in a joint statement at the end of the Germany-Central Asia summit, the parties announced joint cooperation in the field of human rights, while at the end of the Italy-Central Asia ministerial conference, cooperation in this area was not mentioned on the website of the Italian Foreign Ministry.
Despite these trends, the diverse composition of the European Parliament means that centrist and left-wing parties will continue to favor a comprehensive, rights-based engagement with Central Asia. The EU's commitment to supporting civil society, promoting human rights and encouraging democratic transition is likely to be overshadowed by pragmatic economic considerations.
In general, the new balance of power in the European Parliament after the upcoming elections is likely to lead to a more multifaceted approach to Central Asia. Economic interests and strategic partnerships will be prioritized. Central Asian countries can look forward to increased interaction, especially in the areas of trade and energy, but must also be attuned to the changing political dynamics within the EU. As the EU seeks to balance its geopolitical interests with its founding principles, the future of EU-Central Asia relations will be characterized by both opportunities and challenges.