The current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, following the war in Ukraine, has led to an even greater division of the world into blocs depending on the attitude to Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip, says Eldaniz Gusseinov, a specialist in European and International Studies at the Heartland Expert Analytical Center.
The strengthening of the current blocs against this background, the economic effects of conflict and the perception of hostilities will have an impact on the Central Asian countries. Civil society in Central Asia should put more emphasis on the fact that there is no monopoly on the use of force in international relations, which leads to an increase in conflicts.
Middle East: the constellation of forces
The hostilities between Israel and Palestine have influenced many important processes in the Middle East, which may further affect the security and stability of the region. This applies primarily to the negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia and certain gestures on the part of Western countries towards Iran. In addition, this conflict affects the possibility of full implementation and functioning of transport and logistics projects of the US, EU, China and Russia. It is important to understand these processes in order to develop further discussion on the impact of what is happening in Central Asia.
Firstly, after a worsening series of crises in the Middle East, specifically after the Arab Spring, the countries of the region did take steps to create a more non-conflictive space. This is confirmed by findings from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, which show that the number of military conflicts has been gradually declining after a big spike in 2014.
This applies to both Chinese and US initiatives and actions by Middle Eastern countries. However, the new round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had a negative impact on these trends. There are already examples of aggravation of relations in the region, both between the countries of the Middle East as well as between the countries of the region and external actors. Each conflict in the region has its own constellation (mutual placement and interaction of various factors – ed.) of forces of regional and global powers. The presence of a new round of tension immediately disrupts the construction of rapprochement between a number of states.
For example, the U.S. denied Iran access to the promised $6 billion previously frozen under sanctions due to the deteriorating situation in Israel and Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Although the funds were intended for humanitarian needs under U.S. control, the denial creates several negative consequences. The rejection undermines Tehran’s confidence in the possibility of future agreements with Washington, which included not only money and prisoners but also limiting the pace of development of Iran’s nuclear programme.
This measure contributes to the escalation and aggravation of disputes in the region. In addition, the situation has affected the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. According to Bloomberg, the Saudi authorities have notified the United States of their desire to “put on hold” diplomatic consultations on the matter in light of the hostilities between Israel and Hamas. As can be seen, the current conflict reveals various problematic issues in the Middle East, which may further aggravate relations between the parties and have a long-term impact on the countries of Central Asia. This should be taken into account against the background of Israel’s desire to launch a military operation on the territory of the Gaza Strip and, according to analysts, this operation may last for quite a long time.
Secondly, the dots are connecting the way that China and Russia tend to be on the side of the so-called “Global South” in this conflict due to their intensified cooperation with many countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, including the framework of BRICS. Often at the diplomatic level, there is a message about a just order. This also applies to a fair solution with regard to Palestine. This message is actively used by both Russia and China and in this regard, they have actively gained the support of a number of countries. Thus, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that Israel’s actions have gone beyond self-defence, Israel should stop the “collective punishment” of Gaza civilians. In turn, according to the Wall Street Journal, the warm relations between Russia and Israel have worsened after the attack on Israel by Iranian-backed Hamas militants.
The strengthening of cooperation between Russia, China and Iran emerged, especially between Russia and the IRI, around the Syrian crisis, and the current situation creates fear among Western leaders that an anti-Western alliance is being formed with the cooperation of these countries. But China, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran are in no hurry, at least at the official level, to declare the existence of such an alliance, as this could lead to a more active formation of an anti-Western alliance along the perimeter of their borders. Central Asian countries will be given special attention in these processes, as part of the population may occupy the positions of the different blocs forming around the conflict between Israel and Palestine.
The part of the population that supports Palestine may have a more positive attitude towards Russia and China and welcome their presence in their countries, while on the contrary it may have a negative attitude towards the presence of Israel, the United States and other parties that support Israel. It is important for the Central Asian authorities not to allow bloc lines to be drawn among their populations. But it must be recognised that the parties are not yet seeking open confrontation. Separately, Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador-at-Large Oleg Burmistrov said in an interview with RIA Novosti that Russia is not trying to create an alliance with China and North Korea against the United States, South Korea and Japan “in the spirit of the Cold War.”
Also, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at a meeting with Secretary of State Blinken that relations between China and the United States tend to cease their decline and stabilise. Although the statements made by representatives of the Russian Federation and China are indirect, they were made against the backdrop of the tension between Palestine and Israel, which indicates the desire on both sides to prevent further tension in relations with the Western bloc.
Understanding the constellation of forces in the Middle East and the interacting blocs can help to understand how the conflict will affect Central Asian countries and what position they can take.
Conflict Impact on Central Asia: Logistics and Security
The impact of the conflict in the Middle East can be seen not only in the support of different parts of the population for one side or the other. It raises issues related not only to international support for one side or another but also to logistical and security issues in Central Asia.
The conflict affects logistics initiatives, and the role of Central Asia as a “crisis-free” region in the present context for international transport routes may increase. Earlier, at the last G20 meeting, a transport corridor from India through the Middle East to Europe was announced. The planned corridor (IMEC) was expected to link India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Israel and the EU through seaports and railway routes to speed up and reduce the price of trade.
The project should contribute to the stabilisation of relations between Israel and the Gulf countries. In fact, the intensification of hostilities in the south and north of Israel makes the participation of Arab countries with Israel in IMEC questionable, and the absence of Israel makes the idea of bringing Middle Eastern countries closer together through joint projects meaningless. With this in mind, Central Asian countries can actively promote cooperation with India along the North-South route and the Trans-Afghan transport corridor.
At the same time, as mentioned above, further large-scale hostilities in the Gaza Strip could provoke Iran to confront Israel. According to political scientist Andrey Chebotarev, the aggravation of relations between Iran and Israel may lead to the disruption of logistics chains, including the railway Kazakhstan — Turkmenistan — Iran and initiatives to launch high-speed freight trains on the route Chelyabinsk — Bolashak — Iran. This situation creates an opportunity to resolve conflict issues with Afghanistan and to further promote the Trans-Afghan transport route.
The construction of the Kosh Tepa Canal in Afghanistan in the upper reaches of the Amu Darya River is an issue for the Central Asian countries. The construction of the canal poses a threat to water security for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and freezes the possibility of implementing a number of projects that would link Central Asian countries with Pakistan and India, including the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and the previously mentioned Trans-Afghanistan transport route. Therefore, against the backdrop of the crisis in the Middle East, the Central Asian countries can draw India’s attention to the implementation of transport projects and can coordinate efforts to resolve the problematic issues between Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Another significance of the current phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the growing popularity of the use of force to resolve problems. In the absence of a global arbiter of crisis resolution, as the United States used to be, and in the absence of standards to be followed by the clashing parties, there are more and more conflicts. At the same time, conflicts are taking place geographically and mentally close to the countries of Central Asia and in the region itself.
Even in the situation with Palestine, the problem has been “hanging” for several decades, the previous years one could observe phases of aggravation of the situation between Palestine and Israel with a military component, but now many parties have begun to talk about the need to create an independent state of Palestine. Given the presence of conflict zones in Eurasia and the trend towards the use of force to achieve foreign policy goals by small, regional and global actors, the monopoly on violence in international relations has dissipated.
This means that the conflicting parties can start escalating conflicts without fear of a serious reaction from the world community or other major external actors. In fact, it is not clear when to expect the next conflict and how it may affect global processes, following the example of the Hamas attack on Israel and the failure of the latter to prepare for it. Issues of security and stability are becoming a higher priority in foreign policy, including for the Central Asian countries. The realisation of what is happening, namely the growth of conflicts and casualties from them, may cause a sense of wariness among both the Central Asian authorities and the population. In response, the countries of the region will try to react either on their own or within the framework of various alliances. The latter has become more characteristic.
Prioritising security and stability in Central Asia
With the growing intensity of conflicts on the Eurasian continent, Central Asian countries are trying to respond through interaction with regional organisations. Neutral Turkmenistan is a good example of responding to crisis trends in the world. An interesting observation is the participation of the country’s leaders in the SCO and CIS summits. Turkmenistan is not a member of the SCO, nor does it have other statuses: observer state or dialogue partner. From 2021 to 2023. The President of Turkmenistan has continuously participated in the meetings of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation before this participation in 2016. It is noteworthy that at the SCO summit in 2022, the new President of Turkmenistan Serdar Berdimuhamedow explained the country’s interest in cooperation with the SCO, seeing the organisation as “… one of the most important pillars of continental stability, expresses (Turkmenistan’s) desire and readiness to establish closer and more substantive political and diplomatic interaction …”.
This reflects Turkmenistan’s desire to maintain and strengthen stability in its region through participation in regional initiatives. This position was reinforced by the statements of Serdar Berdimuhamedow at the SCO summit in 2023: “We consider the development of dialogue with the Organization in an organic connection both with the progressive course of bilateral cooperation and with the general orientation of our participation in global and regional processes.” Turkmenistan’s engagement in the SCO is seen as a response to crisis trends in the world. This may emphasise that the country is actively involved in regional and global initiatives in response to challenges and changes in world politics.
This can be additionally confirmed by an excerpt from the Turkmen President’s speech at the last CIS summit: “Recent international events clearly demonstrate that preserving peace, strengthening security and stability will be the main priorities of world politics. And despite the fact that Serdar Berdimuhamedow said that the priority area of partnership with the CIS countries is to intensify cooperation in the economy, in fact, most of the speech was devoted to international and regional security issues. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan is not a member of the SCO, and in the CIS it has the status of an associate member, which so far distances the country from full-fledged interaction with the organisations.
The example of Turkmenistan shows how Central Asian countries can strive to become more active and to emphasise the topics of most interest to them in their interaction with other organisations. Another interesting case study is the consultative meeting of Central Asian heads of state. Within this platform, it would be possible to coordinate joint efforts on security and stability issues in Central Asia. However due to the nature of integration at a “different speed” in the post-Soviet space, this process could be slowed down, and other countries in the region would be more active in building up cooperation in other formats where some countries in the region participate and others do not: the CSTO, the SCO, and the CIS. Other formats can also be used for this purpose, some of which became known during the heated phase of the conflict between Palestine and Israel. For example, Tajikistan and China plan to hold joint anti-terrorist exercises of security agencies at least once every two years.
Also in the city of Astana, the second meeting of Secretaries of Security Councils/National Security Advisers of Central Asian countries and India took place. Opinions were exchanged on pressing issues of international and regional security, including the development of cooperation in such areas as countering terrorism and extremism, illicit trafficking of weapons and drugs, and transnational organised crime. In general, the principle of “different speeds” is even noticeable in the joint statement by the foreign ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States in connection with the situation in the zone of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan did not join the statement.
To summarise what has been written above, it is still difficult to define a precise unified strategy for Central Asian countries to respond to the growing conflicts in Eurasia. Some countries in the region are making certain steps towards greater interaction with regional organisations without taking steps towards rapprochement with them. Other countries are looking for different formats of cooperation not only with the countries of the region but also with other external actors.
What should be done next: possible behavioural patterns
Since it is still complicated to unambiguously define the strategy of the Central Asian countries in response to the growth of conflict, including through interaction with regional institutions, it is possible to delve into the consideration of behavioural models and their assessment.
The following models of behaviour can be identified:
Reacting through isolationist policies. Which implies limiting interaction with external actors regarding stability and security in the region. Such a policy may imply a focus on one’s own forces, or a reduction of risks by reducing interaction with the external milieu. This approach is unrealistic given the growing interest of economic centres in transport transit through Central Asia. This leads to the second model of behaviour.
Limited interaction with external actors. It is characterised by participation as an observer in various associations and participation in events of a consultative nature, such as the meeting of the secretaries of the Security Councils of Central Asia and Russia. Such actions may be related to the government’s perception that there are greater risks of full cooperation within the framework of such associations than limited participation.
Variable participation in different associations. Participation in several alliances with the possibility to choose the format of cooperation with each of them. This type of behaviour is rather typical for Central Asian countries due to the presence of different stakeholders and alliances and the lack of full-fledged communication between them. It is possible that with the development of different formats of cooperation between Central Asian countries and other external actors within and outside the alliances, a single alliance recognised by all parties as the main one will emerge. Then a transition to the new model is possible.
Prioritised cooperation within one mechanism. The Central Asian countries or individual countries will identify the most interesting format of cooperation on issues of security and stability in the region and cooperate within it on traditional and non-traditional threats to national security.
Conclusion
The new period of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is important for the Central Asian countries, as the events are not limited to the geography of the conflicting parties, but automatically trigger the process of including the Middle East constellation of forces, which on the one hand creates risks for the development of transport routes, including for the Central Asian countries, and on the other hand creates opportunities for solving problematic issues with Afghanistan through the implementation of alternative initiatives for India. The current conflict and its escalation will have the effect of an increasingly conflicting external environment for the Central Asian countries, which, following the example of Turkmenistan, favours a more active interaction with the external milieu. Nevertheless, it is difficult to define clearly the strategy of the Central Asian countries to respond to events in geographical and mental proximity. Therefore, the study lists possible models of behaviour and gives them an assessment.
Recommendations
Based on the points outlined above, the following recommendations for Central Asian governments and civil society can be suggested.
For Central Asian governments:
Promote Central Asia as a region of stability and security. The main touch here should be the membership of most countries of the region in the CSTO, SCO, CICA and interaction with other external actors to ensure security. It is also important to show that conflicts in the region are of a relatively localised nature, i.e. are not becoming more widespread. This will help increase the attractiveness of Central Asia as an investment destination, especially in the transport and logistics sector.
To promote in the international arena the issue of the absence of a monopoly on the use of force in conflicts. This applies primarily to crisis response mechanisms within organisations such as CICA, the SCO, the CSTO and, of course, the UN.
Promote formats for interaction in responding to the growing conflict in Eurasia. This could be purely through cooperation between all five Central Asian states, or it could be within the framework of the SCO and the CSTO. There may be a situational choice of one or another organisation depending on the circumstances.
For civil society in Central Asia:
Take measures to pre-empt conflicts in Central Asia. It is worth considering which issues are the most conflict-prone in the countries of the region and initiating projects in these areas. Support from international donors will also be needed.
Criticise openly the use of force to achieve their goals. Open criticism in the media should make it clear to the people of Central Asia that the use of force, similar to many other conflicts in Eurasia, is not the best way to achieve goals.
Call for the mandate for the use of force to be given to international structures. This could include cooperation with the UN, and the SCO, to prevent any of the parties from initiating a conflict.