The West did is not convinced by President Emomali Rahmon’s anti-Taliban rhetoric.
Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia that still refuses to engage with the Taliban (banned in Tajikistan). What fruit has this policy brought and what can it lead to in the future?
In Tashkent and Ashgabat, the news of the change of power in Kabul was taken without drama. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov even stated that he did not consider the Taliban terrorists. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are counting on the realization of interstate infrastructure projects and are rather interested in the Taliban’s ability to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. On December 9, the Uzbek foreign minister even called for unfreezing the country’s international assets.
At the same time, Tashkent and Ashgabat ignore human rights activists’ reports about violations of the rights of ethnic Uzbeks and Turkmen.
Even Kazakhstan, not bordering Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan have come into contact with the new Taliban authorities
Even more radical statements were made by Tajikistan’s other strategic ally, Russia. President Vladimir Putin admitted that the Taliban can be removed from the list of terrorist organizations, and added that “Russia’s position will be to move in this direction. On November 28, the Russian Foreign Ministry called on all forces in Afghanistan to abandon the “belligerent rhetoric,” commenting on the creation of the anti-Taliban Supreme Council of National Resistance.
Another influential neighbor and ally of Tajikistan, China, is also lobbying for the new authorities in Kabul.
Against this background, Tajikistan remains the only country in Central Asia that publicly criticizes the Taliban and insists on an inclusive government in Afghanistan.
The crisis in Afghanistan followed clashes on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border in May. Disputes on the northern border remain unresolved and the situation is doubly difficult for Tajikistan because the border with Afghanistan is the longest.
Dushanbe keeps data on the number and armament of its armed forces classified. However, it is safe to assume that the Afghan army, which fell to the Taliban in a few months, was many times larger, better equipped and more combat-ready.
The main guarantee of Tajikistan’s security in these conditions becomes the 201st Russian military base, stationed mainly in the south of the country.
After the recent clashes on the Afghan-Iranian border, it is no longer possible to say that
probability of invasion of some groups of especially radical Taliban in Tajikistan is equal to zero.
Especially since there are Tajikistani natives among them, who do not hide their revanchist sentiments.
Why is Dushanbe challenging the Taliban?
There are several reasons for the Tajik authorities’ tough stance on the Taliban.
First, the perception of the Afghan crisis as an interethnic conflict, in particular between Pashtun Taliban and Tajiks (first of all, residents of Panjsher) is strong in Tajikistan. The social networks remind about the assistance received by Tajik citizens who fled during the civil war in Tajikistan to the northern regions of Afghanistan. Users believe that helping Panjsher to resist the Taliban is a sign of “national pride” (gururi milli – taj).
Some groups even began to express their active desire to join the military action against the Taliban in Panjsher. During the clashes on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border, statements about “uniting the Tajik people in the face of a common threat” were also heard in Tajik society.
In such a situation, President Rakhmon appears in the eyes of the population as a defender of all Tajiks, including those who live in Afghanistan.
Another reason for the rejection of the Taliban is the threat posed by domestic radical groups. Experts noted that after the Taliban came to power, social network users in Tajikistan increased their statements approving of the new government in Afghanistan.
Authorities fear the activation of radical cells within Tajikistan itself, which could occur because of rapprochement with the Taliban. In addition, the recognition of radical theocratic power in Afghanistan may undermine the legitimacy of secular power in Tajikistan.
It is not an easy task for the authorities of the country to take into account all these factors, but at the same time not to allow open military confrontation with the Taliban.
However, it seems that the most important recipient of Dushanbe’s anti-Taliban rhetoric is the West.
Tajik authorities hope that in this way they can improve their image in the West. Especially against the background of frequent criticism from international institutions regarding the human rights situation in the country.
Tajikistan have been experiencing severe economic hardships in recent years and understand that they will not be able to get the necessary loans on the right terms in Moscow or, especially, in Beijing (given the huge debt owed to China).
Therefore, there is hope that Western international financial institutions, which have suspended state budget support programs for Tajikistan, will become more loyal to the “only” ally in the fight against the Taliban in the region.
Indeed, the attention of the international community to Tajikistan has increased significantly. The world media is increasingly referring to Tajikistan as a bridgehead of resistance to the Taliban. Some European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have invited President Emomali Rahmon to visit their countries.
In early October, Rahmon traveled to Belgium, where he held a series of meetings, including with EU representatives, and then traveled to Paris at Macron’s invitation. During the meeting, in addition to the situation in Afghanistan, the presidents also discussed economic and cultural cooperation.
So far, however, all this rhetoric has yielded no concrete results. For France, Central Asia has never been a top priority. Germany and Great Britain were not interested in the prospect of fighting a “non-inclusive” Taliban regime.
Anti-Taliban rhetoric does not prevent Tajik authorities from forcibly deporting Afghan asylum seekers back to Afghanistan, where they could face death. As of November 20, some 14,000 refugees from Afghanistan were living in Tajikistan. Although, earlier Tajik authorities spoke about the possibility of accepting about 100,000 refugees.
Will Tajikistan put up with the Taliban?
Despite the harsh statements and principled position on the Taliban regime, Tajikistan is in no hurry to take similar harsh actions. The countries have not yet severed economic ties.
Afghanistan still remains an important market for goods from Tajikistan. The Taliban, before taking over Kabul in July, canceled visas for truck drivers from Tajikistan at the Sherkhan Bandar border crossing. Electricity supplies from Tajikistan to Afghanistan still continue, albeit in reduced volumes.
Moreover, trade was the only factor that defined the relationship between the two countries even before the crisis. Dushanbe and Kabul were not close as partners either politically or culturally. Their bilateral relations have never been special, even despite a certain linguistic and cultural affinity.
In independent Tajikistan, Afghanistan was almost always perceived as a source of threat and instability. Therefore, little has changed now in this respect.
It is very likely that relations between Dushanbe and Kabul will remain in such a “cold” state for a long time. Trade and energy supplies will continue, but Tajikistan will not progress diplomatically.
For the Taliban the priority now is the internal situation and rebuilding the governing apparatus. Nor have the Taliban given up hope of gaining recognition at the international level. Therefore, the likelihood of a large-scale military clash on the Tajik-Afghan border is low, but local skirmishes are possible.
In the international arena, Tajikistan will continue to promote the ideas of inclusiveness and defender of the rights of Tajiks in Afghanistan.
The image of “the only bastion of resistance” to the Taliban cannot but attract the Tajik authorities, who have not had a chance to make themselves known in the international arena and attract the necessary investments for a long time.
However, the dividends from Western countries will be minimal and more likely to be limited to approving epithets.
Why shouldn’t the Taliban regime be recognized after all?
Some experts say that the Taliban have come “seriously and permanently” and that it is useless to confront them, because they do not pose a threat to neighboring countries, just as they did when they first came to power.
However, the situation has now changed significantly after 20 years. Afghanistan is experiencing a severe famine and humanitarian disaster, which is likely to worsen as the cold weather intensifies. The UN believes that starvation threatens 23 million people in Afghanistan.
In previous years, the Taliban took control of the situation by resorting to threats or even massive murders. Now, for a number of reasons, including international pressure, they are no longer able to use large-scale acts of intimidation. Therefore, it will be more difficult for them to control the situation over the Afghan society that has changed over the last 20 years.
Contradictions among the Taliban’s top brass are growing. Their radicalization is intensifying, and some Taliban think their main patron, Pakistan, is not Islamic enough.
With the Taliban in power, the country has not solved its security problems. The Taliban are not able to suppress the activities of more radical terrorist groups. According to the UN, the Vilayat Khorasan (ISIL-Khorasan) group, an affiliate of the Islamic State (banned in Tajikistan) in Afghanistan has carried out 334 terrorist attacks in 2021 (60 in 2020) and is now present in almost all 34 provinces of the country.
In many regions, the main threat to people’s security is posed by Taliban fighters who settle scores with supporters of the former government or engage in extortion.
Another problem for the Taliban regime is the ruined economy and lack of funds to rebuild it. Even Afghanistan’s secular neighbors are failing to attract investment. The Taliban, who have many ideological constraints (in particular, they do not recognize bank capital), will find it much more difficult to do so.
The Taliban are rightly blamed for not sufficiently involving non-Pashtun national communities in governing the country. But just as importantly, the Taliban are also unwilling to harness the potential of Afghan women for the development of the country.
Without social problems, without security, the fall of the Taliban regime is only a matter of time.
Even in this agonizing state, the Taliban regime, now back in power, poses a threat to the secular states of the region. The Taliban’s example inspires various extremist sleeper cells that could attract new recruits.
Tajik authorities must understand that the most effective counteraction to the growth of extremist ideas is to solve social problems, develop the economy, really fight corruption and cronyism, develop democracy, freedom of speech, etc.
The state propaganda of Tajik authorities against the growth of extremism is not achieving its aim because people lose trust in it. The decline in popularity of Tajik TV channels over the past few years confirms this trend.
Only civil society can effectively combat the growth of extremism, which must make people aware that extremist ideas are unacceptable for the development of a modern state and lead to a dead end.