Dushanbe is intensifying ties with Iran amid Russia’s war with Ukraine.
The Tajik authorities hope to find an ally in Tehran, which could become an additional security guarantor for them because of the growing threats on the country’s borders, said Muslimbek Buriev, an independent researcher and member of the CABAR.asia school of analysis.
In late May, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon visited Tehran, where he met with a number of high-ranking officials, including the spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei.
This is the Tajik president’s first visit to Tehran since 2013, and it is evidence that relations between the countries are now reaching a new political level with common interests in ensuring security in the region.
Tajikistan and Iran: A complicated History
The history of relations between the two countries at the official level began with the independence of Tajikistan. Iran was the first to recognize the independence of the republic and the first (on 8 January 1992) to open an embassy in Dushanbe.
Tehran believed that the linguistically close Tajikistan would potentially become a key partner in this part of the post-Soviet world.
For 30 years, however, relations between the two countries have not been stable and have often been even hostile. During the civil war in Tajikistan, representatives of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) were in Iran, which had a negative impact on bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Iran.
Tajik authorities in the mid- and late 1990s accused Iran of supporting the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and of trying to “export” the Islamic revolution.
Subsequently, the relationship between the two went through several stages, with both negative and positive aspects.
Among the positive aspects it is worth mentioning a significant increase in trade turnover with Iran (reaching $180 million in 2021), the construction by the Iranians of the Sangtuda-2 hydropower plant and the Istiklol tunnel.However, in the mid-1910s relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply. Iran alleged that the National Bank of Tajikistan had allegedly embezzled funds from the Iranian billionaire Babak Zanjani. Tajikistan denied these allegations.
After the IRP ban, the state media in Tajikistan began a campaign against Iran, accusing that country of terrorist activity.
Tajikistan imposed restrictions on food imports from Iran and closed down the Imam Humayni Imdod Committee, Iran’s leading charitable organization.On the official website of the Tajik Muftiate, Iran was even blamed for the deaths of 150 thousand Tajik citizens who died during the civil war.
A Clean Slate
Over the past three years, there has been a gradual warming of relations between the two countries, without any loud statements or even meetings at a high official level. There have been a series of meetings between officials of the two countries.
The main focus of the series of mutual visits was security issues in the face of NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, which created a huge number of risks for the situation in Afghanistan, and as it turned out later: the fears were not unfounded.
The Tajik authorities saw many threats in the strengthening of the Taliban (a movement banned in Tajikistan), which contributed to an accelerated rapprochement with Iran.
The military component as a priority topic of cooperation was most clearly manifested on May 16, when Tajikistan hosted the opening ceremony of a factory for the production of Iranian military drones Ababil-2.
Finally, Tajik-Iranian relations reached their peak in late May. Emomali Rahmon arrived in Iran, where he met with a number of high-ranking officials, including the leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei.
The trip resulted in the signing of 16 documents in areas such as trade, transportation, and energy. Including the program of trade and economic cooperation for 2023-2030 was developed.Thus, literally in half a month the format of the visits reached the level of the top leadership of the countries and there are already concrete mutual agreements. The relations between the countries have reached a new political level, taking common interests in ensuring security in the region as a basis.
It is necessary to understand what could make Tajikistan forget the past serious claims and take steps towards Iran.
A third wheel
The accelerated development of relations between Tajikistan and Iran can be explained primarily by the desire to strengthen security on its southern borders. After the seizure of power in Afghanistan, Tajikistan was for a long time the only country in Central Asia that did not make contact with the Taliban.
The Taliban now has units made up of Tajiks who are hostile to the government in Dushanbe. Plus, the Taliban’s rise to power has permanently frozen the CASA-1000 regional project, which is important for Tajikistan.Both sides have exchanged harsh statements against each other. Several military exercises have been conducted on the territory of Tajikistan together with Russia, China and Uzbekistan in case of a possible invasion of forces from Afghanistan. Given this, a rapprochement with Iran initially on the grounds of strengthening regional security looks logical. Tajikistan needs as many “allies” and partners with significant military power as possible in order to demonstrate to the Taliban that Tajikistan has influential allies.
Iran’s approach towards the Taliban after August 2021 remains pragmatic, with Tehran preferring bilateral dialogue to avoid conflict situations. However, for Tehran, the Taliban regime in Kabul is still more of an irritant.
A large number of refugees are being sent from Afghanistan to Iran, and authorities in Tehran are trying to stem the flow of migrants. After reports in social networks about the beating of Afghan refugees by Iranian police, there were demonstrations in front of the Iranian consulate in Herat because of this. Hence, there may be further risks of the growth of anti-Iranian sentiment in Afghanistan.
Iran is also concerned about the deteriorating living conditions of the Hazaras, an ethnic group in Afghanistan, the majority of which is Shiite. Historically, they have good relations with Iran, where the Shiite clergy is in power, while the Taliban has persecuted them and even carried out mass executions.
On the other hand, Taliban power is a serious threat to the implementation of regional infrastructure projects, including transport corridors connecting Central Asia and Iran through Afghan territory. As well as CASA-1000 and TAPI further development of trade routes through the Iranian port of Chabahar becomes problematic.
At the moment Iran is trying to resolve this issue directly with Afghanistan, but the Taliban factor still complicates the situation and at least for Iran there is a task to reconsider the project on its development.Thus, Tajikistan and Iran in their rapprochement are united by the common threats and risks associated with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. At least the current situation looks like an attempt to contain the Taliban simultaneously from the northern and southern borders of Afghanistan.
Open for a new relationship
The intensification of contacts between Tajikistan and Iran in the current situation has been influenced by the war that began in Ukraine. Russia is under sanctions, which carries serious risks for Tajikistan’s economy as well, since the former is one of its main economic partners. Tajikistan also indirectly, but noticeably, suffers from these sanctions.
Tajikistan’s trade turnover, migrant workers’ remittances, and banking sector are threatened. Many experts have pointed out that new economic partners are needed in such a crisis.
However, Iranian investments cannot be counted on, because Iran is also experiencing an economic crisis. Last year and up to May 2022, protests erupted frequently in the country, displeased with the rise in food inflation, which reached 42% in January of this year. Under these conditions, the Iranian leadership is unlikely to be able to help the Tajik economy.
Therefore, the relations will be formed purely in the sphere of military cooperation, and the signed documents, which also affect foreign economic relations for Iran, are more like a legal basis for new relations with Tajikistan. Still, as a market Tajikistan is not too large and is unlikely to have any impact on the economic situation in Iran through the development of mutual trade.
Also, given the priority of its military action in Ukraine, Russia could sidestep the threat to Central Asian security posed by the Taliban.
Moreover, according to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Russia has withdrawn some troops from the 201st military base in Tajikistan to participate in the war in Ukraine. Some media outlets claim that at least a thousand servicemen of the 201st military base have been sent to Ukraine.
In such a case, it is important for Tajikistan to seek support elsewhere and preferably nearby. Iran turned out to be an ideal option. Plus, the choice of Iran as a partner for Tajikistan would not cause fears in Moscow, since Russia supports Iran as part of a geopolitical bloc that opposes the collective West and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East.
Importantly, prior to his trip to Tehran, Emomali Rahmon to attend the CSTO summit, where he also met with Vladimir Putin. During the meeting, Putin made it clear that the security situation in the region remains “complicated.” Presumably, after their meeting, the two presidents agreed to accelerate rapprochement with Iran.
One should not forget the unresolved border disputes on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border and the ongoing clashes. The most recent skirmish occurred on June 14. Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are trying to build up their military capabilities. The media actively circulated information about the purchase by Tajikistan of Turkish Bairaktar drones, which had also been purchased by Kyrgyzstan before. It is safe to assume that Iranian drones to be produced in Tajikistan will also be used on the northern border.
Together forever?
Despite the rapid progress, it is still difficult to say how relations between Tajikistan and Iran will develop. Looking back, it is mainly concluded that the further stages of bilateral relations will also fluctuate. It is quite possible that a transition to a relatively stable character in relations between Dushanbe and Tehran can be expected in the near future.
It is quite possible that the Tajik authorities will not force events. The task of reducing existing risks and finding new trade and economic opportunities is still far from being solved. It is very likely that Iran will not be the end point, and Tajikistan will continue to build ties with other nearby extra-regional players.
Much will depend on the situation in Afghanistan and the position of the Tajik government toward the Taliban. Another factor is the war in Ukraine. Whether sanctions against Russia will be strengthened and whether Russia’s support for security in the region will be available in the future, the answer to these questions will have a decisive impact on the revival of Tajikistan’s multi-vector foreign policy.
But multi-vectorism must first and foremost imply non-alignment with any bloc, and Tajikistan is far from that. A rapprochement with Iran could complicate relations with Western countries.
Despite Dushanbe’s neutral stance on the war in Ukraine, it is difficult to imagine that Emomali Rahmon will equally develop partnerships on all fronts. Such an attempt was made at the beginning of the confrontation with the Taliban regime in Kabul, when the head of Tajikistan held meetings in Belgium and France. The current rapprochement with Iran is an indicator that the attempt to find allies in the fight against the Taliban in the West has most likely failed, and Tajikistan, given the current conditions, is looking for foreign policy opportunities in the system of coordinates, in which Russia is also present.