Protests in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) have never been planned, organized, and every time they were – a spontaneous reaction to certain events, says Subkhiya Mastonshoeva, M.A. of International Relations. In her opinion, it is also important to understand the socio-economic components of the crisis situations in the Pamirs, to which offenses by law enforcement agencies are often added, which together leads to acute manifestations of discontent.
GBAO remains practically the only region in the Republic of Tajikistan in which mass protest actions of the population periodically take place. Mass nature can be explained by the fact that the population quickly mobilizes in response to various offenses, because life in difficult geographical conditions has led to close interaction within the community and a high degree of mutual assistance.
Protest moods are practically manifestations of the instinct of self-preservation and form a kind of model of civic consciousness. However, in every crisis situation in the region over the past ten years, the authorities have included exclusively forceful methods in their arsenal of influence, neglecting dialogue with the population and understanding the deeper causes of discontent.
Protests in GBAO take place mainly against the arbitrariness of law enforcement agencies, and each time this is a manifestation of a spontaneous reaction to certain triggers. The protests have never had a planned, organized character and have not had a political basis, as the law enforcement agencies are trying to present.
There were many analyzes and expert opinions about the political prerequisites for the crisis at the republican level and external, geopolitical causes at the regional level. In this article, based on factual data, we will try to consider deeply local reasons, what the population actually encounters on a daily basis, what serves as a trigger, and what deeper reasons lie at the root of discontent.
The main triggers of the protests of the last ten years
The protests in 2012 in Khorog were caused by the reaction of the population to the military operation, during which, according to various sources, 21 civilians got killed. Protests in May 2013 in Ishkashim took place over an incident involving a State Committee of National Security (SCNS) officer. The security officer was involved in sexual relations with an underage girl in Ishkashim, for which he was subsequently sentenced to two years in a standard regime penal colony.
In March 2014, residents of the Rushan region expressed dissatisfaction with the use of physical force by the GBAO police against seven residents of the Rushan region and shellfire of their car, one of whom was hospitalized with severe spinal injuries. The reason was the dissatisfaction of representatives of law enforcement agencies about the driving manner of local residents, who allegedly interfered with the unhindered passage of law enforcement vehicles. In 2014, discontent in Khorog was caused by an incident with the shellfire of car by police in the center of the city of Khorog in order to capture suspects, as a result of which two citizens were killed and four were injured. The latest protests in November 2021 occurred after the death of Gulbiddin Ziyobekov, a resident of the Tavdem village in the Roshtkala district, as a result of an operation carried out by the special services to capture him.
His death provoked a sharp reaction from the local population, which resulted in the largest 4-day round-the-clock popular demonstration. During the protest, the security forces fired on the protesters, which led to the death of 2 more civilians and the injury of 17 citizens. The requirement during all previous protests was to investigate the incidents and punish the perpetrators, which, unfortunately, did not follow. Thus, the population increasingly lost confidence in law enforcement and judicial authorities, the geographical scope of discontent and the contingent of participants expanded regardless of the influence of informal leaders.
The distinctive nature of the November 2021 protests
The latest protests in November 2021 were the largest in terms of both the number and composition of participants and the duration, especially given their absolute spontaneity. In fact, these protest sentiments did not end after the demonstrators left the central square after a four-day round-the-clock protest.
Demands for legality and justice continue to be put forward by people from GBAO and other regions of the Republic of Tajikistan through appeals, online discussions, and individual speeches for the past two and a half months. There are several reasons for such a long reaction.
Most importantly, these protests were triggered by the alleged extrajudicial execution of a young man who had previously stood up for a local girl who had been harassed by a representative of the local prosecutor’s office. This caused a public outcry not only in the region itself but also outside the region and the country.
Further, during the November protests, the population of Khorog and several districts expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the security forces, which showed solidarity at the regional level with the demands for compliance with the rule of law. This fact is undeniable, and we see it also in the geographically representative composition of Commission 44, which acts as a bridge between the population and the authorities. The third reason is that more than half of the protesters were women of different ages, and it was also predominantly women who spoke at the protests, which is rather difficult to connect with the theory of the participation of informal leaders and organized criminal groups in the mobilization of the population.
The participation of women and their demands for the observance of the rule of law in GBAO can be clearly seen in numerous videos on social networks. Protest actions of immigrants from GBAO and other regions of the Republic of Tajikistan abroad were organized mainly by young representatives of the country with the requirement to comply with the law. Most of the youth of GBAO is outside the country, many of whom are educated, highly qualified specialists and cannot in any way be mobilized by the so-called organized crime groups or act on the instructions of informal leaders from GBAO.
Informal leaders
Throughout the history of protest moods in GBAO, commentators in the media and social networks quite often associate these moments of crisis with the activities of the so-called informal leaders. The term “informal leaders” in the initial interpretation was applied to former field commanders from GBAO, who were integrated within the framework of the mechanism of national reconciliation, some of them received official positions. To date, there are only three informal leaders from that composition – Mahmadbokir Mahmadbokirov, Tolib Aembekov and Edgor Shomussalamov. Mahmadbokir Mahmadbokirov is currently the chairman of the Upper Khorog mahalla council, that is, he is actually involved in public institutions of local self-government.
In recent years, the term “informal leaders” has been used in a negative connotation in connection with various accusations against both the old informal leaders and the new younger authorities who have some kind of influence among a certain circle of young people. However, there has been no official investigation on these charges and no trial over the years, so it is quite difficult for the population to understand what caused the then disproportionate episodic forceful reaction to their presence in the region without the use of legal mechanisms of justice.
Increasingly, the term has also become applicable to other individuals who have some sort of authority among young people. From time to time, athletes or active representatives of the diaspora abroad get into the list of informal leaders. Such a rather broad and negative interpretation of the term “informal leaders” also becomes the subject of a skeptical attitude of the population towards the authorities, because the emergence of opinion leaders among young people and the population is a natural process in general and does not mean a connection with criminal elements.
Criminality of the region
The triggers for protests and discontent among the population, as noted above, were specific incidents involving law enforcement agencies. However, it is also important to understand the socio-economic components of the crisis situations in the Pamirs, to which offenses by law enforcement agencies are often added, which together result in acute manifestations of discontent.
During the Soviet years, GBAO had the lowest number of crimes committed per capita. Crisis situations in GBAO are often explained by the high crime rate in the region by law enforcement agencies. However, statistics on the trend of increasing or decreasing crime levels are not fully available to the public in order to understand what the reason for the increase in crime in the region is, what types of crime prevail, what age categories are more prone to crime and other important characteristics for a broader analysis, including for preventive purposes.
At the end of January 2019, the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Tajikistan, at a meeting with journalists, announced a decrease in crime in GBAO by 30% and connected this with the start of the activities of the inter-agency headquarters in the fall of 2018.
Speaking about the existence of organized crime groups in GBAO, the Prosecutor General noted that they exist in GBAO, as in any other place, and they need to be fought. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan, the crime rate in GBAO decreased by 30% in 2019, and by 13.2% in 2021. According to the Agency on Statistics, in 2020, a decrease in crime was observed in GBAO – by 11.3% and Sughd region – by 1.4%. According to official data, since 2018, there has been a steady decrease in crime in the region, however, during the November events, the high crime rate in the region was again voiced as one of the causes of the crisis.
In 2020, the Government adopted the Strategy for Reforming the System of Execution of Criminal Sentences, and the reform, along with other measures, also includes the introduction of a probation system and the development of alternative measures of criminal punishment not related to deprivation of liberty. According to the International Center for Prison Studies/Research (ICPR), there are about 10,000 prisoners in places of deprivation of liberty in the republic.
However, in general, information on the number of convicts is protected and it is impossible to make an analysis on various indicators. In the petition of people from GBAO in connection with the November events, which gained more than 15,000 signatures, it is noted that over the past ten years, more than 1,000 young people from GBAO have been sentenced to imprisonment.
In connection with the November events, in December 2021, criminal cases were initiated against 13 young people in GBAO, including for cutting down trees, and the court, at the request of the GBAO prosecutor, sentenced 4 of them to prison terms from one to four years.
The process of investigation into the cases of two more immigrants from GBAO, who were taken out of Russia, is underway in the city of Dushanbe. Subsequently, criminal cases were announced against 6 more people. Thus, only in connection with the November events, 17 people, mostly young people, can potentially be held criminally liable. The media also reported on the imposition of a ban on leaving the country for 66 residents of GBAO who participated in the protests on November 25-28.
Criminal cases against young people from GBAO have been initiated after every protest in the region since 2012, which together can have a rather alarming trend. Discussing the process of resocialization of convicts, experts note that after serving their sentence, prisoners often face stigma and discrimination – they are not hired when they find out about the presence of a criminal record and serving a sentence in places of deprivation of liberty.
This increases the risk that an ex-convict may reoffend. Given the level of unemployment in GBAO, a criminal record for young people, even after the minimum term of imprisonment, will mean futility, both in the capital or other cities of the country, and outside the Republic, creating an endless tangle of social problems.
Economic side
According to the country’s first Vulnerability and Resilience Atlas, the geographical distribution of poverty remains highly unequal in the country. According to official poverty estimates for 2015, the highest poverty rate in Tajikistan is in GBAO (39%). A World Bank study on multidimensional poverty has revealed evidence of growing deprivation, inequality, and vulnerability in people’s access to goods and services such as food, energy, water, education and healthcare.
In GBAO, six out of eight districts have higher levels of multidimensional poverty than the national average (64%). There are serious difficulties with housing and infrastructure in GBAO. In the large regional city of Khorog, 50 percent of the population does not have access to drinking water. Up to 90% of the income of the population goes to food and essential goods – the prices for them are two to three times higher than in other regions of the country, due to the cost of delivery.
Youth unemployment
The number of unemployed in GBAO for 2020, according to the information of the previous head of the region, exceeded 16 thousand people, although according to official data there were 4327 of them. In world practice, one of the risk factors for the growth of crime, violence and conflicts is the high rates of NEET (Not in Employment, Education or Training), that is, the category of young people who are not employed, studying, or not undergoing vocational training. NEET status entails not only economic consequences, but also socio-psychological dysfunctions. Researchers identify various negative trajectories for NEET status carriers: loss of orientation in society, expressed in a subjective feeling of aimlessness, uselessness and social isolation, exacerbation of health problems, increased craving for unearned income. The risk of crime among this category of the population increases many times over.
Thus, NEET becomes not only a personal and family problem, but also a real threat to the development of society. In GBAO, according to information from 2016, 30.4 young males aged 15-24 were included in this category. For comparison, in Khatlon as a whole NEET included 25.4% of them 1.1% men, in Sughd oblast 23.8% of them 0% men, in RRS 36.1% of them 8.9% men. In the current situation, young people are forced to leave the country and travel for work in Russia. Many people can quite easily be involved in some kind of illegal activities, they can end up in places of deprivation of liberty, they can potentially become an object of violence and a victim of corruption on the part of law enforcement security agencies and do not have the opportunity to independently get out of such difficult life situations.
Results
Thus, abstracting from external geopolitical theories, some kind of political struggle in the apparatus of the central government, or other theories of unlimited influence of informal leaders, there is a real, long-term, complex socio-economic situation in the region and, in conjunction with manifestations of corruption, arbitrariness of law enforcement agencies and against this trend of impunity, this is becoming a factor of discontent and alienation of the population of GBAO.
For ten years, the authorities, even in the presence of joint commissions from among representatives of civil society, have practically never met the needs of the population, have not met the requirements for establishing truth and justice, ultimately leading to a situation of almost complete impunity for government officials. However, against this background, young people were massively sentenced to criminal terms, often as a result of non-transparent trials.
If the current trends continue, in the future the authorities run the risk of completely losing the opportunity to conduct any kind of dialogue with the population or the opportunity to involve legitimate representatives of civil society in the negotiation processes, because the population will finally lose confidence in the authorities, and the mechanism of joint commissions will already be exhausted.
In the absence of other mechanisms for a constructive dialogue with the authorities, protest moods are inevitable in the future, and as bitter experience shows, they almost always end in injuries and casualties among the population and potentially representatives of law enforcement and security agencies.
It becomes a spiral of endless violence, social anger, alienation, crime. In Khorog for ten years there was not a single micro-district left where someone would not die from a bullet or remain disabled.
In recent years, this trend has already spread to the districts, covering more and more of the region. At this rate, it will also soon be difficult to find young people under the age of 30 without a criminal record.
Given the turbulent border with Afghanistan, and the difficulties on the border with Kyrgyzstan, the prospect of turning an entire region into a permanent zone of instability poses a serious threat to the peace and security of the country as a whole. In the absence of recognition and solution of such problems as institutional weaknesses, structural impunity, corruption, related factors can also lead to similar events in other parts of the country.