“Turkmenistan is eager to break away from its dependence on China and Russia as the only routes for its energy exports, which the latter two use to pull Turkmenistan into their orbit of influence” – notes in an article written for the analytical portal CABAR.asia, political analyst Rustam Muhamedov (Turkmenistan).
In recent years, the Turkmenistan-Russia bilateral relations have been characterized by an upswing following almost a decade-long period of crisis between the two states. The current revival of relations has led to certain breakthroughs, such as the expansion of trade and the deepening of cooperation in the field of security. Despite the steady rise of the relations, certain limits remain, namely Turkmenistan’s refusal to join Russia-centric integration projects, resulting from Ashgabat’s hard-driven attempt to maintain the continuity of its foreign policy strategy that promotes equidistance from global centers of powers.
Turkmenistan, however, finds itself in a more narrow space to attain this objective as the domestic and external challenges, namely the domestic economic crisis, the excessive economic dependence on China, and the rise of the Taliban regime (terrorist movement banned in Central Asia) in neighboring Afghanistan, force it to gravitate closer towards Russia. In this regard, it is of interest to study to what extent does the current level of bilateral cooperation indicates the strategic change in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy, and what are the main breakthroughs and the existing limits of these relations.
The legacy of the past and the post-2016 revival of relations
The bilateral relations between Turkmenistan and Russia have followed an uneven path marked by periods of friction and unease. In this regard, S. Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s former president, left a controversial legacy. Domestically, he assertively pursued the policy of “Turkmenization”, which removed the Russian language from all social domains, including the closure of schools with Russian as the language of instruction, and bans on Russian periodical subscription and mass media broadcasting.
In the foreign policy domain, Niyazov pursued isolationism rooted in the country’s ambivalent status of “positive neutrality”. This policy posture allowed him to insulate his personalistic autocratic regime from international scrutiny and foreign influence, which naturally impacted the relations with Russia. Ashgabat prioritized bilateral economic contacts, focused mainly on the needs of its energy sector, refraining from actively engaging with Russia-centric platforms. The country downgraded its status in the Commonwealth of Independent States to an associate member and showed no interest in becoming a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
G. Berdymukhamedov’s first steps after coming to power toward Russia seemed to indicate the strategic change in the country’s foreign policy direction. The two countries expressed ambitious plans to expand trade and economic cooperation, foremost in the energy sector, but also other fields. They agreed on the construction of the Caspian Coastal Pipeline (together with Kazakhstan) that would have increased the volume of exported Turkmen gas to Russia by roughly 20-30 billion cubic meters.
This reorientation, however, was short-lived; in 2009, the blast at a Central Asia – Center pipeline delivering Turkmen gas to Russia resulted in mutual accusations and the ensuing gradual deterioration of relations, putting the plans for the pipeline construction to a halt and bringing the economic and political cooperation to the minimum. The relations hit the rock bottom by 2016 when Russia’s Gazprom stopped gas imports from Turkmenistan and filed a lawsuit against Turkmengaz at an international arbitration court in Stockholm over a price in the supply contract.
Since 2017, Turkmenistan’s leadership has taken considerable steps to revive its relations with Russia. In 2017, the presidents of the two countries signed a landmark strategic partnership treaty that included over 13 documents, among them the program of economic cooperation for the period 2017-2019 that contained around 80 joint projects and events. In May 2021, G. Berdymukhamedov approved the new program of economic cooperation between the countries for the period 2021-2023, which envisages the further expansion of cooperation in an array of fields, including in industry, agriculture, high tech, finance, and energy.
The change has also been reflected in the increased number of regular meetings at the highest and high political levels, intergovernmental and interregional contacts, including Turkmenistan’s recent guest attendances in Eurasian Economic Union Intergovernmental Council meetings and SCO summits. It is also indicative that Serdar Berdymukhamedov, the President’s son and apparent successor to his father’s post, was assigned as the co-chair of the Russia-Turkmenistan intergovernmental commission and most recently as Turkmenistan’s representative to the Economic Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The economic relations: growth of trade and cooperation – yes, EAEU – no
Turkmenistan’s interest in reviving relations with Russia is dictated by economic needs. The country has been experiencing the most acute economic and financial crisis in its independent history, which resulted from a combination of factors: the drop in global hydrocarbon prices, the loss of foreign customers for its gas, and massive mismanagement of public funds on vanity projects. The gas trade with China, which has become the main purchaser of Turkmen gas and from 2017 to 2019 had been its only customer, has not been particularly profitable despite the large volumes as Ashgabat had to repay Chinese infrastructure loans. Due to the loss of revenue, the cash-strapped regime was even forced to cut the free provision of certain utilities, which have been the pillars of the informal “social contract” with the population, and encountered food shortages that even led to small-scale and isolated protests in different parts of the country.
The resumption of gas imports by Gazprom, hence, was Ashgabat’s top priority as it could have mitigated its financial hardships. In 2019, Gazprom withdrew the lawsuit against Turkmengaz and resumed gas imports from Turkmenistan by signing a 5-year contract, although at a humble annual volume of 5,5 billion cubic meters. While no information on the factual price was provided, the indirect evidence suggests that it may stand at around 187 US dollars per 1,000 cubic meters. Though such an arrangement can hardly be viewed as a full success story for the Turkmen government, given the previous gas deals between the two sides, it is nonetheless crucial support in current circumstances as the resumption brings in much-needed cash earnings without delay and helps stabilize the domestic economic situation. In addition, it strengthens the Turkmen side’s bargaining position with China over gas export prices as the latter no longer maintains a full purchasing monopoly.
Ashgabat, however, is not the only side reaping benefits from the reviving cooperation in the energy sector. In June 2021, Russia’s ambassador to Turkmenistan Alexander Blokhin positively assessed the agreement between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to jointly develop the previously disputed Dostluk oil and gas field in the Caspian Sea, highlighting Lukoil’s readiness to become the operator of the project. Previously, in February 2021, during his meeting with Lukoil’s head Vagit Alekperov, G. Berdymukhamedov expressed Turkmenistan’s support for the company’s intent to become the operator of the oil field and the country’s readiness to consider the company’s specific investment proposals.
Tatneft is another Russian oil giant that is expanding its operations in the country. The company has been present in Turkmenistan since 2008; in 2020, it signed a new agreement with Turkmennebit (Turkmen oil) state company to continue the provision of services to increase the flow rate of oil wells in the Goturdepe field until 2028, and in January 2021 it launched a new site for the repair of tubing pipes. Tatneft is one of the several companies from Russia’s republic of Tatarstan that directly benefit from the good personal relationship between G. Berdymukhamedov and R. Minnikhanov, the republic’s president. Tatarstan’s KAMAZ, for instance, will deliver around 2,000 units of vehicles in the period 2019-2021 and is currently expanding the local network of its service centers. Kazan Helicopter Plant also expects further cooperation, having delivered 2 new helicopters for ambulance aviation services. Ak Bars Shipbuilding Corporation is involved in modernizing the Turkmen marine fleet; in 2019, it delivered a new passenger ship “Rovach” and is currently assembling another one. Overall, in January 2019, the trade turnover between Turkmenistan and Tatarstan reached 120 million USD and is sure to grow further. The two sides also share close humanitarian ties as Tatarstan’s universities are one of the main destinations in Russia for Turkmen students.
The upward trend in economic cooperation between Turkmenistan and Russia is not bound to hydrocarbons alone. In recent years, there has been a recorded steady growth of non-natural gas-related trade turnover; in 2020, despite the global economic slowdown caused by the coronavirus pandemic, this trade had expanded by 40% and reached a record-breaking mark of 970 million USD. At the same time, as the numbers show, the expansion of non-gas trade leads to the growth of a negative trade balance for Turkmenistan. The figure, hence, indicates that Turkmenistan’s economy remains highly undiversified and has little to offer besides hydrocarbons.
While the bilateral economic cooperation is thriving and is projected to expand further in the coming years, it does not lead to the change of heart for Ashgabat towards Russia’s integration projects, namely the Eurasian Economic Union. At the same time, most recently Turkmen delegation has indeed become a recurrent guest at EAEU summits, highlighting that the country has the resources that may be of great interest to its members. The delegation mentioned namely the country’s transport and logistics infrastructure, including Turkmenbashi International Seaport. Turkmenistan has a long-cherished ambition of becoming a major inter-regional connectivity link and hence, has heavily invested in the development of this infrastructure, which is currently not used to its full potential.
Despite the aforementioned, Ashgabat is not interested in joining the EAEU as it would shrink further the already narrow space for maneuvring, locking Turkmenistan in Russia-centric economic and political orbit, which the Turkmen leadership tries to avoid, considering the intensifying geopolitical contestation in the region by the outside powers and the still significant dependence on China. This also explains Turkmenistan’s increasing participation in intra-regional cooperation as it can strengthen the positions of the regional countries for promoting their interests vis-a-vis the outside powers. On the domestic level, the reluctance of joining the EAEU is linked to the need to carry out structural economic reforms to harmonize domestic legislative and regulatory framework and to open the domestic market, which the top leadership is reluctant to do as it would take away important levers that it uses for its own political and financial benefit. Thus, Turkmenistan is most likely to continue negotiations for some form of arrangement with the EAEU that would not impinge on its ability to act unilaterally.
The relations in the security field: the spotlight on the Afghan problem
In comparison to the economy, the security-related cooperation between the two states has not experienced the same level of breakthroughs, despite the persisting multitude of security challenges in the region that are of mutual concern. Turkmenistan has always maintained the least pronounced security partnership with Russia of all five Central Asian countries. Ashgabat has always refused to join the Russia-led multilateral security-focused platforms – the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, referring to the non-alignment principle of its neutrality status. Ashgabat has also avoided participating in joint military drills and maneuvres, unlike, for instance, Uzbekistan (also not a CSTO member). This self-exclusive posture, while provides the opportunity for a multi-vector policy course, comes at a hefty price as Ashgabat is left to rely on its capabilities.
This capability to withstand threats emanating from Afghanistan unaided has long raised doubts in Kremlin. Thus, since 2017, when the cooperation between the two states has gained new momentum, Russia has stepped up its efforts to urge Turkmenistan to develop a deepened security partnership. These efforts culminated in the signing of a long-awaited joint security cooperation agreement in October 2020, after a 17-year wait. The timing and the context in which Turkmenistan accelerated the adoption of the document highlight that the Kremlin did not shy away from using economic leverage to attain this objective. It is highly unlikely that it came as a result of Turkmen officials’ security needs reassessment as Ashgabat has always insisted that it has the border situation under control, even at times when independent observers reported about the violent incidents at the border that led to casualties on the Turkmen side. Later that same year, reports indicated that Russian troops provided direct assistance to Turkmenistan in protecting its border with Afghanistan, which Turkmen authorities denied as this openly violates the fundamental principles of its foreign policy.
While having divergent preferences on the mechanisms of cooperation (informal partnership vs. formal alliance), the goals of both Turkmenistan and Russia coincide regarding the restoration of political stability in Afghanistan, which some observers view as fertile ground for a more robust security arrangement between the two. Indeed, when signing the 2017 strategic partnership treaty, G. Berdymukhamedov highlighted the acceptance of Russia’s interests in the region, its approach as a “stabilizing factor” and the mutually shared position for an all-inclusive political settlement in Afghanistan through the political and diplomatic means. The two sides have also shared similar strategies of engagement in dealing with the Afghan problem; both Russia and Turkmenistan have maintained diplomatic dialogue with both the official government and the Taliban, viewing the latter as an important actor for stabilizing the situation.
Notwithstanding, Russia and Turkmenistan differ in their larger strategic objectives regarding the political settlement in Afghanistan. For Russia, the recent rise of the Taliban regime and the associated risks provide a viable opportunity to solidify further its already-dominant position in the regional security architecture, which includes pulling Turkmenistan closer to its military-security orbit of influence. The factor of China plays an important role in these considerations. In recent years, China has activated its security engagement in the region, increasing arms sales to the countries of the region, establishing a military base in Tajikistan, and pledging to support the latter in securing its borders. Turkmenistan is on the list too; indicatively, Ashgabat was the first stop in China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s five-day tour to Central Asia in July 2021. During his meeting with G. Berdymukhamedov, Wang Yi expressed Beijing’s readiness to help Turkmenistan defend its borders through both “traditional” and “non-traditional” means; the latter, according to some observers, most likely implies an expanded deployment of Chinese private security company personnel, which already help protect the Chinese-owned infrastructure in the country.
The offer was warmly welcomed by Ashgabat, especially given that it was tied to new economic deals between the two states. Most importantly, having the backing of another major power, Ashgabat receives important leverage in its discussions on more intense security collaboration with Russia that it will use to avoid being gravitated too much into the latter’s regional security-focused platforms. Hence, it is expected that Ashgabat will try to find the right balance in its relations with both major powers and avoid becoming too dependent on any of the two in the security field. In addition, Turkmenistan will continue on its course of establishing friendly relations with the Taliban to secure its infrastructures’ projects and investments in Afghanistan, such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, which is important not only from an economic but also a geopolitical standpoint as it would diminish the Ashgabat’s dependence on both China and Russia.
Conclusion
The recent intensification of cooperation between Turkmenistan and Russia, which although is marked by certain breakthroughs, does not indicate the strategic change in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy course, namely its reorientation towards the Kremlin. This is emphasized by Ashgabat’s preference to keep the relations at the bilateral level focused on economic cooperation and continuing reluctance to join Russia-centric multilateral platforms, such as the EAEU, the SCO, and the CSTO.
While immediate interests of Russia and Turkmenistan indeed do overlap regarding the issues of mutual concern, namely concerning the stabilization of the political situation in neighboring Afghanistan, the two countries diverge in their preferences on the mechanisms of cooperation and larger strategic objectives. Turkmenistan is eager to break away from its dependence on China and Russia as the only routes for its energy exports, which the latter two use to pull Turkmenistan into their orbit of influence. Hence, Ashgabat will continue on its course to ensure the success of the TAPI pipeline project, which, however, is extremely difficult to be realized in the nearest future. Given this, Turkmen authorities will try to find the right balance in their relations with both Moscow and Beijing so as not to worsen the relations with either of two on one side, while, on the other side, trying to avoid becoming too entangled in the political-security arrangement that would shrink further the space for unilateral action.
It is yet to be seen how the Turkmen leadership will master this counterbalancing plan, given the domestic and external challenges that put additional pressure on the ruling regime. Turkmenistan marks the 30th anniversary of its independence with a highly inefficient economy that is overly dependent on the export of hydrocarbons, the multitude of social problems caused by the worsening socio-economic situation, and the hereditary power succession looming on the horizon that requires political stability. Most importantly, Turkmenistan does not enjoy the same degree of autonomy in the foreign policy domain it once had, which made its self-exclusive posture based on the status of neutrality possible. Given this contemporary reality, Turkmenistan faces many difficult questions to address with far lesser options that would please its interests and ambitions, and the potential “zugzwang” position, when any potential move would only most likely lead to the worsening of its position.