“It is clear that the stability of the existing system now depends on how effectively the tandem will function, particularly when (and if) the tensions or disagreements arise in the “family””, – notes in an article written for CABAR.asia, political analyst Rustam Muhamedov (Turkmenistan).
The burdensome “baggage”
On March 19, 2022, Turkmenistan held a presidential inauguration that formally instituted the first dynastic power succession in the region from the country’s ruling president Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov to his son Serdar. The omnipotent post that Serdar Berdymukhamedov inherited from his father came with a burdensome “baggage.”
Despite the officially declared Era of Might and Happiness and state-promoted boastful narratives of economic growth and prosperity, since 2015, Turkmenistan has been in the grip of one of the worst economic and financial crises in its independent history that exposed the structural deficiencies of its Potemkin economy. Instead of structural reforms, the ruling regime cut the government spending on the provision of public goods and services which diminished the living standards for most of the population. In 2020, the already dire situation deteriorated further by the government’s stubborn denial and incompetent management of the COVID-19 pandemic.
As a result, the country is plagued by the multitude of socioeconomic hardships and challenges: public health emergency, decaying education and healthcare systems, massive unemployment and exodus of the local population, depreciated purchasing power, food shortages and rationing, long lines, spiking prices, cash restrictions, the volatile black-market exchange rate of the manat. The situation is exacerbated further by the pervasive corruption, clientelism, nepotism, lack of transparency and accountability, poor steering capacity of state institutions, impaired responsiveness to the needs of people and emergencies, wide-scale restrictions, and violations of human rights.
Considering the risk of the country slipping into further decline, it is evident that far-reaching political, economic, and social reforms are needed if Serdar is to keep Turkmenistan as a functional state able to withstand domestic and external challenges to its sovereignty, development, stability and prosperity. This concise brief aims to contribute to discussions on how a change in president might affect the challenges the country faces and shape its policy orientation in the upcoming years. Serdar’s first weeks in the presidential office have been marked by the lack of clear policy vision and strategy that makes these questions still of great relevance.
Political reforms and personnel policy
The analysis of Serdar’s potential policy decisions is challenged by the fact that little is still known definitively about him. Serdar’s utterly vague presidential campaign program did not provide any clear answers, expectedly keeping him in the shadows of his father and emphasizing the continuity of the country’s domestic and foreign policy course.
Some observers find a sliver of opportunity in the change of Ashgabat’s formal ruler, citing the difference in experience between father and son: the latter’s longer and broader government experience prior to the presidency, significant time spent outside of Turkmenistan, an academic degree from a European institution, and being of a different generation. Even so, in the political realm even modest reforms aimed at democratization and openness should not be expected. The choreographed election campaign clearly underlined the regime’s interest in preserving the existing power structures, even though the state propaganda tried to portray Serdar as a forward-looking reformer.
Thus, Serdar’s immediate priorities will center on consolidating his power, strengthening his authority, and minimizing potential and perceived defection in the inner elite. Given the endurance of the “strongman” authoritarian rule in Turkmenistan, Serdar’s figure now may be perceived by some of its members and groups (i.e., security officials) as not authoritative enough to hold such a powerful post because his rapid career advancement owes more to his father’s actions than his personal achievements. Furthermore, Serdar’s frequent career reassignments also arguably undermined his ability to establish deep working relations with members of the elite and consolidate own powerbase (team).
Regarding the personnel policy, Serdar then faces a pronounced challenge: he needs to build a team of personal loyalists who will not challenge his authority, which, at the same time, needs to be qualified enough to keep the administrative infrastructure functional, at least in current satisfactory state. As such, he needs to ensure that these objectives are not mutually-exclusive; his decisions, so far, reflect this point. He reappointed all but one deputy prime ministers, including the political “heavyweight” Foreign Minister R. Meredov, despite the speculations that he would be replaced by the lesser-known E. Aydogdyev so not to overshadow the president-elect. While R. Meredov kept his post for now, his position is clearly weaker now after Serdar split various intergovernmental cooperation commissions between the reassigned deputy prime ministers. Serdar also kept his father’s practice of limiting the scope for independent decision-making by keeping deputy prime ministers as the only officials in charge of preparing strategic plans and programs for his approval and supervising their execution.
For the time being, the political dynamics will nonetheless be directed not by Serdar alone but the father-son tandem as G. Berdymukhamedov still retains significant formal and informal influence. He is still the Chairman of Halk Maslahaty – formally the second person in the system who assumes the presidency in case the powerholder is incapacitated to perform their duties. Furthermore, in early January 2022, G. Berdymukhamedov announced plans of amending the Constitution and elaborating legal changes to the “ex-president” status. Due to the secretiveness of the regime and lack of any informed public discussions, it is only clear that the proposed changes will focus on reconfiguring the power relations to accommodate the emerging duopoly.
It is challenging to prognose how the competencies will exactly be split in the duo and which additional “safe break” mechanisms for (yet) unforeseen circumstances will be suggested. It is, for instance, possible that G. Berdymukhamedov may chair the Security Council or gain a spot there. Although seeming unlikely as of now, the “leader of the nation” status granting specially assigned powers to G. Berdymukhamedov cannot be ruled altogether as well; it is equally possible that he may continue to shape the country’s policy orientation from behind the curtains so not to overshadow his son’s public profile.
There is no public evidence that such tensions exist between father and son, and overall, such prospect seems unlikely; it is more likely that they may arise between Serdar and his relatives who have accumulated significant wealth by controlling many lucrative businesses, namely his cousins (i.e., Shamyrat and Hajymyrat Rejepovs). In December 2021, for instance, journalists reported that Serdar ordered the arrest of Maksat Bayramov, the director of Gulistan shopping center in Ashgabat and Shamyrat Rejepov’s close friend, and the closure of several night shops belonging to his cousins. Reportedly, Serdar was outraged with his nephews following the journalists’ investigations revealing details of their corrupt business schemes that “brought shame on his family.” It is quite likely that Serdar may gradually decrease some of his relatives’ informal influence in various areas or redistribute the spoils between them, particularly if it will negatively impact his public image and authority. Overall, however, this should not lead to serious confrontations and impose a significant threat to the durability of the existing regime.
The economy: keeping it in the “family”
The country’s economic system is riddled with problems and is in a desperate need of structural reforms; it is misbalanced and over-dependent on the extractive industry, subjected to constant and pervasive state dirigisme, highly non-transparent and hostile for foreign investors and private sector. Furthermore, the scattered and falsified information put out by the government make the detailed assessment of the real state of the economy more complicated.
Despite this, a radically new direction seems unlikely under Serdar; it is indicative that he instructed the newly reappointed team of deputy ministers to develop a “presidential program for the development of the state for the next seven years”, which indicates a lack of clear vision and specific steps in mind. Serdar’s “National Program for the Socioeconomic Development of Turkmenistan in 2022-2052” was also expectedly vaporous and repeated his father’s boastful agenda: the diversification of the economy, state assistance to processing industries, expansion of the country’s export potential, and etc.
Some “cosmetic” changes can certainly be expected that will aim to improve the country’s reputation and simulate the country’s trend toward further integration into the global markets. In 2021, Turkmenistan formally applied for WTO membership following the organization’s decision to grant it the observer status in July 2020. Similarly, Turkmen authorities continuously reiterate eagerness to improve cooperation with international financial institutions, such as the ADB, the IDB, the EBRD, and others, to attract financial support for government-promoted infrastructure and processing projects. Given this, Turkmenistan may expect pro forma legal changes in some areas, such as rationalization of the tax, customs, budgetary, foreign trade, and privatization policies. These measures, however, are unlikely to lead to major breakthroughs in terms of cooperating with these institutions, unless the government removes nontransparent and cumbersome procedures and practices that provide fertile ground for corruption breeding.
That being said, Serdar is mostly likely to keep the main parameters of the economic system intact. This continuity can be explained by the fact that Turkmenistan is practically a “family-run” business; as was documented by journalists, G. Berdymukhamedov, his relatives and close associates enjoy privileged position, controlling lucrative sectors and businesses and using their high positions in politics and management as sources of private income. While some changes may occur as was noted above, Serdar is still unlikely to significantly challenge this status quo, considering its overall role in securing his rule. Thus, any market-oriented policy maneuvers will likely accommodate the interests of the “family”. The regime is also likely to continue splashing public funds on large-scale construction and infrastructure projects, as it has proven to be an effective way to siphon off funds and redistribute the spoils among the members of the inner circle.
The state will also keep its tight control of all strategic and lucrative sectors of the economy and prioritize the extractive and oil/gas processing industries, including the development of new deposits in the Caspian Sea sector and Galkynysh gas field. This sector will remain a priority as the government has no clear plans how to diminish its dependence on hydrocarbons which currently account for nine-tenths of the country’s export earnings. The further development of the sector, however, is inevitably linked to resolving the emerging foreign policy challenges, namely increasing sanction pressures on Russia and unstable situation in neighboring Afghanistan. Russia is one of Turkmenistan’s strategic trading partners in many areas; along with China, it is the largest buyer of Turkmen natural gas and is involved in the development of the country’s oil/gas deposits and wells. Currently, Ashgabat is surely not satisfied with the price these countries pay for its gas reflected in the long- and medium-term contracts; it is not incidental that while discussing the Line D gas pipeline and CNPC’s involvement in further development of Galkynysh gas field with Xi Jinping in January 2022, G. Berdymukhamedov raised the question of “gas prices” that need to be based on “global precedent.”
Turkmenistan, however, does not have a strong bargaining position on the table; despite the abundance of natural gas reserves and continuous negotiations with an array of “interested buyers”, the country lacks the requisite transportation infrastructure and capacity to export more of its resources and expand its export routes. Namely, the west and south bound orientations have significant obstacles, which would require considerable time, and technical and financial instruments to overcome. The TAPI gas pipeline is an exemplary case as the implementation of the project has stalled for many years due to security and financial considerations. In March 2022, the Asian Development Bank stated that it will not help implement the TAPI project unless the Islamic Emirate is recognized; similar security and commercial prospect considerations were most recently voiced by India as well.
That being said, Afghanistan is surely to be one of the biggest challenges for Serdar in the foreign policy, including the situation at the Turkmen-Afghan border which is currently stable. When talking about “humanizing international relations”, Serdar has made it clear that Turkmenistan’s posture toward Afghanistan and its dealings with the ruling Taliban regime will remain unchanged and focused on continuing the political dialogue and supporting the neighboring country in return for protecting its investments and connectivity projects there.
In short, the easing of relations with Azerbaijan and Russia’s stated interest in getting involved in the TAPI project may ease the task of diversifying the country’s export possibilities for Serdar; at the same time, when it comes to gas exports to Europe (potentially via Azerbaijan), Serdar will inevitably have to demonstrate the country’s real commitment to improving its human rights record and market-oriented reforms. As such, he will have to find ways to make new market partners without risking the political stability of the existing regime.
Social policy
Despite the multitude of socioeconomic hardships, the government, thus far, failed to develop discernible policies for poverty alleviation, and even to openly acknowledge the existing hardships and identify social groups that have been struggling the worst.
Serdar then can certainly boost his public profile even by implementing moderate improvements in this area. Even so, it is most likely that he will keep the current course of acknowledging and responding to these problems indirectly and disguising them under the boastful rhetoric of development in public statements so not to damage his father’s authority and public image as the source of his legitimacy.
Of the most pertinent issues, the government may improve the availability and affordability of basic foodstuffs as the population at large experiences a constrained access to affordable food due to shrinking purchasing power. The situation is particularly troubling outside of major urban areas. The long lines and food shortages have already caused fights and sporadic protests targeting local authorities. During the 2022 presidential campaign, the government already reduced prices and improved availability of certain food items, such as sugar, eggs, cooking oil and even meat, to diminish the disaffection with Serdar’s election. Similarly, the black market of the manat also dropped. It is likely that this pre-electoral bump will turn into a long-term policy to reduce the “boiling points” in the society.
The other area where modest improvements may happen is the situation with travel restrictions that significantly impacts students and labor migrants that were stranded abroad because of COVID-19, particularly in Turkey and Northern Cyprus. In this case, the government will have two main considerations. First, it will have to figure out ways to improve employment opportunities, particularly in the public sector, to accommodate the needs of returnees. Second, considering the rise of protest activism among Turkmens abroad in 2020 and 2021, the government will be extremely watchful of those returning home and strengthen its controlling and repressing capacity further. Modest reforms in other areas, such as in healthcare and education sectors, can also be expected; yet, these will be cautious and gradual so not to threaten the internal stability of the regime and the legacy of now the former president.
Instead of a conclusion
The real indicator of change in leadership and the country’s new policy course will be meaningful reforms in the area of human rights protection, advancement of civil liberties and democratic practices, and civil society development. The release of political prisoners, the removal of censorship and countless other informal restrictions, facilitation of political pluralism and civic activism, and constructive dialogue between the state and society can open up the country, attract such-needed investments and innovativeness, and foster political, economic and social modernization. After thirty years of complete disregard of these principles, isolationism, corrupt and oppressive rule, Turkmenistan finds itself behind nations at similar tiers of development and highly vulnerable to external shocks and challenges that can undermine its sovereignty and prosperity.
That being said, the stakes are much higher for Serdar as the challenges and problems he has to deal with are far greater than those his father had inherited when he became the president. When G. Berdymukhamedov first assumed office in 2007, there were similar hopes among the population and foreign partners that he would reinvigorate the troubled state. These hopes failed to materialize as Turkmenistan remained one of the most closed and authoritarian polities in the world. Furthermore, “Arkadag’s” misguided and short-sighted policies rooted in self-interest even exacerbated the situation in many respects.
Nonetheless, it is most likely that Turkmenistan will demonstrate stubborn durability of the system and little incentive for systemic change vested in the self-interest of the ruling “family” and the inner circle to maintain its privileged position. While Serdar may implement modest improvements in certain areas to diminish the “boiling points” in the society and improve the functioning capacity of the system to keep up with rapid global changes, he will be selective and cautious of taking steps that may potentially foster social aspirations for democratic reform and liberalization. To what extent he personally shares his father’s conviction that the system needs to remain as such is a different question; the next seven years may give us better understanding to this question.