“A condition of persistent instability along the Afghan-Turkmen border will have a negative impact on the main trade and energy gateways (namely Aqina and Tourghundi) so freezing or delaying all bilateral projects and perspectives of economic growth and development”, – political analyst Fabio Indeo (Italy) notes in an article written specifically for the analytical platform CABAR.asia.
The decision of US president Biden to definitely complete the withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan after 20 years – also NATO made the same step – by September 11 has spread serious concerns among Central Asian republics as well as among external involved actors (China, Russia, Iran) about threats which could affect regional stability and security. Indeed, we can observe that the US military disengagement has revitalized Taliban activism (editor’s note: the terrorist movement banned in Central Asian countries) and their ambitions to seize the power, pushing them to extend their control on the Afghanistan’s northern districts along the border with Central Asian countries: according to the Tajik officials, the Taliban terroristic movement already controls 900 kilometres of the 1,357-kilometer border with Tajikistan.[1]
A new long-term conflict could flare up in Afghanistan – not only opposing terroristic Taliban against Kabul’s government, but also Taliban against the Islamic State-Khorasan’s foreign fighters because of their ideological divergences – triggering a dangerous condition of instability and its potential spillover to the whole Central Asia region: the worsened domestic scenario will fuel a potentially consistent flux of civil refugees from Afghanistan to the bordering countries, which should provide them humanitarian assistance.[2] In the meanwhile, hundreds Afghan military troops crossed the border seeking protection in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the last weeks, escaping from Taliban offensive.[3]
These events have immediately pushed Tashkent and Dushanbe to actively play a role to deal with the alarming situation at their border (Tajikistan plans to reinforce its border sending additional 20,000 troops, while Uzbekistan aims to undertake a diplomatic initiative expressly excluding a military solution),[4] while Turkmenistan at the beginning did not officially express concerns towards Taliban activism, mainly because the country appears not directly affected.
However, the scenario of volatility along the shared border with Afghanistan has become progressively worrying for Turkmen authorities, as a potential perceived threat to the domestic stability and security.
In less than one month, Taliban militants expanded their presence in the Faryab province, controlling of 13 out of 14 districts. On June 25 Taliban took the control of the Qaramqol and Ghormach settlements, while Afghan forces expelled Taliban’s presence from the strategic city of Andkhoy (situated about 32km from the border with Turkmenistan).[5] Taliban’s temporary control of Andkhoy district pushed Afghan authorities to close Aqina border port which is main trade gateway of foodstuff from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, so exposing local communities to a shortage of foods and rising prices.[6] On July 9, Taliban seized the control of Torghundi border town in the western province of Herat, the other dry port between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.[7]Similarly to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan has decided to adopt measures aimed at reinforcing security along the border, concentrating heavy weaponry, helicopters and other aircraft as well as moving additional troops from Mary 1 and Mary 2 military bases (in the Lebap region) to Serhetabad, a major border crossing with Afghanistan, with the task to support border guard units.[8] Moreover, according to Radio Azatlyk (the RFE/RL’s Turkmen service), Turkmen authorities summoned some reservists to military recruiting posts in Ashgabat, alerting them to be ready for a possible deployment.[9]
A turbulent border
For Turkmenistan, the main concern is to prevent armed incursions of terrorists and militants from the shared border: even if Taliban reassures about their “national aspirations”, namely to rebuild the Islamic Emirate only in Afghanistan and that they are not interested to undermine national borders and sovereignty of Central Asian neighbouring countries,[10] IS-K foreign fighters could benefit from the volatility along the border to lead destabilizing actions inside Turkmen territory.
This appears as a realistic threat considering that in 2017 IS-K fighters claimed to have captured Darzab district in Afghanistan’s Jowzjan Province, which is territorially contiguous with Turkmenistan’s eastern province of Lebap. For the first time IS claimed the temporary control of an Afghan district so closer to the Turkmen border, spreading fears about their expansionist intentions, but Afghan security forces and Taliban were able to drive out IS fighters from this district.[11]
In the last decade, several incidents and clashes occurred along the Turkmen-Afghan border, involving smugglers but also armed extremists, which highlight the condition of vulnerability in security terms: the most serious incident happened in 2014, when Afghan Taliban killed six Turkmen border guards in two ambushes, and in 2016 with the deaths of 27 Turkmen conscripts along the Afghan border. The situation is further complicated by the presence of an estimated 1.5 million ethnic Turkmens in the northern Afghan provinces of Faryab and Jowzjan, just beside the border with Turkmenistan: some years ago, ethnic Turkmens formed the “Arbeki” militias – a paramilitary force which was not economically or military supported by Kabul or Ashgabat government – with the task to defend their villages from Taliban attacks.[12] Consequently, a potential conflict involving different ethnic communities represents an additional dangerous perspective for Ashgabat, which could undermine its domestic stability.
Dialogue with Taliban, relations with President Ghani: energy and infrastructural projects as main strategic goals
In addition to the military dimension, Turkmenistan has also decided to adopt a diplomatic initiative aimed at implementing a political dialogue with Taliban: on July 11, Taliban representatives were hosted in Ashgabat to hold talks with Turkmen Foreign Ministry officials, mainly focussed on security and border issues in order to prevent incursions inside Turkmen territory and to contain migrant refugees. Turkmen authorities did not officially confirm this meeting because they don’t want to irritate Kabul official government with these diplomatic steps which appear as a political recognition of Taliban movement in opposition to President Ghani’s leadership.[13]The idea to promote a dialogue with Taliban appears a current shared trend in the region, considering that Uzbekistan held talks with Taliban in 2018, while on July 8 Russia hosted a meeting with Taliban representatives in Moscow: Russia’s special envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov received assurances that Taliban have not plans to violate Central Asian borders, while he tried to engage them to take actions to prevent the conflict in Afghanistan from spilling over its borders.[14]
Actually, Turkmen authorities started bilateral dialogue with Taliban in January 2021, some months before their military offensive in Afghanistan as well as before the US withdrawal’s announcement. The ratio of this diplomatic initiative is linked to the fact that for Turkmen authorities the main strategic goal is to protect infrastructures’ projects and investments, which will allow Turkmenistan to boost national economy benefiting of additional revenues: the diversification of natural gas’ export routes, to increase electricity exports to Afghanistan, to play a role in the architecture of regional interconnectivity developing road and railway routes from Afghanistan and Central Asia to Europe and the Arabian Sea.
The main precondition to implement these projects is to maintain cooperation with Afghanistan: considering the strategic relevance of these energy and infrastructural projects for the national economy (according to Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov Turkmenistan has spent $1.25 billion on projects integrating Turkmenistan with Afghanistan), until now Turkmen authorities have dealt with Kabul government but also preserving at the same time relations and a dialogue with Taliban.
As a matter of fact, we can observe that less than one week after the meeting with Taliban, Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov had a meeting in Kabul with Afghanistan Foreign Minister Atmar and President Ghani to discuss initiatives and cooperation for the next two years.[15]
On January 14, 2021, during a virtual ceremony Afghan President Ghani and Turkmen President Berdymukhamedov inaugurated three major energy and connectivity projects, underlining the improvement of the bilateral cooperation and the strong engagement to realize regional connectivity projects aimed at promote Afghanistan’s socio-economic development and its integration in the regional economy.[16]
Turkmen government financially supported Afghanistan to realize the Aqina–Andkhoy railway on Afghan territory, which is a key segment of the Lapis Lazuli transport corridor, an intermodal corridor (officially opened in December 2018) aimed at delivering goods from East to West crossing Turkmenistan and then Caspian Sea before to reach Caucasus and EU markets: Aqina and Torghundi respectively are the southern and the northern terminus of this overland corridor, so after the construction of the Kerki-Imamnazar-Aqina-Andkhoy steel highway and the modernization of the Serhetabat-Turgundi line the Lapis Lazuli route could be totally implemented.
For Afghanistan Lapis Lazuli corridor represents a strategic alternative to reduce reliance on the transit through Pakistan in order to reach international markets.[17]
The realization of the 153-kilometer power transmission line connecting Kerki in eastern Turkmenistan) to Sheberghan in Afghanistan represents the first leg of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (TAP) power project part-financed by the Asian Development Bank. At present, power delivered through the Kerki-Sheberghan line will supply Mazar-i-Sharif, while Kabul will be reached after the completion of the project, scheduled by 2022. Another project is the realization of a fiber optic cable from Imamnazar in Turkmenistan to Aqina in Afghanistan, and Serhetabat in Turkmenistan to Torghundi in Afghanistan.[18]
The reciprocal commitment to realize the TAPI gas pipeline – a 1,800 km long corridor conceived to annually deliver 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) from Turkmenistan’s giant Galkynysh gas field to Indian and Pakistani markets crossing western Afghanistan – is an ambitious challenge which would offer promising benefits for both: Afghanistan would receive 5 bcm of that gas (while Pakistan and India would both receive 14 bcm) also collecting transit fees, while Turkmenistan could diversify its energy export routes developing an alternative corridor which will be not under Chinese or Russian influence.[19]Until now, security and financial issues ($10 billion of estimated costs) have regularly affected the concrete realization of this project: the TAPI route will cross areas affected by a great instability such as South-Western Afghanistan (Herat, Helmand, Kandahar) and Pakistani Baluchistan.
However, during the meeting in Kabul in January Turkmen Foreign Minister Meredov declared that the construction of the Afghan section will start by August 2021, while in April both sides signed in Kabul the Concept of Security of the Afghan Section of TAPI, defined as an important step in the implementation of the project.[20]
At the same time, Turkmen authorities also received reassurances from Taliban concerning the protection of infrastructures: during the meeting in January 2021, Taliban representatives reassured Turkmenistan about the intention to offer “full support for the realization and security of the TAPI natural-gas pipeline and other infrastructure projects” (namely the TAP power line, and the railway connection between these two countries) “which will contribute to the achievement of peace and economic development in Afghanistan”.[21]
Regional security and stability’s shared concerns
In the current scenario of political uncertainty concerning Afghanistan, Turkmenistan sincerely hopes that Taliban (the terrorist movement banned in Central Asian countries) will be able to concretely engage themselves to protect infrastructures and to provide security: unfortunately, they don’t appear as reliable partners, considering that they made a similar promise in 2016 without fulfilling it, because power transmission infrastructures were targets of their military campaign against Kabul’s government.
In spite of the recent military moves to increase security along the border, the real capacity of Turkmen armed forces must be carefully evaluated: as a matter of fact, the Turkmen army did not undertake any military operations and were not involved in any multilateral training exercises as a consequence of Turkmenistan’s neutrality policy, while the lack of qualified training personnel could undermine the efficient deployment of the national army.[22]
Since 1995, Turkmenistan has adopted a foreign policy based on permanent neutrality (Baky Bytaraplyk), according to which Turkmenistan can neither join any military alliances nor host foreign military bases in its territory: the country cannot evidently participate in armed conflicts – with the exception of self-defence – nor join economic blocs.[23]
Furthermore, Turkmenistan has always refused to join multilateral regional organizations backed by Russia and China in the security field (namely the Collective Security Treaty Organization as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization): Turkmenistan’s self-exclusion from regional security organization exposes the country to a dangerous vulnerability, due to its inability to provide security along the border with Afghanistan. However, some years ago there were rumours about the involvement of Russian troops and military advisors along the Turkmen-Afghan border to strengthen security as well as preventing destabilizing incursions of IS-K foreign fighters and Taliban from Afghanistan, even if this speculation has never been verified. Turkmen authorities have repeatedly denied the presence of Russian soldiers, mainly because this would represent a clear breach of “positive neutrality” policy.[24]
In view of a possible deterioration of the security scenario, it appears not a case that in October 2020 Turkmenistan decided to ratify the joint security agreement with Russia after 17 years (as a matter of fact, it was originally signed under former Nyazov’s presidency in 2003) on the basis of which both sides aim to coordinate efforts to provide security and to cooperate in counteracting terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking.[25]
In the next months Turkmenistan should evaluate the effects of its reiterated adhesion to the neutrality policy within the worsening security scenario: Uzbekistan (which is not CSTO member like Turkmenistan) and Tajikistan have planned bilateral military drills with Russia, the main regional security provider. Moreover, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan will hold joint military manoeuvres near the Tajik-Afghan border in early August to counteract security threats coming from Afghanistan.[26]
Also, China is worried about Afghanistan’s growing instability, which could affect investments and infrastructural projects under the Belt and Road Initiative’s banner: Turkmenistan was the first stop of the Central Asian tour undertaken by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi aimed at addressing Central Asia’ security concerns. Wang defined Turkmenistan as a “truly reliable strategic partner”, also declaring that “China is ready to step up cooperation with Turkmenistan in traditional and non-traditional security fields and help the country safeguard its national security”.[27]
Conclusion
A condition of persistent instability along the Afghan-Turkmen border will have a negative impact on the main trade and energy gateways (namely Aqina and Tourghundi) so freezing or delaying all bilateral projects and perspectives of economic growth and development.
However, Turkmenistan has not the military capacity to counteract a condition of instability along the border: in order to preserve domestic political stability and his political leadership, Turkmen President should take into consideration the possibility to deepen military cooperation and security partnership with the two biggest regional players – Russia and China – but carefully balancing these initiatives with the neutrality policy’s principles.
At present Turkmenistan (and other Central Asian republics) perceives terroristic movement Taliban not more as a threat to interstatual borders and domestic political stability but as a more reliable political partner which will contribute to provide security in the region, as a necessary precondition to implement energy and infrastructural projects focussed on Afghanistan and aimed at promoting regional cooperation. One of the key point of the US-Taliban “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” signed in Doha is to fight against terrorist groups linked to Daesh and Al Qaeda, which aims at achieving transnational goals, ensuring that Afghan territory under their control would be not used to threaten the country’s neighbours: this will be the test bench to evaluate the political reliability of Taliban.
[1] Golnaz Esfandiari, Mumin Ahmadi, Fighting The Taliban Was ‘Suicide’: Hundreds Of Afghan Soldiers Escape To Tajikistan, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 9, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-soldiers-taliban-tajikistan/31350957.html
[2] Iskander Akylbayev and Nurtas Janibekov, What Does the US Withdrawal From Afghanistan Mean for Central Asia?, The Diplomat, May 25, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/what-does-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-mean-for-central-asia/
[3] Uzbekistan, Tajikistan report fresh Afghan troop crossings, Eurasianet, June 28, 2021, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-tajikistan-report-fresh-afghan-troop-crossings
[4] President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Meeting of the National Security Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, July 5, 2021, http://www.president.tj/ru/node/26124; Uzbekistan, Tajikistan report fresh Afghan troop crossings, Eurasianet, June 28, 2021, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-tajikistan-report-fresh-afghan-troop-crossings
[5] Dzhumaguly Annayev, Central Asian states bolster security in response to Taliban activity along borders, Central Asia News, July 2, 2021, https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2021/07/02/feature-01
[6] Famine feared in Faryab after rebels seize key port, Afghanistan Times, July 4, 2021, http://www.afghanistantimes.af/famine-feared-in-faryab-after-rebels-seize-key-port/
[7] Taliban captures Torghundi town on border with Turkmenistan, AKIpress, July 9, 2021, https://akipress.com/news:660393:Taliban_captures_Torghundi_town_on_border_with_Turkmenistan/
[8] Turkmenistan Sending Heavy Weaponry, Aircraft To Afghan Border Amid Deteriorating Security, RFERL, July 11, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-border-afghanistan-weaponry/31352997.html#:~:text=Turkmenistan%20has%20begun%20moving%20heavy,Taliban%20fighters%20continue%20major%20offensives.
[9] Ibid
[10] «Талибан» пришел на все границы, Kommersant, July 10, 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4897832; Afghanistan: Taliban assures Moscow it poses no threat to Central Asia states, The Times of Central Asia, July 11, 2021, www.timesca.com/index.php/news/23970-afghanistan-taliban-assures-moscow-it-poses-no-threat-to-central-asia-states+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=it
[11] Bruce Pannier, Is there a terrorist threat for Turkmenistan?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 1, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-turkmenistan-terror-threat-afghanistan-islamic-state/28653368.html
[12] Dzhumaguly Annayev,Turkmenistan counts on Turkmen-Afghans to fight extremism, July 20, 2016, https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2016/07/20/feature-01
[13] Taliban Holds Talks With Turkmen Officials In Ashgabat Amid Deteriorating Afghan Security, RFERL, July 12, 2021, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-turkmenistan-talks/31354090.html; Turkmenistan: As Taliban arrives at the gates, diplomats and army scramble, Akhal-Teke: A Turkmenistan Bulletin/Eurasianet, July 13, 2021, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-as-taliban-arrives-at-the-gates-diplomats-and-army-scramble
[14] Vladimir Isachenkov, Taliban visit Moscow to say their wins don’t threaten Russia, Associated Press, July 8, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/taliban-moscow-europe-russia-51327432f1455020352826281c6c4e73; Taliban assures Moscow it poses no threat to Central Asia states, The Times of Central Asia, July 11, 2021, www.timesca.com/index.php/news/23970-afghanistan-taliban-assures-moscow-it-poses-no-threat-to-central-asia-states+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=it
[15] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, The Delegation of Turkmenistan had meetings with the Afghan Leadership, January 9, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.tm/en/news/2435
[16] Turkmenistan, Afghanistan open new rail, power and communication links, Caravanserai and AFP, January 14, 2021, https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2021/01/14/feature-03;Shadi Khan Saif, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan launch connectivity projects, Anadolu Agency, January 14, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/afghanistan-turkmenistan-launch-connectivity-projects/2109837
[17] Ogulgozel Rejepova, Lapis Lazuli Corridor –Major Trade Route From Afghanistan to Europe, Business Turkmenistan, May 17, 2021, https://business.com.tm/post/7064/lapis-lazuli-corridor-major-trade-route-from-afghanistan-to-europe; Naghi Ahmadov, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan Sign Trilateral Roadmap for Cooperation on Eurasian Connectivity, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 23, February 10, 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-afghanistan-and-turkmenistan-sign-trilateral-roadmap-for-cooperation-on-eurasian-connectivity/
[18] Turkmenistan, Afghanistan open new rail, power and communication links, Caravanserai and AFP, Janaury 14, 2021, https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2021/01/14/feature-03
[19] Turkmenistan Wants Fast Completion Of Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline, Silk Road Briefing, September 25, 2020, https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/09/25/turkmenistan-wants-fast-completion-of-turkmen-afghan-pakistan-india-gas-pipeline/
[20] Turkmen Petroleum, Security concept for Afghan section of TAPI gas pipeline singed in Kabul, April 20, 2021, https://turkmenpetroleum.com/en/2021/04/20/security-concept-for-afghan-section-of-tapi-gas-pipeline-signed-in-kabul/
[21] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, The Meeting with the Delegation of Political Office of Taliban Movement was held in the MFA of Turkmenistan, February 6, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.tm/en/news/2470
[22] David Goreburg, External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces’, SIPRI Working Paper, January 2014, pp. 12-15, http://www.sipri.org/research/security/afghanistan/central-asia-security/publications/SIPRI-OSFno1WP.pdf
[23] Luca Anceschi, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of Turkmen Regime, London, Routledge, 2009, pp.26–29
[24] Nicole Wolkov, Implications of Turkmen-Russian Security Consultations, Caspian Policy Center, March 9, 2020, https://www.caspianpolicy.org/implications-of-turkmen-russian-security-consultations/
[25] “Turkmenistan: Feeling insecure”, Akhal-Teke: A Turkmenistan Bulletin, October 27, 2020, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-feeling-insecure
[26] Catherine Putz, Russia to Hold Military Drills Near Afghan Border in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, The Diplomat, July 21, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/russia-to-hold-military-drills-near-afghan-border-in-tajikistan-uzbekistan/
[27] Shi Jiangtao, Chinese foreign minister talks energy in Central Asia but Afghanistan casts a shadow over meetings, South China Morning Post, July 13, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3140958/chinese-foreign-minister-talks-energy-central-asia-afghanistan