“Cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia is characterized by a steady rise and certain breakthroughs, and this is the main difference between the current stage of Uzbek-Russian relations. At the same time, relations are still concentrated at the bilateral level, and the refusal to join Russian-centric structures is the continuity of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy strategy”, Ildar Yakubov, an Uzbek expert, said in an article written specifically for the analytical platform CABAR.asia. in the field of international relations.
The first presidential term of the head of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev demonstrated the consistent expansion of the country’s foreign policy and foreign economic relations. The openness of the new Uzbekistan is called the main distinguishing feature of the country’s foreign policy over the past five years.
Russia traditionally takes the leading place for Uzbekistan. Both states are united by historically established political, economic and cultural ties. In this regard, it is of interest to study the changes in Uzbek-Russian relations that have been observed under the presidency of Shavkat Mirziyoyev.
The legacy of the “old” Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan’s first president left a controversial legacy in relations with Russia. Some observers note the uneasy interaction between the countries, which has become a “calling card” of foreign policy under Islam Karimov. He was probably the most uncomfortable partner of Russia in Central Asia.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Karimov has developed a close relationship with Vladimir Putin in recent years, which is important for political regimes in which key foreign policy decisions are made personally by the head of state.
It seemed that both sides accepted the established rules of the game, in which Tashkent tacitly recognizes the role of Russia, and Moscow takes for granted Uzbekistan’s emphasized distancing from global centers of power. Russia also recognized the reality formed in Uzbekistan for its political leader, in which some problems related to bilateral relations and the region, but which do not fit into the picture of the world and the place of Uzbekistan in it, are denied.
For example, the problem of labor migration or an overestimation of one’s own role in Central Asia, including in the security sphere, which was expressed, in particular, in unsuccessful attempts to resolve border problems by force.
Pro-Russian orientation?
The very first steps of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who took power in Uzbekistan in the fall of 2016, could inspire Moscow to expect important strategic changes. It seemed that its patience should be rewarded: Mirziyoyev was called pro-Russian[1] immediately when discussing the issue of Karimov’s successor, and the “multi-vector” nature of the previous course was replaced by expectations of an accentuated focus on Moscow[2].
Changes in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, refusal of self-isolation and the principle of “openness” entailed a revision of relations with Russia. The change in the nature of relations was reflected in the dynamics of contacts, regular meetings at the highest and high levels, intergovernmental, interparliamentary, interdepartmental contacts, forums of representatives of business circles, and the actualization of interregional cooperation.
Uzbekistan’s interest in investments led to the rapid development of relations formed during the premiership of Shavkat Mirziyoyev with Russian oligarchs of Uzbek origin, who acquired industrial enterprises and developed socially significant projects.
Russian-Uzbek meetings began to be filled with specific content and large-scale projects. A flurry of initiatives and proposals from the new head of Uzbekistan following the Uzbek side’s readiness to discuss previously closed topics, such as joining the EAEU or labor migration, aroused additional enthusiasm in Moscow.
A reflection of the dynamics and development prospects was the visit of Vladimir Putin to Tashkent on October 18-19, 2018, which ended with the signing of contracts worth $ 27 billion. Enthusiasm about the prospects for Uzbek-Russian relations is well reflected by the phrase in one of the Russian media: “astronomical figures and stratospheric plans”[3].
That said, $ 11 billion were future loans for the already forgotten nuclear power plant construction project, which even initially looked like a contradictory long-term construction. Foreign projects for the construction of nuclear power plants are distinguished by their duration, associated both with the approval of documentation, including with the IAEA, and with the construction of the facility itself.
In particular, the Russian project for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Egypt was approved in 2015, the cost of $ 25 billion was to be secured by loans from the Russian side, but the start of construction is constantly being postponed[4].
Growth of trade and economic cooperation
Shavkat Mirziyoyev liberalized foreign economic activity, developing large-scale cooperation by the standards of Uzbekistan with all centers of power and in all directions, which was reflected in the growth of trade and economic ties with Russia.
It is significant that, in contrast to the previous period, the upward trend in trade turnover remains stable, as does the growth of the negative trade balance of Uzbekistan. Bilateral trade is growing despite the controversy over joining the EAEU or the pandemic, which has affected the cooperation of almost all countries in the world. In particular, in 2020, trade grew by more than 15% compared to 2019[5].
As can be seen from the table, the growth of trade turnover is largely due to imports from Russia. In 2020 alone, the negative balance for Uzbekistan increased by 25.89% (707,010,864 US dollars), imports increased by 19.24%, while exports to Russia grew by 3.82% compared to 2019[6].
At the same time, the attempts of the Russian Federation to involve Uzbekistan in its integration project - the Eurasian Economic Union - have so far been unsuccessful.
EAEU: "for" or "against"
The accession to the Eurasian Economic Union was actualized by the efforts of the Russian side almost immediately after Mirziyoyev came to power.
Among the goals of the EAEU are "comprehensive modernization, cooperation and increasing the competitiveness of national economies and creating conditions for stable development in order to improve the living standards of the population of the member states"[7], and this fully meets the stated goals of the leadership of Uzbekistan. However, in practice the EAEU is the union of Russia and the countries belonging to the European, Caucasian and Central Asian subregions of the former Soviet Union, in which Moscow appears as an informal core and the main initiator of the integration ideas.
Thus, an important indicator of the effectiveness of regional integration is the volume of mutual trade. At the end of 2018, it amounted to $ 59.7 billion, while the volume of foreign trade in goods with third countries reached $ 753.4 billion[8]. Consequently, the trade turnover within the EAEU is less than 10% of the external trade turnover. This indicates insufficiently effective integration, which still has significant untapped development potential. Indeed, the main integration processes are associated with Russia, in addition to it, the trade turnover of, for example, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia (two member states of this economic bloc) is extremely insignificant, and, naturally, does not play a significant role in the trade turnover of these republics.
In this regard, joining the EAEU would mean abandoning the fundamental principle of "equidistance" of Uzbekistan's foreign policy and granting economic and political exclusivity for Russia. To compensate for the asymmetric dependence settlement of certain issues, such as labor migration, it is not quite an adequate solution.
In addition, migration issues turn out to be less acute thanks to bilateral cooperation with the relevant departments of the Russian Federation and the opening of new consular missions, their provision of practical assistance to citizens, even despite the persistence of the problem: according to official data, the annual surplus of labor is about 200 thousand people, and it should compensated by external labor migration[9].
What is even more important in the context of joining or not joining the EAEU is that the possibility of competition with Russia in the economic field for modern Uzbekistan is permissible only if structural reforms are carried out, which in practice would confirm the declared theses of economic modernization.
It seems that the rejection of liberal economic reforms and the rejection of joining the EAEU look like interrelated events. In these conditions, it would be difficult for the political and economic elite to compensate for their losses from joining the EAEU. Although for the citizens of Uzbekistan, the appearance on the country's market of better and more competitive goods and services would bring more benefits, and the principle of free movement of labor would qualitatively change the problem of labor and other migration for the better.
Thus, Uzbekistan's acquisition of a non-binding observer status in December 2020 looks like a completely logical decision for Tashkent. For Moscow, such a development of events seems to be an outright failure, especially against the background of previous statements about the already adopted decision and development plans "after Uzbekistan's accession to the EAEU"[10].
Military-technical cooperation
In the midst of discussing the prospects of Uzbekistan in the EAEU, the question of the "third advent" of Tashkent to the CSTO was also raised[11]. However, this issue was not put on the agenda of bilateral relations. Over the past five years, Tashkent has never given any doubts about the continuity of that part of Islam Karimov's foreign policy course, which concerns the principle of a multi-vector policy. This is not surprising as the balance of power and many of the security threats persist today. It is no coincidence that the Foreign Policy Concept, adopted in 2012, which explicitly prohibits the country's participation in military-political blocs, was never revised, despite statements about the need to make changes.
However, the continuity of the strategy did not prevent significant changes at the bilateral level. Shavkat Mirziyoyev activated the option of privileged military-technical cooperation, obtained under Islam Karimov, and which allows him to enjoy privileges in the purchase of Russian weapons.
Already on November 29, 2016, the defense ministers of the two countries signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation, which allowed the Uzbek side to negotiate directly with Russian weapons manufacturers. At the same time, Uzbekistan got the opportunity to send its military personnel to study in Russian military institutions, renewing the agreements, which ended in 2012, with the withdrawal of Uzbekistan from the CSTO.
In 2017, agreements on the supply, maintenance and repair of weapons and military equipment began to be implemented. From the same year, the practice of joint exercises resumed, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis.
On the other hand, Russia is active in cooperation not only with Uzbekistan, but also with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Perhaps there is an element of prestige in the build-up of Russian military power in the region, with echoes of the historic “Great Game”. Arms sales, expanded joint military exercises with escalation scenarios, increased surveillance, cooperation within the CSTO are all part of an overall strategy to strengthen Russia's status at the global level and a response to Beijing, which in between 2016 and 2020 has increased arms sales to countries in the region, established a military facility in Tajikistan without an official announcement and pledged to support Dushanbe's efforts to secure the border in Afghanistan with new facilities and military assistance[12].
In this context, the strategic partnership program in the military field for 2021-2025, adopted in April 2021, immediately after the CSTO summit, by Moscow and Tashkent, consolidates the level of military-technical cooperation for the medium term[13].
Desecuritization of Russia's soft power
Despite a 30-year independence period, during most of which Uzbekistan has markedly distanced itself from the former metropolis, Russia's “soft power” seems to have undergone minor changes. Factors such as institutional legacy, types of political thinking, bureaucratic processes, common historical experience continue to influence.
Russian media are still popular in Uzbekistan, including television, which often serves as a source of news and, importantly, further formation of a position on certain issues. Moscow's position on the international agenda, broadcast through the media, can serve as a starting point for understanding and further analysis of international events. Russia's positive image is also supported by a much higher level of personal connections. Taking into account labor migration, more Uzbek citizens visit Russia annually than all other countries.
In recent years, this has also been facilitated by the policy of Mirziyoyev. Tacitly shared common views on the political model and the development of legislation are manifested in public support for Putin's domestic political initiatives, in particular, regarding a referendum on the extension of his powers, which may be a certain signal for Uzbek society, or the adoption of bills similar to those in Russia. In addition, demonstratively pro-Russian gestures with respect to political and historical issues related to history have become characteristic, which is expressed in a positive and sentimental image of many features of the Soviet past, the Great Patriotic War, as well as the promotion of the study of the Russian language and education in Russia.
Tashkent's attitude to the possibility of Russia using "soft power" as a means of propaganda and manipulation of Russian-speaking citizens, or even creating a fifth column to undermine sovereignty[14], characterizes the incident that took place in May 2020. It is connected with an attempt to implement the provisions of the Law on the State Language of 1995, when the obligation to use the Uzbek language in office work caused a negative comment by the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry M. Zakharova, who was regarded by the Uzbek Foreign Ministry as an attempt to interfere in internal affairs. This shows the line between political cooperation and political manipulation for Tashkent. The fact that the incident did not develop indicates the acceptance of the rules of interaction by both parties.
Meanwhile, few surveys of public opinion show that the society of Uzbekistan has a generally positive attitude towards Russia. A survey conducted in spring 2020 by the Central Asia branch of the Global Barometer Surveys project showed that 57.8% of Uzbeks rely more on Russia as a source of assistance to the republic against the COVID-19 pandemic, and only less than 14% believed that China could best help. Although the above figures are not the result of large-scale research, they obviously reflect existing sympathies in one way or another.
Conclusion
Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan took a course towards a comprehensive deepening and development of relations with Russia, which, for its part, greeted the initiatives of the Central Asian republic with great enthusiasm and hopes for building exclusive relations and fully involving it in its orbit.
However, the intensification of cooperation is not an exclusive offer for Russia. A similar dynamic can be observed in Uzbekistan's relations with other centers of power and neighboring states.
Cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia is characterized by a steady rise and certain breakthroughs, and this is the main difference between the current stage of Uzbek-Russian relations.
At the same time, relations are still concentrated on the bilateral level, and the refusal to join Russian-centric structures lies in the continuity of Uzbekistan's foreign policy strategy.
[1] See, for example: Baranova M., Bratersky A. Prime Minister appointed by the President. 09/08/2016. - https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/09/08_a_10183475.shtml; Dubnov A. What awaits Uzbekistan after the end of the Karimov era. -30.08.2016. https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2016/08/30/57c432659a79472f9c9c5392; Russian media: Who, if not Karimov? - 30.08.2016. - https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-37217721; Is Mirziyoyev a pro-Russian politician? 10/15/2016. - https://vesti.uz/mirziyoev-prorossijskij-politik/, etc.
[2] Knyazev A. Tashkent tends to be equidistant from Moscow - 26.12.2016. - https://www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2016-12-26/11_6894_tashkent.html
[3] Kurilkin A. Astronomical figures and stratospheric plans: results of Putin's visit to Tashkent. 19.10.2018. https://uz.sputniknews.ru/20181019/Astronomic news-tsifry-i-kosmicheskie-plany-itogi-vizita-Putina-v-Tashkent-9753537.html
[4] Rosatom has named the expected date for the start of construction of a nuclear power plant in Egypt. 09/23/2020. https://www.tinkoff.ru/invest/news/460326/
[5] Trade between Russia and Uzbekistan. Russian Foreign Trade website, https://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2021-02/torgovlya-mezhdu-rossiey-i-uzbekistanom-v-2020-g
[6] Trade between Russia and Uzbekistan. Russian Foreign Trade website, https://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2021-02/torgovlya-mezhdu-rossiey-i-uzbekistanom-v-2020-g/
[7] Eurasian Economic Union. http://www.eaeunion.org/#about
[8] Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). RIA News. https://ria.ru/20191001/1559271451.html
[9] The issues of supporting citizens working abroad were discussed. 17.08.2020. Official site of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/3780?fbclid=IwAR1XjbRVrX7qJWt27oyl1n_f1UbL3qotetrzCNP_Nh1hbk3yoOtwMgn2T4Y
[10] Uzbekistan is working on the issue of joining the EAEU, Matvienko said. https://ria.ru/20191002/1559343154.html
[11] It's time for Uzbekistan to join the EAEU and the CSTO. 10/04/2019. https://forbes.kz/finances/integration/uzbekistan_v_eaes/
[12] Kinga Szálkai. Russia’s Recent Military Buildup in Central Asia. September 25, 2020. https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/russias-recent-military-buildup-central-asia
[13] Russia and Uzbekistan first adopted a military partnership program, April 28, 2021 - https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/04/28/rossiya-i-uzbekistan-vpervye-prinyali-programmu-voennogo-partnerstva
[14] Arkady Dubnov. Reflecting on a Quarter Century of Russia’s Relations With Central Asia. April 19, 2018.https: //carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/19/reflecting-on-quarter-century-of-russia-s-relations-with-central-asia-pub-76117
[15] Where the Central Asians expect the Aid coming from Ii Order to handle the COVID-19 Crisis? 02.02.2021. https://ca-barometer.org/en/news/where-the-central-asians-expect-the-aid-coming-from-ii-order-to-handle-the-covid-19-crisis