In Kazakhstan, the upcoming parliamentary elections are not intriguing at all, says Sergey Marinin, an independent researcher from Kazakhstan and participant of CABAR.asia School of Analytics. “In essence, terrific environment has been created for the re-election of the old party guard and the preservation of the status quo in the parliament,” the expert says.
Follow us on LinkedIn!
The beginning of the new 2021 was marked by a minor historical event – the first regular parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan. In the past, only early elections were always held with the exception of the very first election campaign in 1994. However, that is where the amusing facts about the upcoming elections end.
All parliamentary campaigns in Kazakhstan since 1999 had serious violations and did not meet international election standards, according to the assessment of the OSCE International Observation Missions.
The new political cycle presents another round of senseless budget spending for holding the next elections because nothing new and innovative seems to be offered by the parties.
The only registered opposition force, the National Social Democratic Party (OSDP in Russian), is boycotting the upcoming elections depriving the protest electorate of the opportunity to express its political view.
Kazakhstanis have no hopes for changes regarding the new election cycle for several explicit reasons:
- The party power vertical has been formed since 1999 and remains unchanged since then;
- The first president’s party, Nur Otan, has long been dominating the parliament;
- Loyalist parties that got into the legislature are not particularly visible on the political scene of the country;
- ‘Spoiler parties’ are only active during the election race but that is what they are created for.
The parliamentary elections do not stir interest among Kazakhstanis also because in the indefinite agenda of the parties along with a lack of coherent and publicly known party men except for the representatives of the ruling party. The absence of focused and consistent work of parties outside the electoral cycle creates more difficulties for their better functioning. The electorate, in turn, poorly navigates the ideologically diverse party platforms and is swamped with various loud promises that are typically not brought to life.
The overall socio-political apathy is also due to the countless challenges of 2020. The crisis caused by the pandemic has morally and economically exhausted society. Finally, the pre-election race falls on the holiday period – the Independence Day and New Year’s festivities, so the campaigning becomes problematic. The voters simply won’t care about it. In essence, the ideal conditions have been created for the re-election of the old party guard and the preservation of the status quo in the parliament.
Past parliamentary elections: evolution from multi-party chaos to authoritarian monopoly. And why do autocracies need parties at all?
Although the history of the parliamentarism in Kazakhstan is comparatively short, in terms of party building at the dawn of its independence the republic had true freedom of speech. That resulted in quite a heterogeneous party field during the first years of independence. According to the analysis of L.I. Karmazina, perestroika became the starting point of the flourishing of various informal and proto-party associations linked by a common idea of becoming a new alternative to the old ideology of the Communist Party.
Periods of development of party building in Kazakhstan[1]
Until about 1993, the party field of Kazakhstan consisted of scattered pro-party formations without regional subdivisions and a clear ideological basis. During the period from 1993 to 2001, Kazakhstan had party pluralism,[2] where the first key milestone was 1996, when the law “On Political Parties” was adopted, and after that, when the electoral formula changed and the elections were held by districts and based on party lists. In general, this and subsequent periods are characterized by a tightening of electoral legislation, violation of the rights of both voters and those who were being elected.
A clear trend on monopolizing the party field started since 2002, when under the new law “On Political Parties” the requirements for registration, the number of party members, and the presence of regional divisions were tightened. This led to the absorption of parties and weakening of their influence on the country’s politics. Out of 19 parties that existed at that time, only 7 were re-registered.[3]
As a result, in the 2004 elections the forerunner of the presidential ‘Nur Otan’ party, back then called ‘Otan’, became the dominant political force. Further election campaigns cemented the leading positions of ‘Nur Otan’ even more. In 2007 the party won all seats in parliament. Spoiler and loyal parties created afterwards did not constitute true political competition. They only became an obvious facade of party struggle.
Over-centralization of power is endemic for an authoritarian regime and it is clear that majority of key decisions are made by one structure. However, why Kazakhstan still needs political parties and holds elections? Apart from the obvious reasons such as legitimation of the ruling elite and stabilizing of the ruling regime, creation of a democratic facade, political parties have practical purpose in the authoritarian system.
According to the typology of R. Isaacs,[4] parties serve the economic and political interests of various elite and near-elite groups. Party functionaries articulate these interests in the so-called “leverage” model, when elite groups close to the regime use party representatives to advance their own financial and political ambitions.
Another model of exploitation of the party apparatus is the “coordination” model, when the party plays the role of a mobilizing force of the population and serves as a mechanism for informing the population. In this model, the party also consolidates the ideas of the president and his close elites in order to pass laws in the interests of the latter. The presidential party has precisely become this mechanism – the mouthpiece and a gatekeeper of the ruling class on the ground for more than 15 years.
However, in 2017 president initiated a major constitutional reform, endowing the country’s parliament with great powers and potentially giving the right to form the government. This reform at the time received a positive appraisal from the Venice Commission.[5] However, some wordings of the reform could have been interpreted ambiguously, especially in terms of delegating a number of powers to the parliament. This was also reflected in the Commission’s assessment.[6] In general, the proposed mechanisms and amendments “develop the mechanisms of parliamentary control, which contributes to the improvement of the democratic organization of the state.”[7] Given this situation, the renewed party landscape looks interesting. What are the parties going to propose during the upcoming elections of 2021?
What’s new in this election campaign
Five parties participate in the new electoral cycle: the ruling Nur Otan, two loyalists who were already present in the outgoing composition of the lower house – Ak Zhol and the renewed Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan, now simply called the People’s Party of Kazakhstan (PPK), as well as two loyal to the authorities parties that did not enter the legislature earlier – “Auyl” and “Birlik”, now known as “Adal” (“fair” or “devoted” from Kazakh).
Elections are held to the lower legislative chamber – the Mazhilis, as well as to maslikhats of all levels.
The parties have already submitted their party lists. It is interesting that in terms of the number of candidates presented, after the self-evident leader in the form of the ruling party, the People’s Party of Kazakhstan is in second place. With such indicators, the parties were registered by the CEC (in the order of their location in the voting form):
In total, the Mazhilis will include 98 deputies and 9 more appointees from the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.
What is new in this campaign?
- The threshold for the number of party members for registering the latter has been reduced from 40 to 20 thousand,[8] including all its structural divisions (branches and representative offices) in all regions, cities of republican significance and in the capital, with at least six hundred party members in each of them. In general, this step can be assessed more likely as positive than negative, but this amendment cannot be called significant liberalization, since the existing model of party lists prevents the country’s citizens from participating as self-nominated candidates. Election legislation in this part requires significant reforms.
- A mandatory 30% quota has been introduced for women and youth of the total number of candidates for deputy. For all its indicative progressiveness, the norm “blurs the goals of achieving equality and justice for women [and] does not comply with the UN recommendations and the UN sustainable development goals”.[9]
- The National Social Democratic Party (NSDP), the only registered opposition party in Kazakhstan, which participated in previous elections and fail to make it to parliament, is boycotting the new elections. The protest electorate is left without representation both in the main legislative body and on the municipal and regional levels.
- The rights of independent observers are significantly limited. Most civil society organizations will no longer be able to observe elections if there is no provision in their charters specifying that election observation is among key priorities of their activities. The use of means of photo and video recording of electoral violations is also prohibited or significantly restricted. Therefore, proving the facts of violations now becomes extremely problematic. The authorities drew conclusions based on the results of last year’s presidential elections, when social networks were flooded with videos of massive falsifications and ballot stuffing. In 2019 this sparked a wave of peaceful rallies across the country and massive police arrests afterwards.
Conclusions
The voters are once again being lured and tricked by new names and slogans, promises of social justice and economic growth and prosperity, and new reforms. However, the upcoming parliamentary elections present no suspense. The presidential party remains the dominant power in the country and lack of independent observers makes it simple for the ruling regime to rig the final digits. The only ‘exciting’ thing here is whether Nur Otan will share the pie with the NPK and whether new players emerge on political scene.
The inability to mobilize the protest electorate on the one hand and the opposition’s lack of visible and meaningful activity beyond the pre-election period on the other completely destroy its chances for further political struggle.
2019 post-election protests of last year demonstrated the society’s demand for change. It was intensified by the socio-economic problems caused by this year’s pandemic.
Given the current situation, it is important to bring the initiated constitutional reform to the end and even expand it by imparting the parliament with more powers.
It is now pointless to hope that the new convocation of the Mazhilis will become a full-fledged representative body with party struggle and combative debates on pressing socio-political issues. But, we as a society need to strive to ensure that the new parliament does not turn into a faceless technical body that acts merely as a printing press.
This article was prepared as part of the Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Project.
[1] Karmazina L. I. “Party-political models of Kazakhstan and Russia: genesis and institutionalization”, Publishing house “Gramota”, 2009. www.gramota.net/materials/1/2009/1-2/26.html
[2] Ibid, p. 80.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Isaacs, Rico (2020) The Role of Party Interest Articulation in the Personalist-Authoritarian Regimes of the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, Problems of Post-Communism, 67:4-5, 375-387, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2019.1645606, P. 376.
[5] European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)2017 Kazakhstan: Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 110th Plenary Session (Venice, 10-11March 2017), 14 March 2017, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)010-e
[6] Ibid.
[7] Khabrieva T. Ya., Andrichenko L. V. Constitutional reform in the Republic of Kazakhstan: trends and development prospects // Journal of foreign legislation and comparative jurisprudence. 2017. No. 3 (64). (date of access: 21.12.2020), p. 148.
[8] Clause 6 of Article 10 of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 15, 2002 No. 344-II “On Political Parties” (with amendments and additions as of May 25, 2020) https://online.zakon.kz/document/ ? doc_id = 1032141
[9] Raisova Z., “Why did Kazakhstan introduce quotas for women and youth?”, June 5, 2020, Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting < https://cabar.asia/ru/zachem-v-kazahstane-vveli-kvoty -dlya-zhenshhin-i-molodezhi > (date accessed: 21.12.2020)