As the EU faces challenges in promoting democracy in Central Asia, many wonder what the current strategy for democracy promotion should look like. What are the key elements of a successful strategy, and how can conditionality be used effectively? Moreover, can the goals of promoting democracy, protecting human rights, and supporting civil society in the region realistically be achieved, given the current complex political and economic realities? CABAR.asia explores these questions and more in an exclusive interview with the Ghent University expert.
Fabienne Bossuyt is an Associate Professor and co-coordinator of the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies (GIES). She earned her PhD from Aston University (UK) and Ghent University, where she wrote her doctoral dissertation on the European Union’s influence in Post-Soviet Central Asia. Dr Bossuyt is a senior lecturer in the MA program for EU Studies and the MA Program for Global Studies. She is also a co-director of the Eureast Platform of Ghent University, a Professorial Fellow at UNU-CRIS, an affiliated researcher of EUCAM, and a member of the Academic Board of the European Neighbourhood Council.
The worldwide spread of democracy marked the 20th century. However, the current trend is characterised by a significant regression of democracy, not only in countries where democratic traditions are not well-established but also in Western societies where we observe the emergence of illiberal democracies. This ‘democratic backsliding’ poses a serious threat to democracy globally. The Economist Intelligence Unit has identified a steady decline in democracy in half of the countries examined in its most recent report, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite this worrying trend, the European Union (EU) member states stand out as normative actors committed to promoting liberal values and supporting civil society worldwide. The EU’s continued efforts make it a critical force in defending and advancing democratic principles in an increasingly complex global environment. How do you assess the EU’s democracy promotion strategy in Central Asia (CA) over the years?
The European Union’s efforts to promote democracy in Central Asia have fallen short. Central Asia has always been a peripheral region for the EU, and as such, it has not been a top priority. The limited scope of the EU’s activities is one of the primary reasons for this lack of effectiveness. Even in the most active countries of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the EU’s efforts have been somewhat limited compared to other post-Soviet nations, especially those of the Eastern Partnership. Despite starting its work in the early 2000s, the EU has not achieved significant results in promoting democracy in Central Asia. Overall, it is fair to say that the EU’s democracy promotion in Central Asia has been relatively ineffective.
In light of the EU’s more intense focus on promoting democracy in Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, one might wonder about the reasons behind this approach. Could it be due to their proximity to the EU’s borders and the stronger cultural and political ties between the EU and the EaP countries when compared to more geographically and civilisationally distant Central Asia? Is it possible that the EU will become more deeply involved in supporting democracy in Central Asia in the future?
The EU’s engagement with Central Asia has historically focused on material interests, such as energy cooperation and connectivity, with democracy promotion taking a backseat. By contrast, the EU has prioritised promoting democracy in Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, largely due to their geographic proximity. However, despite the EU’s increased efforts in the EaP, there have been ups and downs, such as in Azerbaijan, where the EU’s energy interests have overshadowed EU democracy promotion. This raises the question of why the EU’s democracy promotion strategy has been largely ineffective in Central Asia.
There is a range of factors at play. Firstly, the EU’s limited offer to Central Asian countries has hindered the promotion of democracy, as compared to Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, where the EU could offer more powerful incentives for democratisation. Additionally, the instruments of democracy promotion used by the EU have been largely ineffective. Among other things, the instruments have been characterised by technocratic and depoliticising tendencies. They reflect a set of ideals for governance, which adheres to the virtues of depoliticisation, harmonisation, rationalisation and objectification of policy-making and evaluation of democracy aid. It favours the role of technical experts in policy-making and policy implementation over substantively political or democratic public actors.
Moreover, it excessively emphasises tangible, measurable outputs and relies excessively on long-term resident expatriate advisers. Another critique concerns the EU’s reluctance to employ the “conditionality approach” when promoting democracy in Central Asia. This is due to the EU prioritising its own interests over its values, often favouring stability over democracy, which is evident in the EU’s ties with highly authoritarian leaders in the region. That said, the conditionality approach is also under scrutiny, especially for a region like Central Asia.
Read also: Central Asia’s Geopolitical Importance: Western Policies and Agendas
You have mentioned the EU’s neo-liberal approach to promoting democracy in Central Asia. Could you explain what you mean by “neo-liberal” and how this approach plays out in the context of democracy promotion? Additionally, could you provide some concrete examples of how the EU in Central Asia has manifested this understanding of democracy promotion?
As our conversation has touched upon the issue of the EU’s neo-liberal approach to democracy promotion in Central Asia, it’s worth exploring this topic in more detail. Some scholars argue that the EU’s approach to promoting democracy in Central Asia is highly technocratic and managerial, with ready-made solutions being transferred to the local context. Moreover, the EU’s approach is embedded in the neo-liberal paradigm of the “state – civil society – market” mindset, which is prevalent in the West. However, this paradigm is not necessarily applicable to the local context of Central Asia, where liberal democracy is a foreign concept. This understanding can impact the effectiveness of the EU’s democracy promotion strategy in the region.
One area where this can be observed is in the type of civil society organisations that the EU works with in Central Asia. These organisations often operate according to Western-style systems and processes, which are required to access and manage EU funding. While these organisations may fit well into the EU’s understanding of civil society, they may not necessarily represent the local context of Central Asia.
How does a de-centred, post-neoliberal approach to resilience differ from traditional approaches, and why is it necessary in Central Asia? Furthermore, what are some examples of successful self-organisation efforts in Central Asia, and how can they be replicated in different states of the region?
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition among some scholars that promoting democracy in Central Asia requires a shift away from the traditional Eurocentric and neoliberal approach. This approach emphasises the need to tailor democracy promotion efforts to the local context rather than impose externally designed solutions. In other words, it is a post-liberal approach that de-centres the Western perspective and takes into account the specific realities of Central Asia.
One example of this approach can be seen in the volunteer groups and self-help unions that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic in Central Asia. These organisations provided crucial support to communities in need when government responses fell short. This demonstrates the resilience of Central Asia’s societal fabric, which places a high value on principles of solidarity and social trust. This is in contrast to the West, where government support was relied upon more heavily. The success of these local initiatives highlights the importance of incorporating local actors and values into democracy promotion efforts in Central Asia.
The emergence of civil society groups and self-help organisations in Central Asia during the COVID-19 pandemic was undoubtedly a significant development. Do you believe that the lack of trust in governments played a pivotal role in their emergence and allowed them to take on a more significant role in society?
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed starkly contrasting societal attitudes between Central Asia and the West. While in the West, there was a heavy reliance on the government to provide support, in Central Asia, the principles of solidarity and social trust played a crucial role. As distrust of Central Asian governments grew, traditional and newly-emerged civil society groups and self-help organisations came to the fore, providing much-needed support to communities in need. This collective communitarian willingness to contribute and help is a testament to the resilience of the societal fabric in Central Asia. In contrast, the Western attitude of “Why should I help others? I need to help myself” prevailed. This dichotomy highlights the potential for effective democracy promotion in Central Asia rooted in local realities and values rather than the Eurocentric and neoliberal approach often employed by the EU.
Given the impressive civil society mobilisation efforts in Central Asia during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a concern that these groups could be co-opted by incumbent regimes and turned into political rivals. Some activists who gained symbolic capital during the pandemic attempted to enter local politics but were met with legal restrictions, political barriers, and corrupt institutions. The question remains: how can the EU effectively support such initiatives amidst political rivalry with traditional autocracies in Central Asia and amidst propagandist narratives accusing the EU of interference in the internal politics of Central Asian states under the guise of promoting democracy?
The EU’s approach to democracy promotion and civil society support in Central Asia has been flawed, as it has been based on a Eurocentric view that is out of touch with local realities. Building democracy in the region is a complex process that cannot be externally imposed and must grow internally from the hands of Central Asian citizens. The EU needs to reconsider its approach, as it cannot expect the same mechanisms that worked in the West to work in Central Asia necessarily. The region has a diverse societal fabric and cultural factors that shape its understanding of democracy, which the EU must take into account.
Given the deeply ingrained Eurocentrism in the EU’s approach to democracy promotion in Central Asia, raising awareness of the need to reconsider its approach is indeed a significant challenge. How do you propose the EU should address this issue and work towards a more effective approach that takes into account the local realities and diverse societal fabric of the region?
Those on the ground widely recognise the challenges of promoting democracy in Central Asia. However, there is still work to be done in raising awareness among EU officials in Brussels and other European capitals. While officials who have lived in the region understand the flaws of the current approach, those at a distance may cling to Eurocentric beliefs and assume that Western democracy can be easily replicated elsewhere. The EU must recognise the diversity of the Central Asian region and the need for democracy to grow internally rather than being externally imposed. Only by acknowledging these realities can the EU effectively support democracy promotion and civil society development in the region.
The EU’s approach to democracy promotion has been criticised in Central Asia, but what about other regions where it promotes democracy? Is the EU using a systemic approach in other parts of the world, and are there any successful regional models in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) or Africa that the EU could adapt for better results in Central Asia?
The EU’s approach to democracy promotion in Central Asia has evolved over time. Initially, the region was seen as similar to post-Communist Eastern Europe and Russia, and the EU’s approach was focused on promoting liberal democracy and a market economy. However, as the EU realised that Central Asia was less advanced than initially envisioned, the region began to be viewed as a developing one. This approach is similar to how the EU approaches Sub-Saharan African states, with some exceptions, such as Kazakhstan, which has advanced much more than its Central Asian counterparts. However, there are still challenges in tailoring the EU’s democracy promotion approaches to each region’s specific needs and realities. It is worth exploring successful regional models in the MENA and Africa regions that the EU could adapt to better promote democracy in Central Asia.
The recent Summit for Democracy 2023 in the United States has brought to the fore the issue of digital authoritarianism and the need to counter the misuse of technology. This prompts the question of whether such forms of authoritarianism are becoming more prevalent in the countries of Central Asia, and if so, what actions should be taken by civil society to counter it. Furthermore, it raises the question of whether the EU’s 2019 strategy for democracy promotion in the region envisions these threats and proposes adequate measures to address them.
The challenge of Central Asian governments actively engaging with China and Russia regarding digital coercive technologies is not new, and the EU is well aware of this. While the EU has raised concerns publicly about human rights violations resulting from these relationships, it does not appear to have a clear strategy for countering the phenomenon. One question that arises is whether the EU’s 2019 strategy for democracy promotion in the region takes into account the threat of digital authoritarianism, which is becoming increasingly prevalent in other parts of the world. Civil society in Central Asia may also need to consider what actions it can take to counter the misuse of technology by authoritarian governments. Despite the EU’s efforts to bring attention to the issue, it remains to be seen whether it has sufficient tools to address this challenge effectively.
As the EU seeks to revamp its strategy for democracy promotion in Central Asia, what specific measures should be included to achieve success? How does conditionality factor into this strategy, and what steps can be taken to ensure its effectiveness? With numerous challenges and obstacles on the path to promoting democracy in the region, can these goals realistically be achieved and if so, how?
The effectiveness of the conditionality approach (where rewards or incentives are offered in exchange for the implementation of democratic reforms and sanctions are imposed in case of a breach of specific commitments) to promote democracy in Central Asia is under scrutiny, as experts question whether sanctions and incentives alone can induce change in the region. While some argue that sanctions can be a powerful tool for pressuring governments to comply with democratic norms, others, like me, are losing faith in the approach and argue that the limited scope of influence and unintended consequences of sanctions may render them ineffective. For instance, Kazakhstan has shown its willingness to comply with the sanctions imposed on Russia while at the same time asserting its independence from Moscow. The question remains: is there a better way to incentivise democratic reforms in the region?
If the conditionality approach is losing its effectiveness in democracy promotion, what alternative measures could the EU utilise to make a greater impact in Central Asia?
As the EU looks for alternative strategies to promote democracy in Central Asia, some experts suggest that a less imperialistic approach may be more effective. Rather than denying that the so-called universal values and norms are predominantly Western in nature and insisting that the Western model is the best and demanding that Central Asian countries adopt it, the EU could show more respect for cultural and societal differences in the region. This would allow for greater freedom of choice, enabling states to decide how to utilise the EU’s promoted best practices and collaborate more effectively. Some have viewed this approach as more constructive and less confrontational than traditional conditionality methods.