In a year marked by further democratic backsliding, CABAR has spoken with Dr Anna Matveeva to dissect the evolution of authoritarianism in Central Asia. Dr. Matveeva, renowned for her insights into post-Soviet political dynamics, explores the nuanced trajectories of autocratic regimes in the region, exploring the mechanics of autocratic developments, the regimes’ authoritarian learning tactics, and the precarious future of democracy after the pandemics.
Dr. Anna Matveeva serves as a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Russia Institute, King’s College London, with a focus on conflict and peace studies, particularly in post-Soviet regions. Her research encompasses a wide geographical range, including Ukraine, Syria, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russian policies in these areas, building on her initial expertise in Afghanistan. Dr. Matveeva has extensive experience with the United Nations, including a role as the UNDP Regional Adviser on Peace and Development in Central Asia and leading the Research Secretariat of the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission in 2010. She consults for various international bodies, including the UN and the EU, leveraging her past experiences at Chatham House, the London School of Economics, and leading programs at International Alert and Saferworld. Additionally, she is a board member of Nonviolent Peaceforce, an international NGO based in Geneva.
CABAR.asia: In the latest developments from Kyrgyzstan, the trajectory towards democratic reform appears increasingly tenuous. Since 2020, the nation has witnessed a worrying trend of power consolidation, marked by a series of repressive legislative measures, extrajudicial actions targeting criminal elements, and escalating pressures on civil society and independent media. Similarly, neighboring Tajikistan, in the wake of disturbances in the GBAO region, and Uzbekistan, following the Karakalpak unrest, exhibit scant signs of democratic advancement. In contrast, Kazakhstan, post its 2019 power transition, initially showed promise of democratic progress. However, the tragic events of “Bloody January” have cast a pall over its journey towards a democratic ethos. In this complex landscape, what is your perspective on the potential for democratic transformation within Central Asia (CA)? And to what extent is external “democratic pressure” of the international system or international society able to influence democratic reforms and transformation in CA?
The dynamics of Central Asian political systems and regimes are primarily shaped by domestic political processes, with external influences playing a conditional role. International developments, including the positions of the United States and the European Union, are unlikely to sway the leaders of Central Asian states from making key political decisions that they perceive as critical to their national policy or security. This underscores the significant primacy of domestic politics in the region.
Reflecting the broader global shift, the trend towards authoritarianism is evident not only in Central Asia but also worldwide. The era of the 1990s and early 2000s, marked by a widespread embrace of democratisation, is giving way to a growing acceptance of authoritarian tendencies. This shift doesn’t always imply outright authoritarianism; it frequently manifests as a concentration of power within a dominant group, alongside a robust monopoly on power. Such models, once viewed as deviations from the democratic norm, are increasingly seen as legitimate alternatives.
In Central Asia, this trend is nuanced. On paper, these nations are democracies, with constitutions grounded in democratic principles and citizens ostensibly granted fundamental rights and freedoms. There is no overt movement to rewrite constitutions along non-democratic lines. However, the reality diverges significantly from these democratic facades. Previously, there was an expectation to maintain a semblance of democratic governance, but now, even this superficial adherence is no longer deemed necessary.
What has also changed is that the demonstration model of democratisation has become “lame”, because it is difficult to live in countries that are in the process of democratisation and experience a lot of different growth problems, which neither the leadership of these countries nor their “Western partners” know how to solve in essence. And this fact has begun to undermine the democratisation model. Therefore, the fact that Central Asian countries have come to their autocratic models is not a deviation, it is a different path, but it does not break out of the global trends.
The evolution of democracy in Central Asian states, 32 years post-independence, presents a diverse picture, especially when contrasted with the 70-year tenure of the Soviet system. The Soviet legacy remains influential, yet these states have developed under varying conditions and economic landscapes.
Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan exemplify this diversity, starkly contrasting in their developmental paths. Tajikistan, as per World Bank classifications, struggles at the lower end of the income scale. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, stands apart with its substantial resources, superior infrastructure, and less reliance on tax revenues, allowing for a more flexible redistribution of national income.
Kazakhstan’s diversity in social, political, and economic spheres somewhat enhances its internal freedom, particularly among elites. This is evident in the broader spectrum of public discourse, the existence of divergent viewpoints, and a government that not only acknowledges these debates but also occasionally adjusts legislation and policies in response to societal demands. This does not imply constant consultation with the populace, but rather a clear response to societal expressions.
Uzbekistan mirrors this trend. Its government endeavors to demonstrate the importance of societal engagement, acknowledging the need for a critical function within governance, making power more approachable, and aligning state institutions with societal needs. This approach marks a departure from previous regimes, which were deeply rooted in the Soviet model, highlighting a shift towards greater public feedback under current leadership.
Kyrgyzstan’s trajectory does not diverge significantly from the broader regional dynamics of Central Asia. The nation follows a similar course as its regional counterparts, navigating between the poles of democracy and authoritarianism. However, Kyrgyzstan’s current leadership appears to be contending with a different set of binaries: chaos and order.
Kyrgyzstan’s path to its current state of governance has been turbulent, marked by a series of protests, a lackluster previous presidential administration, myriad economic and social challenges, repercussions of the pandemic, a decline in labor migration and its economic fallout, weak political parties failing to represent citizen interests, and self-serving political players. This backdrop has cultivated a “system of collective irresponsibility,” where accountability is elusive, and responsibility is often shirked.
President Japarov’s ascent to power, under the banner of restoring order and accountability, represents a significant shift. His administration’s promise is to navigate the country from chaos to order, a journey that does not necessarily preclude democratic transformations. The notion of order might initially entail a consolidation of power, but this doesn’t rule out a gradual enhancement of democratic elements. This situation suggests the emergence of a hybrid regime in Kyrgyzstan, one that blends democratic institutions with authoritarian methods to fortify state structures.
It should be recognised that the state in Kyrgyzstan had obvious weaknesses. What is personally interesting to me is that the new president made radical changes – he changed the constitution, the system was changed, people without much managerial experience came in. It was assumed that all this would quickly end in a coup or some kind of elite reshuffle, that it would not last long. But it turned out that these people were able to consolidate their power, the protests are minimal, there is little resistance to new policies on the part of society, the opposition to the current regime is mainly an educated elite consisting of civil society, intellectuals, etc. What Japarov can present to the people are concrete solutions to the problems that have been accumulating for 30 years. Perhaps, some solutions were achieved by somewhat unconventional methods, but organised crime, corruption, shadow economy began to retreat, lose ground, economic growth began, and the country was brought into the fold of the formal economy. This, of course, was not achieved by democratic measures. The population sees this style of governance, not everyone likes it, but, on the other hand, it brings certain results.
CABAR.asia: In assessing the evolving landscape of autocratic governance in Central Asia, one must consider the subtle yet discernible shifts in institutional behavior. To what extent have the structures of authoritarianism within the region undergone transformation in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic? Moreover, what emergent patterns of governance can be identified, and how do they redefine the traditional contours of autocracy in the post-pandemic era?
The upsurge in grassroots activism across Central Asia represents a noteworthy social trend. This region exhibits a strong inclination towards social solidarity and mutual assistance, a characteristic that transcends the prevalent atomization seen in many societies. The pandemic and subsequent lockdowns underscored this tendency, with people demonstrating a readiness to engage in selfless acts of neighborly support, even at personal risk.
Illustrative of this grassroots mobilization was the response to the Kyrgyz-Tajik border conflict. Volunteer groups from both nations rapidly organized themselves, displaying a willingness to assist their respective armies, even to the extent of taking up arms. Such spontaneous initiatives highlight the capacity for swift and effective self-organization within these communities.
During the COVID-19 crisis, governmental responses across Central Asia, much like elsewhere in the world, often appeared hesitant or reactive. In Tajikistan, a typically regulated society, the authorities initially remained silent, leading to grassroots civil society stepping in to support medical staff and the general population in unprecedented ways. This pattern of civil society filling gaps left by the government was mirrored across the region.
However, in Kazakhstan, this grassroots mobilization took on a different tone with widespread dissatisfaction and resistance to the universal vaccination campaign, reflecting a more contentious aspect of public engagement.
In summary, Central Asia is witnessing a significant grassroots mobilization, primarily evident in times of acute need. While this mobilization is not inherently oppositional or politically motivated against the authorities, it represents a vital aspect of the region’s social dynamics, reflecting a community’s capacity to come together in times of crisis.
CABAR.asia: In the realm of Central Asian geopolitics, there has been a notable rhetorical shift as regimes advance narratives under banners such as “New Kazakhstan,” “New Uzbekistan,” and “New Kyrgyzstan.” Do these initiatives prompt a critical examination of the substantive changes the national governments are proposing? Are these merely cosmetic adjustments, or do they signal a deeper recalibration of the social contract between the states and their citizens? Furthermore, what are the implications of these developments for the relationship between the Central Asian states’ regimes and their respective societies?
The efforts to craft new ideologies in Central Asia represent a crucial aspect of nation-building for these relatively young states. Moving beyond merely rejecting their Soviet past or, in Kyrgyzstan’s case, a turbulent recent history, these nations are striving to establish forward-looking, positive narratives.
However, the approach of constructing national identity around the concept of a “titular nation” poses inherent risks. To avoid the pitfalls of racial or national-ethnic exclusivity, there’s a pressing need for more inclusive, future-oriented ideologies. Such ideologies should inspire a collective journey towards a brighter future. Yet, in the absence of a clear ideological stance from the authorities, there’s a vacuum, often filled by alternate forces. In Central Asia, these include ethnic nationalism, which has had its share of adverse outcomes, and the rising appeal of Islamic ideologies among the youth.
The challenge for the state is to articulate unifying themes that resonate with its populace. Success in this endeavor requires more than just grand statements; it necessitates tangible reforms and significant actions.
A notable aspect of this socio-political landscape is the extensive segment of the male population engaged in overseas labor migration. These individuals, often detached from their home country’s political and social fabric, contribute to a complex dynamic. This detachment poses a challenge to the stability of the social contract within their home countries. Yet, paradoxically, there’s a heightened sense of social solidarity among these labor migrants. This phenomenon presents a unique and intriguing dimension to Central Asia’s socio-economic and political narrative.
CABAR.asia: The concept of “illiberal solidarity” has emerged as a descriptor for the brand of regional cohesion that prioritizes “authority” and “stability” as the linchpins of Central Asian order. This phenomenon merits a deeper discourse. What are the practical underpinnings of this “authoritarian state-centered solidarity,” and how does it manifest within the interplay of regional dynamics? Further, how does this paradigm influence the geopolitical fabric and the conduct of states within Central Asia?
The trend of “illiberal solidarity” in Central Asia is evident, paralleled by a growing propensity for power inheritance within family dynasties. This regional characteristic is observed in Azerbaijan’s political landscape, Turkmenistan’s direct father-to-son power transition, and potential succession plans in Tajikistan. This phenomenon marks a significant aspect of the region’s political evolution.
Simultaneously, there is an increasing trend of interaction and cooperation among Central Asian countries. This development is notable, especially considering the longstanding emphasis on regional collaboration. Excluding the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan conflict, regional cooperation is becoming more pronounced and tangible.
Central Asian states are also expanding their cooperative efforts beyond their borders, aligning with regimes and countries with similar governance structures. Their active participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation exemplifies this trend, signifying a growing engagement in a broader geopolitical context. Additionally, their involvement in the Eurasian Economic Community (now EAEU) serves as a vital platform for exchanging experiences and learning. This collaboration extends across various levels, including ministries and heads of departments, with a particular focus on security issues. It’s here, in the realm of security, where these regimes find common ground most readily, offering each other valuable insights and strategies.
This scenario underscores a key insight: just as democracies learn from each other, autocracies too follow a similar pattern of mutual learning and adaptation, as evidenced in the dynamics of EAEU and other regional alliances.
CABAR.asia: The scholarly community suggests a pivot from a neo-liberal lens towards a more expansive post-liberal, decentralized framework for interpreting civic grassroots movements, such as those observed within Uzbekistan’s mahallas, for example. This recalibration calls into question the applicability and efficacy of such an analytical shift in the contemporary Central Asian milieu. How might this revised perspective enhance our understanding of the region’s grassroots dynamics, and to what extent does it resonate with the prevailing socio-political landscape in Central Asia?
It is a fact that there is a lot of movement, energy, solidarity in Central Asian societies. These are not atomised or apathetic societies. But this does not mean that such movements are in opposition to the current government and would like to fight for democracy. The manifestations of solidarity in the example you mentioned were particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic.
But there are also Islamic movements, various platforms, some of which lead the society to a stricter observance of Islamic norms, including bans on drinking alcohol or some establishments. There are movements that are outright dangerous. All these phenomena arise, as a rule, on the part of society, not the state. We see these processes even in such a relatively secular country as Kyrgyzstan.
There is solidarity in the form of collective consciousness among “our group” that is under threat. In such cases, when a situation arises where it seems that “our people are being beaten”, spontaneous mobilisation happens very quickly. We have seen such manifestations in Karakalpakstan, on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border during outbreaks of tension, and during the Osh events of 2010.
All these social movements differ from each other in subtleties and local peculiarities. Where will they lead? We do not know yet, as there are no formalised groups with a clear agenda or demands.
CABAR.asia: Amidst the broader discourse on the emerging multipolar world order, the normative influence of Russia and China in Central Asia remains a topic of considerable geopolitical weight. As these and other great powers navigate their own internal complexities and the stratagems of global chessboards, one must ponder the ramifications of their engagement in Central Asia, particularly concerning the sustenance of authoritarian frameworks. What trajectory might external influence from these dominant regional players take, especially in the context of bolstering autocratic governance within Central Asian states?
China’s influence on Central Asian domestic politics appears constrained due to three primary factors:
- Cultural and Historical Distance: The significant cultural and historical differences between China and Central Asian states limit the depth of China’s influence in the region.
- Non-export of the Development Model: Unlike other global powers, China does not actively seek to export its development model to Central Asia, thereby reducing its ideological imprint on these states.
- Ideological Stance: While China globally supports communist parties and regimes, in Central Asia, the presence and influence of such parties have waned. For instance, Tajikistan’s once robust Communist Party has seen a decline paralleling the rise of autocracy in the country. This trend is consistent across other Central Asian nations.
In contrast, Russia’s influence in Central Asia is more profound and multifaceted. The concept of “authoritarian learning” is relevant in the relationship between Russia and Central Asian states, with norms and regulations often being adopted mutually. The cultural ties, underpinned by the Russian language, media, and social connections, facilitate a deeper mutual influence and effective internalization of norms.
The relationship between Central Asia and Russia is characterized by extensive interaction across various levels. The factor of labor migration further accentuates this deep connection. Post-2022, following the outbreak of military conflict, Russia has intensified its focus on Central Asia, indicating a trend towards closer ties.
Central Asian elites, while keen on maintaining relations with Russia, are also intent on diversifying their international connections to other global regions and power centers. However, they approach these relationships with caution, wary of any actions that might antagonize Russian leadership.