“This unrest in Nukus can actually generate a chain reaction that will move Uzbekistan away from the role of the “mediator” in the region and, combined with the turbulence in Kazakhstan, it can pave the way to other regional players to assume such a role, receiving many more benefits”, – writes analyst Dimitris Simeonidis, exclusively for CABAR.asia.
When President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was introducing the constitutional amendments that would take place in Uzbekistan, very few would suspect that this would cause a continuation in the strain of disruptive events in Central Asia. Even fewer would be the ones who would presume that this exact continuation would not transpire by virtue of the clause that paves the way for the Uzbek Head of State to remain into power until 2036. The reforms of the constitution that were introduced in Tashkent on June 21 included, in addition to the aforementioned clause, the legal framework to strip the rights off the Autonomous Region of Karakalpakstan to secede, if it deems fit. This generated a new round of protests in unrest-stricken Central Asia that led to the death of at least 18 people in Nukus and to hundreds of citizens of Western Uzbekistan getting injured. This led President Mirziyoyev to take matters personally and travel to Nukus, with the objective of promising the locals that he would roll back the proposed amendments. As unrest in many Karakalpak cities lingers, questions arise about why this lesser-known region maintains this status, why the timing of the reforms and what the geopolitical implications for Tashkent will be.
The least-known autonomous state – but of great interest (and value)
Laying in the lowlands of the Amu Darya river, Karakalpakstan has faced multiple alterations to its modus operandi throughout history. During the Tsarist era, even though Karakalpaks were acknowledged as a Turkic nationality different than the others, the region belonged to the greater “Turkestan” province that the Russian empire controlled. The Soviet era brought the national delimitations in the 1920s and 1930s, during which the Karakalpak Autonomous Socialist Republic (ASSR) initially became part of the Kazakh ASSR, a move that was based on the notion that Karakalpaks share more cultural similarities with Kazakhs than with Uzbeks. Nevertheless, after 1932, when the status of the Kazakh ASSR was upgraded to SSR, the central Soviet administration decided that Karakalpakstan ought to be attached to the Uzbek SSR.
This status remained uncontested and not discussed until the independence of Uzbekistan after the fall of the Soviet Union. That was the moment that groups such as Halk mapi emerged and initiated a discussion over whether Karakalpakstan should keep its current condition, opt to become independent or choose getting attached back to Kazakhstan. To weather the storm, President Karimov decided, in April 1993, to provide Karakalpakstan with the option of voting for its independence within 20 years, a period that has already passed without a corresponding referendum taking place. The region of Western Uzbekistan has not seen major disruption events with only small groups such as Erkin Karakalpakstan remaining active and the topic of independence has only periodically been brought up, when events such as the Kosovo independence in 2008 or the annexation of Crimea in 2014 took place, in a rather mild tone.
Why now?
Many observers are probably wondering why President Mirziyoyev made the decision of poking the hornet’s nest, especially when the “hornets” in this case are very quiet and not being a cause of concern. The main reason might be much clearer if the trends in sectors ranging from politics to climate change are seen in a more holistic perspective.
In terms of the global politics trend, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has certainly enhanced the separatist mood of several movements. For Karakalpakstan in particular, it had already been noticed during the annexation of Krimea that such a move was the starting point that gave birth to freedom movements in Nukus, such as Alga Karakalpakstan Azatlyk hareketi. Contemplating that the current situation in Ukraine is even more serious and the de facto states are gaining momentum, one can easily make the correlation and understand that a potential unrest and separatist action in Western Uzbekistan has the potential to be orders of magnitude higher than in 2014.
In the broader Central Asian context, this is much more than the continuation of turbulence. Uzbekistan has been deemed by many research scholars to be the pillar of stability in the region and this had been proven over the past 3 years, where internal conflict has been prevalent in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Tajikistan, in particular, might have been the cherry on top of the disquietude that President Mirziyoyev was facing. The unrest that was sparked by the internet shutdown and the military violence in GBAO brought back questions concerning separatism of autonomous regions and increased that very sentiment among the Pamiris. Monitoring the situation, the Uzbek president might have decided to take proactive action rather than reactive, such as his Tajik counterpart. However, doing the former resulted in him needing to do the latter as well.
On the energy and climate change sector, Karakalpakstan has been home to one of the biggest environmental disasters globally, the collapse of the Aral Sea. Together with the deterioration of other water sources in an already arid region, it is having an increasing negative impact on the population in two ways. Firstly, it is taking a massive hit on the agricultural sector, which is the main source of income for the region. More specifically, 73% of the working force is employed in the agricultural sector, with cotton, a water-intensive crop, being the prevalent crop. This is having far-reaching ramifications both in the employment in a sector that is already considered seasonal and in the revenue streams of a region that is already lacking those. Secondly, it is affecting public health, as less and less Karakalpaks are having access to high-quality water. Both phenomena, according to recent research papers, have been strengthened over the past years due to climate change, reducing water quality and increasing salinity, making water more scarce and more difficult to be exploited even for irrigation purposes.
Reflecting on the fact that Karakalpakstan is lacking in revenue streams, it is important to go to the fourth and final trend. There is no diversity in the job market for the Western Uzbekistan region and residents are restricted to the deteriorating agricultural sector, with industry being virtually non-existent. To add to that, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made matters worse, as Uzbekistan’s economy is heavily dependent on that of Moscow. Remittances have plummeted and the sanctions towards the Kremlin have affected Tashkent to a large extent, increasing, consequently, the pressure within the Karakalpak society, which is already struggling economically. It should be noted that, while Karakalpakstan was the unemployment champion in the late 1990s with 0.96% of the registered work force being unemployed, today it has a lower unemployment rate than other regions such as Surkhandarya and Fergana, with 6% of unemployment. This, however, if compared to the past years instead of comparing to other regions, can become a stress factor for the population.
Geopolitical Implications
The main geopolitical implication in this case is the fact that president Shavkat Mirziyoyev is basically “losing face” as the stable force in the region. This comes at a remarkably bad timing. The extremism violence by ISKP in neighboring Afghanistan is heating up and, based on their rhetoric, fear that they will expand their action to Central Asia is increasing. Seeing virtually all other countries in the region crippled by internal unrest over the past years, Tashkent was looking to assume the role of mediator and even security guarantor at maintaining stability with regards to Afghanistan and its relations to Central Asia.
What to expect from global (and regional) powers: Scenarios
On one hand, Russia can see this to reverse the growing away trend from Central Asia. Amid the invasion of Ukraine, most state actors in the region have refrained from supporting Moscow, keeping a neutral stance, which poses as an unprecedented move, as the general trend was a complete alignment of diplomatic and foreign affairs strategies with the one in Kremlin. Handling this situation in a way that verifies the security guarantor status of Moscow in the region is not expected to make Central Asia forget the invasion of Ukraine, it can however portray the importance of organizations like CSTO, of which Russia is the leader.
This scenario at the moment, nonetheless, seems to be the least likely to happen. The grip of Russia in Central Asia is expected to be weakened even more after the unrest in Karakalpakstan, in particular because the already neutral stance that Moscow is taking can only remind people of its overall stance over de facto and partially recognized states in the post-Soviet space, such as Abkhazia, Transnistria, Donetsk and Luhansk. Hence, the spillover effect of the events at Nukus is projected to be exploited by the two key players that have been looking to take advantage of the power void that keeps increasing in the region during the past months. These players are no other than Turkey and China.
Turkey has been the main winner in the security sector after the war started in Ukraine. The TB-2 Bayraktar drones have shown outstanding efficiency and buyers from Central Asia have been lining up. This results in Ankara growing even closer to Central Asian states, a trend that has already been observed due to the pan-Turkic movement and the increasing importance that the Turkic Council is gaining for sectors such as trade and energy. The Turkish government has used the disputes in Karakalpakstan as another chance to champion the “brotherly” love that Turkic nations share and provide its full support to the Mirziyoyev government, a smart move that might prove to be fruitful on the long run.
The other contestor to cover the Russian void is China. Beijing had already established its military footprint in Central Asia via the base in Wakhan corridor, Tajikistan and is currently attempting to expand its grip, initially through a dialogue with the Ministry of Defense of Turkmenistan. The fact that China is not yet as competitive on the weaponry market as are other players (e.g Turkey) means that this scenario has several hurdles that need to be overcome. Here comes a potential technology transfer through agreements with the Kremlin that could remedy that. At a first glance, it seems impossible that Moscow would be willing to provide military technology assistance to a power that can be considered competing. Observing, however, the bigger picture, with India increasing its defense budget and building its own industry, it can be deemed as a “common enemy” to the two countries’ plans to retain influence in Central Asia.
Regional state actors could also benefit from the unrest. Iran and India both swiftly voiced their support for the Uzbek President and their confidence that the situation will be solved. The main geopolitical “weapon” of Tehran is cultural diplomacy with Tajikistan, as it does not contain the military industry to compete the other state actors. As far as India is concerned, as mentioned, policymakers in Delhi have been focusing on increasing the defense budget and Central Asian states can be the perfect “beachhead market” for that regard. However, apart from the huge competition with Moscow and Beijing, compatibility issues with Russian military equipment ought to be explored further.
The clear loser in this case would be Tajikistan. President Emomali Rahmon managed, after months of oppression, many people dead and a prolonged internet shutdown to calm the unrest in GBAO, whose residents realized that there was very little that could be done regarding Dushanbe’s treatment towards them. Contemplating now, nonetheless, on the fact that President Mirziyoyev basically caved to the demands of the people in Nukus and decided to roll back the proposed amendments, the Pamiris might see that as a sign of hope and this might lead to internal conflict reigniting in Gorno-Badakhshan, causing further damage to national and regional stability. Combined with the fact that non-state actors such as the ISKP might consider this a moment of vulnerability and enter the region via Tajikistan, there are many reasons for concern in Dushanbe.
Conclusion: More than just a simple unrest?
The situation in Karakalpakstan looks more like a boiling marmite whose lid has just blown up. Several trends have been enhancing discomfort among the people in Western Uzbekistan and the amendments proposal was most probably the last straw. For President Mirziyoyev to return to stability for good, his policymakers and policy researchers ought to better understand these trends and issue strategies that will provide a permanent remedy. At the same time, this unrest in Nukus can actually generate a chain reaction that will move Uzbekistan away from the role of the “mediator” in the region and, combined with the turbulence in Kazakhstan, it can pave the way to other regional players to assume such a role, receiving many more benefits. A lot of the potential chain reaction scenarios will largely depend on the behavior of external powers, with Turkey being best positioned to continue championing its pan-Turkic movement and its influence in the region. For the people in Karakalpakstan, a bumpy road is to be expected until Tashkent decides on a governance model that will ensure long-term stability.