“In the energy sector, GBAO possesses great renewable and inexpensive energy sources and lies in a strategic location that can facilitate interconnections and partnerships, provided that the political instability and its connection to the geopolitical and financial constraints is better understood”, – writes analyst Dimitris Simeonidis, exclusively for CABAR.asia.
For residents of the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) the months after the November 25-28 protests have been a true rollercoaster between hardships and promising news. The special operation of the SCNS to detain Gulbidin Ziyobekov in the region led to massive riots, after which the government in Dushanbe decided to shut down the internet. This came as an additional problem to the existing electricity outages and seasonal rolling blackouts and created the perfect storm for the local communities. However, the end of March had relatively good news for the internet connection which was restored, but the ones about the electricity problem were the most hopeful. More specifically, the regional electricity grid of GBAO is being connected as a whole to the national grid, after an agreement that has been an initiative of several national and international actors, including Pamir Energy (PE) and the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). And just when a sense of amelioration of things was looking highly probable, May entailed a new round of protests that led to massive distress and clashes with troops, eventually even resulting in alleged killings of civilians. This has also brought a new internet shutdown in various areas of the region and currently locals are growing desperate as to where this state of affairs will go.
As far as the progress in the electricity sector is concerned, while enthusiasm might have been the first sentiment that such an announcement brings, the details about the strategy and its impact on the energy security of the GBAO are still not very clear, as substantial investment and efficient allocation of the budget in electricity is needed on the region. In addition, the strategy seems to fail to address the broader electricity security issue that the country faces. The pressure of all the past failed strategies has basically mounted to the point that every discomforting event causes massive clashes with the local and the national government. Unless society-changing reforms on electricity and telecommunications happen, this landscape will only get worse.
Is the solution really one transmission line away?
In 2021 the governor of GBAO officially apologized to the citizens for the seven-hour long outages that the region was facing as part of the seasonal blackouts, promising that the situation would ameliorate in the future. This was not the case, however. This winter, Tajikistan faced one of its worst electricity outages in its history, where the crippling blackouts’ duration was more than ten hours long throughout the country. Facing mounting pressure, the government mobilized the partly state-owned Pamir Energy to create a consortium with a series of international actors, including the MFA of Norway, SECO (Switzerland), the World Bank and KfW (Germany) and find a solution. The initial solution was the extension of the transmission line from the area of Vanj-Darvoz by 25 km, so that Gorno-Badakhshan will now be in the same grid as the rest of the country.
While this move makes sense, reflecting on many shortcomings of the Tajik grid, and it is very much welcomed, it is only a band-aid solution to the long-term issue of electricity security. It is, nonetheless, highly encouraging, that international financial institutions like the world bank are engaging in activities in the region and it already brought the very much needed impetus for other similar entities to support energy and electricity projects. More specifically, two months later, on May 6, EBRD started promoting fresh funds towards climate action and related projects in Tajikistan, which encompass projects on renewable electricity.
This certainly brings a glimmer of hope. Nevertheless, it is rather doubtful that the totality of the needed funds will be found by the foregoing entities, as investment on electricity projects and interconnections will require a rather much larger financing. With Russia, one of the main financial partners of the region, on a major financial strain after the invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions that followed, this is the perfect chance for China to jump in.
Strengths of GBAO – Gains for China?
Beijing is already implementing a rather ambitious green hydrogen strategy, both nationally and globally. At a national scale, it announced the world’s largest green hydrogen project in Ningxia, with 150MW of electrolysers. Together with other announced similar projects in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, China shows sincere interest in harvesting the renewable energy strengths that the Chinese mainland entails. Neighboring GBAO is no exception to this rule, with vast solar and wind potential that are currently untapped. By assisting in modernizing the grind in the autonomous region, it can take advantage of the excess energy and the local residents can benefit from the relief from rolling blackouts.
GBAO can also serve Chinese investments in another way. Geothermal energy has been the “hidden weapon” of the region for decades as it is being used for small-scale projects, such as the greenhouse projects in the Sughnan district. With the right investment it has huge potential to benefit the society. This, through Chinese investment, can be performed in two ways. The first and most simple one would involve tapping into the actual thermal and electrical energy that can be generated from geothermal one. The second one would be to implement the Chinese innovation strategy in direct air capture (DAC) technologies to be able to “such” air out of the atmosphere, through projects similar to the one in Iceland.
However, there seems to be very little willingness for China to get involved in GBAO without going first through Dushanbe. While several OSCE states such as Poland, but also the USA, publicly condemned the deterrence efforts from the Tajik armed forces in Khorog, Beijing has not yet issued an official statement over the clashes in its neighboring region. At the same time, the foregoing protests have been happening in parallel with the inauguration of the first super-high plateau airport in Taxkorgan, Xinjiang, very close to Gorno-Badakhshan, portraying a rather indifferent stance over the insurgency happening in the neighboring region. A potential reason for this stance is the fact that Beijing values stability and transactionalism more than anything. This is something that President Rahmon has audibly proven capable of providing, nonetheless his son and potential heir to the presidency, Rustam Emomali does not guarantee through his so far behavior. More precisely, Rustam has been seen by the Pamiris as a messenger of hope and his election could potentially initially lead to a series of destabilization events, which would be unpleasant for China, since it will happen next to the troublesome region of Xinjiang.
The absence of Russia
Moscow enjoys very close relations with virtually all Central Asian states and Tajikistan is no exception to this. However, while several countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan engage in trade in many energy and financially-intensive sectors, this is not the case for Dushanbe, which mostly relies in the Russian economy with regards to remittances. This reflects even less on the development of the eastern part of the country. The latest investments on energy in Tajikistan from Russia were on the Sangtuda 1 and 2 hydroelectric power stations in 1989 and ever since Dushanbe and Khorog had to rely on other sources. The main rationale for the Kremlin was revolving around the low reliance of the country on oil and gas together with the lack of skills to modernize an energy grid with so many challenges related to geography and landscape. This is even more evident in Gorno-Badakhshan, where fossil fuels and relevant processing plants are virtually non-existent, and its morphology requires a largely sophisticated and decentralized energy network, which is in contrast to the rigid and centralized grids that Russia operates. This indifference was enhanced even more ever since China built its military base on the Wakhan Corridor. Moscow and Beijing enjoy mutual respect, which translates in no one intervening in any way in the region and sector that the other is invested. The final factor that has even further accelerated this behavior to a complete absence of investment, especially in GBAO, is the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its aftermath, leaving the Kremlin with major financial issues that even further prevent it from having an extrovert stance in foreign affairs.
A potential change in regime might be good news for Moscow, should it look to engage further with Tajikistan and GBAO. Rustam spent the early part of his academic life at the diplomatic academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, combined the fact that his first visit after the initiation of his political career was in Moscow, there are clear signals that the two countries are only projected to grow closer. For GBAO this might entail investment in various areas from Russian businesses, but energy might not be one of them, for the aforementioned lack of expertise on the renewables sector. In addition, if the isolation towards the Kremlin from the global community persists, this might encompass an alteration of strategy by Rustam Emomali.
Barriers in implementation
As it has been mentioned, several national organizations and international institutions are eager to aid a just energy transition in Tajikistan and, ultimately, in GBAO. Moreover, the region can produce immense value to global powers such as China, but potentially also to regional players, such as India or Pakistan. But what are the exact barriers that both the authorities in Khorog and the external powers should look out for?
The first and foremost is the current lack of decentralized grid frameworks, making it expensive and not financially sound to install many mini grid units. GBAO is sparsely populated and the distances are vast, which will call for numerous mini grids and high expenses in interconnections, as modernized forms ought to be used, which will require state-of-the art and expensive electronics. Decentralized electricity grid models that have will have a smaller financial burden are projected to emerge in the future, though, but for the moment it is reason to cause concern. In addition, foreign players like Chinese firms are notorious for miscalculating and eventually investing smaller amounts than what is actually needed for infrastructure projects, so a similar challenge would be the negotiating part between the state and the project developer.
Another issue that stems from the aforementioned one is the rigidness of the Tajik grid and its respective power utility. The current market structure is far from suitable for a renewable energy-dominated grid. Distribution and transmission operators are governed by the state-owned utilities and neither a liberalization of the market nor an unbundling process of these respective operators has taken place. If Dushanbe is interested in deploying renewable energy units it should move forward with such measures and not resort in sole public private partnerships, although they can also be helpful. It is eminent that Khorog promotes this within the governmental agenda.
A barrier of geopolitical nature is also highly likely. Involvement of Beijing so far in Central Asia has only been as a financial guarantor, in topics that are of relevance to Moscow. These include oil and gas pipelines and refining of oil derived products, which all require the action of the state owned Russian energy firms and hence contribute to the enlargement of the Russian economy. Amidst the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China is attempting to maintain a balance and a neutrality stance and hence any action that might generate friction between the two states will not be very welcome in Beijing.
Another point of potential geopolitical interest is the interconnection to neighboring Xinjiang. The discussion over the repression of the Uyghur community is prevalent in the international community and potential collaboration might avert US-based organizations and other international institutions from the region. The local residents themselves, also, might oppose such a movement, causing even more civil unrest, which can have far-reaching ramifications as the stories of neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have delineated.
The way forward – Clearing the air
One solution seems clear enough, but also rather complicated for the Tajik landscape: the Local Renewable Energy Communities (LREC). The LREC initiative is recently taking of in the EU and it has been proven that it can provide enormous value to remote communities, which perfectly fit the GBAO scenario. However, the grid in Khorog is operated solely by Pamir Energy, which is an improved version of Borki Tojik, as it is a public-private partnership, but it still maintains a rigid structure that hinders even more decentralized electricity structures. Reforms are to be made both in Khorog and Dushanbe separately, but dialogue ought to also take place both between them and with external actors that could provide expertise. Some of which are already involved at other projects in the country, such as the Norwegian MFA.
A way to resolve a potential geopolitical conundrum so close to the disputed Wakhan Corridor would be through partnerships with key players that can maintain a balance, while being oriented towards renewable energy. A perfect example of that is the UAE. More specifically, Masdar Clean Energy company has been recently involved in various “green” projects in Central Asia. Examples include the Nur Navoi 150 MW solar park and the 220 MW hybrid parks in Jizzakh and Samarkand in Uzbekistan, but also the 10MW hybrid park in the Balkan region of Turkmenistan. For the latter, Turkish company Calik Energi has also been involved, which points out to Ankara as a potential partner. Indeed, Turkey has depicted pragmatism in its diplomatic approach of the shift in the geopolitical world order and its involvement in a region so close to China would not be perceived in a wrong manner by Beijing. For both however, two issues are at question. The first one revolves around their technical capacity to support geothermal energy projects. The second one concerns their financial and technical expertise to develop decentralized electricity solutions, which will be largely the case for the rocky Pamirs.
A land of challenges – a land of opportunities
GBAO is certainly a region that encompasses all sorts of challenges: climate, environmental, (geo)political and financial ones. Located at the end of the post-Soviet space, which marks the beginning of the East Asian one, investments stemming from any key player and towards any specific means of energy might generate a chain of disruptive events.
The nature of these events is being strengthened by the existing political instability in GBAO, which is only getting worse ever since last November. The recurring clashes have been intensifying and their immediate consequences are expected to be dire for the people in Khorog. Already internet has been suspended anew in the region and potentially even stricter military control might be expected. On the long term, nevertheless, there is a silver lining. Delegations of EU and OSCE member states, together with the US, have started paying attention and condemning the behavior from Dushanbe towards GBAO. The protests that started this month might be seen as the turning point for the global community to commence rounds of discussions where it will demand from President Rahmon to reduce the acts of violence towards the Pamiris. The timing is perfect, as the Tajik government has already turned to the IMF to request a bailout or any kind of assistance for its outstanding debt. The international financial institution ought to include the alleviation of the community in Gorno-Badakhshan from violent deterrence measures. Meddling with a region so close to a part of China of great sensitivity to instability is going to be far from easy, as Beijing will oppose any effort that would lead to a change in the regime. However, the overall impetus created after the latest protests, especially in Europe, can only be perceived positively.
At the same time, financing seems to always be an issue and, currently, with one of the major financial partners struggling due to sanctions, the landscape is even worse. As mentioned, however, there are numerous reasons to be optimistic. International institutions have been increasing financial flows in Tajikistan, with a particular focus on climate finance and sustainable business models and people in Khorog would largely benefit by harnessing the colossal capabilities of their land in terms of wind, solar and geothermal energy. However, they should also be careful of the investment mix, having always in mind that it is paramount to pertain their sovereignty and at the same time manage to have an adequate level of societal cohesion. The latter has many chances if initiatives like the LRECs are followed, as people will be involved in the process of energy generation and distribution and this will also increase trust towards both governments.
For this to happen, policymakers in Khorog and Dushanbe have to deal with certain dilemmas, both on choosing geopolitical partners and on making market and financial reforms, which can prove to be quite challenging. At the same time, both governments need to see the electricity system crisis as interconnected to the political unrest and understand that, solving the former is paramount to the solution of the latter. It is of utmost importance that professionals with socio-technical experience, as well as experts on the geopolitics of energy are also involved in this process.