Central Asian experts share how Russia’s military invasion to Ukraine affects the countries of Central Asia in economic, geopolitical, and other ways. What economic and investment projects can be slowed down? Will foreign policy change and what will be the geopolitical picture of the region – in the material, specifically for CABAR.asia.
Kazakhstan: the future of projects with Russia is in doubt
Dauren Aben, political scientist:
How will Russia’s invasion to Ukraine affect relations between the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan? Should we expect any adjustments in foreign policy? In politics within the EAEU?
To date, Kazakhstan has not made a single official statement about the invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine and has not even expressed its usual concern and readiness to act as a mediator. The statements in the media about the alleged refusal of the Kazakh authorities to send troops to the combat zone in response to Russia’s request are most likely an interpretation of the words of Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi about the neutrality of Kazakhstan in recognizing the DPR and LPR, as well as Senate Speaker Maulen Ashimbaev about the impossibility of the CSTO peacekeeping forces’ participation in the settlement of the conflict. Akorda’s very cautious approach is apparently due to the unwillingness to irritate the Kremlin, but it puts our country in a very ambiguous position against the backdrop of a strong condemnation of Russian aggression by the world community. In this regard, the mentioned messages worked in favor of Kazakhstan, although the authorities did not voice the official position of the country.
The wait-and-see tactics of Kazakhstan, which has not yet recovered from the January events, is caused by the vulnerability of its strategic position and the increased political and economic dependence on Russia. In this context, the future of Kazakh-Russian relations directly depends on the outcome of the Kremlin’s military gamble.
At the same time, the failure of the Russian military campaign may lead to a radical breakdown of the existing system of interstate relations in the post-Soviet space, calling into question the very existence of military-political and economic associations under the auspices of Russia, including the CSTO and the EAEU, on the ruins of which more equal and mutually beneficial regional projects may appear.
What economic and non-economic consequences will there be in Kazakhstan? How interconnected are Kazakhstan and Russia? What bilateral projects are likely to be called into question or stalled?
Obviously, regardless of the outcome of еру military activities, Russia will find itself in complete diplomatic isolation and under the pressure of comprehensive sanctions. Due to the fact that Russia is our closest ally and largest trade and economic partner, since 2014 Kazakhstan has been indirectly affected by anti-Russian sanctions. The current crisis was no exception, which led to another collapse of the national currency following the Russian ruble and a partial fall in the stock market, and in the context of the aggravation of the military-political and sanctions confrontation between Russia and the West, the negative economic impact on Kazakhstan will only intensify.
As for the possible political consequences, they will entirely depend on the further actions of Kazakhstan. If Akorda follows the Kremlin’s lead and gets drawn into the conflict or helps Russia bypass the restrictions imposed on it, then our country itself will become the object of sanctions. It is no coincidence that in his speech in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, US President Biden warned that the reputation of any country that supports the Kremlin’s actions will be tarnished.
What unites Kazakhstan and Ukraine? What to expect in relations between Ukraine and Kazakhstan?
Relations between Kazakhstan and Ukraine have always been friendly and based on mutual respect, but in recent years bilateral ties have weakened somewhat due to Kazakhstan’s orientation towards partners in the EAEU, artificial obstacles created by Russia and the negative impact of the pandemic. However, the parties have always expressed their readiness to intensify trade and economic cooperation, primarily in the energy, transport and logistics and agricultural sectors, as well as cooperation in the humanitarian sphere. The relationship was somewhat overshadowed by the words of President Tokayev that Kazakhstan does not call “what happened in Crimea an annexation,” but in the end, Akorda managed to assure the Ukrainian side of respect for its territorial integrity. The current events have shown that the sympathies of the majority of Kazakhstanis are on the side of Ukraine. Whichever way the Russian invasion goes, Kazakhstan will strive to preserve friendly relations with Ukraine and the disclosure of the unrealized potential of interaction between the two countries.
Kyrgyzstan: problems of migrants and an atmosphere of permissiveness
Medet Tyulegenov, political scientist:
How will Russia’s invasion to Ukraine affect relations between the Russian Federation and Kyrgyzstan? Should we expect any adjustments in foreign policy?
Russia’s invasion to Ukraine will not fundamentally affect the foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan. On the one hand, because Kyrgyzstan does not currently have a clear and coherent foreign policy. Therefore, it is not yet clear what could change there at all. In any case, Russia will remain a partner, because our leadership will not take any radical steps, considering all the possible real risks there, as a result of such behavior of our strategic partner. On the part of Russia, for sure, there will be some actions in relation to partners and allies in order to try to put pressure on them and recognize the same territories that broke away from Ukraine as states. However, I think that these attempts, like in 2014 or about the recognition of South Ossetia or Abkhazia, are also likely to fail.
In any case, such negotiations and attempts at some kind of soft pressure are likely to take place. It is difficult to say how our foreign ministry and our leadership will react to this. It remains to be hoped that the country’s leadership, gently maneuvering, will avoid pandering to what Russia is doing now in relation to Ukraine. And in this regard, once again, the foreign policy will probably not change. Most likely, voices will be heard around this topic, but this will be from such critical experts and civil society about what the CSTO and our membership in the EAEU mean in this situation, and these possible sanctions and so on. Nevertheless, I believe that in general, this is unlikely to greatly affect our foreign policy, because the current leadership of our country in general, is going in the wake of Russian politics. Therefore, in this respect, they will try to avoid making careless or at least adventurous actions that could spoil our international image, but at the same time, they will try not to annoy the Russian leadership and Kremlin regarding their policies in relation to Ukraine.
What economic and non-economic consequences will there be in Kyrgyzstan? What bilateral projects are likely to be called into question or stalled?
Regarding sanctions, there will most likely be such a large and general effect due to the fact that sanctions will worsen the economic situation in Russia as a whole. And this, first of all, will affect the situation with our migrants and their opportunities to earn money and, accordingly, the transfers they send to Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the financial inflow through this line to Kyrgyzstan will decrease. This will, of course, affect the solvency of people in Russia and the commodity preferences of supplies that come from Kyrgyzstan or through Kyrgyzstan to Russia. This will have some effect on those of our suppliers in the business that supply to Russia. That is, in this respect, sanctions will negatively affect Kyrgyzstan to some extent, and we even see a certain effect regarding this unstable exchange rate, how the RUB collapsed, accordingly, the KGS also reacted to this. And if the war continues and the sanctions continue to grow and intensify, this will continue to affect the stability of currencies and the general economic situation in Kyrgyzstan.
The deterioration of the economy will affect the possibilities of the Russian budget and the need to somehow reallocate funds and prioritize.
Russia does not have any high-tech investment projects in Kyrgyzstan. Accordingly, Western sanctions that relate to high technologies are unlikely to affect our country. Therefore, in this aspect, any of the investment projects of Russia in Kyrgyzstan will not fall under the threat. I repeat once again, for sure there will be such a more general effect: sanctions worsen the economy, revenues to the Russian budget and, accordingly, it will become a question of the priority of foreign policy assistance or foreign assistance provided to countries such as Kyrgyzstan.
How can these events affect the civil sector in Kyrgyzstan?
An alarming signal for Kyrgyzstan may be the fact that the current leadership of our country is also engaged in what we can call an illegal and informally illegitimate way of how power is exercised. What Russia is doing with respect to Ukraine is the same at the international level.
It is even significant how recently anti-war protests in Russia were suppressed, although in general, protests have been suppressed before, of course. All this creates such a common atmosphere that we are in such a common information space, in an atmosphere of permissiveness on the part of those who have power and authority. And this is an alarming signal for us as well, because we observe such a bold trend not at the international, but already at our internal level in Kyrgyzstan. Because, in general, we already have pressure on civil society, various initiatives are being taken, and the opinion of citizens and civil society is not considered.
Accordingly, what Russia is doing can add some more confidence to various autocrats, including in our country, who may feel that, in general, this is becoming the norm, the norm of permissiveness both in the international arena and in domestic politics. Accordingly, this can have a rather bad effect on how the government will treat civil society. Especially considering that this trend in Kyrgyzstan began to gain momentum in the last year and a half.
Uzbekistan and the problem of maintaining balance
Alisher Ilkhamov, director of Central Asia Due Diligence:
What are the consequences for Uzbekistan from the invasion of Russian troops in Ukraine? Will the concept of foreign policy be revised? Will there be changes in the regional policy of Uzbekistan in Central Asia?
It is still too early to speak about the full scale of the consequences of the Ukrainian events, as well as the recent events in Kazakhstan (here it will be necessary to sum up the effect of both) for Uzbekistan and, in particular, for its foreign policy. However, there is already President Mirziyoyev’s first, though not direct, reaction to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has just visited Karakalpakstan and their he mentioned that Uzbekistan needs to increase its efforts to develop the economy and the country’s defense capability. Here you can see a hint that the country should be able to repel any aggression from the outside, the likelihood of which from the Russian Federation, in one form or another (say, hybrid), cannot be ignored. In general, this is the right position: it is really impossible to achieve a strong defense capability without a developed economy. But how to achieve and accelerate economic development is already another matter. On this issue, the government’s position is still weak, because it has not fully understood that the development of the economy is very dependent on factors such as the rule of law and an administrative system that meets modern standards. In these two areas, reforms are still stalling.
As for the concept of foreign policy, it should be borne in mind that it does not yet exist in the country as such. There is a concept that was adopted under Karimov in 2012. However, its full text was bashfully removed from the official websites, I believe because it was clearly stated there that Uzbekistan would not join any political blocs and deploy foreign military bases in the country. It is on these two fundamental issues that Mirziyoyev apparently has not yet come to a final decision, reserving the possibility of joining the CSTO and allowing Russia to deploy its military base in the country.
At the end of 2020, a program was announced to develop a new concept of foreign policy, and work on it was to be completed in 2021. But there is no indication yet of when it will be completed. The president seems to be taking an extra pause to comprehend the Kazakh and Ukrainian events and develop an appropriate approach arising from this analysis, considering both the interests of the country and his own as an authoritarian leader.
At the same time, at the end of 2020, an attempt was made to formulate some of the fundamental principles of this concept. In that rather lengthy document, the emphasis was on pragmatism and the priority of economic interests. That is, foreign policy was placed in direct dependence on the priorities of economic development. And this, in turn, dictated the observance of a multi-vector foreign policy. What we observed in general was how the foreign policy was implemented in practice, how the government tried to develop beneficial relationships with a whole range of countries and powers, including both Russia and China, the United States, Turkey, and EU countries, as well as with neighbors in region. In general, it would be desirable to maintain this multi-vector course.
However, at the same time, uncertainty remains on the above two principles, the attitude towards blocs and the deployment of foreign bases on the territory of the country. And here, in my opinion, Mirziyoyev is torn apart by conflicting moods and preferences. On the one hand, after the Kazakh events and with the end of his second presidential term approaching, he would be interested in assistance from the CSTO (say, Russia) precisely as a police structure that would help suppress local protests if Mirziyoyev wanted to extend his rule for an indefinitely long period. To the point, Karimov had the same expectations when, after the Andijan events in 2004, he decided to join the CSTO, although he later left it, apparently not trusting Russia. He then called for reorienting this structure to the fight against “terrorism”, to which he was inclined to classify any protest movements in the country.
On the other hand, the invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine cannot but frighten Mirziyoyev. There is certainly a growing fear that Putin’s apparent desire to restore a semblance of the USSR and his willingness to achieve this not only by a system of incentives, but also by force, will one day put the state sovereignty of Uzbekistan at stake.
I think Mirziyoyev will strive to achieve a certain balance between these two priorities, which are mutually contradictory. And it won’t be easy to do so. Hence, further delays with the adoption of a new concept of foreign policy are inevitable.
Which projects and areas of cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia (economic, investment, infrastructure, etc.) may suffer in the future due to the sanctions?
First of all, in the financial sector, since these sanctions, adopted by the United States, Great Britain and the European Union, hit primarily the financial and banking sector of Russia. Another question is how strong the ties are today between the financial and banking sectors of both countries, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Unlike the members of the EAEU, they are apparently not so strong that it will make the government of Uzbekistan think about whether it is even worth joining this structure, which is so toxic, given the dominance of Russia in it.
Will pressure increase on Tashkent concerning joining the EAEU and the CSTO?
I think so, but for the time being Moscow will act with hybrid methods, combining diplomacy, soft power, economic incentives, blackmail, especially on the labor migration front, and various kinds of scary stories, for example, in the form of exaggerating threats from the Taliban.
Can Tashkent’s position change regarding plans to build a nuclear power plant?
Given the fact that Russian troops targeted the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in their invasion of Ukraine and managed to take control of it, the Uzbek government should fall into deep though about such scenarios in the future on the territory of Uzbekistan. For example, in the event of Russia’s alleged takeover of Kazakhstan, Russian troops would be at arm’s length from the location of the future Uzbek nuclear power plant. And this will become an additional lever of chantage and Moscow’s dictatorship in relation to Tashkent.
What will be the consequences for the Central Asian region?
I think and hope that the countries of the region will begin to rethink the problem and the prospect of regional integration in a new way. I believe that here it will be necessary to pursue a dual goal: 1) to strengthen these integration processes, but without the intrusive participation of the Russian Federation, and 2) to pursue a policy of checks and balances in the foreign policy sphere, balancing the presence of different players in the region, such as the Russian Federation, China, the United States and NATO, as well as Turkey, not only in the economic, but also in the military-strategic sphere.