One of the noteworthy events in May 2023 for the Central Asian countries was the recent China plus Central Asia summit held in Xi’an. CABAR.asia collected insights from regional experts, focusing on the summit’s outcomes, the strengths, and weaknesses of this mode of interaction, and emerging trends in China’s collaboration with the five countries in the region.
Intra-regional expert assessments of the China-Central Asia summit are almost unanimous in their opinion that China is gradually growing in importance in matters of regional security in Central Asia, while strengthening trade, economic and transport and energy cooperation.
Kazakhstan
Erkin Baidarov, PhD in Philosophy, chief research fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies. Named after R.B. Suleimenova Science Committee of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty
What are the results of the summit for Kazakhstan?
The recent summit certainly became a large-scale political event for Kazakhstan and the countries of the region. As a specialist who examines inter-civilizational interactions, including the historical connection between the Celestial Empire and the “Western Territory,” the ancient name for modern Central Asia, this summit once again underscored that cooperation with China remains the sole viable option across multiple domains, including political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian development. Beijing, viewing the Central Asian region as an integrated entity, acknowledges a profound historical connection that spans over three millennia. As Li Bo eloquently stated, “a new meeting and a good conversation is priceless,” presenting an opportunity for Central Asian countries to continue the thousand-year tradition of friendship and explore novel prospects, as emphasized by Xi Jinping. Within the framework of the Joint Statement, Kazakhstan and China signed 22 crucial documents, with notable importance attributed to agreements concerning the development of the Trans-Caspian transport corridor and the implementation of a visa-free regime.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Central Asia plus China format?
The advantage is the opportunity for both China and the Central Asian countries to discuss directly, without intermediaries, the pressing problems of mutual interaction. The weak side is the repetition of already existing C5 + 1 sites. But, unlike other formats, C+C5 more “dynamic” and has a certain long-term perspective.
What is the place of the Republic of Kazakhstan among other Central Asian countries for China?
To my mind, Kazakhstan holds significant importance for China, alongside other Central Asian countries. Several factors contribute to this assessment, including the extensive shared border, rich oil and gas reserves, abundant resources, and the sizable Kazakh diaspora of nearly two million residing in China. Furthermore, the Chinese language proficiency of the Kazakh leader holds significance. However, it is noteworthy that prevailing Sinophobia in Kazakhstan motivates the Chinese political and intellectual elite to endeavor to disprove these concerns by showcasing that such apprehensions are exaggerated.
What new trends are there in cooperation between Kazakhstan and China?
As the results of the summit showed, cultural and humanitarian cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the PRC (as well as between other Central Asian countries and the PRC) is reaching a new level, which is not surprising, since the recently proclaimed Global Civilization Initiative, aims primarily at promoting exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations, advancing the progress of human civilization, and promoting the building of a “community with a common destiny for mankind.” This trend, as it seems to me, will be one of the main ones in the near future.
Kyrgyzstan
Nargiza Murataliyeva, PhD in political science, editor of CABAR.asia analytical materials.
What are the results of the summit for Kyrgyzstan?
For Kyrgyzstan, the China summit yielded several significant agreements, with one standout being the provision of a grant worth approximately 42 million USD by China. This grant is allocated for the implementation of priority projects focused on technical and economic cooperation between the two countries. Additionally, an investment agreement was reached for the construction of a solar power plant in the Issyk-Kul region, amounting to 800 million Euro. The cumulative value of the agreements for various projects is estimated at 1 billion USD. Furthermore, both parties agreed to establish a third checkpoint, Bedel, which will enhance trade flow by improving goods throughput. Plans are also underway for the construction of an additional road that will connect the Kyrgyz village of Barskoon with Uchturfan county in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. Moreover, a substantial package of agreements was signed in the realm of humanitarian cooperation and soft power initiatives.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Central Asia plus China format?
The advantage of the format is the ability to synchronize watches (reach a common understanding) at the multilateral level, as well as to pursue a comprehensive and integrated strategy for China in Central Asia. This format also demonstrated that China recognizes the processes of strengthening intra-regional cooperation in Central Asia and is ready to support them. In addition, such a summit clearly demonstrates the economic power of China, in comparison with other players, and its ability to invest in projects and allocate grants. Additionally, the flexibility of this format allows for more effective and expeditious development of unanimous positions among the leaders of Central Asian countries, thereby reducing potential contradictions.
If we consider the weaknesses of the format, one aspect that has surfaced is the comparison of economic outcomes among bilateral agreements made by Central Asian countries. For instance, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan individually securing agreements with China exceeding 20 billion USD, it has created the perception that the outcomes for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are relatively more modest.
What is the place of Kyrgyzstan among other Central Asian countries for China?
Kyrgyzstan occupies one of the leading, but not a key place in China’s strategy, due to the presence of alternative routes for Beijing, passing through other Central Asian countries. However, with the growing momentum of plans to construct a railway network across Kyrgyzstan, its significance is poised to increase. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan assumes importance in terms of transit potential, particularly in facilitating China’s trade, economic, and energy interactions. The transport infrastructure within Kyrgyzstan presents specific opportunities in this regard.
Security issues are an additional incentive for cooperation with the Kyrgyz Republic for China. In the context of ensuring security in the western parts of the country, stability in Central Asia is of particular importance.
What new trends are there in cooperation between the Kyrgyz Republic and China?
Among the emerging trends, I would like to highlight the significant array of agreements aimed at promoting Chinese soft power and enhancing China’s image among the Kyrgyz population. Another noteworthy aspect pertains to the intentions of the Kyrgyz authorities to export electricity to China. However, the feasibility of such plans is contingent upon addressing the current limitations of power production capacity within Kyrgyzstan itself. Furthermore, there is a shifting landscape in terms of “green” projects involving Chinese investments. The actual implementation of these projects will play a crucial role in determining their outcomes.
Tajikistan
Parviz Mullojanov, Ph.D. political scientist, orientalist, and independent researcher from Tajikistan.
How do you assess the results of the summit for Tajikistan?
The objectives of the summit for China did not solely target individual countries. Instead, China sought to test a new format and assume a different role in the region. The essence of this new format was that it effectively relegated other players, primarily Russia, to secondary and tertiary roles.
In this format, Beijing is the main guarantor of the security of Central Asia. If earlier this role was given to Russia in agreement with China, now China wants to fully assume this role . In Beijing, they think that Russia should accept this as a reality , and because of the war in Ukraine, it will not oppose it. In any case, openly, so as not to spoil relations with China. Moscow will strengthen cooperation with local states through its own channels. However, it won’t be in the new format. And that is why Russia was not invited to the summit.
China has initiated discussions regarding the establishment of supranational bodies, such as a supranational business council and institutions aimed at coordinating foreign policy. This indicates China’s ambitious aspirations. Notably, even Russia did not have similar proposals.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Central Asia plus China format ?
Indeed, the format of China plus five is a natural phenomenon, similar to Russia plus five, Europe plus five, and the US plus five. However, China currently holds greater influence compared to other players. China will continue to foster bilateral cooperation while also establishing institutions to coordinate efforts within Central Asia. Additionally, there is a possibility of intensified efforts to expand transnational corridors for trade, road, and rail, with China taking the lead in these endeavors.
What is the place of Tajikistan among other Central Asian countries in China’s politics?
China does not divide like that. Instead, China views Central Asia as a cohesive community. Naturally, China places greater importance on countries that serve as sources of mineral resources, particularly oil and gas. Geopolitical significance and economic factors are also taken into account. In terms of security, Tajikistan holds particular interest for China due to its proximity to Afghanistan. Additionally, Tajikistan is seen as a valuable transportation hub and a source of mineral and energy resources. It is important to note that Beijing regards Central Asia as a unified region rather than a collection of distinct entities.
What new trends are there in cooperation between Tajikistan and China?
There are no special changes, but I would still call the strengthening of the role of China in ensuring security, military cooperation, and military technology. For example, we are talking about Chinese drones, the supply of new equipment. Another trend is to provide Tajikistan with access to the so-called Middle Transport Corridor, which runs through Central Asia on to the Caspian Sea and Europe. Perhaps new trends related to issues in Afghanistan will develop.
It is worth noting that if Russia was previously considered the main partner for Tajikistan, now it is fading into the background. Of course, Tajikistan remains a zone of influence of Russia, but now the importance of China, as well as new players, is growing. China has ousted Russia in the sphere of economy and finance, and now the same is happening in matters of security in Tajikistan.
Turkmenistan
Rustam Mukhamedov, independent researcher
What results of the summit for Turkmenistan would you single out?
In my opinion, in general, official Ashgabat is satisfied with the results of the summit and considers them positive, despite vague media reports about bilateral discussions. In its own way, the participation of Serdar Berdimuhamedov and his speech at the summit can also be seen as a logical continuation of his visit to China in January this year, where propositions were outlined on the main guidelines for deepening further cooperation between the countries. The key priority of interaction has been and remains the fuel and energy sector. In 2022, through three existing pipelines, Turkmenistan exported 35 billion cubic meters of gas to China, receiving more than 10 billion USD.
China, in this regard, remains the main buyer of Turkmen gas, and this trend will continue, despite the attempts of the Turkmen leadership to diversify the export routes of Turkmen natural gas, which are associated with the presence of geopolitical and other limiting factors. In this regard, Turkmenistan is extremely interested in increasing the volume of exports of natural gas and in accelerating the construction of the fourth branch of the gas pipeline to China, given the emerging situation on international markets in the context of the war in Ukraine, which can also be used by Ashgabat to improve its negotiating position as with China itself, and with Russia and other (potential) buyers. It is no coincidence that in his speech, S. Berdimuhamedov emphasized the readiness of Turkmenistan “to continue work on the implementation of new projects related to the supply of Turkmen natural gas to China.” Turkmenistan also used the summit as a platform for “advertising” its transport and logistics capabilities, given the growing urgency of creating new transport corridors. In this regard, Turkmenistan is also trying to make the most of the emerging international situation and has already expressed its interest in joining the North-South corridor. Another issue is internal structural problems, institutional and other barriers, which are the main obstacle for Turkmenistan to squeeze out the maximum of its logistical capabilities.
What is the place of Turkmenistan among other Central Asian countries for China?
Relations between the two countries are extremely unbalanced, as China is certainly much more important to Turkmenistan than Turkmenistan is to China. And it’s not just the export of natural gas. In my opinion, building close relations with China is also important for Turkmenistan to create the appearance that the country is pursuing a balanced multi-vector foreign policy, as opposed to arguments that it is part of Moscow’s economic and political orbit.
In addition to Turkmenistan’s role as the main supplier of natural gas, its significance for China lies in the regional security system, particularly given Turkmenistan’s neutral status and non-participation in regional military formations, considering the situation in Afghanistan. With a long border adjacent to Afghanistan, Turkmenistan’s strategic importance cannot be overlooked. Moreover, the Galkynysh gas field, which produces gas for export to China in collaboration with CNPC, is located in the southern part of the Mary velayat, relatively close to the Afghan border. Notably, during the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s offensive in 2021, China emphasized the necessity of enhanced security cooperation among nations during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit. A similar rhetoric was observed during the summit. Hence, cooperation in the realm of security can be seen as a potential new trend in bilateral relations.
What new trends are there in cooperation between Turkmenistan and China?
In addition to the previously noted potential deepening of cooperation in the field of security, there are several other areas that can be attributed to having a real, rather than declared, prospect. Turkmenistan is particularly interested in the development of international transport corridors through its territory. S. Berdimuhamedov in his speech did not accidentally mention the proposed project of Turkmenistan “Revival of the Great Silk Road” and its significance in the context of the “One Belt – One Road” project.
Another area where further deepening of cooperation can potentially be seen is innovation and high technology, given the attention that Ashgabat pays to the country’s digitalization project (the image of the project with modest real results), incl. and in the context of security (regime) issues. The news about China’s plans to open a medical laboratory in Turkmenistan was also interesting, and cooperation between the countries in the field of healthcare and traditional medicine was also discussed at a meeting in January – given that Turkmenistan received large batches of COVID-19 vaccines from China, this looks enough promising direction.
Uzbekistan
Abbos Bobokhonov, Head of the China Studies Program at the Institute for Advanced International Studies at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy of Uzbekistan.
What are the results of the summit for Uzbekistan?
During this visit, a very huge package of documents worth 25 billion USD was signed. This has never happened before in the history of bilateral relations. However, there should be no illusion that China will allocate 25 billion tomorrow and we will be able to use these amounts. Back in 2017, during the visit of our President to China, a package of documents was also signed for a total amount of about 21 billion USD. However, the analysis shows that not all projects from this amount were implemented.
In general, in recent years, China has been striving to increase its presence in the economy, investment, and intensify negotiations on security issues, including on Afghanistan, but in political issues and cultural and humanitarian interaction, Beijing’s influence is still quite limited.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Central Asia plus China format?
C+C5 is the same format that was introduced by Japan and other partners of Central Asia, but the Chinese were able to adapt this format to their own interests, that is, a platform with Chinese characteristics. At the initial level, this format was at the level of foreign ministers, and this format was also at the level of experts. Now the format has moved to the level of country leaders.
China indeed enjoys numerous advantages through a consistent format of interaction with the Central Asian countries, independent of the involvement of other players. This enables China to stay informed about pertinent matters and swiftly respond to international events within this framework, thereby resolving issues without reliance on Russia. While previous interactions occurred within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China now aspires to establish itself as an independent player in the region. While the format demonstrates efficiency, its weaknesses may gradually emerge over time.
What is the place of Uzbekistan among the other two countries of Central Asia for China?
Partially, I have already answered the question. That is, Uzbekistan holds a significant position for China among the other two Central Asian countries, particularly in terms of security considerations. Uzbekistan’s role becomes crucial for China’s understanding of the evolving situation in Afghanistan, and the ongoing dialogue between Uzbekistan and the Taliban government can greatly assist China in this regard. Furthermore, Uzbekistan’s historical significance as a “transport bridge” along the Ancient Silk Road offers substantial opportunities for China to access other regions, including South Asia, the Middle East, and potentially the Caspian Sea. While similar routes can be pursued through Kazakhstan or Pakistan, Uzbekistan offers advantages of a shorter and safer route, as well as access to a sizable market.
What new trends would you note in cooperation between Uzbekistan and China?
Of the signed documents, I would single out two points related to cultural and humanitarian cooperation. Previously, in the countries of Central Asia, and even more so in Uzbekistan, there was not a single branch of higher educational institutions in China. However, during this summit, agreements and memorandums were signed on the presence of Chinese universities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. That is, China is already firmly striving to enter the cultural and humanitarian space in Uzbekistan, in particular, and in the region as a whole. The second point is the signing of documents on the media, that is, China is already actively beginning to enter the media space of Uzbekistan in order to create a positive image.
Another noteworthy aspect is the significant rise in Chinese investment in Uzbekistan, which potentially increases the country’s dependency and could translate into political influence in the future. We have witnessed in Tajikistan that China’s influence has grown to such an extent that, under Beijing’s “tacit recommendation,” Dushanbe was unable to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). A similar approach may be applied to other countries, including Uzbekistan. Hence, it becomes imperative for our countries to maintain a careful balance in foreign policy and exercise control over external debts.