How can the other middle powers decrease the tension between the US and China and what role will the Central Asian states play in this? How does the US assess the Chinese Global Security initiative? And will it contribute to strengthening China’s role in the regional security of Central Asia? Will the US strategy in Central Asia be changing? These and other questions were discussed with the Director of the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Robert Daly, exclusively for CABAR.asia.
Robert Daly is the Director of the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. He has served as a U.S. diplomat in Beijing; as an interpreter for Chinese and U.S. leaders, including President Carter and Secretary of State Kissinger; as head of China programs at Johns Hopkins, Syracuse, and the University of Maryland; and as a producer of Chinese-language versions of Sesame Street. Recognized as a leading authority on Sino-U.S. relations, he has testified before Congress, lectured widely in both countries, and regularly offers analysis for top media outlets.
The first question would be around the current Sino-American confrontation. It has already been called a new Cold War, and in your opinion, what is the difference between this new one – Cold War, and the old one we had before in the history? To what extent is it likely to grow into a bigger conflict?
Robert Daly: I think that this is a new Cold War. It will not be like the old Cold War in a couple of important respects. I think first we have to recognize that there is a much greater diffusion of power in the world now than there was during the first Cold War, when power was concentrated politically within the Warsaw Pact and NATO, or within Moscow and the United States, if you like. Now there is far more agency within middle power countries and even in smaller countries. They have greater agency, in part, because of the globalization of communication, the globalization of economics. There are more ways to have messages heard and to communicate than there used to be. So, it’s not just power in Moscow, Brussels, Washington, and Beijing. There is also power in Bishkek and there is power in Lithuania.
There is also more power in multinational organizations than there was during the first Cold War. There is power in NGOs, in media, in the arts, even in individual bloggers. It’s very hard to know in today’s world where the influential voices are going to come from. This is a good thing. It serves as a kind of buffer. If we speak as though the United States and China are the only two countries in the world, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that we’re headed for conflict.
One is that, unlike during the first Cold War, in Cold War two all of the superpowers face major transnational challenges. The growing Cold War between the global West and China (and Russia, Iran and a growing number of other countries) is the world’s biggest geostrategic challenge. What’s distinct about this era is that our greatest geostrategic challenge may not be our greatest challenge overall.
We also face challenges from global warming. This was an over-the-horizon, theoretical problem 10 years ago. It’s not over the horizon now. So, we have global warming, we have issues like the globalization of pathogens, the globalization of ideas, the globalization of problems of uneven development with resulting human flows, the globalization of crime. Perhaps the greatest challenge we face is the emergence of new technologies. Artificial intelligence, quantum, nano, big data, machine learning, genetic medicine, synthetic medicine–the emergence and confluence of these new technologies – how will they interact and change the world? No one knows the answer to that.
So, superpowers are going to have to deal with Cold War dynamics – but they also have to address transnational issues. How will that affect the Cold War? It is going to detract from the attention and resources large nations can commit to their competition. We didn’t face such pressures during Cold War I.
Another difference between Cold War I and Cold War II is that China, the United States, and Russia all face tremendous domestic fragility. The United States has recurrent problems in its banking system, problems of unequal development and poverty, and political polarization. China faces a secular slowdown in its economic growth. The demographic crisis has hit 10 years earlier than China thought. Its population is shrinking and getting older while China is still within the middle-income trap. China continues to have problems with debt, corruption, pollution, and the gap between the modern expectations of the people and their Leninist political system.
Is it likely that the Central Asian countries will be under secondary sanctions? If yes, will this make the cooperation between China and our countries stronger?
Robert Daly: There have always been problems with America’s imposition of secondary sanctions. They usually fail to meet their goals. They breed resentment of the United States and they weaken global systems, including things like the SWIFT system which we sometimes use to impose secondary sanctions. And I would advise the American government strongly against imposing secondary sanctions on Central Asia, if such an action were under consideration. To the best of my knowledge, it isn’t.
Now, if Central Asia became a direct party to a conflict that would be different. But Washington needs to be very sensitive to the geography, the history and the interests of this region. You can’t change your geography. You need to have stable relations with Russia, and China, and the Middle East, and Iran, and Turkey. And we need to be sensitive to that. So I don’t see any sign of secondary sanctions on the region. If we did impose secondary sanctions, and again I don’t see any sign of that, this would tend to push the region closer to Russia and China. But that is not where we are right now. And Washington understands the position that Central Asian nations are in, even though we may be neglectful of the region.
And you mentioned about middle powers, so, how can the other middle powers decrease the tension between the US and China and what role will the Central Asian states play in this?
Robert Daly: I think the key way to increase your agency is to deal equally with all of the great powers. If Central Asian nations can find a way to have relatively good relations with the United States, and Europe, and Russia, and China, and the Middle East, but on your own terms, based on standing up for your interests, then you will greatly increase your agency.
That means there needs to be a willingness to say “no” to all players, including the United States, but also including Russia and China. That’s really where agency lies. If you find that you’re never saying “no”, you’re giving away your agency. There may be things that you say “no” to the United States and Europe about, and maybe you say “no” to China, for example, on the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative. They have no real content anyway.
China has clear interests in the region, so they’ll still invest here, right? Again, saying “no” to all the powers when their interests don’t meet yours, is the key to increasing your agency. If Central Asian countries can have pretty good relationships with all the major powers on Central Asian countries’ terms, they can help build networks of compromise and complexity, and those networks are probably the greatest guarantor of peace.
You also mentioned about Chinese Global Security initiative. In this context, how does the US assess the initiative? And will this concept contribute to strengthening China’s role in the regional security of our region?
Robert Daly: First, let’s admit that the Global Security initiative is not a “concept”. It’s a phrase. Concepts have content. The Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Security Civilization initiatives are very broad, very vague. All they offer are phrases that nobody can object to.
For example, through these initiatives, China asks other countries to “endorse” the proposal that we should all uphold sovereignty. We should all respect our country’s civilizations. Well, of course. Everybody knows this. Everybody believes it. There’s nothing Chinese about it. It’s not new. It’s like saying. America wants to launch the global “Cute Babies Initiative”. Can we all agree that babies are cute? Yes, but so what?
There is a danger here for Central Asia. China offers these vague initiatives, right? And so Central Asian countries say “sure, we will endorse your initiatives.” Why? Because you are afraid that if you don’t endorse these initiatives, China will be angry and will coerce you in some way, even though you don’t know what endorsing these initiatives mean. This is a form of geostrategic blackmail. You think this doesn’t cost you anything, but there’s the danger: China proposes these broad things, the SCO when it started, had no real content, right? The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Community of Common Destiny – no one knows what these things meant when China first proposed them. The Global Development, and Security and Civilization Initiatives seem to mean nothing. But if you read the analysis of Chinese writers, it is these very vague things that China is planning to stand up as the framework of a new alternative global order. Even though it’s vague at present, once you’ve endorsed it, they will add more substance. It will be incremental.
And as it takes on substance it’s going to be harder for you to pull out because you’ll be even more afraid of being coerced. This could happen soon. When it does, you will be perceived by the global West as standing with China and Russia on the other side of this line, in opposition to the West, even though that’s not what you intend. That’s what the Cold War context does.
Central Asian countries do not desire this outcome when they endorse Chinese initiatives. They’re deeply interested in America and the West. That is why I think it important for Central Asian countries to say “no” now. You don’t have to insult China. You can say “Oh, these global initiatives of yours are very interesting. Thank you for raising these issues. We are going to study these proposals and we’ll get back to you when we are ready. Don’t call us, we’ll call you.” You’re already part of the BRI. You work with China. Fine. But you need practice in saying “no”, and frankly you need to give China practice in hearing “no”. That is the way to increase your scope for action even within a Cold War context.
And does it mean that it would become more difficult to save neutrality for Central Asia? Neutrality in their positions around Ukraine and neutrality at all?
Robert Daly: Again, Washington understands multi-vector diplomacy. And clearly, that is going to involve compromise and balancing. I’m new to Central Asia. There’s nothing worse than an arrogant American who doesn’t know anything coming into a region and pretending that they know. I am telling you my impressions, but I might be wrong. As I just said, if you’re going to maintain neutrality, the test is, do you ever say no? If you never say no, what does that mean? Are you really maintaining a multi-vector neutrality that preserves your agency, your independence, your neutrality?
As you know, Chinese BRI and Chinese infrastructural projects have already changed our region and it was announced the construction of China-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Railway will start soon. And in your opinion, how would this project change our region?
Robert Daly: I’m not qualified to answer that question. I don’t know the region well enough to know what the benefits of connectivity would be. But the benefits of connectivity can be great and we should not demonize every BRI project. So if China is bringing investment that delivers real connectivity and if these are bankable projects that grow your economy such that you can pay back loans to China, and if these projects are done with due diligence, and if you do the right kinds of environmental impact statements and if you observe labor rights, and if you involve Kyrgyz and Uzbek companies, then good. In that case, China should be thanked and congratulated. China is capable of providing global public goods. If the people of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan support this project for the right reasons and it’s well done, then fine.
And the last question would be around the United States strategy in Central Asia. You also talked about new dynamics in world order and the system of international relations. Do you think that somehow the US strategy in Central Asia is changing?
Robert Daly: There have been several criticisms of American policy in Central Asia. One is that historically, we simply don’t pay enough attention to the region. A second criticism has been that we have tended to see Central Asia, over the past several decades, too much through the lens of Afghanistan and that when America pulled out of Afghanistan, we lost interest in the region.
I can tell you that Washington’s interest in the region is growing and it’s growing in the context of a new Cold War, even though Washington doesn’t use that phrase. What Washington talks about is new great power competition.
My own sense, having met with people in Almaty and Tashkent and here in Bishkek is that it’s impossible for the United States to compete directly with Russia in the security realm or China in the economic realm. They have enormous advantages of proximity and historical connection and China has tremendous economic capacity, which the United States cannot match in the region. But there’s an area that I think that we can play a prominent role in: education and training. We have the world’s best universities. People in Central Asia know it. We should strengthen our academic cooperation at every level by building institutions, and providing scholarships to Central Asians. We should expand training in areas like public administration, rule of law, and jurisprudence. These are areas in which Russia and China cannot compete with the United States.