«Despite the low level of interaction between Central Asia and the South Caucasus, the analysis of events around Nagorno-Karabakh is of particular value due to the presence of certain parallels in the post-Soviet period of the development of these regions», – mentioned independent expert Akram Umarov in an article, written specially for CABAR.asia.
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The long-running conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh entered a new phase of escalation on September 27, when the troops of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh army, supported by Armenia, and the Azerbaijani army entered into fierce battles along the entire front line. According to media reports, both sides of the conflict have numerous casualties, both among the military and civilian population.
Despite this, the international community is making extremely cautious and uncertain attempts to achieve a ceasefire in the conflict zone and start a negotiation process. A number of international events, such as the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, the internal crisis in the EU, an active election campaign in the United States, a serious socio-economic downturn in the world under the influence of the coronavirus crisis, have moved the current aggravation of the conflict in the South Caucasus to the periphery of the global agenda.
The exacerbation of tensions in the South Caucasus, the current development of the conflict and its potential outcome should be carefully studied by all Central Asian countries. Given the close political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties, as well as the recent common historical past, the regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia have many similar achievements, problems and features of independent development after 1991. In view of this, drawing lessons for Central Asia from the current crisis in the South Caucasus can contribute to strengthening regional cooperation, resolving existing interstate complex issues, as well as creating an atmosphere of trust and sustainable development in the region.
The role of external powers in the settlement of regional issues
As the current development of the situation demonstrates, the main external forces capable of influencing the conflict in this region are Russia and Turkey. Both countries have historical strategic interests in the South Caucasus region and clearly intend to expand their presence in this area. An alarming circumstance is that despite the declared growth of political and economic cooperation between Moscow and Ankara, at the same time, in recent years, the interests of these powers have tangibly collided in the Middle East and North Africa.[1]
Unfortunately, these countries have made their “contribution” to the development of the current escalation by the almost synchronous conduct of large-scale military exercises between Russia and Armenia, as well as between Turkey and Azerbaijan in July-September 2020.[2] In 2010-2019, Russia was also the main supplier of weapons to Armenia with an indicator of 93% and to Azerbaijan with 63% of the total imports by these countries.[3]
Central Asia is also facing the growing presence of China, Russia, Turkey, the United States, European countries such as Germany and France, and other significant powers in the region. However, the experience of other regions demonstrates the need to avoid turning the Central Asian region into an arena of competition and confrontation between the leading world powers.
The practice of neighboring regions clearly shows that the absence of truly intra-regional cooperation, the transfer of the role of arbiter to the leading powers and the search for footholds in the person of influential extra-regional actors can increase instability and exacerbate existing regional discrepancies.Separate extra-regional actors are largely interested in the long-term preservation of the stalemate situation and turbulence in the regions of presence, which increases their importance and influence, and creates conditions for the conflicting parties to turn to them for various support or intermediary services.
In these conditions, it is important for the Central Asian states to adhere to a multi-vector foreign policy and to create truly regional mechanisms of interaction. They will contribute not only to building up political, socio-economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation, but also to a planned and comprehensive discussion of a consolidated position on the most important regional issues and promoted initiatives of extra-regional actors.
It is encouraging that starting from 2018, the countries of Central Asia have begun annual regional meetings as part of the consultative meetings of the heads of state. Such a format makes it possible to consider the urgent problems of the region in a calm atmosphere and think over ways to resolve them in order to strengthen the comprehensive and mutually beneficial interconnection of Central Asia.
Creating the image of an “external enemy” out of neighboring countries
Since the emergence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the late 1980s, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been actively working to promote the discourse about the presence of an “external enemy” in the face of a neighboring state, which is extremely belligerent, not ready to make rational compromises and, therefore, unable to negotiate on a peaceful settlement of the existing disagreement. This approach contributed to the high ideologization of the foreign policies of Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the framework of which the establishment of diversified cooperation with natural partners-neighboring countries was not given due attention. The long-standing position on the perception of the neighboring country as an “external enemy” undermines attempts to establish dialogue and constructively discuss charged matters in bilateral relations.
In its recent history of independent development, Central Asia has also experienced (more than once) attempts to construct a hostile image of neighboring countries. For example, the Turkmen government has accused Uzbekistan of involvement in the alleged assassination attempt on the country’s first president, Saparmurat Niyazov in November 2002.[4] Then the Turkmen authorities searched the Uzbek embassy, the ambassador was declared as a persona non grata, and later Ashgabat has sent troops for border fortification.[5] All these actions were also actively accompanied by the Turkmen leadership with a narrative about Tashkent’s hostile attitude towards Turkmenistan.
Serious difficulties also arose in relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Especially the issue of the construction of hydroelectric power plants on the territory of Tajikistan has made a significant negative contribution to bilateral cooperation. The perception by the Uzbek leadership of the large-scale project for the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station as a threat to national security and the principled position of Dushanbe on the implementation of this initiative turned into a large-scale reduction in almost all types of interaction between the countries. The Tajik side raised the construction initiative to the level of national ideology,[6] which will contribute to the revival of the country and the solution of pressing economic problems.[7] In this context, Tajikistan blamed the slow progress of the construction of the hydroelectric power station on its “enemy” neighbor.[8]
In recent years, the state of regional cooperation in Central Asia has radically changed in a positive direction. The new regional policy of Uzbekistan in its striving to create an atmosphere of trust, friendship, mutually beneficial cooperation and solving long-standing interstate problems is actively supported by its regional neighbors.However, despite this positive dynamics of regional interaction, it is important to remember, as lessons from our own past, also the experience of the South Caucasus countries in avoiding the promotion of the discourse on an “external enemy” in their foreign and domestic political activities. The formation of such a non-constructive ideology can potentially harm in a radical way the favorable background for deepening synergy between the countries of Central Asia.
Timely settlement of all controversial issues in interstate relations
The experience of the South Caucasus clearly shows that all attempts to freeze the settlement of complex regional issues are fraught with their periodic aggravation and further complication of the prospects for a diplomatic solution. The parties have not been able to normalize the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for over 30 years, despite the presence of the international mediation mechanism of the “Minsk Group”, the adoption of a number of important Security Council resolutions, which have not been largely implemented in practice. As a result of the lack of progress in the peace negotiations, the parties at times make attempts by military means to reverse the status quo and pedal the settlement of the conflict situation in their favor.
Central Asia also faces a number of perennial problems, such as incomplete formalization of state borders, the problem of rational water use, interethnic tensions in certain parts of the region, as well as the deterioration of the ecological situation.
For example, despite significant progress in the issue of delimiting state borders since 2016, more than 10% of the sections[9] between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as 40% of the sections[10] between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, are still not delimited. On the undivided sections of the border and enclave territories, to a greater extent between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, to a lesser extent between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, clashes sometimes occur between residents and border detachments of neighboring countries, which in some cases even lead to casualties and injuries on both sides.
At the same time, it should be noted that the states of Central Asia are aware of the challenges in border issues and in recent years, having made a kind of “foreign policy reset”, have achieved a significant breakthrough in solving this difficult task.
Thus, the process of delimitation and, in many respects, demarcation of the borders of Kazakhstan with Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan was completed.[11]
On the issue of water resources allocation, it is also obvious that the parties decided to move away from the position of excessive securitization and politicization of the problem, paying more attention to the formation of a common positive agenda in bilateral relations and building confidence and trust between the parties.
Nevertheless, this issue certainly remains vital for Central Asia and should be discussed in order to find compromise diplomatic solutions for the sake of sustainable development of the entire region.
Despite the centuries-old bonds of friendship and coexistence in the common region, the presence of a huge range of cultural and humanitarian ties, the atmosphere of interaction in the region and the willingness to settle complex interstate issues were largely determined by the strong-willed decisions of national leaders over the past 29 years of independent development of states. This approach often turned into both a sharp freeze of contacts in Central Asia and a significant thawing of relations. In order to prevent such rapid fluctuations in regional interaction, it is necessary to gradually develop and deepen the system of multi-level cooperation between the states of Central Asia with the active involvement of private business and public associations, the academic community and representatives of the sphere of culture and art.
The formation of multilateral regional formats for constant discussion of topical problems and prospects of partnership at the level of ministries, as well as think tanks of Central Asian countries, will contribute to improving mutual understanding and developing mutually acceptable solutions.
In general, despite the low level of political and social-economic interaction between Central Asia and the South Caucasus after the collapse of the USSR, the analysis of events around Nagorno-Karabakh is of particular value due to the presence of certain parallels in the post-Soviet period of development of these regions.
It is important to draw timely conclusions from the development of the situation in the neighboring South Caucasus and pay close attention to the miscalculations, failures and achievements in the recent history of Central Asia in order to strengthen confidence-building measures and determine the prospects for regional cooperation.
In this context, the active expansion of regional cooperation in Central Asia in recent years is a step in the right direction to ensure sustainable development of the entire region. Further searches for intraregional opportunities for deepening trade and economic cooperation, expanding cultural, humanitarian, scientific and educational exchange, improving logistics, energy and other infrastructural connectivity, expanding the mobility of people and goods, as well as ensuring regional security can prevent potential conflicts in the region, resolve many protracted problems and establish strategic partnership between the countries of Central Asia.
This material has been prepared as part of the Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Project. The opinions expressed in the article do not reflect the position of the editorial board or donor.
[1] Ishaan Tharoor. Turkey and Russia preside over a new age of mercenary wars. // The Washington Post, 30 September 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/09/30/armenians-azerbaijan-turkey-russia-clashes/
[2] Vasif Huseynov. Azerbaijan, Turkey Hold Large-Scale Military Drills Amidst Escalation of Tensions with Armenia. // The Jamestown Foundation, 14 August 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-turkey-hold-large-scale-military-drills-amidst-escalation-of-tensions-with-armenia/
[3] Andrey Yegupets, Evgeny Kozichev, Mikhail Malaev, Evgeny Fedunenko. Non-equilateral triangle. // Kommersant, October 3, 2020. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4518525
[4] Uzbekistan: President Cannot Get Enough of Turkmenistan. // Eurasianet, 18 May 2017. https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-president-cannot-get-enough-of-turkmenistan
[5] Bruce Pannier. Central Asia: Uneasy Summit As Karimov Meets Turkmenbashi. // Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 18 November 2004. https://www.rferl.org/a/1055960.html
[6] Filippo Menga (2014). Building a nation through a dam: the case of Rogun in Tajikistan. Nationalities Papers, 43(3), 479–494. doi:10.1080/00905992.2014.924489
[7] “Everything came together in Rogun – homeland, faith, future, unity,” – the speech of the president. // Avesta, January 5, 2010 http://avesta.tj/2010/01/05/v-rogune-soshlos-vse-rodina-vera-budushhee-edinstvo-rech-prezidenta/
[8] Jeanne Féaux de la Croix, Mohira Suyarkulova, « The Rogun Complex: Public Roles and Historic Experiences of Dam-Building in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan », Cahiers d’Asie centrale, 25 | 2015, 103-132. https://journals.openedition.org/asiecentrale/3123#quotation
[9] Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan discussed the issue of border delimitation. // Gazeta.uz, August 26, 2020. https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/08/26/borders/
[10] There was a shootout on the border of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and there are wounded. // Interfax, 8 May 2020. https://www.interfax.ru/world/707895
[11] Alexey Gryazev. Unlimited threat. // Lenta.Ru, October 19, 2019. https://lenta.ru/articles/2019/10/19/mir_bez_granic/