Kazakhstan’s civil society is eying the rapprochement with China with suspicion. This is primarily because people don’t trust their own elites, said Temur Umarov, a researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies in Berlin.
Temur Umarov is a research fellow at the Carnegie Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies in Berlin. His research interests focus on the domestic and foreign policies of Central Asian states as well as China’s relations with Russia and the former Soviet Union. Umarov holds a bachelor’s degree from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) in foreign regional studies (Chinese studies) and a master’s degree in global economics from the Moscow Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and the Beijing Institute of International Business and Economics (UIBE). Umarov is a graduate of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center’s Young Ambassadors program and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Central Asian Futures program.
CABAR.asia: When they talk about China’s soft power in Central Asia, they mention Confucius Institutes and state programs developed in China to attract foreign students. How effective is this Chinese soft power?
Indeed, thousands of students go through this cycle, return and become propagators of the official Chinese position already within their own country. They return home satisfied, and you can see that in the interviews that are conducted with these people. They speak very highly of China, a country where they had a wonderful time as students.
However, I would not exaggerate the scale of China’s soft power effect. The same high school graduates, if possible, will happily choose some Western university if the conditions are the same.
It is just that China provides these conditions to a much larger number of potential students, and it is much easier to win a grant for free education in China than in Western universities.
Another thing is that China does not give education, especially in the humanities, from an objective point of view. It can hide some facts of its own history, it can understate some of the actions of the Chinese leadership of different historical periods, or twist some facts and create in students distorted images about China, about its interests in politics and in general about Chinese history.
China is also trying to distribute its media through some kind of contracts with local Asian media. We should not speak about the success of this policy yet either, because China still has not learned how to produce quality material in local languages.
China tries to promote its culture, holds film festivals and things like that, but again, this all happens only at the initiative of the state.
That is, there is no such thing that people themselves seek to study, learn, try to find some information, as happens, for example, with Korean doramas, with Japanese anime, or with American pop music. All of this happens only because of the efforts of the Chinese state. Without it, Chinese soft power would be virtually unpopular.
We have such a history with China that this country remains somehow under-explained, not very clear. That is why people paint a scary or somewhat super optimistic picture of what China is doing in Central Asia and it seems to me that in 30 years time all states will speak Chinese. But I think this is some distorted impression of what’s going on, and I’m skeptical about this prospect.
CABAR.asia: Especially because, for example, there is a language barrier – the Chinese language is still relatively little in demand, in general. And if a person wants to go to a Chinese university, he usually needs the Chinese language. And, as a rule, then with this Chinese language, it’s more likely that he or she will have to look for a job in China…
Or in a Chinese organization that works in Central Asia. That is, it’s energy companies, oil companies, or some structures connected to China. But there aren’t many jobs like that.
Of course, you can do part-time work all the time, work as a translator and accompany delegations of Chinese and Kazakh businessmen to various exhibitions and enterprises in China, but it’s not a very attractive field to work in.
CABAR.asia: How does China’s policy compare to, for example, the United States and Russia?
China always publicly articulates the equality of the parties. If Vladimir Putin or the U.S. can say that you have Russians being hurt or that you don’t have enough democracy, then the Chinese talk about partnership. This demonstrative equality is what distinguishes China from the other major partners of Central Asia.
Secondly, China does not spare funding for its presence in the region, it is ready to give loans and humanitarian aid.
This also distinguishes it from Russia or Western countries, which in every investment project, and in every financing assume some political conditions. If the West gives out money, it has to be transparent and it has to contribute to democracy, if Russia gives it out, it has to be very pro-Russian.
CABAR.asia: Money without obligations is a dream for local elites – to receive funds without unnecessary conditions and questions. After all, as a rule, most of it then settles in the pockets of those in power…
Of course. China also understands how things work and adapts to local conditions. They come in, study how it works, who needs to be bribed, which laws need to be enforced, which laws you can’t enforce if you’ve bribed the right official.
This is all very different from the working tools of organizations like the World Bank.
CABAR.asia: In general, how would you describe the attitude of the ruling elites in the region toward China and its “unobtrusive” policies?
In Kazakhstan, especially after Tokayev, who has lived in China and understands more about it than the rest political class of Kazakhstan (Kasymzhomart Tokayev worked in USSR embassy in PRC in 1985-1991) came to power, the approaches {in this direction} are being revised.
And I would characterize it as growth of interest to China and at the same time the preserved level of certain distrust to Chinese political practices. There is interest, China may be allowed to enter many spheres, but with caution, because it is not completely clear what political goals it pursues in Kazakhstan.
For Kazakhstan, Russia is much more understandable partner, the political elites of both countries speak the same language. It is both rhetorically the same language, that is, the values of such a post-Soviet man are broadcast, and in fact it is the Russian language. These people know each other for decades and at the same time grew up practically in the same country.
This is not the case with China. Even if you speak Chinese, there are still value and cultural barriers between you.
So I think that in the region as a whole there is such a pragmatic, curious attitude toward China, but at the same time there is still a mistrust of the practical interests of China.
CABAR.asia: All the more so if we remember that when the borders were delimited, all of the Central Asian countries bordering China gave up some parts of their territory to China in one way or another.
I think there was no other way out there. It’s good that the issue was resolved back when China was not such a powerful power as it is now.
CABAR.asia: Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev and now under Tokayev tried to play some special role in the region. How the possible strengthening of China in the region can affect these ambitions? Or is the current Kazakh elite no longer concerned with ambitions?
It seems to me that they still have them. Kazakhstan’s ambitions are slightly different from those of another country, Uzbekistan, which is also called the leader of the region. Uzbekistan is limited to Central Asia, but Kazakhstan goes further, it talks about leadership in general in Eurasia, it sees itself as an important mediator between the East and the West. In this regard, I think that under Tokayev, this vision of Kazakhstan’s strategy has even strengthened. That is, Kazakhstan will be a reliable partner simultaneously for the largest economic engine of the world – China, and for Europe.
Especially considering the fact that Russia is now turning more and more into an isolated, toxic country, Kazakhstan is taking on the role of an intermediary.
CABAR.asia: How does Kazakhstani civil society feel about the prospects for increased cooperation with China? After all, China is an authoritarian country, it doesn’t even have the level of freedom of speech that we have in our countries. Yes, there were some positive political instruments in China, for example, the changeover of power was ensured. But, under the current leader, we see that these elements of the system of checks and balances are beginning to crumble…
I think that civil society is watching such a rapprochement between Kazakhstan and China with suspicion. This fact has been confirmed by polls that have been conducted for several years in a row. In the 2019 poll, Kazakhstan was the most anti-Chinese country, there about 30% looked with distrust at the Chinese presence. We saw the biggest protests against China exactly in Kazakhstan in 2016, then in 2019.
The visa-free regime with China was recently introduced. I think the public in Kazakhstan looks at this with skepticism, not primarily because China is authoritarian, but simply because they don’t trust their own elites. There is a sense that the elites are willing to do anything for personal or corporate interests, willing to give up sovereignty. But, nevertheless, society is heterogeneous and people look at the strengthening of China in different ways, some with the understanding that there is nowhere to go from China, some making money from the shuttle business. There is a religious part of society that looks at China negatively, given what is happening in Xinjiang with the Uighurs and religious minorities. There are hundreds of thousands of Uighurs in Kazakhstan who have relatives in Xinjiang and know the real situation.
There are, of course, political elites who are the main beneficiaries of the Chinese presence in the economy, and it is in their interest to continue their relations with China.
CABAR.asia: Millions of migrants from the region, especially from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are working in Russia. This is an important factor of Russian influence in these countries. In the future, could China become an alternative labor migration destination for the region?
It’s too early to say because China now has a demographic safety cushion that allows it not to attract migrants. But if we talk about the situation decades from now, it does not look very optimistic for China. Chinese society is aging rapidly, and the demographic burden is growing very strongly every year. Last year, for the first time in China, the death rate exceeded the birth rate. For the first time since the seventies, or even since the great famine, China’s population declined. This suggests that China will have to simplify its migration policy at some point in the foreseeable future.
CABAR.asia: What other new instruments of China’s soft power can you predict?
In general, China’s influence is really growing, not only in the region, but in what is called the global south in general. This is a trend. Experts were talking about this before the war {in Ukraine} and before the pandemic. For Central Asia, this means that in the future we will not only actively trade with China, but we will also depend on China in terms of technology.
I think that in the near future we will see more small and medium-sized enterprises in the region working together with Chinese investors. In addition, as our dependence on Chinese technology increases, so will the need for engineers with Chinese technological education. So there will be a need for students to go to Chinese technology universities. In addition to that, I think we will also see more people in politics who are more Chinese-centric.
CABAR.asia: Russia, at least in the early 2000s, was quite attractive to some parts of Central Asian society. For example people liked that Putin talked to the press regularly, there was a lot of interesting and brave media and there were some reforms. But what could China be attractive to different segments of society in Central Asia?
We can say that despite the lack of democracy, China’s economy is still developing. In part, China is an example of a developed and enlightened authoritarianism. There is also a meritocratic system for promoting people to power, if they are really good professionals.
In addition, there are issues on which the Chinese machine has been really effective and has shown good potential for borrowing. For example, in terms of poverty alleviation, China has made significant progress.
CABAR.asia: China’s economic success is due to competition. Will the elites in our countries, who often create monopolistic groups themselves, accept this experience?
This is the main question: the decision what to take from China, what not to take, will not be made by society, but by the people who are in power. The most important thing for them is to maintain the status quo, and most likely they will look at China from a different lens, to look at it from the perspective of how China manages to maintain a stable authoritarian regime.
CABAR.asia: We saw that there was unrest in China over the covid lockdown, after which the authorities made concessions. Is there any possibility of a comparative democratization of power in China? For example, a return to the practice of first-person turnover?
In the near future I do not think we will see anything like that. The Chinese political regime is becoming more and more personalistic, and it has concentrated an unimaginable amount of power in its hands, which probably has not been seen since the time of Mao Zedong. And this is a trend that has so far remained unshaken and to which there has been no strong opposition.
Second, there are actually quite a lot of protests in China, but we just don’t hear about them. In Chinese provinces, there are protests on a fairly regular, I would say even daily, on a different scale, often related to some kind of scandal at work, non-payment, low-quality goods that have led to illness and death. This kind of protest activity in China rages all the time. The Chinese censorship machine simply works very well to ensure that this does not come to light inside China or from the outside. Until 2016, the Chinese Ministry of the Interior published official statistics on the number of protests, and there were figures like a thousand protests each year.
So what happened during the covid wasn’t unusual, but of course the scale of these protests was larger than usual.
CABAR.asia: How do other players feel about China’s growing influence in the region?
Russia is already taking it for granted. Putin has said many times that China’s growing influence in third countries is something we cannot stop.
In this regard, Russia is now trying to coordinate with China. The last time Xi Jinping came to Moscow in March, he and Putin signed a joint statement saying that Russia and China would coordinate in Central Asia and prevent the import of color revolutions.
Russia is trying in this way to keep its finger on the pulse and monitor Chinese activity in the region so that it would not be directed against Moscow’s interests.
In turn, the U.S. is increasingly trying to negotiate with Central Asian elites not to let China get too deep, lest it turn into Russia # 2.
The other countries do not have the tools to fight for influence. Japan, for example, has a very serious eye on what China is doing, but it does not have enough tools to replace China or interfere with it in any way. It is the same with India and other countries.
CABAR.asia: China is trying to increase its influence on the media in the region. How can you fight Chinese propaganda?
The best fight against any propaganda or against attempts to promote a certain agenda is to form independent media that are popular and trusted by the public. If there are media outlets that produce regular, high-quality content, then people will naturally turn to them in the first place and will not use any obscure sources of information.
CABAR.asia: From the outside, the Chinese government seems like a super-organized, monolithic force that is very thorough, thinking through its policies for many years to come…
That’s an exaggeration. It seems to me that China is much more reactive than proactive, and I don’t think there’s a strategy there on every issue. But structured is true, the Chinese power system is very well controlled. This, of course, is the success of the Communist Party. It has managed to reform and in doing so expand the party to the point where there are party people, in almost every organization. It could be a private entrepreneurial company, it could be some kind of IT startup, or an English language course. But there always will be a person who will make sure that the activities of this organization do not contradict the interests of the party.