On March 19, 2023, it will be four years to the landmark moment in the history of Kazakhstan, when the first and seemingly eternal president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, announced his resignation. What has crucially changed in the political structure of the country after the resignation of the Yelbasy – the leader of the nation?
In February 2023, the second president of Kazakhstan, Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev endorsed the abolition of the constitutional law “On the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Yelbasy” and sent it to the ash heap of history. The law was adopted in 2000 and assigned a special status of Yelbasy, or the leader of the nation as translated from Kazakh, to Nazarbayev. The law on the Yelbasy has become, as one might say, the quintessence of the regime and personality cult of Nazarbayev.
But can we expect that the abolition of the law would stamp out the tradition of eternal centralised power in Kazakhstan? What new structures Tokayev began to build in politics, economy and social sphere and how are they different from the ones built by Nazarbayev? CABAR.asia asked these questions to experts.
Be or try to become
“What is the political structure built by Tokayev? This is new Kazakhstan, fair Kazakhstan. In my opinion, it is still being developed as the ideologeme. There are no clear directives as to what the new Kazakhstan is like, but the president’s words from the September message are often cited, “strong president, influential parliament, accountable government.” We can say that the president outlined something by this formula,” political analyst Eduard Poletaev said.
According to him, the society of Kazakhstan needs the fairness of political institutions, and political trust:
“Now the society is more demanding on the authorities than it was in the era of the first president, it wants justice, it wants the struggle against corruption, it wants to have more active impact on the authorities and take part in the governing of the state.”
He explained the activation of the civil society by focus on forthcoming parliamentary election from activists who decided to go into politics (so far in single-member constituencies).
March elections to Mazhilis and maslikhats of all levels will put an end to another stage of political reforms, Poletaev said. He forecasts a sort of demonopolization of political activity:
“The role of formal institutions will be strengthened in the political life, the parliament will be strengthened – it can already be felt. Influence of informal relationships, clan, undercover games of various types will be reduced. Politics will get more rationalised, while bureaucracy and management structures will be even more professional.”
Of course, as political analyst said, the process of redistribution of powers will continue. This process has taken a long time due to the amendments in the Constitution: Presidency is restricted to one term, the status of political parties is increased, the role of massive political participation is increasing.
“These are the directions of development of the system built by Tokayev. We can hope that instead of one-man command in adoption of political and economic decisions, more various professionals would be involved to make these decisions more adequate and efficiency for the development of Kazakhstan,” Poletaev said.
We can hope that instead of one-man command in political and economic decision-making, more various professionals would be involved, so that their decisions are more adequate and effective for the development of Kazakhstan,” Poletaev said.
Political reviewer Viktor Kovtunovsky feels less optimistic about it.
“The political structure has not changed. Kazakhstan was and remains the autocratic super presidency republic. The figure on the throne changed,” the analyst said. “Tokayev, even in his public speeches, is not going to back away from the presidential model, share the power with the parliament, government, etc.”
However, the president, according to Kovtunovsky, realises how strong the need for changes in the society is, and that’s where the attempt to imitate changes comes from. The “hearing state”, “new Kazakhstan”, “fair Kazakhstan”, “second republic” are the ideologemes suggested by Tokayev.
Kovtunovksy assesses the prospects of the second president to become the new Yelbasy as follows:
“If you asked this question before January 2022, I would say evasively: ‘He would like to be the second yelbasy.” But now, after blood was shed, after foreign military force was used to suppress mass protests, Tokayev will have to fight to retain his power as long as he is able to do it physically.”
Change in the concept?
“Economy is always the foundation of politics. First, economy is built, and then politics is built over,” this phrase of Nursultan Nazarbayev seems to have lost its relevance. The strengthened role of the state in reallocation of resources and material wealth is another social need, let’s call it the need for demonopolisation and deoligarchization. And in this case, the economic strategy of the state conduct seems to be closely tied to the political strategy.
“It is too early to speak about the transformation of economy,” said financial expert Rasul Rysmambetov, “because at the level of institutions – maslikhat, Mazhilis, Senate, government – they do not work as the presidents want them to. That’s why the elections are taking place now, and after the elections the rules of the game would be changing gradually at the level of laws. The most important thing is how the institutions will be organised, and the economics will depend on the plan.”
Economic priorities of “new Kazakhstan” will remain the same – agriculture, logistics, trade.
“There’s nothing new we can come up with, we cannot organise the petroleum industry quickly. So far, we will be working using old schemes – using what was already created, and it will take us at least three years to realise where our economy is heading,” he said.
The short-term forecast from Rysmambetov:
“The whole quasi-sector (companies owned by the state – Editorial office) and akimats (administrations of residential places – Editorial office) will have new team of suppliers. One oligarchs will be replaced by other oligarchs, but I think the number of oligarchs will reduce.”
Rysmambetov also suggests that in the era of Tokayev the state will reduce its participation interest in the economy of Kazakhstan. The willingness of the government to transfer some thermal power plants to the ownership of the state suggests otherwise. But, according to Rasul Rysmambetov, in case of TPPs the state will restore the infrastructure and significantly reduce its presence in other sectors.
“I don’t see any demonopolisation processes so far, I see only processes of financial flows from one group to another,” said Magbat Spanov, expert of the Institute for Innovation Economics, professor of KazNU.
He also said that Kazakhstan has not developed the clear economic policy since 2019.
“I have repeatedly said that we have two options: we pursue either the anti-inflationary policy or the economic development policy. We need to apply relevant management methods depending on the model. But we don’t see any distinct macroeconomic policy for five years already. I relate it to the fact that, unfortunately, those people who determine the national policy generally do not understand what they want,” Spanov said.
Look in the mirror
Calling the past 30 years the era of Nazarbayev would be an oversimplification, said sociologist Yeset Yesengarayev. This oversimplification reduces all social nuances, typical for Kazakhstanis, to only one figure and thus forces us to believe that everything that happened in the country in the years of Nazarbayev’s ruling depended on one person only. According to the sociologist, it is more reasonable to take Nazarbayev and Kazakhstanis as complementary phenomena.
“Nazarbayev and his regime emerged and developed in a social context, which was very favourable to his authority. In turn, Nazarbayev contributed to the improvement of those traits of Kazakhstanis, which were advantageous to him and his inner circle. And not only to his inner circle, but generally to the system of government and public institutions determining the status of the Kazakh society these years. And that system of government and institutions had sociocultural background that lasted for one thousand years,” the expert said.
According to him, while reducing the 30-year-long history only to the figure of Nazarbayev and his policy, we miss the opportunity to be understood by the Kazakh society in a complex, and, above all, more objective way.
For objective understanding, Yeset Yesengarayev suggests taking into account positive consequences of Nazarbayev’s policy. For example, creation of more favourable conditions for business (if compared to most ex-Soviet countries), the launch of the Bolashak programme (allows Kazakhstanis to study in foreign universities at the cost of the state budget), creation of the NIS network (Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools for gifted children) and Nazarbayev University (the world-level university).
“We cannot but admit the role of Nazarbayev in creation of Astana,” Yeset Yesengarayev continued. “The transfer of the capital led to the establishment of the new cultural centre of the country in addition to positive political consequences. Unfortunately, the general outcome of Nursultan Nazarbayev’s ruling turned out to be more negative than positive. And this is not only his fault, but the fault of the society, to some extent.”
The sociologist is not expecting any fundamental changes in the mindset of fellow nationals after Nazarbayev’s resignation as lifestyle practices of Kazakhstanis cannot be changed quickly: “We do not have new narratives and discourses that allow us to build new identities and institutions. Moreover, the absolute majority of Kazakhstanis, including some part of the expert community, are not prone to reflection that can help them critically reinvent themselves.”
As a result, today Kazakhstanis and most of meaning makers still think by childish-paternalistic patterns. “These patterns always justify them, letting them find the ones who are to blame for their situation, and always hold the authorities liable for changes. In this case, the new president is liable,” said Yeset Yesengarayev.
Does Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev himself contribute to the change in the way of thinking of Kazakhstanis, and in the attitude to the central government and to one’s own responsibility for the future of the republic? The answer to this question depends not on Tokayev’s statements, but on his actions in the next five-six years.
“And if we see that he does not prolong his presidential term or try to appoint a successor, then his policy could be seen as the policy that abolished the practice of continuous illegal prolongation of powers that was peculiar to the period of Nazarbayev’s ruling,” Yeset Yesengarayev said.
Keep in mind that once the new president came to power in Kazakhstan in 2019, the form of government did not change: according to the Democracy Index, the republic is still mentioned as the country with the authoritarian regime.
Main photo: akorda.kz