“At the end of last year the government of Kazakhstan announced plans to introduce new requirements for obtaining citizenship of the country, which point to the existing dilemma of Kazakhstan’s national identity,” – Dias Takenov, a graduate of the CABAR.asia School of Analytics analyzes the new amendments in an article for CABAR.asia.
In early November last year, the government of Kazakhstan announced plans to introduce new requirements for obtaining citizenship of the country. The proposed amendments introduce additional grounds such as ignorance of the Kazakh language, basic history and legislation of Kazakhstan for refusal to grant and restore citizenship of the country. Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov mentioned that these measures are aimed at preventing the facts of dual citizenship. Indeed, the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs indicate a large number of citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan who have the citizenship of another country.
However, these amendments are not limited to this, but point to deeper processes in Kazakhstani society. First, the proposed changes point to the existing dilemma of Kazakhstan’s national identity. The country does not have a generally accepted policy in this direction, and the current situation is more similar to a delicate balance between the ethnic and civic model of nationalism. Secondly, the requirements for Kazakh language proficiency signal that the government is strengthening the ethnic component, and the said balance will move towards an ethnocentric model.
Double citizenship
The issue of dual citizenship in Kazakhstan is acute and is invariably perceived as the basis of potential separatism in the country. President Tokayev mentioned that the problem of dual citizenship is a threat to the national security of Kazakhstan. Although the source of the threat was not named directly, the data obtained suggest that it is a threat from the northern neighbor. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for the period from 2015 to 2021, more than 90 thousand facts of dual citizenship were registered, of which more than 85 thousand are persons with Russian citizenship. If we consider these figures by regions, it becomes obvious that most people with two citizenships live in the regions bordering Russia. For example, in the Kostanay region, over 31 thousand administrative cases on dual citizenship have been registered over 7 years. This number contrasts particularly strongly with the southern regions – for example, in Shymkent, less than a thousand cases of dual citizenship were opened during the same period. Even if we compare two neighboring regions – West Kazakhstan and Atyrau, one can immediately see a big difference between the number of registered cases – more than 4.5 thousand versus less than 500 cases.
Another interesting moment is the intensification of the work of law enforcement agencies, which coincided with the annexation of Crimea. If in 2013 a little more than 2 thousand cases of dual citizenship were recorded, then in 2015 their number was already more than 8.5 thousand. From the period to 2013, there has been a significant increase in the number of cases, and in 2021, the police have already registered more than 17 thousand cases in just one year. Kazakhstan also actively promoted cooperation on the exchange of data on citizenship between the CIS countries. In parallel, new legislative measures were taken in this direction. In 2016, amendments were adopted that increased the penalty for failure to report dual citizenship by employees of the public and quasi-public sectors to 300 MCI (about 2,000 USD). The amendments also allow for the simultaneous deportation of violators.
A new article on separatism in the criminal code, adopted in 2014, deserves special attention. The government introduced a draft new criminal code a year earlier, but the Mazhilis unexpectedly introduced a new article on separatism in April 2014, a month after the annexation of Crimea. This article provides from 5 to 10 years in prison for public calls to change the territorial integrity and unitarity of Kazakhstan. Since the article came into force in 2015, at least 20 cases across the country have been filed against it, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office. One of the latest cases is that of a couple from Petropavlovsk, who declared on the Chatroulette app that Northern Kazakhstan should be annexed to Russia. Both spouses were sentenced to 5 years in prison. Summarizing the picture obtained, it becomes obvious that the issue of potential separatism is taken as seriously as possible.
Here it should be noted that the motives of people for obtaining citizenship of the Russian Federation can be very different. Many people are interested in social payments: there are numerous cases when people received social payments: pensions and benefits both in Kazakhstan and in Russia. Someone wants to move to Russia for work but does not want to lose the opportunity to return to Kazakhstan under unforeseen circumstances. Other people see the Russian passport as a guarantee of security in an emergency, especially after the January events in Kazakhstan. Simply put, people’s motivations for obtaining dual citizenship can be very different, and they are not necessarily associated with separatist views. On the other hand, the authorities of Kazakhstan may reasonably fear a repetition of the Georgian and Ukrainian scenarios: the passportization of the border population and the further introduction of troops “to ensure the safety of citizens.” These fears are especially strengthened by the open revanchist rhetoric of the Russian authorities and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
It is also worth noting the twofold position of the Russian Federation on these issues. Yes, Russia has concluded an agreement on the transfer of information to Kazakhstan upon obtaining Russian citizenship by citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan. On the other hand, the current Russian legislation does not require renunciation of the citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan (as one of the exceptions) when obtaining a Russian passport. Moreover, Russia adopted a new draft Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation, which simplified the acquisition of Russian citizenship for more than 20 categories of persons, including compatriots. However, the most alarming moment is that Russia has begun granting political asylum to people accused of separatism in Kazakhstan. On February 15, it became known that Maxim Yakovchenko, accused of separatism and inciting ethnic hatred, received political asylum in the Russian Federation. Earlier, Yakovchenko escaped from under house arrest and was detained by Russian police in the Rostov region. This case sets a dangerous precedent and could be taken as a signal of greater Russian support for separatist tendencies.
Language, identity, and citizenship
Considering the feasibility of these amendments, it is worth noting several key points.
First, language is not a key factor in a person’s political preferences. Research shows that people can have political views, both along the language line and against it. It is also necessary to consider that the language, although it has an influence on the ethnic identity of a person, does not always determine it. Simply put, language is an important and powerful factor in shaping ethnic identity and political views, respectively, but by no means a key one. A striking example of this is the Ukrainian military personnel who use the Russian language during the war for the independence of Ukraine. The survey data for Kazakhstan also indicate that language is not the main determinant of Kazakhstani national identity. More important factors were the actual presence of citizenship of Kazakhstan, a sense of patriotism, knowledge of the history of the country, respect for the laws, the fact of birth in Kazakhstan, and only then knowledge of the Kazakh language. It is interesting to note that a person’s ethnos is not directly associated with national identity. In other words, a person can be a Kazakhstani, being a non-Kazakh, and not knowing the Kazakh language.
Secondly, the effectiveness of these amendments as a mechanism to counter attempts to obtain dual citizenship is debatable. In most cases, people who have citizenship other than Kazakhstani were originally citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and only then received citizenship of another country. Accordingly, the proposed amendments will not be an obstacle for them. Moreover, given that a certain number of Kazakhs abroad do not speak Kazakh, the new rules may become an obstacle for them to obtain citizenship.
On the other hand, the proposed amendments are made in response to a growing demand for stronger government support for the Kazakh language. Recent studies on national identity in Kazakhstan show the important role of the Kazakh language for the population. The findings indicate deep dissatisfaction with the state of the Kazakh language: respondents pointed to the low level of language use in some parts of the country, even among the Kazakhs themselves. Moreover, the study participants blame the government’s weak policy on supporting the state language in this situation. Lack of Kazakh language proficiency requirements, inefficient government programs, low language proficiency among civil servants themselves, and weak Kazakh language development legislation were cited as the main reasons for this situation. Such sentiments are especially strong among young people. Given these factors, the proposed amendments to the Citizenship Law seem like a logical response to growing public demand.
Moreover, the proposed amendments themselves do not represent anything fundamentally new. Similar rules exist in the legislation of many countries around the world. Russia requires knowledge of the Russian language to obtain citizenship. Even such liberal Western countries as Great Britain and the United States require knowledge of English for citizenship, higher education, and work in the public service. In this regard, Kazakhstan is rather an exception since the current Law on Citizenship does not define knowledge of any language as a necessary condition for obtaining citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Therefore, there is nothing fundamentally new in the rules proposed by the government.
Balancing between two fires
The most important point with the proposed amendments is the issue of Kazakhstan’s national identity.
Over the past thirty years, the government has more or less successfully balanced between ethnic and civic models of national identity. This is especially evident in the Constitution and the Law on Languages adopted in 1997. According to the Constitution, the Kazakh language is recognized as the only state language in Kazakhstan, but the Russian language is officially used in state organizations and local self-government authorities. This provision is also reflected in the Law on Languages. All public services can be obtained both in Kazakh and in Russian. Litigation, document circulation in state bodies is carried out in both languages. The same current version of the Law on Citizenship does not require knowledge of the Kazakh language or the basics of the history of Kazakhstan in order to obtain citizenship. At the same time, the government is promoting the use of the Kazakh language. The Law on Languages enshrines the provision that mastering the Kazakh language is the duty of every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan. At the moment, knowledge of the Kazakh language is required to work in the public sector, receive the Bolashak presidential scholarship, and so on. In 2018, Nazarbayev instructed to hold meetings of the government and parliament in the Kazakh language. At the same time, the government suppresses the actions of both Kazakh nationalists and outright separatists through the article introduced in the Criminal Code on inciting ethnic hatred. In general, the government has successfully implemented elements of both civic and ethnic nationalism in Kazakhstan.
The proposed amendments pointed to this long unresolved issue of Kazakhstan’s national identity. The current situation with the policy of national identity is more like a deliberate uncertainty, and that its decision was left for later in order to avoid any conflict situations. The last public step to resolve the issue was the “Doctrine of National Unity” proposed in 2010 with the idea of creating a new “Kazakhstani” nation. After its publication, the proposed model was criticized for the lack of a clearly defined role of the titular nation and the potential threat of assimilation of ethnic minorities, and was subsequently removed from the political agenda. After this incident, the government followed a rather vague policy regarding national identity – as shown above, elements of both ethnic and civic nationalism developed in the country. It is possible that this was a strategic uncertainty since the topic of national identity was considered too sensitive.
The current legislation reflects this uncertainty. On the one hand, Kazakhstan provides an opportunity to obtain citizenship in an accelerated form for qandas and for ethnic Kazakhs who study in the country. On the other hand, according to an interstate agreement, Kazakhstan gives the right to accelerated obtaining of citizenship for citizens of Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, as well as for the countries of the former Soviet Union with certain conditions.
However, since the annexation of Crimea, the increased risk of separatism, and even more so with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this topic has become increasingly difficult to ignore. Therefore, the proposed amendments signal changes in the policy of national identity in the direction of strengthening the ethnic component of national identity. The status and role of the Kazakh language will increase, and the requirement for knowledge of the language may create an additional mechanism for combating separatism in the country. Previously, it was relatively easy for citizens of the republics of the former Soviet Union to obtain citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan, especially if there were relatives who were already citizens of Kazakhstan. Now they will have to take additional exams in the Kazakh language, history, and fundamentals of legislation. For example, the same citizens of Russia or Kyrgyzstan will have to take an exam in the knowledge of the Kazakh language and history – in fact, this is the abolition of the clause on the accelerated acquisition of citizenship without actually canceling it.
However, it should be noted that the amendments will be more symbolic. The new rules will not affect people who are already citizens of Kazakhstan, so the population is unlikely to feel them in practice. In this sense, a much stronger signal for the transition to an ethnic model would be, for example, the requirement to know the Kazakh language when passing an exam for a driver’s license. In this case, the amendments are aimed at people who only want to become citizens. Therefore, the proposed amendments are a big, albeit rather symbolic, step towards the ethnic model of national identity.
Conclusion
New amendments to the Citizenship Law have exposed a long-standing dilemma of Kazakhstan’s national identity. The current uncertainty is gone, and the country is openly, although symbolically, strengthening the ethnic component of the policy of national identity. However, this does not mean at all that it is going full steam ahead towards ethnic nationalism. The proportion of the population that does not speak Kazakh and the desire to avoid open conflicts with the northern neighbor will continue to influence the politics of national identity in the country. Moreover, it is difficult to say that the current leadership of the country really wants a complete ethnic model – on the contrary, the role of the Russian language is often emphasized by officials. However, even now we can confidently say that the role of the ethnic component in the national identity of Kazakhstan is increasing.
Acknowledgements
The author expresses his sincere gratitude to Dr. Serik Orazgaliyev and Aruzhan Meirkhanova for reviewing the work and making suggestions.