How Did the Media and Social Media Cover the Conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik Border?

According to the Factchek.kg journalist Asel Sooronbaeva, there were many fakes, especially on social media. There were also messages denigrating the Tajik side by the Kyrgyz social media users and vice versa.

The media also published such messages. The old reports were presented as news, for example, the fakes about the requests for Emomali Rahmon’s resignation and the fact that Turkey is about to provide military assistance to Kyrgyzstan. This information was initially distributed by the Russian media, and local journalists republished it without verifying.

The media distributed the information stating that the President of Turkey, in response to the message by the Kyrgyz TV host Assol Moldokmatova, requested Tajikistan to stop military aggression against Kyrgyzstan. The fact-checkers refuted this information.

In Tajikistan, on May 2, the websites of the Tojikiston (pressa.tj) and Faraj (faraj.tj) newspapers published reports about an attack on Khistevarz village by the Kyrgyzstan citizens. However, Faraj deleted this report later, and Tojikiston newspaper stated that it turned out to be false.

According to the co-author of Factcheck.tj resource Jamshed Maruf, during the week, his team published more than 10 fact-checking materials on the situation on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border in Russian and Tajik.

According to him, the social media users mostly discussed the fakes about the President of Turkey and that “Tajikistan used Russian combat helicopters on the border with Kyrgyzstan”.

In addition, on May 2, 2021, a video of the unloading of the Russian Operational-Tactical Iskander Missile System appeared on the Sadoi Kuhiston YouTube channel. Allegedly, this took place at that time in Khujand airport. However, a search by the screenshot revealed that the video was actually shot back in 2017.

Maruf admits that they could not verify many reports due to the lack of reliable information on open sources.

“Currently, we are working on ten more materials, and will soon publish them. During our work, we decided that from now on, we will quickly publish the Russian version of the checked materials, and even publish our materials in English, so that the global community has access to this information,” Maruf notes.

According to Asel Sooronbaeva, the sources of the fakes were everywhere. These were the tabloids, some Russian media, which deliberately or unintentionally disinformed the readers, as well as social media. The Kyrgyz media republished fake information. Some authors checked the data, but not every media did so.

Jamshed Maruf adds that a significant false information flow invaded the social media. This happened both in the Tajik and Kyrgyz segments of social media, and then, it was shared in messengers.

“Still, the disinformation flow in social media from both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is quite large. There are many more materials that we do not know about. This information has not been confirmed by the authorities, or published in the media yet,” he says.

Tajik political scientist Parviz Mullojanov considers the fakes’ appearance inevitable in such situation.

According to him, the fakes are part of the information warfare, which, in turn, is an integral part of geopolitical and military confrontation.

“The social media and the online environment today are as much a battleground as the traditional theatre of military operations. Some of the fakes are intended for international readers, and some – for internal audience, in order to preserve the authorities’ reputation, to present the course of events in the most acceptable light,” Mullojanov noted.

In Tajikistan, state media remained silent about conflict at the border. For example, over the past month, the government news agency Khovar published only one message about this conflict – about the meeting of the head of the State Committee for National Security Saimumin Yatimov and the chairman of the Sughd region Rajabboy Akhmadzoda with the residents of the villages of Vorukh, Chorkuh and Khoja Alo in Isfara.

As the media expert Azamat Tynaev notes, the Kyrgyz journalists did their best under the given conditions. Unfortunately, in the early days, there was little official information. There was a lack of press releases, as well as speeches from representatives of government agencies.

The Tajik journalists also expressed similar complaints about the work of the authorities’ press services. According to the editor-in-chief and founder of the Asia-Plus media group Umed Babakhanov, the Tajik media found themselves in a very difficult situation during the conflict.

“While our Kyrgyz colleagues received information from all official structures, we did not receive any information from government bodies – neither from the security forces, nor from the social or political structures. Therefore, most of the Tajik media performed poorly and failed to fulfil their mission of informing society,” he says.

Parviz Mullojanov assessed the Tajik media’s work positively.

“The main burden fell on the digital media; the timely information was provided by Asia-Plus and Ozodi (RFE/RL’s Tajik Service),” he said.

After the earlier transborder clashes and events associated with the large-scale popular unrest and violent change of power, the media experts have already given a recommendation to develop algorithms for an agreed upon, coordinated, and stable reporting, Tynaev notes. But so far, no one has listened to this advice.

According to him, there are objective reasons for this. It is often that press services, even of very serious state bodies – those ensuring life support and security of the entire nation, perform poorly. They have insufficient human resources; they are understaffed and lack proper equipment. These factors come into play in the crucial moments.

Thus, on May 3, the Committee of Emergency Situations of Tajikistan posted information about the pogroms in a Tajik village but used a photo from the Kyrgyz news agency kloop.kg for illustration. This photo was taken in Maksat village of Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. Later, the Committee apologized for the inaccuracy and replaced the photo.

The role of the media was revealed in efficiency of citing Border Service’s press-releases, statements of politicians and the use of videos and photos from social media, says Inga Sikorskaya, Program Director of the School of Peacemaking and Media Technologies in Central Asia.

According to her, it was on the basis of the analysis of media reports on the most intense days of April 28-29-30 that some TV channels broadcast boring conversations of “talking heads”, who deliberated on what happened. There were almost no original materials.

Since there was a duplication of information from social media, and there was no original reporting from the scene, there was no point in discussing conflict journalism in this case, Sikorskaya says.

According to her, the mention of the ethnicity of people (Kyrgyz, Tajiks) was present in many materials – and very often in headlines. In Kyrgyz and Russian languages, this always sets reader’s teeth on edge. It is opposite to, for example, headlines in English, where in public discourses references to an ethnic group are better correlated with references to belonging to a particular citizenship.

“Some media reported that the deceased warrant officer in Batken was an “ethnic Uzbek” or that the Dungans (meaning the Dungan diaspora as a united group) are helping Batken residents. How necessary and important was it to emphasize this? It was much more important to put the facts in context. The coverage of the border conflict gave rise to the stereotype of a “small victorious war” across the information space – and it began to be replicated by many media outlets,” she notes.

The reports on the topic of war and security, especially if the conflict occurs very close, always arouse interest, anxiety and different emotions in the audience. The constant media monitoring of news feeds showed that the news kept the audience in suspense, since the messages about the situation were constantly shared in a negative context, according to Inga Sikorskaya.

“On the one hand, it was uncensored information, and we clearly saw and understood what was happening. On the other hand, we again faced a lack of balance. We did not see or hear the other side. There was a lot of information, but there was no balance. This did not contribute to understanding and left a number of questions among viewers and readers.

Unfortunately, our media did not use the peacemaking journalism approaches. Such approaches are sorely lacking in coverage of such conflicts. After all, the peacemaking journalism provides a set of tools for reporters and editors, shows what and how to report to the audience about the situation in order to create opportunities for society to consider a non-violent response to this conflict. This is not a mitigation of the conflict, not a search for those guilty of the conflict, and not the replication of opinions and claims as established facts. (Which is practiced everywhere in our country),” she says.

She believes that for the reports to contribute to de-escalation, the reporters must develop the habit of exploring, discussing and creating a dialogue, presenting different perspectives on the conflict, shaping public opinion to create peace initiatives. In peacemaking journalism, this approach is called “providing a win-win report orientation for both sides of the conflict and raising the debate on how to resolve it.”

Parviz Mullojanov believes that all sides of the conflict should fight against fake news.

“The most effective way to counter fakes is to monitor the information space in order to detect them in due time and prepare a convincing refutation. The civil society, NGOs and independent journalists usually play a crucial role in this process,” Mullojanov said.

Umed Babakhanov believes that in order to minimise the fakes’ influence, it is necessary to raise the media literacy of the population and provide people with more high-quality content.

The conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border has a long history. Usually, the clashes between the residents of border villages occur in the spring.

Currently, out of 971 kilometres of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, the parties have officially agreed on only 519 kilometres. The disputed border areas lie in Batken region of Kyrgyzstan and Sughd region of Tajikistan, including two conflict zones: Tajik jamoats Vorukh and Ovchi Kalacha.

Vorukh jamoat belongs to the territory of Tajikistan, but is located in Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. The total area of the jamoat is about 130 thousand square meters. About 35 thousand people live here.

The main reason for the disputes between the residents of the two countries is settling in disputed areas where construction is prohibited.

Another reason for the dispute is the transit highway that connects Tajikistan and Vorukh. At the same time, this highway connects the Leilek district with Kyrgyzstan. Earlier, the Kyrgyz side proposed to build a bypass road, but the neighbouring republic opposed it.

The third point of dispute is the water distribution point from the Tortkul reservoir. Both countries claim to use this water during the irrigation season.

The conflict between the states started developing in the mid-90s, when the issue of delimitation and demarcation of state borders aggravated among the countries of the Central Asian region.

The very first conflict between the Kirghiz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics occurred in 1989. Several hundred residents of Samarkandek village of Batken region fired at Khoja Alo village populated with ethnic Tajiks. The conflict ended only after the military intervention.

Same year, the governments of both countries tried to establish a border line based on actual land use, but this initiative was unsuccessful.

After the clashes on April 28-30, 2021, the government delegations from Kyrgyzstan met for discussion in Batken. According to the press service of the government of Kyrgyzstan, the topography working groups were instructed to create the project line of the state border at the remaining undefined border sections from May 5 to 9, 2021.

While the process of delimitation, demarcation and legal registration of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border is ongoing, the parties agreed to build a joint road to connect the Tajik village of Khoja Alo located in Isfara district with Vorukh jamoat. It will be built to bypass the eastern side of the Kyrgyz village of Kapchygay.

This road will be built for the safe movement of citizens, for vehicles and goods transit of Tajikistan. It will be used and maintained by the Tajik side, and its status will be determined by a separate state agreement between the two countries.

For a long time, the sides have been arguing over water, but not because of its shortage, but because of its irrational use. In total, there are 40 water canals in the region, but there is no department responsible for their restoration and maintenance. As a result, the water canals are being used not at full capacity.

According to the Support Centre of Vorukh jamoat, earlier, the representatives of water management organisations of three countries – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – were constantly present at the water distribution point. Now, there is no such practice, since the border post of Kyrgyzstan is located here.

In 1960s, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan decided to build the Druzhba Canal, which was later named Tortkul. According to the plan, the canal was supposed to fill the Tortkul reservoir. Such a step would make it possible to irrigate a large area of undeveloped land and improve water supply to villages.

The citizens of both countries participated in its construction. According to the agreement, the Kyrgyz side had to allocate the necessary amount of water for the Tajik population. But later, the USSR collapsed, and the issue of water use became problematic.

According to the UNDP analysis of the border communities, “the Tajik community considers itself deceived and cites the argument that before the development of the Samarkandek area (1000 ha of land), the Kyrgyz side was supplying Isfara district with water from the Tortkul reservoir via the canal of Surkh jamoat, which was compensated by the water of the Matchai canal.

After its development, the Kyrgyz side demanded a larger amount of water from the Isfarinka River and stopped supplying water from Tortkul reservoir in sufficient amounts.

Residents of Tajik villages believe that water is being used as leverage during disputes, as well as a mean of enrichment of certain individuals [municipal heads]”.

Not only. In 2009, Kyrgyzstan introduced a moratorium on the lease of pastures and their use by foreign citizens. This ban led to the mass slaughter of livestock and the transfer of part of animals to stalls, which provoked an increase in livestock feed prices.

Bypassing the legislation, the residents came up with a new way to solve the problem – Kyrgyz herdsmen take the neighbours’ cattle for grazing and claim it as their own.

“The solution to the problem of joint grazing depends on the signing of an interstate agreement, on which the Kyrgyz authorities insist. However, the Tajik authorities are reluctant to take this step, because they consider the issue of pasture ownership as open to negotiation,” said UCA researcher Asel Murzakulova.

The money collection is another acute issue, since the Tajik herdsmen are unable to pass ecological checkpoints.

According to the Resource Centre of Vorukh jamoat, the residents of Tajik villages often employ Kyrgyz herdsmen. However, the potential livestock losses are the main source of disputes, as there is no written agreement between the parties. Every year, for various reasons, an average of 50 to 100 head of small and large livestock disappear.

Yes. In 2011, the Support Centre of Vorukh jamoat released an analysis of the development of border communities in Isfara district of Tajikistan and Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. The researchers concluded that the border guards and the police, by their actions and attitudes, provoke conflicts and tensions in controversial issues between residents of the Kyrgyz and Tajik communities.

Security officers and unauthorised checkpoints are present at the entrance and exit of the jamoat, which creates problems with the movement of local residents.

“The creation of obstacles for movement by one side is immediately reciprocated by the other,” the analysis states.

The expert community shares the opinion that in such a region, the powers of the military and border guards should be strictly limited. Otherwise, by their actions, they may inflame inter-ethnic clashes.

Often, in the Kyrgyz-Tajik border areas, the theft of livestock, hooliganism, theft of property and drug trafficking are registered. Geographic location is among the main reasons. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are very close to Afghanistan – one of the global leaders in the production of illegal drugs.

Read also: Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Disputes: Reasons and Ways of Solution

They need security and justice. Asel Murzakulova, researcher at the Mountain Societies Research Institute of the University of Central Asia, spoke about this in CABAR.asia interview.

According to her, it is wrong to say that the trouble is caused by undefined borders only. The main reason of conflicts is a lack of security and justice. The border guards represent the only structure, which the residents of border areas can address.

“What do people need? They need security. Not the kind of security, when they are required to present their passports at every step and armed people become a daily routine in rural life, but the security that is present when moving, so that you can go to the market, hospital, school without passing a checkpoint,” she said.

Parviz Mullojanov believes that in order to improve the negotiation process, it is necessary to actively involve civil society from the both sides of the border.

“We must solve this problem all together, and only by peaceful means,” he said.