Experts from Central Asia and beyond share their forecasts of what to expect in the region in 2022, what internal and external risks countries will face, and also summarize the results of the past year in a material, written specifically for CABAR.asia
The experts for CABAR.asia were represented by independent researcher Askar Nursha from Kazakhstan*, political scientist Emilbek Juraev from Kyrgyzstan, independent researcher Parviz Mullodzhanov (Tajikistan), director of the non-state scientific and educational institution “Bilim Karvoni” Farkhod Tolipov from Uzbekistan, independent researcher Rustam Muhamedov (Turkmenistan). Out-of-region assessments are presented by Edward Lemon (USA), head of the OXUS Society for Central Asian Affairs.
Experts unanimously believe that 2021 turned out to be a busy year for the region: a pandemic, an increase in social tension, ongoing economic and energy crises, etc. With regard to the events, experts talk about a Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and the renaming of the Turkic Council into the Organization of Turkic States in November. Among the internal problems in the region, there is a risk of growth of protest movements, unresolved border issues; external geopolitical risks include the strengthening of China, Russia’s desire to tie the countries of the region to itself and the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan.
Results of the previous year
Askar Nursha (Kazakhstan): in general, the year passed under the auspices of the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the independence and was filled with events and actions of a patriotic nature. A population census has been carried out, reflecting the new reality in the ethnic and demographic composition of the population. Kazakhstan, under the influence of the coronavirus pandemic, has made a significant leap forward in the digitalization of government, banking, and financial services.
A number of important changes have been made to the state planning system. A new National Development Plan of the country until 2025 has been adopted. Instead of developing state programs, a transition to the format of national projects was approved. With the active participation of members of the National Council of Public Trust, a lot of legislative work was done to improve state policy in the social, financial and law enforcement spheres. For the first time, elections of rural akims were held.
In the field of foreign policy, important events for Kazakhstan were the holding in August of the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and the renaming in November of the Turkic Council into the Organization of Turkic States.
Emilbek Juraev (Kyrgyzstan): For Kyrgyzstan, 2021 was especially eventful. The year kicked off with early presidential elections in January that legitimized the country’s new leader, Sadyr Japarov, who took over in the October 2020 protests. Further, three major events characterized the year for Kyrgyzstan. First, it is a massive revision of laws, starting with the adoption of a new constitution and including reworking over 300 individual laws under the heading of an inventory check – a process never completed in 2021. Secondly, this armed clash on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border in late April-early May is the most destructive such event for Kyrgyzstan in 30 years. Third, it is the de facto nationalization of the Kumtor gold mining company from the Canadian corporation Centerra through the introduction of external management and the imposition of multi-billion USD fines for environmental violations.
The year will also be remembered in the future for many electoral events, and the extended term of the outgoing convocation of parliament for a whole year, and almost three different compositions of the cabinet of ministers within one year, and the economic crisis (primarily inflation) that was intensifying throughout the year, and an acute energy crisis by the end of the year. In general, 2021 was a year of unprecedented challenges, uncertainty and more than controversial moves from the side of the leadership.
Parviz Mullodzanov (Tajikistan): 2021 turned out to be extremely difficult for Tajikistan. First, at the beginning of this year, there was a peak in the problems associated with the pandemic and its consequences for the country and the region. On the one hand, it was a period of growth in coronavirus diseases, on the other hand, the road abroad remained closed for labor migrants. In general, experts believed that at that time about 200 thousand Tajik labor migrants were stuck in their homeland, unable to return to their jobs in Russia. All this caused a sharp decrease in the volume of remittances to the country, a drop in the level of budget and population incomes and inflation, and also significantly increased the level of social tension in the country.
Secondly, in April 2021, another exacerbation of the transboundary conflict took place in the Isfara-Batken zone. At the same time, the tension in the conflict zone began to build up already in February 2021; Although the outbreak of direct violence was relatively short-lived, the consequences of the conflict (in the form of constant tension on the borders, the beginning of an unspoken arms race, and so on) are felt for the country and the region to this day.
Third, of course, the events in neighboring Afghanistan became a serious challenge for the country. The coming to power in this country of a group of radical jihadists is an unpleasant and unexpected surprise for the entire region, for all of Afghanistan’s neighbors. None of the neighboring countries wants to see a state next to them, the government of which is 60% composed of people who are on the international wanted list for terrorist activities. Tajikistan also turned out to be virtually the only state in the region, which from the very beginning took a position of complete non-recognition of the Taliban government – at least until the latter fulfill a number of conditions of the international community. One of the consequences of these concerns has been a series of new security agreements with China, resulting in a new base for the Chinese military on territory of Tajikistan.
Fourth, the internal challenge for the country was the protests and social tensions in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), which have been continuing with interruptions since 2012. In fact, these events reflect the accumulated problems in relations between the center and the regions – first of all, we are talking about the gap in the level of income and economic development. The system of management and distribution of budgetary funds is too centralized, as a result of which the regions do not have the means of delivery for their development, and the drop in living standards in the provinces of the country is taking on a much larger scale than in the capital.
Rustam Muhamedov (Turkmenistan): In 2021, G. Berdymukhamedov’s personalist authoritarian rulership tightened its grip further on the country’s political system. In a clear violation of the country’s constitution, the President was elected as the chairman of the national Parliament’s upper chamber, gaining greater personal control over the legislature, and thus, removing even minor and symbolic semblance of principles of separation of powers. Turkmenistan also got one step closer to a dynastic power succession as Serdar Berdymukhamedov’s political and media profile became even more visible. During the year, Serdar was promoted to a number of top positions, namely the deputy prime minister post overseeing the country’s most important and currently the most troubling area – economic and financial matters, and embarked on many trips to foreign states, becoming the country’s face to the world. The country’s population continued to experience significant social and economic challenges aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which officials arrogantly continued to deny, despite the surges in coronavirus-like cases and deaths. The government also became even more vigilant towards activists and independent journalists both at home and abroad using a wide variety of offline and online measures of intimidation and repression in an attempt to eradicate even minor potential for dissent.
Farkhod Tolipov (Uzbekistan): 2021 was a busy and intense year for Uzbekistan. In domestic politics, the most important event in 2021 was the presidential election, which took place in October. Although no surprises were expected at them, nevertheless, President Mirziyoyev was elected for a second term and this, according to the Constitution and legislation, is the last term. In this regard, many in the country and abroad are wondering whether the president will try to extend his term in office after the expiration of the second term.
The economic reforms in the country continued quite successfully. A number of large enterprises were commissioned; Uzbekistan has improved its international rankings on a number of indicators. A construction boom is taking place in the capital, which is sometimes accompanied by discontent among the population due to the eviction of residents of the districts at the construction sites, as well as excessive dusty air in the city. There is also a tourism boom, due to the country’s greater openness and the improvement of the country’s tourism climate.
In foreign policy, it is worth noting the following: in August 2021, the 3rd Consultative Meeting of the Presidents of Central Asia took place, which became another stage in the implementation of Uzbekistan’s initiative to strengthen regional cooperation.
On November 12, 2021, a summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States was held in Istanbul, at which the Council was transformed into the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The first OTS summit will take place in 2022 in Uzbekistan.
In the last month of last year, President Mirziyoyev paid a state visit to Kazakhstan and a state visit to South Korea. With both states, the level of cooperation and strategic partnership was raised to the level of allied relations.
An important achievement of Uzbekistan was that on May 18, 2021, the UN General Assembly adopted a special resolution declaring the Aral Sea region a zone of environmental innovations and technologies. The initiative belongs to the President of Uzbekistan.
On July 15-16, Tashkent hosted a high-level international conference “Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity. Challenges and Opportunities”. This conference made it possible to form a political and expert platform for multilateral discussion of the model of a mutually beneficial strategic link “Central Asia-South Asia” in the transport and logistics, energy, trade, production, investment, technological, cultural, and humanitarian spheres.
However, August 2021 became a serious challenge for Uzbekistan in connection with the seizure of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban (a banned terrorist organization in Central Asian countries – ed. note). Despite the ongoing diplomatic contacts between Tashkent and the Taliban leadership, the chaos that befell Afghanistan in August persists and future projects of cohesion are likely to be set aside for an indefinite future.
What important events are expected in your country in 2022?
Askar Nursha (Kazakhstan): at the end of 2021, Nursultan Nazarbayev announced his decision to transfer the powers of the head of the Nur Otan party to the current president, making it clear to society in which direction the political and elite processes in the country will develop in the coming months. The key attention will be focused on the upcoming Nur Otan congress and the subsequent process of strengthening the positions of the current president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in the system of state power.
The public is also interested in the work on the draft law on local self-government, which is expected to be adopted in 2022.
Emilbek Juraev (Kyrgyzstan): after an overly eventful 2021, 2022 is expected to be quiet. No elections (except for repeated parliamentary elections in two districts in Bishkek) or other major events are expected. Instead of events, this year can be viewed as a process of full-fledged entry into the work of all the new foundations laid down last year. First of all, this is a new constitution that has significantly rebuilt the architecture of the country’s power. Secondly, it is the executive branch changed in the new architecture, where the president is given the broadest powers in all spheres and levels of government. Thirdly, this is the newly elected parliament, in a significantly changed structure – 90 deputies instead of 120, elected at the end of 2021 in single-mandate constituencies (36 deputies) and in a single constituency according to the proportional system (54 deputies). These and other institutions (new relationships and compositions of local government, a new tax system and many new laws) have been in the process of emerging, debating and staffing in the past year, and 2022 will give many of these innovations a litmus test for their consistency and effectiveness. Besides the point, in the context of the ongoing economic crisis, success in this test is not guaranteed, and if the failures are serious, Kyrgyzstan can expect new shocks – unplanned, but already not surprising.
Parviz Mullodzanov (Tajikistan): Most likely, the Tajik government will have to make any concrete decision this year on whether or not to join the Eurasian Economic Union. This issue has remained unresolved for several years, despite its importance for the future of the country. It is also a matter of geopolitical choice, since the country’s economic dependence on the PRC is already taking on such proportions that it directly threatens Tajikistan’s future as a sovereign state. In these conditions, joining the EEU could balance the country’s foreign policy, putting Chinese expansion in a more or less restrictive framework.
Rustam Muhamedov (Turkmenistan): There are no scheduled parliamentary or presidential elections in Turkmenistan in 2022. It is highly unlikely that the country will experience some major political events, all while hereditary power succession to Serdar cannot be discarded altogether. While the government continuously expresses interest in integrating the national economy into the world economy (i.e. WTO), there is no evidence that the officials are eager to initiate genuine economic reforms in the upcoming year. Hence, the country’s troubling socio-economic situation will remain difficult, aggravating the plight of the population. In the foreign policy, Turkmen authorities will continue to attempt maintaining balance between the interests of China and Russia. Cooperation with Turkey is also worth of noting as Turkmenistan recently became an observer state in the Organization of Turkic States and considering that many Turkmen civic activists and anti-regime critics reside and conduct their activities in Turkey.
Farkhod Tolipov (Uzbekistan): The 4th Consultative Meeting of the Presidents of Central Asia is expected in 2022. Most likely it will take place in Kyrgyzstan. As it was announced at the last meeting, at the 4th meeting, the roadmap for the development of regional cooperation for 2022-2024 will be approved, as well as the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the XXI century will be signed. For Uzbekistan, this will be a major achievement in its efforts to develop regional cooperation.
The continuation of reforms in Uzbekistan in 2022 will require even greater liberalization. The economy is expected to grow at around 6%. In the coming year, construction of a nuclear power plant will begin in the Jizzakh region of Uzbekistan. Perhaps important and breakthrough decisions will be made to solve the problem of labor migration and create new jobs.
Constitutional reform is expected in 2022. The President initiated 9 amendments requiring inclusion to the Constitution. The expediency of their introduction has caused discussions among experts. The new Constitution is likely to be adopted by the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the first basic law of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
Domestic problems and challenges in 2022
Askar Nursha (Kazakhstan): In Kazakhstan, inflation has sharply increased in the past year, which affects the social well-being of society. Attempts are being made to restrain them by administrative methods, but this is difficult to do, since there is a loss of control over pricing in the field of fuels and lubricants and commodity imports from Russia and other countries.
The state is fighting corruption, but against this background, there is an ineffective use of state budget funds, theft of funds and waste on a huge scale. There is growing discontent in society that hard-to-explain budgets are allocated for the implementation of projects ordered by the state, which are much higher than the cost of work, which can also be related to corruption and capital outflow. In 2021, this became especially noticeable.
The results of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s activities as president, aimed at modernizing the economy and the political and legal system, are generally positive, but the effect from them should not be expected immediately, but in two or three years. The reforms and the power of Ak Orda in general lack depth. In various sectors, nomenclature lacunae that have grown together with business and elite groups have formed, locally hampering the reform process. Explosions at an ammunition depot in the Dzhambul region are yet another evidence of the process of degradation of management culture in a number of spheres of state administration.
Emilbek Juraev (Kyrgyzstan): 2022 is not expected to be eventful, but probably very difficult. The economic crisis continues and many of the government’s actions at the end of 2021 cannot be called anti-crisis. The energy stress, which will continue throughout the 2021-2022 heating season, could be replaced by a food and agricultural crisis due to the same climatic phenomena and poor resource management.
However, in Kyrgyzstan, more often than not, challenges of a political nature, rather than an economic one, are ripening and pouring out into events. Risks in politics in Kyrgyzstan are primarily due to the level of concentration of power in the office of the president, unprecedented for many years, and even more than before, the loss of opposition-minded groups from the institutional political field. This situation creates a strong temptation for the authorities to use excessive force, suppression, persecution, and opposition – to fight from the position of “nothing to lose.” Also, with such a broad inclusiveness of pro-government forces, the risk of splits within such forces also increases. The degree to which the authorities – and President Japarov personally – will be able to control this temptation and maintain a constructive line both within the power groups and with their critics will determine how great the risk of new political upheavals is.
Parviz Mullodzanov (Tajikistan): in 2022, the government of Tajikistan will have to solve the same list of problems and issues that the country faced last year. If we talk about external challenges, then in addition to the aforementioned problem of geopolitical choice, there remains the question of the events in Afghanistan. Moreover, the instability in Afghanistan, to all appearances, is already a long-term factor that will influence the situation in the entire region in the coming years.
Of course, another important and priority challenge remains the need for an early and peaceful settlement of the Isfara-Batken conflict. The authorities of both countries are faced with the question of completing the demarcation of the border and finding a mutually acceptable settlement option. To date, unfortunately, the negotiation process has slowed down again, and much progress in reaching agreements is not seen. All this again increases the risk of a new aggravation on the border, which contradicts the interests of both states.
Of the internal problems, it should be noted the need to start a real dialogue with the protest movement in GBAO, which is gaining momentum every year. To date, the protests in GBAO are fundamentally non-political. However, if the government drags out the establishment of a real dialogue or confines itself only to forceful pressure, then the politicization of protests in the region may indeed become an unpleasant reality for the authorities.
However, the most important problem and challenge for the country this year will be issues of the socio-economic nature. The pandemic has brought a host of economic problems, hitting the pockets and incomes of large segments of the population. Every month there is an increase in the outflow of the population for permanent residence abroad, the outflow of qualified personnel, which will have long-term consequences for the country. The government of Tajikistan will have to solve these problems – so the issue of large-scale socio-economic reforms is becoming more urgent than ever.
Rustam Muhamedov (Turkmenistan): The country’s poor socio-economic situation is deepening social tensions and widening the social inequality, which may lead to sporadic and isolated domestic protests as was the case in 2020 and 2021. These protests, however, are highly unlikely to bring genuine political and economic changes for the people. As most demands during such protests relate to day-to-day economic or financial matters, the local authorities may respond with somewhat conciliatory measures as was already the case. At the same time, the government will continue on its vigilant path towards any forms of dissent and anti-regime criticism, especially regarding topics of corruption, abuse of office and poor management of coronavirus pandemic. While the activists-in-exile currently appear to be on the “defensive”, following intensified intimidating and repressive actions by Turkmen authorities by the end of the year, their protest activity will remain, if not grow.
Farkhod Tolipov (Uzbekistan): In Uzbekistan, in the context of large-scale reforms, there is a clear or latent confrontation between progressive and anti-reformist forces. Some areas of reform, especially in the political sphere, are experiencing various zigzags and contradictory tendencies. Therefore, the main internal challenge, I think, will be resistance to reforms, which are reaching their apogee, and further stages will be linked and require the liberalization of the political system.
In particular, corruption and the omnipotence of khokims (heads of executive power) in the provinces of the republic became the main brake on reforms and democratic development of the country. The administrative reform and the adoption of the Law on Civil Service, and the creation of the Public Chamber are being dragged out.
In 2021, the ecological situation in the country worsened, even an unprecedented dust storm occurred, the consequences of which were felt for a month. The merciless felling of trees, the elimination of urban micro-reservoirs and green areas for the sake of the construction business continues.
Perhaps these issues and problems will be high on the agenda in 2022.
External threats and the place of Afghanistan
Askar Nursha (Kazakhstan): the main challenge at the moment is the aggravation of relations between Russia and the West and the desire of Russia against this background to bind even more closely friendly post-Soviet countries, including Kazakhstan, to itself with integration military-political and economic ties. The ultimatum issued in December 2021 by Kremlin to the US and NATO on security guarantees contains a clear disrespect for the sovereignty of other post-Soviet countries by Russia. In line with this trend, Russian financial and industrial circles will more actively push their commercial interests to the leadership of Kazakhstan, as well as to other countries of Central Asia.
In Kazakhstan, they are psychologically getting used to the fact that power in Afghanistan has passed into the hands of the Taliban. At the same time, considering the possible permanent instability in Afghanistan, the Afghan topic is the basis for cooperation in the field of regional security for Kazakhstan with other Central Asian countries and Russia. This does not exclude Kazakhstan’s search for new economic opportunities in the Afghan market.
Emilbek Juraev (Kyrgyzstan): In Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy, 2021 was a relative year of calm: due to the internal political turmoil in the country, it was difficult to expect breakthrough actions and events with external partners. The biggest event with an external actor – the conflict with Tajikistan – was negative, and it remained in an open, suspended state, postponed to 2022. Is there a risk of new conflicts with Tajikistan in 2022? It is impossible to say that there is no such risk. And many of the actions of both parties throughout 2021 contained prerequisites for aggravating, rather than resolving mutual claims. Much more diplomacy, a principled commitment to good neighborliness and the peaceful resolution of disputes will be required than was seen in 2021. The events of April-May 2021, and, in particular, the nature of the actions and consequences that took place there, make this task much more difficult than it could have been before these events.
In a broader regional context, in view of the deepening geopolitical confrontation of world players, the Central Asian countries in 2022 are unlikely to be able to stay on the sidelines, and they may have to offer a clear answer to the question “who are they with?” The clarity of such a response does not necessarily require acceptance by one of the world parties, and countries in the region should clearly understand this. They can respond, figuratively speaking, that they are “with each other, with constructive cooperation with everyone and against the use of force or participation in other people’s competitions.” To do this, the countries of the region need to build a common language and vision quickly and efficiently.
Kyrgyzstan, in this aspect, must develop its own clear pattern of behavior and establish an effective and trusting dialogue with its neighbors. Obviously, such a dialogue with the southern neighbor is deliberately complicated by the above-described state of affairs, but it is not impossible. Kyrgyzstan’s relations with Russia are as close as they are burdensome, and everyone knows this. The question for the foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan is “how to manage this burden, so that the partner can be in a mutually constructive way and remain independent from the gambles of a big partner with third parties?”.
The Afghanistan factor in 2022 for Kyrgyzstan can manifest itself in several ways, but most likely not in a fateful level in any respect. Kyrgyzstan cannot influence events in Afghanistan in any remarkable way, and no party expects this from Kyrgyzstan. Depending on how the Taliban manages the country and its crises, and how it is received in the world, Afghanistan could stabilize or destabilize within a year. Kyrgyzstan, along with other countries and not necessarily one of the first among them, will have to build its position on the development of events there.
Parviz Mullodzanov (Tajikistan): in my opinion, the issues of external debt and the preservation of independence in the new conditions are the main challenge for the country in the coming years. Afghanistan itself is a threat in the sense that the territory of this country in the future can become a kind of base for international jihadist groups. That is, the question is what will happen after the Taliban government can finally gain a foothold in power. Today we can already see the concentration and activation of various extremist groups in Afghanistan. The active formation and development of a network of educational madrasahs under the control of the Taliban and the “Haqqani Network” associated with Al-Qaeda began. We see that the Taliban government is creating conditions for ideological indoctrination of immigrants from Central Asia and other countries. In Afghanistan, in fact, an infrastructure and a system of extremist propaganda is being created: this includes the organization of electronic and print media, technologies, the creation of servers, and so on. This is an external factor, which in subsequent years can have a significant impact on the internal stop in every country in the region, and not only in Tajikistan.
Rustam Muhamedov (Turkmenistan): Afghanistan will remain Turkmenistan’s main security focus in 2022. Indicatively, the year started with reports about a gunfire exchange at Turkmenistan’s border with Afghanistan. It is highly likely that such reports will reappear throughout the year, despite Turkmen government’s attempts to appease the ruling Taliban regime by trying to engage it transnational projects and trade, namely TAPI. Kremlin’s ultimatum to NATO and US, and the overall deteriorating relations between them will have its implications on Central Asian states, including Turkmenistan, despite the latter’s rather isolationist (neutral) stand. If the situation will continue to deteriorate further, Turkmen authorities will find it more challenging to maintain their “multi-vector” foreign policy course.
Farkhod Tolipov (Uzbekistan): Geopolitics has always been a difficult burden for all Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan. The aggravation of Russian American relations cannot but affect Uzbekistan. Russia’s open desire to subjugate the post-Soviet space, expressed in the ultimatum of the Russian Foreign Ministry sent to the United States and NATO, stirred up public opinion in Uzbekistan.
The situation in Afghanistan will continue to worry neighboring countries. Uzbekistan is at the epicenter of international processes aimed at resolving the Afghan issue, which, in all likelihood, will only aggravate. In 2021, the level of threats from Afghanistan has increased markedly and there are no signs of a decrease in 2022 yet.
Foreign assessment
Edward Lemon (USA): Of course, there are many internal risks, so I will just choose one. We are currently witnessing tens of thousands taking to the streets to vent their grievances related to economic inequality, social justice, and governance in Kazakhstan. This points to one of the main developments in recent years which will continue to shape the region in 2022. The Oxus Society’s Central Asian Protest Tracker has documented an increase in protests, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where we have seen protests increase from 38 in 2018 to 508 in 2020 in Kazakhstan, and from 7 to 113 in Uzbekistan. Transitions of power in both countries have opened spaces for protesters to mobilize and this has been compounded by ongoing economic problems, governments unable to provide sufficient welfare and rising levels of inequality. We can expect this trend towards greater levels of mobilization to continue in 2022.
If we talk about external threats and risks, then, the Taliban takeover of the country has raised concerns and will continue to have an impact on the rest of Central Asia in 2022. My opinion is that the effects of the takeover have thus far been limited and seem likely to continue to be so this year. We have not seen a mass influx of refugees or spillovers of violence. Each government has opted to cooperate with the Taliban, offering economic cooperation in exchange for reassurances about security. Even Tajikistan, where the government has been very critical of the Taliban, recently signed an agreement on electricity exports, signaling that actions speak louder than words. Of course, a few risks remain. First, militants from Central Asia are in the border areas. For example, Jamaat Ansurallah, controls districts near Shamsiddin Shohin district, where Russia has just committed to fund a new military post. We cannot rule out expect spillovers of violence, although militant groups have limited support in Central Asia. A larger, but still small, group within Central Asia support the idea of Islam playing a more prominent role in public life.
With a group of local researchers, I have recently been analyzing social media posts about Afghanistan and we do see a large number of posts praising the Taliban and calling for a spread of their system of governance to Central Asia. Should the Taliban be successful in normalizing relations with other governments and consolidating power, we may see those calling for Islam to play a greater role in politics being emboldened.
One of the main developments in the region over the past five years has been the rising levels of regional cooperation, with trade increasing, military cooperation developing and leaders meeting to coordinate positions on shared areas of concern. Mirziyoyev, who has placed emphasis on strengthening ties among the Central Asian states since coming to power in 2016, has been key to driving this. We are likely to see this continue in 2022, although unresolved tensions between Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic could derail this to some degree.
Speaking about the geopolitical climate, I would like to highlight China’s rising role in the region. This is nothing new of course. But I think two areas that will be interesting to watch in 2022 are China’s growing security presence, particularly in Tajikistan, where it recently committed to funding another base, and potentially took control of another facility. Should the situation in Afghanistan destabilize then it will be interesting to see the extent to which China intervenes. A second aspect is the growing number of protests against China in the region. We are seeing an increasing divide between the governments who rely on China particularly economically, and publics who are skeptical towards the benefits of China’s presence. It will be interesting to see the extent to which these social movements are able to influence government policy and potentially cause a headache for Beijing.
* Views from Kazakhstan were received on December 31, 2021.