“Twists and turns of bilateral relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan have demonstrated that the normative factors associated with history and culture do not always predetermine the modality of their political relations,” – political scientist Farhod Tolipov (Uzbekistan) notes in an article written specifically for the analytical platform CABAR.asia.
Turkey and Uzbekistan have always been associated as two related nations. This association has become a stereotype in the minds of many researchers and politicians. The factor of historical, linguistic, cultural, and ethnic closeness of the two countries and peoples, as it were, a priori directed the analytical thought towards simple, clear, and even romantic conclusions that Turkey and Uzbekistan are destined for friendly relations and their cooperation will be guaranteed by the fundamental significance of this factor.
On the one hand, this factor has truly played and is playing a huge role in the relationship between the two states and the mutual ideas of ordinary people. On the other hand, other factors also came into play at the political level: national interests, globalization, and geopolitics.
Twists and turns of bilateral interaction
The 30-year period since Uzbekistan gained its independence has shown various zigzags in Uzbek-Turkish relations. Turkey was the first among the states of the world to recognize the independence of Uzbekistan, which was a reflection and confirmation of the historical, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic closeness of the two nations. In the first years of independence, the so-called “Turkish model” of state and social structure was even discussed in the political and expert circles of Uzbekistan. The first president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, apparently pinned hopes that Ankara would become the most reliable partner and friend for the young independent state in the complex and new world system, into which his state had to enter.
Indeed, Ankara and Tashkent showed a good start in the early 1990s: diplomatic relations were established, mutual trips of citizens of the two states began, traders from Uzbekistan were very keen on shuttle trade in Turkey; Uzbek and Turkish airlines began operating flights connecting the two countries; Turkish schools began to open and Turkish business began to expand in Uzbekistan; students from Uzbekistan had the opportunity to study at universities in Turkey.
Under Karimov, the relationship between Uzbekistan and Turkey, as well as its relationship with Russia, the United States and other powers of world and regional rank, went through difficult stages. During his first visit to Turkey, Karimov stated that “if Turkey supports us, no one will be able to subjugate the Uzbeks … Ataturk’s principles correspond to what we are going to create in Uzbekistan. I admire Ataturk and I hope the Central Asian countries will repeat the Turkish path. I support the unity of the Turkic nations. This unity must be fulfilled”.[1]
However, as noted above, the Uzbek-Turkish relations have experienced different twists and turns. Moreover, over a period of time, these relations deteriorated due to political tensions between the two states that arose in the mid-1990s. When some leaders of the political opposition in Uzbekistan fled to Turkey, which refused to extradite them to Uzbekistan, it marked a turning point in relations between the two states. Turkey also signed a UN report criticizing the Karimov regime for the actions of the Uzbek security forces during the well-known Andijan events. Thus, this zigzag demonstrated that normative factors associated with history and culture do not always predetermine the modality of political relations.
As the Turkish analyst Hakan Fidan writes, despite a certain historicity, one cannot discuss these communities [Turkey and Central Asia] only within the framework of a common historical narrative. He mentions at least three initiatives that have not been implemented: 1) Uzbek leader Karimov pointed to the possibility of institutionalizing a commonwealth-type structure among Turkic-speaking countries, including Turkey; 2) Turkey’s proposal in the 1990s to create a common market between Turkey and Central Asia with the Turkish lira as a common currency was not supported; 3) Central Asian leaders stumbled at supporting Turkey on the Cyprus issue, as well as on the Karabakh issue. All this revealed the difficulty of convergence of various foreign policy approaches within the framework of certain regional integration schemes together with Turkey.[2]French researcher Bayram Balchi also pointed to the factor of the so-called Hizmet Movement, founded by the famous Turkish Sufi cleric Fethullah Gulen. This movement contributed to the creation of many educational institutions in Azerbaijan and countries of the region, including Uzbekistan. By 2001, however, the Uzbek authorities had closed these institutions due to the deteriorating political environmnet between Tashkent and Ankara.[3]
A new stage in relations and cooperation between the two countries began with the coming to power in Uzbekistan of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. In October 2017, he made his first visit to Ankara as president. In fact, this visit gave a new dynamism to the Uzbek-Turkish relations since there have not been such visits since 1999. Back then, Mirziyoyev stated that Uzbekistan is ready to mobilize all forces and means to develop traditional friendship, comprehensive and long-term cooperation in all spheres for the welfare and peace of our fraternal nations.[4]
It should be noted that Uzbekistan and Turkey are now at the level of strategic partners. In October 2017, during the first state visit of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Turkey, a Joint Statement was signed that brings the cooperation of our countries to the level of strategic partnership.[5] In accordance with it, a high-level Strategic Cooperation Council was established with the aim of intensifying cooperation. For example, the parties intend to bring the volume of mutual trade to 5 billion USD in the near future (this figure in 2019 was about 2 billion USD). In addition, in 2020, Turkey and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on military cooperation.[6]
It is planned to open a branch of Bahchesehir University in Uzbekistan, as well as the establishment of the Fergana Higher School of Tourism in conjunction with the University named after Khoja Bayram Vali. The issues of accelerating preparation for signing the Agreement on preferential trade between Uzbekistan and Turkey, expanding the list of commodity items proposed for inclusion in this agreement are also being worked out, and the procedure for its practical application has been agreed upon. The activity of the business community has significantly intensified. Over the past two years, more than 750 Turkish enterprises have been created in Uzbekistan; by February of this year, the number of firms with the participation of Turkish capital reached 1306.[7] Moreover, at the Uzbek-Turkish business forum held in June of this year, it was reported that as of today, there are 1,576 enterprises with Turkish capital operating in Uzbekistan, including 694 joint ventures and 882 enterprises with 100% Turkish capital.[8]
Recently announced promising projects in the field of modernization of water supply and sewerage systems in the regions of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, the cultivation of sesame by the drip irrigation method with the organization of its further export to Turkey, the construction of a hospital for one hundred beds, as well as training and skill improvement of medical staff in leading educational institutions in Turkey.[9]
As one can see, bilateral cooperation is successfully developing in all areas. However, this is not just cooperation based on the historical and cultural proximity of the two nations, but cooperation determined by national interests. Some experts have previously argued that Turkey claims to be the “big brother” for the Central Asian countries. Nevertheless, the young independent states of the region, including Uzbekistan, sought to build their relations with Turkey on a pragmatic basis, proceeding from their national interests.
In the international arena
As for multilateral formats, first of all, it should be noted that in 2019 Uzbekistan resumed its participation in the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States (CCTS). At the dawn of independence, the President of Turkey of that time Turgut Ozal initiated the creation of the Forum of Turkic-speaking countries, which was supported by Uzbekistan. The aforementioned zigzags of tension between the two states led to the suspension of Uzbekistan’s participation in this format. The new stage of the Uzbek-Turkish relations was reflected in the participation of Uzbekistan in the CCTS.
President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, while delivering a speech at the VII summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States (Turkic Council) in Baku, stated the need to effectively use the potential of the new Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway. This project in the South Caucasus was initially presented as “the third project of the century”.[11] Moreover, Uzbekistan is interested in using the Navoi-Turkmenbashi-Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway transport corridor, which will connect the railways of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia with the transport network of Turkey. This railway will allow Uzbekistan to provide access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Turkish port of Mersin.[12] Mirziyoyev, by his resolution, approved a comprehensive program for improving the transport infrastructure of Uzbekistan and diversifying foreign trade routes for the transportation of goods for 2018-2022. The event “Implementation of pilot transit transportation of foreign trade cargoes along the Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway route with access to seaports” is included in this program.[13]
It is especially worth noting that, although Uzbekistan did not express direct support, however, it actually indirectly supported Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. As it is known, Turkey has provided substantial military-strategic support to Azerbaijan, and the President of Uzbekistan congratulated the President of Azerbaijan on the end of hostilities, the return of the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and the restoration of historical justice. Thus, indirectly, Tashkent acted as a strategic partner of Ankara.
It seems that the strategic partnership between Tashkent and Ankara should also manifest itself in the Afghan issue. After the withdrawal of international military contingents from Afghanistan, the situation in this country, as expected, is extremely aggravated. Under these conditions, a large role in the settlement of the Afghan conflict is assigned to regional states. In particular, Uzbekistan and Turkey participate in the “Heart of Asia” Istanbul process, the main objectives of which are: 1) political consultations; 2) implementation of confidence building measures; 3) cooperation with regional organizations.
Uzbekistan, in turn, seeks to make an active contribution to the establishment of peace and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In particular, Tashkent is actively promoting the project for the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar-Karachi railway with access to the Indian Ocean. It is assumed that after the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan, Turkey will continue military cooperation with the Afghan government, in particular, in the control of the airport in Kabul.
It seems that Uzbekistan and Turkey could bring their positions closer to the Afghan issue. At the high-level international conference “Central and South Asia: regional interconnectedness. Challenges and Opportunities” which was held in Tashkent (15-16 July), the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed to involve Turkey in the Afghan reconcilement. Thus, the interaction of Uzbekistan and Turkey in the Afghan direction can give a greater strategic character to their cooperation.
This cooperation should also extend to the field of combating terrorism. As it is known, many citizens of Uzbekistan, recruited by terrorist organizations, left for Syria through Turkish territory. This problem also requires counter-terrorism cooperation from the two states.
In this regard, it should be noted that in March of this year, in the southern city of Uzbekistan – Termez – joint tactical and special exercises of special units of the armed forces of Uzbekistan and Turkey were held. According to the scenario of the exercise, Uzbek and Turkish special forces found armed gangs that illegally entered the country, violating the state border with the help of drones, and neutralized them through air and ground strikes.[14]
Conclusion
Uzbekistan and Turkey are strategic partners. This status imposes on them a great responsibility in the international arena and determines an agreed position on the most important issues of world politics. The meaning of strategic partnership lies, in particular, in the fact that the parties have a high level of mutual trust and mutual support. Their relationship is not too susceptible to various twists and turns and their interests in the world arena are close to each other.
At the same time, both Uzbekistan and Turkey are involved in major geopolitical processes, being located in their geopolitically charged regions: Turkey – in the Middle East, Uzbekistan – in Central Asia. The current globalization has linked these two regions with various ties of cooperation, as well as security challenges. From this point of view, Uzbekistan and Turkey can and are called upon through their strategic partnership to contribute not only to regional security, to successfully develop bilateral cooperation, but also to make a significant contribution to international security.
[1] “Özbekistan’la İnişli Çıkışlı İlişkiler (2016). Aljazeera Turk. retrieved February 20, 2020, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/ozbekistanla-inisli-cikisli-iliskiler)
[2] Hakan Fidan. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Central Asia, in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.12, No.1, March 2010.
[3] Ibid
[4] “Özbekistan, Orta Asya’da Her Açıdan Stratejik Bir Ülke” (2017). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/86085/ozbekistan-orta-asyada-her-acidan-stratejik-bir-ulke.html)
[5] https://uza.uz/ru/posts/uzbekistan-turtsiya-novyy-etap-strategicheskogo-partnerstva–20-02-2020
[6] “Turkish, Uzbek Defense Ministers Sign Military Agreement, Underline Further Defense Cooperation” (2020). Daily Sabah, (October 27, 2020). https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkish-uzbek-defense-ministers-sign-military-agreement-underline-further-defense-cooperation?gallery_image=undefined#big
[7] https://uza.uz/ru/posts/uzbekistan-turtsiya-sotrudnichestvo-ukreplyaetsya-06-03-2020
[8] https://uzdaily.uz/ru/post/61898
[9] https://yuz.uz/ru/news/turetskie-kompanii-zainteresovan-razvivat-sotrudnichestvo-v-respublike-karakalpakstan?view=veon-investiruet-40-mln-doll-ssha-v-razvitie-docherney-kompanii-v-uzbekistane
[10] Paulo Duarte. Turkey vis-à-vis Central Asia: a geostrategic assessment, in Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.13, No.3, Fall 2014.
[11] https://vestikavkaza.ru/analytics/Uzbekistan-pridast-uskorenie-proektu-Baku-Tbilisi-Kars.html
[12] https://az.sputniknews.ru/economy/20180616/415815708/uzbekistan-navoi-baku-tbilisi-kart.html
[13]https://cfts.org.ua/news/2017/12/22/uzbekistan_reshil_nachat_perevozki_po_novoy_zh_d_baku_tbilisi_kars_44692
[14] https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80/%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%BB%D1%8B-%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%86%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B8-%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%88%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5-%D1%83%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F/2188284