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Political scientist Farhod Tolipov on the information attacks on the Central Asian region

The expert discusses the information sovereignty of the countries of the region, the search and imposition of external enemies and recipes for strengthening their independence.


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He who follows reason milks the bull

Wisdom is now unprofitable for sure!

Nowadays it is more profitable to play the fool

For reason today is the price of garlic.

Omar Khayyam.

In the year of the thirtieth anniversary of their independence, the Central Asian countries were captured by a new wave of information attacks, causing some unjustified fears and confusion, some with an ostrich defensive reaction, and some with irony and ignorance. Why did this information storm rise? The thirtieth anniversary of independence is a serious date: it is not a decade or twenty years, when the remnants and legacy of the Soviet past in political, economic, and social life were still fresh, but a special moment in the development of these countries, when they did not just emerge as independent and capable states, but also got rid of this legacy. This statement may seem strange and not convincing when much still reminds of the Soviet political tradition. This is true, but this “much” is most often demonstrated, manifested, reminded, and recreated in the form of information attacks (or pressures, or influences).

An information attack is essentially a form and method of projecting the authority of a major power onto a small, vulnerable, and dependent state. This is not a manifestation of so-called soft power, as some may think, but rather a kind of “gray power”, which is bordering with the hard power.

Recently, the question of whose sphere of influence the countries of Central Asia will find themselves in has begun to be discussed with renewed vigor in political, media, analytical and public circles (mainly Russian) to such an extent that even the usual diversification of international relations of these countries has often been interpreted with point of view of their geopolitical implications. It is in this context that the rhetoric of “soft power” and “gray power” in Central Asia has been actualized today.[1]

For example, one of the most controversial problems in relations between young (no longer new, as they used to say) independent states today is associated with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), whose geopolitical nature has already become obvious to the members themselves.[2] Despite this, the EAEU protagonists are trying by hook or by crook to justify its validity, for example, pointing to the situation of labor migrants in Russia or recalling friendly relations with Russia. At the same time, they do not seem to notice that in fact the EAEU is a kind of organizational screen that disguises the bilateral relations of the member states with Russia, which, even without the EAEU, are quite firmly established and are developing at the bilateral level.[3] The more artificial information volleys are made in favor of the EAEU, the more this artificiality is revealed.

When critics of this organization pointed out that it could threaten the independence of the member states and that it was created and defended mainly by supporters of the restoration of the USSR in one form or another, perhaps they slightly exaggerated the likelihood of such a prospect. However, these supporters at the highest level are constantly reminding of themselves, which is becoming more and more insistently.

After 30 years of independent development of the former Soviet republics, the speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation V. Volodin dawned on him to call for an assessment of the collapse of the USSR, who, in the style of investigator’s interrogation, poses the question: “who betrayed? Surnames, names?”[4] And this is when the younger generation in the former Soviet republics no longer understands what is at stake and why someone needs to be interrogated on this score. I would like to ask: so, they will give an assessment of the collapse of the USSR, then what? And what will be, in fact, the assessment: positive or negative? The most surprising point is that the USSR as its monopoly private property is spoken of mainly in Russia, as if all other former Soviet republics have no say in the assessment of the USSR. Self-confident, “sensational” statements by Russian politicians and experts alike about the Soviet past sound as if they alone possess the whole truth about this past and, moreover, that all this may have some kind of impact on the neighboring republics.

Likewise, it is surprising that the provisions on the protection of the truth about the Second World War are enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It is wondering how it (this truth) will be defended? After all, other republics are not going to constitutionally defend this truth in the same way. Isn’t Russia arrogating to itself a monopoly on the truth in front of other participants in the Second World War from other countries?

Finally, I would like to draw attention to one more example of the use of “gray power”, namely: Russian anti-Americanism, imposed on the countries of Central Asia. Everything that these countries do in cooperation with the United States or Europe is perceived as deliberately anti-Russian actions. Here, for example, is the notorious problem of the deployment of the US military contingent withdrawn from Afghanistan on the territory of Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. There has not yet been an official request from Washington to host the base, nor an invitation from Tashkent or Dushanbe, but rumors alone have alarmed the minds of analysts and politicians in Russia, who saw a potential decision in favor of the deployment as a threat to Russian interests. The states of Central Asia seem to be denied an independent decision, thereby expressing mistrust in them.

Arguments are made that Uzbekistan, as a strategic partner of Russia, should not do this to the detriment of its partner. At the same time, firstly, they have forgotten that Uzbekistan is also a strategic partner of the United States and can cooperate with them in the military field; secondly, they deliberately distort the fact that this base cannot have any anti-Russian purpose, if only because Uzbekistan, as a strategic partner of Russia, will not allow this to happen. Moscow does not make “basic” claims to its neighbors such as Japan or South Korea, which also have American bases on their territory for many years.

Ironically, I note that the more preventive information attacks are carried out against the American base in Uzbekistan, the more motivation they generate for such deployment in Tashkent, because otherwise, the refusal of the base would mean that the shout from Moscow worked, and the independence of Uzbekistan turned out to be flawed.

There are many examples of information attacks, outbreaks, and fakes. Apparently, there is a limit to enrichment with information fakes and horror stories when they already reveal themselves with the naked eye. The law of dialectics was violated: it is no longer the content that determines the form, but, on the contrary, the form determines the content (or its absence). One Russian analyst, using the example of symbolisms in recent Russian-Belarusian contacts (swimming in the sea, hours-long dinners, skiing, yacht, etc.), remarked: “They are trying to create different pictures, last time they showed how they were skiing. This creates an entourage of informal contacts, that this is not just a protocol meeting of the leaders of the two countries, but that Putin and Lukashenko allegedly have deep informal contact. It seems to me that this is an attempt to decorate the difficult reality that is hidden behind this facade.”[5]

Anti-Americanism, casting a shadow of mistrust on all countries along the perimeter of Russia, clearly manifested itself in the thesis of the Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev that the threat to the future of Russian statehood lies in the change of generations in the post-Soviet states, taking place under the ideological influence of the West. In his opinion, “the example of Georgia and Ukraine testifies that the process of forming a hostile state style of elite behavior around Russia can be accelerated artificially.”[6] Why necessarily a threat, why a style of behavior that is necessarily hostile to Russia, and why it is only under the influence of the West is not clear. What is to be done now with this change of generations?

Instead of a conclusion

Can we assess all these fake news and information attacks as a threat to the independence of the Central Asian countries? Probably yes if independence is understood as the antinomy of dependence in a broad sense. Obviously, the loss of independence of Uzbekistan or other countries of the region today is difficult to imagine in the form of occupation, seizure of territory or military aggression. However, the information “ninth wave” can give rise to the “Overton window”, when specially prepared information air is purposefully created, which fetters their independent actions and creates excessive nervousness in relations with major powers.

The threat to independence in seemingly superficial and low-quality expert articles, media materials, and irresponsible statements by officials such as V. Zhirinovsky, V. Fedorov, V. Volodin and others can be seen from the obviously imperial meaning of these articles and statements. They seem to be speaking on behalf of the countries of Central Asia, as if they are worried about Central Asia, where they want to patronize these countries, which without this tutelage can quarrel with each other.

The principle of “divide and rule”, by the way, begins precisely with sowing the seeds of discord between countries, and then offering mediation services, spreading misinformation about the impossibility of their unification outside the superpower regulation. At one time, the myth of the rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for leadership in the region was exaggerated, which almost disoriented public opinion and even official circles and analysts in these countries, diverted analytical work and research into useless disputes about who is the leader.

They also spread the myth that Kazakhstan is not Central Asia, so the region was allegedly called “Central Asia and Kazakhstan” in Soviet times, quickly forgetting that in 1991 all five countries themselves corrected the name of the region as “Central Asia”. The myth of the insurmountable contradictions between Turkic Uzbekistan and the Persian Tajikistan was spread, that even the First President of Uzbekistan I. Karimov said that “Tajiks and Uzbeks are one people speaking two languages”.

Under these conditions, the countries of Central Asia, apparently, must overcome, so to speak, the complex of a weak state, when it seems to them that it is difficult for them to object or respond to a great power.

These countries have an important, rare, and valuable asset in the world system – their regional unity.

Speaking from a united, solidarity position on the world stage in any situation – be it information attacks from outside the region or intraregional troubles – would give them more confidence in their international relations and a greater guarantee of independence.

The time has come to create a single information space for Central Asia. This is the only way to compensate not only for the lack of innovative ideas for regional development, but also to resist information attacks. It is needed to create joint television broadcasts and television channels, major regional events up to consolidated diplomacy in the international arena.

The real soft power of the Central Asian countries must be opposed to any “gray power”, no matter which side it comes from. I repeat, the “gray” power should not be identified with the “soft” one. Russia, China, Europe, the United States, Turkey, India, etc. have a huge arsenal of soft power. What is interesting: so to speak, the soft power tools of these countries are by no means antagonistic towards each other. The “gray power” instruments are indeed often incompatible with each other. Pushkin, Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky, and thousands of other great representatives of Russia – on the one hand; Armstrong, Hollywood, Harvard, J. London, T. Dreiser, and thousands of other representatives of America – on the other hand; Confucius, medicine, Chinese cuisine and other representatives of China – on the third, this is a world heritage and therefore valuable all over the world. However, when they say in Russia that America is an enemy, while America is not an enemy for Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, then “gray forces” come into play, which not only harm the neighboring countries of Russia but also Russia itself.

Note that many Russian media, experts, and officials tirelessly, with professorial confidence, write and talk about the former Soviet republics: their domestic and foreign policies, relations with other states, the state language, intraregional incidents, etc. But almost no one in these republics writes or talks about the domestic and foreign policy of Russia itself, no one, shall we say, interferes in the internal affairs of Russia with academic interest, no one studies and researches Russia the way Russian experts study us. The asymmetry – informational, political, and scientific – is obvious. In Russia (as well as in China) there are many analytical centers (even if they are biased) that “specialize” in Central Asia, but in the countries of Central Asia there are practically no such centers specializing in Russia.

Ultimately, a united, self-sufficient, peaceful, developed Central Asia is objectively in the interests of both Russia and China. Neither Russia nor China should spend their information and other resources and time on the tutelage of Central Asia, on the search for an enemy in this region, whose countries in fact did not give and do not give reason to doubt their friendship, partnership, and cooperation with these relatives (as well as distant) major powers.


The opinions expressed in the article do not reflect the position of the editorial board or donor.


[1] Tolipov F. “Units, entities and carriers of soft power: the Central Asian geopolitical context”, https://www.tadqiqot.uz/index.php/consensus/article/view/660/617, Consensus, No. 4, 2020 , DOI 10.26739 / 2181-0788-2020-4-4

[2] Satpayev D. “Kazakhstan has driven itself into a trap, the exit from which can be very expensive” https://zonakz.net/2018/04/17/dosym-satpaev-kazaxstan-zagnal-sebya-v-lovushku-vyxod-iz-kotoroj-mozhet-stoit-ochen-dorogo/?fbclid=IwAR2ZejfuetYOqt3tr-bgxvmQjXyN-dzfl4jErpzFCWbIFQQa6a9eSk6NDsk 4.17.2018

[3] Tolipov F. “The Hamlet question for Uzbekistan in the Eurasian Economic Union” November 5, 2019 https://caa-network.org/archives/18507

[4] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/06/01/spiker-gosdumy-prizval-k-ocenke-raspada-sssr-kto-predal-familii-imena 1.06.2021

[5] https://ex-press.by/rubrics/obshhestvo/2021/05/31/etot-anturazh-neformalnosti-kataniya-na-lyzhax-i-yaxtax-prizvan-skryt-pustotu-chto-ne-bylo-ozvucheno-vo-vremya-vstrechi-lukashenko-i-putina?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fzen.yandex.com

[6] E. Treshchenkov “Does Russia Need Allies?” https://www.ipg-journal.io/rubriki/vneshnjaja-politika-i-bezopasnost/nuzhny-li-rossii-sojuzniki-1207/?utm_campaign=ru_214_20201223&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter 21.12.2020

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