The China-Central Asia summit in Xi’an on May 18-19 was an unprecedented event on a surprisingly large scale. China intends to institutionalise its relations with the Central Asian states, which Beijing considers a single region, says Umedjon Ibrohimzoda, an independent political scientist and graduate of the CABAR.asia School of Analytics.
The first China-Central Asia Summit (C+C5) concluded in the Chinese city of Xi’an. It was chaired by Chinese leader Xi Jinping and attended by the heads of the five Central Asian states. This was the first face-to-face meeting of the summit format. Before that, since the summer of 2020, meetings of the China-Central Asia format had been held regularly at the level of foreign ministers. Only in May 2022, the meeting between the «group of five» and China was held online, which was to mark 30 years of diplomatic relations between the countries. China envisions the summit in Xi’an on 18-19 May this year to usher in a new era in its relations with the states of the region and to trigger more profound and more comprehensive cooperation.
Based on the Xi’an Declaration, the joint statements of the Central Asian and Chinese heads of state and all the documents signed during the summit, Beijing has taken the meeting seriously, examining the needs and specifics of each country individually.
Highlights of the China-Central Asia Summit
The two-day summit in Xi’an was a significant event for both China and the Central Asian states due to Russia’s declining influence in the region and the growing attention of international players to the «group of five». Previously China had been more focused on bilateral cooperation and worked with each country individually, but now the Central Asian heads of state and the Chinese president can jointly discuss the prospects for further relations, pressing regional issues and the current issues on the global agenda. Moreover, unlike the SCO, there will be no contradictions among regional players such as Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran in this format.
And while the G7 summit in Japan discussed curbing China’s growing influence, Chinese President Xi Jinping, at a meeting with Central Asian leaders, proposed expanding cross-border trade and pledged funding and cooperation on security issues.
At the summit, a large number of documents and points in a joint declaration were signed, and most importantly, the proposals and tools offered by China to the Central Asian states were voiced.
First, a declaration by the parties that the summit formally establishes a mechanism for meetings between Central Asian and Chinese heads of state. The summit will be held every two years alternately in China on the one hand and in one of the Central Asian states in alphabetical order on the other. The next China-Central Asia summit will be held in Kazakhstan in 2025. This initiative will allow the states of the region and China to develop comprehensive planning for further C+C5 cooperation and create a new mechanism for high-level relations.
Second, in his keynote speech, the Chinese president went beyond economic cooperation to address the topic of ensuring common security and supporting the sovereignty of the Central Asian states. Xi Jinping noted that regional states and China should «act on the Global Security Initiative, and stand firm against external attempts to interfere in domestic affairs of regional countries or instigate colour revolutions». It was also noted that there should be zero tolerance for the three forces – extremism, terrorism and separatism – and that they should work together to prevent conflicts.
Third, an important initiative is the possible creation of a mechanism for meetings regarding key and priority spheres of cooperation, the full involvement of the foreign ministries of each state, also the parties will consider the possibility of establishing a “China-Central Asia Secretariat”.
In other words, China is moving from abstract proposals and vague formulations to the creation of real instruments for deepening cooperation that will allow it to move to a different architecture of relations with the states of the Central Asian region. And this is more than just investments.
Fourth, to unlock the potential of the «Dialogue and cooperation in the field of electronic commerce», and intensify cooperation in new sectors, including digital commerce and the «green economy». This comprehensive approach by Beijing, which creates new tools and offers different areas for cooperation, allows China not only to be attractive but also to be seen by Central Asian states as an alternative direction in any industry. And if we link this to the growing competition of global and regional players in the Central Asian region, we can say that China, in our view, is winning with a significant advantage.
Looking at the great number of documents signed, new projects in various areas, initiatives in priority areas of cooperation and instruments created during the summit, we can say that the China-Central Asia meeting in Xi’an was an unprecedented event, the scale of it surprised everyone without an exception
Is China forcing out the major actors in the region?
For instance, in his keynote speech at the summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping said «To bolster our cooperation and Central Asian development, China will provide Central Asian countries with a total of $3.7 billion of financing support and grant». This significantly exceeds the $25 million that the United States promised to direct to Central Asian states after the visit of Secretary of State Anthony Blinken.
China is gradually pushing out major players in the Central Asian region and becoming a leader in all areas of cooperation. China’s growing influence in the region is indicated not only by its rising investment and security involvement but also by the dynamics of its foreign trade. Compared to 2021, China’s trade with Central Asia has almost doubled in 2022, reaching $70 billion. Russia, traditionally considered a major external actor in the region, has a much smaller trade volume, increasing by $6 billion to $42 billion a year. In terms of these figures, Russia comes only third, behind the European Union.
It is not accidental, but a cause-and-effect relationship of China’s consistent foreign policy in the Central Asian region. The last summit showed that China has carefully prepared and studied each Central Asian country individually and, based on their needs and requirements, has promoted its initiatives, projects and allocated funds. With each country, China has launched several projects in infrastructure, oil and gas exploration, energy, digital economy and manufacturing.
In addition to the positive economic developments, as mentioned above, China has become more active in the security domain, and behind a mask of pompous and vague language, it offers the Central Asian states its global initiatives and its vision of the architecture of international relations. China’s global initiatives, though generalised and without content, could still be a trap for the countries of the region. And as Beijing takes a strategic approach to its foreign policy, it may add more content to these initiatives gradually after the countries in the region have joined them. Thus, if the international situation deteriorates, a dilemma is created for Central Asia — to be or not to be with China.
What projects has China offered Tajikistan?
China is the main investor in Tajikistan’s economy and one of the country’s three main economic partners. Beijing is investing a substantial amount of money in Tajikistan’s economy, implementing major projects and participating in the construction of various facilities in the country. Tajik authorities attribute this generosity to China’s interest in maintaining stability in Tajikistan. During the last summit in Xi’an, China again proved to be generous and put forward several initiatives that are important to both countries.
For example, at the summit, during a meeting between President Xi Jinping of China and the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon, projects of strategic importance to the country were discussed. Such projects include the implementation of joint activities on the reconstruction of the Tajik Aluminium Company Talco.
The two leaders also supported the creation of a China-Tajikistan-North Afghanistan economic corridor and, in this direction, the construction of a section of the Varshez road in the Shugnan district of GBAO to the Kulma-Karasu junction. These projects have been well received by the PRC Chairman and are likely to be implemented with Chinese investment and the involvement of companies from that country. Since, according to the Ministry of Transport of Tajikistan, the commitment to build roads and bridges in GBAO has been transferred to China Road and Bridge Corporation.
Moreover, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will allocate concessional funds of $500 million for the construction of the Roghun HPP. The head of the Bank announced this during a meeting with the President of Tajikistan, which was held in Beijing on 17 May. It is not reported when and on what terms the funds will be allocated for the construction of the strategically important Tajikistan facility.
Among other agreements and joint projects, the Chinese government will provide Tajikistan with “grant assistance” worth $57 million. The project notes that the assistance is being provided at the request of the Tajik government to implement projects agreed upon by the parties. The language is also vague, and it is not clear which specific projects the funds have been assigned to and whether they are in fact ‘grant aid’.
In this vein, it may be noted that China is taking over Tajikistan’s most important strategic facilities, investing in and building them with its own companies. Of course, there are certain risks of Tajikistan becoming dependent on the “economic giant,” considering the country’s foreign debt to China.
But since Tajikistan currently has no alternative to China, it needs to be more careful about attracting Chinese investment and receiving concessional loans. This could lead the country to various negative consequences, up to and including sovereign default.
Challenges for Tajikistan
By the will of fate, China is our neighbour, and there is no way out of it, and cooperation with this country has been and remains a priority in Tajikistan’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, based on the growing influence of China both in Central Asia and in Tajikistan, there are several issues that Tajikistan should take into account in its cooperation with its eastern neighbour.
Even though Beijing and Dushanbe have long been major partners in almost all areas of cooperation and China has been investing heavily in the economy and implementing important projects since 2012, Tajikistan has not fully studied its eastern neighbour. The consequence is that there are currently no answers to key questions such as “What does China want from Tajikistan?”, “What are China’s real interests in Tajikistan?”, “To what negative consequences can China’s allocated funds lead in the long run?”, “What can Tajikistan offer China?” and many other important questions.
This attitude may ultimately lead Tajikistan into an inadequate, “blind” partnership with China. In this vein, Tajikistan needs to pay more attention to studying its eastern neighbour to correctly set priorities in its cooperation with Beijing and to carry out a dialogue that respects its national interests.
Tajikistan also needs to build its foreign policy through consolidation with other states in the Central Asian region, as it is difficult for a small country with limited resources to advance its agenda in cooperation with a giant like China.
The efforts of integration processes in Central Asia play an important role in this direction. Moreover, China has begun to perceive the states of the region to be one organism, as the recent summit in Xi’an demonstrated. In this case, both Tajikistan and the other Central Asian states will have more room to manoeuvre between regional and world powers and implement their multi-vector foreign policies.
Conclusions
Based on the above theses on the Xi’an summit the following general conclusions can be drawn.
The Xi’an summit showed that China intends to institutionalise its relations with Central Asian states by intensifying the C+C5 format at the level of heads of state, as indicated in the initiatives to establish a mechanism for ministerial meetings on key and priority areas of cooperation and the possible establishment of a ‘Central Asia-China Secretariat’. China has developed a perception of Central Asia as one region and has already started to work actively in this direction, consolidating its influence.
China is gradually increasing the instruments of its influence in the Central Asian region, which include not only economic leverage but also cultural and political influence, and is ahead of players such as Russia, the US and the EU in virtually all areas of cooperation. This is demonstrated by the growing dynamics of investment and trade flows between China and Central Asian states.
Moreover, Beijing offers the countries of the region not only investments but also its vision of the architecture of international relations. In this case, the challenge for the Central Asian states is to construct their visions of global processes and to implement foreign policies based on the principle of balanced equidistance from the world centres of power.
China has already become Tajikistan’s main partner and this year will mark 31 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. But despite this, Tajikistan has not paid much attention to studying its eastern neighbour. Many articles and studies by Tajik experts and scholars present only the positive side of the Sino-Tajik relationship, while there is virtually no objective assessment and consideration of critical areas of cooperation. In this regard, Tajikistan needs to start studying China, as this topic is important for choosing an adequate strategy in cooperation with China and correctly setting priorities in the long term.