“The high numbers of dead and injured and the crackdown on the right to assembly in Nukus, will not go unnoticed, and will leave a big smear on Mirziyoyev’s presidency,” – states Marius Fossum, human rights activist, regional representative in Central Asia for the Norwegian Helsinki Committee in an interview with CABAR.asia analytical platform.
In early July 2022, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of Nukus, Republic of Karakalpakstan, to protest against proposed constitutional reforms that would have abolished the autonomy’s right to secede from Uzbekistan. Attempts to suppress the protests by law enforcement forces led to mass clashes and resulted in deaths and injuries on both sides and numerous arrests. As a result of the unrest, the President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, made an emergency visit to Nukus and promised not to change the articles in the constitution concerning the status of Karakalpakstan. Mirziyoyev also imposed a state of emergency in the autonomous republic until early August this year.
The international human rights organisation Norwegian Helsinki Committee has a long history of detailed monitoring and documentation of human rights violations in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in the region. CABAR.asia spoke with Marius Fossum, Regional Representative of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee for Central Asia, about the demonstrations, the role and place of Karakalpakstan within Uzbekistan and what lessons the countries in the region can learn from such protests.
CABAR.asia: What are the specific features of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan’s regional politics? What is its place in the socio-economic picture of Uzbekistan? To what extent have the amendments played a role in triggering protests?
Although the population of Karakalpakstan is not very large, the region stretches across around 40 percent of Uzbekistan’s total territory. Also, while the region is underdeveloped and also the poorest region of Uzbekistan, it holds gas resources and is as such authorities in Tashkent would not allow Karakalpakstan to secede from Uzbekistan.
The amendments that would remove the right of Karakalpakstan to secede from Uzbekistan were the direct trigger of the protests. However, there were several factors at play, as mentioned Karakalpakstan is the poorest region of Uzbekistan, life is harder than elsewhere, there’s a feeling of not being involved when policy issues regarding the region are decided in Tashkent. When Tashkent announced the amendments it became the tip of the scale.
Many experts draw parallels with the situation in Ukraine and see separatist threats in Karakalpakstan. How relevant are such comparisons and could the alleged amendments be linked to Ukraine, other developments?
The Constitution of Uzbekistan gives Karakalpakstan the right to secede by referendum, and its (Karakalpakstan’s) status is autonomous, a status it has had for many decades, also in the Soviet era. I would therefore not draw parallels between Karakalpakstan and the so-called “breakaway republics” in Ukraine. However, Tashkent may have viewed the Russian war in Ukraine, and the Russian state modus operandi of levelling power over neighboring states by establishing breakaway republics as a threat, although this will be speculation on my part.
How can we characterise the authorities’ response to the protests and is there a difference in the official and independent media’s interpretation of events? Is the response of the government and the president timely and considered?
The response to the protests were heavy-handed and brutal at any rate, the official number of casualties – whether the actual full numbers or not – speak for themselves, according to authorities 18 people were killed during the protest, while more than 200 were injured.
Regarding the media’s interpretation of events: Uzbek authorities have been suppressing media coverage of the events, just as it has been routinely suppressing free media and hindering the development of any free media scene for decades. Although the administration of Mirziyoyev has announced many reforms, and received international praise for it, conditions for media freedom are still barren in Uzbekistan. Of course, now this repression makes it hard to gather verifiable information about what actually happened in Karakalpakstan. Authorities have blamed troublemakers among the protesters for causing the unrest, but when independent media is not allowed to do its legitimate job, facts remain obscured.
Case in point, the blogger Davletmurat Tazhimuratov was arrested during the events and is now charged with calls to overthrow the constitutional order of Uzbekistan, while Karakalpakstan journalist Lolagul Kallykhanova is reportedly held incommunicado, we do not yet know if or with what she will be charged, but we are very worried that authorities may create scapegoats out of these two by retaliating against them for exercising their constitutional rights to freedom of expression.
What lessons can the countries of the region learn from such protests, given that there are threats and challenges of a similar nature in every Central Asian country?
I’m sure there are many lessons, that would also be relevant for the recent unrests that have taken place in Kazakhstan and in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan earlier this year. While routinely suppressing dissent, freedom of expression and independent media, authorities do not only deprive the population of necessary channels for airing legitimate grievances, and thus creating a pressure cooker, authorities also keep themselves in the dark about what sentiments are alive amongst the population, and end up being caught unaware and ill-prepared each time protest breaks out, and typically overreact by brutal crackdowns.
To what extent will these deadly events affect relations with Western countries and the image of the “new” open Uzbekistan?
Even though the world’s attention is mostly and for good reason turned towards the illegal war of Russia against Ukraine, the high numbers of dead and injured and the crackdown on the right to assembly in Nukus, will not go unnoticed, and will leave a big smear on Mirziyoyev’s presidency. After years of announced reforms, Tashkent still needs to prove it is serious about respecting human rights.