Tajikistan’s foreign policy trajectories are not drastically changing. In light of the Ukraine war only a few new actors entered its foreign policy scene, while traditional strategic players remain the same. Perspectives of regional integration are also bleak against the background of the existing protracted conflicts between some Central Asian countries, – notes Karolina Kluczewska (Belgium) in an interview, exclusively for CABAR.asia.
Dr. Kluczewska is a researcher at the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies, Ghent University in Belgium. Her research focuses on development aid and social policy in Tajikistan.
How is the war in Ukraine affecting Tajikistan’s relations with Russia? Can we expect Tajikistan to distance itself from Russia, as other countries in the region are currently trying to do?
So far, the invasion of Ukraine did not prove to be a turning point in Tajikistan’s relations with Russia. To understand this, we should look at both sides in this interaction, Tajikistan and Russia, given that they seem to have diverging perceptions of the situation and also different expectations from each other.
In recent months, Tajikistan did not try to distance itself from Russia, unlike Kazakhstan and to some extent also Uzbekistan. Generally, Tajik political elites have a special affinity for Russia, seeing it as one of the strongest states in the international arena. Still, Tajikistan did not express any stance on Russia’s war in Ukraine, explicitly or implicitly. It also remained silent on annexation referendums in Russian-occupied territories in September this year. We can say that Tajikistan ignored this conflict, even if the war and in particular Western sanctions on Russia had a direct negative impact on Tajikistan’s economy which largely depends on Russia through imports and labour migrants. This is a strategic position of a small country that relies on Russia, politically and economically, but that realises the dangers of this dependence. Tajikistan remains “passively” loyal to Russia because it does not have other options. Even if Tajikistan manages to diversify its international partnerships and attract other forms of foreign direct investment, as the Tajik government is currently trying to do, in any case Russia will remain its viable strategic partner.
As for Russia, this year it clearly became more interested in Tajikistan than it used to be over the last few years. As a result of sanctions, Russia is looking for new economic partners. This is why it became interested in investing in Tajikistan, for example in the cotton sector. Moreover, for Russia making investments in Tajikistan is a way to maintain its upper hand in this country. It seems that Russia does not mind Tajikistan’s multi-vector foreign policy, but it minds specifically Tajikistan’s cooperation with Western partners. Russia would clearly like Tajikistan to be “actively” loyal, and it knows that Tajikistan’s loyalty cannot be taken for granted and that it requires constant funding. President Emomali Rahmon made this clear in October 2022 in his speech at Russia-Central Asia summit in Astana, when he asked Russia for more “attention.” The scale of Russian potential investment in Tajikistan, however, is not even comparable with Chinese funding, especially in the conditions of the economic crisis that Russia is currently facing. In short, I would say that Tajikistan’s relations with Russia are stable, but complex.
In the light of an economic crisis in Russia, are Tajik labour migrants still interested in working in this country, or are they going elsewhere, for example to Europe?
Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian economy was not in a good shape. After two years of GDP contractions during the pandemic, this year the economy of this country was hit by sanctions. This, of course, had a negative impact on foreign labourers in Russia. In March this year, international organisations foresaw that in 2022 remittances sent home by Tajik labour migrants working in Russia will shrink significantly. The World Bank indicated a decline by 22% and the Asian Development Bank by 50%, as compared to the last year. We need to wait to see to what extent these predications are correct.
But even despite the worsening economic situation in Russia, Tajik migrants continue leaving. The Russian labour market in crisis still offers more opportunities than the Tajik one – that is also in crisis due to its dependence on Russian economy. Many Tajiks are taking loans to pay for airline tickets to Russia, and every day in Dushanbe airport we can see as many flights going to Russian cities, as before. They are all full.
As for Tajik migration to Europe, this is a new trend that for sure will grow in future. So far, its dimensions are relatively small, especially compared to over one million Tajik migrants in Russia. Official data from the Polish Office for Foreigners show that at the moment there are only about 1200 Tajik citizens living in Poland. Many of them study, and not work – at least not officially. I did not come across similar, updated data from Germany, although the number of Tajik citizens living there will probably be higher than in Poland. I have also heard about some Tajik migrants who relocated from Russia to the UK, due to a shrinking supply of EU migrant workers after Brexit.
Using an economic formula, in Tajikistan there is definitely a “supply”, but I am not sure if in European countries there is a big demand for Tajik labour. This is because Europe already has “its” migrants. In Western European countries, in particular, there are well-established migrant networks from countries with long, often colonial relations with Europe. There are always niches in migrant economies, but at the moment, in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Ukrainians are filling them.
Do you see any new foreign policy directions emerging in Tajikistan?
Overall, Tajikistan has been trying to diversify its international relations already for two decades. After the civil war and general instability in the 1990s, in 2002 the Tajik government declared an “open door” type of foreign policy. Previously, however, the government’s focus was on strengthening relations with whom we might now call as “traditional” partners – initially Russia, US, EU countries, and then also China. This were mostly donor-recipient relations, where Tajikistan was at the receiving end. A few years ago, Tajikistan started stipulating investment agreements with Japan, South Korea and Turkey. We can see a similar trend in Uzbekistan, under Mirziyoyev, albeit Tajikistan is less active and these partners are also less interested in Tajikistan than in its neighbour. Tajikistan is still more in the development aid mode than in the investment one.
What changed more recently is Tajikistan’s approach to oil-rich states in the Persian Gulf. The Tajik government, that remains largely secular, used to be sceptical to accept humanitarian or development aid from these countries, fearing their potential religious influences on the local population. Back then, the only big investment from the Gulf countries was a massive mosque in Dushanbe, financed by Qatar, the construction of which started in 2011. Recently, however, Tajikistan started stipulating various agreements with Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, both in the form of investment and charity. As I was told in September at the Qatari embassy in Dushanbe, the Tajik government is now very interested in opening legal, structured channels for labour migrants to work in the Gulf. It seems that the war in Ukraine and the worsening economic situation in Russia, which negatively impacts on Tajik labour migrants working there, only accelerated this new foreign policy trend.
In the light of the energy crisis, the EU is already exploring new energy cooperation projects with some countries in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Is the EU-Tajikistan relationship also changing in some ways?
I would say that it is not changing significantly. Tajikistan does not have resources that might be of the EU’s interest due to the current energy crisis, namely oil and gas. It also does not have many other raw materials which would allow the EU to diversity its trade flows.
We also need to take into account that EU policymaking is rather slow and bureaucratised. For example, preparations for the current, 2019 EU-Central Asia strategy took two years. The
multiannual indicative plan, which finances this strategy, was approved in 2021 and will be in place for the next six years. Moreover, the EU is actually several EU institutions and 27 members states, each with a different approach towards Tajikistan and Central Asia more broadly. All of this means that it will take a few years before EU policymaking towards Central Asia will be able to reflect current events, such as the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Another reason which explains a lack of change in the EU’s approach is Tajikistan’s southern neighbour. Over the last two decades, the EU has seen Tajikistan through the prism of Afghanistan, and this is still the case. From the EU perspective, before the Taliban’s takeover in the summer of 2021 Tajikistan was supposed to secure the West from the potential insecurity spillover, understood mainly as terrorism and organised crime. Now, Tajikistan is expected to help secure the West from the spillover effects from the Taliban takeover, such as mass migration towards the West because of the current humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Tajikistan is a security partner of the EU, and it is well aware of that.
On a similar note, is the US still interested in Tajikistan since its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021?
It is. Already while preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan, the US dedicated more attention to Tajikistan. For example, already in 2020 USAID delinked Tajikistan from its regional USAID mission in Almaty and opened a bilateral, full mission in Tajikistan. The new strategic framework for Tajikistan, launched in 2022 and thus after the Taliban takeover, clearly states the risks resulting from coming back of the Taliban to power. Already the opening paragraph of this document talks about “fears of re-emerging extremism and regional instability,” which is telling about the rationale behind the US interest in Tajikistan.
What about China’s growing influence in Tajikistan, starting from economic infrastructure projects to cultural soft power?
China is Tajikistan’s largest source of foreign investment, which is concentrated in construction, communication, agriculture and mining sectors. China is also among Tajikistan’s top trading partners. We can say that China is active on all fronts because it also runs several cultural activities in this country, including offering free language classes and multiple scholarships for Tajik students to study in China.
I believe that Tajik policymakers realise very well that Chinese investment comes with strings attached, but these strings will be revealed only in future. This is actually China’s advantage over other partners, particularly Western ones, where strings are visible from the very beginning. For example, the World Bank’s loans and investment projects are conditional to – mostly neoliberal – reforms undertaken prior to receiving funding. Thus, for the time being it is easy for Tajikistan to collaborate with the Chinese. They do not demand changes in the legislation, and Chinese investment is much bigger than grants and loans from Western donors. This is also a matter of mutual perceptions. Some Tajik policymakers whom I spoke to appreciate that Chinese partners are more straightforward and do not look down at them, like some Western interlocutors tend to do.
At the same time, Tajikistan owns 60%, or nearly $2 billion, of its public debt to China alone. In 2017, China provided a $250 million grant to erect a new parliament complex in the centre of Dushanbe. The old, Soviet-era parliament building was demolished and the construction of the new complex is now ongoing. It is perhaps symbolic, and worrying, that a big slogan saying “Assistance from China for a common future” can be seen in the very heart of Tajikistan.
Like in other Central Asian countries, despite some admiration for Chinese economic progress, the population in Tajikistan tends to be sceptical about Chinese influence and presence in the country. Similarly, Tajik labourers who work in Chinese companies often complain about a rigid working regime and long working hours. It is also telling that whenever president Rahmon speaks about the necessity to learn foreign languages, he refers to Russian and English, but not Chinese. Many young people, however, learn Chinese because they realise that knowing this language is an asset on the precarious domestic labour market.
How about Iran? Could you say a few words about the uneasy relationship between the two countries?
Indeed, over the last three decades Tajikistan’s relations with Iran witnessed several ups and downs. From the very beginning, Iran manifested interest in this country. Iran was the first state that recognised Tajikistan’s independence from the Soviet Union. It was also the first country to open its embassy in Dushanbe, in 1992. The two countries share many similarities, but there are also significant differences between them. For example, Tajik and Persian are two varieties of the same language. At the same time, Iranians are predominantly Shia and Tajiks are Sunni. Even more importantly, Iran is an Islamic republic, where governance is based on an official interpretation of sharia, whereas the Tajik government is secular and, I would even say, allergic to religious forms of governance.
In a gesture of solidarity, Iran has partially financed and built the Istiqlol tunnel, a 5 km long tunnel on a highway connecting Dushanbe and Khujand. It was opened in 2006, but until 2017 there were significant problems with pavement, drainage, ventilation and lightening. Anyone who has ever passed through this tunnel, will remember complete darkness, rivers of water splashing around and dark smog. I mention this tunnel because we can see it as a metaphor of Tajikistan-Iran relations. They are important, like this road, but ruptured by several events.
During the Tajik civil war, for example, Iran hosted representatives of the United Tajik Opposition, a gesture that was not appreciated by the Tajik government. Another critical event concerns the arrest of an Iranian oligarch, Babak Zanjani, by Iranian police in 2013. The Iranian government charged Zanjani with money laundering and alleged that the businessman stored several billion dollars in Tajikistan, but representatives of the National Bank of Tajikistan denied it and refused to hand over assets demanded by Iran. In 2016, in turn, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khomenei, received the leader of Tajik opposition who is wanted in Tajikistan. The Tajik government responded by issuing a note of protest to Iran.
After almost a decade long hiatus, this year we see a renewal of diplomatic ties, so far only through high-level diplomatic visits. This once again suggests that Tajikistan is now actively widening its international network, “just in case”, which needs to be seen against the background of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
And what about Turkey? After the recent 2022 Organization of Turkic States summit in Samarkand, Turkey is intensifying cooperation with some countries in the region. Is Tajikistan on Turkish agenda?
The 2022 summit in Samarkand took place under the slogan “a new era of Turkic civilisation”, and indeed, the Organization of Turkic States focuses on Turkic speaking countries. Tajikistan defines itself as belonging to Persianate culture, and is neither a member not an observer in this organisation.
In Tajikistan, there has always been a fear of cultural pan-Turkism. At the same time, there are many cultural similarities between the two countries, and this is something that in the course of my research was pointed to me multiple times by both Tajik elites and representatives of the Turkish embassy in Dushanbe. Thus, since its independence, Tajikistan has developed small scale but stable cooperation with Turkey, and over 40 agreements were negotiated in various fields, from agriculture and education. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), has been active in Tajikistan since 1992, offering technical assistance in the field of healthcare and education. For example, TIKA renovated several healthcare facilities and classrooms in Tajikistan. While these are small projects, they signal that Turkey approaches Tajik people with sympathy. Turkey is now willing to invest in cotton production facilities in Tajikistan, drawing on its own experience in the textile sector. This means that Tajikistan is on Turkey’s agenda, and vice versa, although not in the first tire.
Central Asia is divided by many complex and unresolved issues, and so far regional integration attempts have not been successful. Yet, this year’s summit of Central Asian heads has shown some moderate progress. What is your view on regional ‘rapprochement’ perspectives and on projecting a regional, united agenda vis-à-vis external partners?
The last meeting of the Central Asian heads of states on the shores of Issyk-Kul in July 2022 had a consultative character. This detail, in my opinion, tells everything about the nature of Central Asian regionalism. Such consultative regionalism serves to exchange information and is based on the principle of non-interference. Consequently, it is also characterised by an aversion to joint declarations and binding commitments. Could we expect anything else given the recurring tensions in the region, such as constant clashes at the Tajik-Kyrgyz border?
Central Asian states have similar aspirations and share many common challenges, which gives an impression of a regional, united agenda. For example, all of them attempt to diversity trade relations. They also try to position themselves vis-à-vis the invasion of Ukraine in a way that will not make Russia angry. But they also share certain domestic and foreign policy inclinations, such as the principle of sovereignty, when national interests come first, and a strong preference to deal with each other and with external partners on a bilateral basis, rather than multilaterally. Precisely these shared features make regional integration impossible.