In October 2021, the Central Asia region was in the focus of the foreign press in the context of the re-election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan for a second term, the European tour of Emomali Rahmon, a new Chinese outpost in Tajikistan, and the expected “storm of crises” in Kyrgyzstan.
Mirziyoyev’s victory in the elections. What is next?
The German media bne IntelliNews wrote about the recent victory of Mirziyoyev in the presidential elections. Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was returned to serve a second term in office on October 24. Preliminary results showed him winning 90% of the vote in what was a largely uncontested race. However, later official results gave the incumbent slightly over 80%.
Since succeeding Islam Karimov five years ago, Mirziyoyev has been widely recognized for opening this Central Asian country to the world, overthrowing his predecessor’s repressive regime, and embarking on an extensive reform program. There have been many different positive changes in the country.
Although Mirziyoyev has rediscovered the country, political reform is not a priority on the Uzbek government’s agenda, and little has been done to promote political pluralism or remove obstacles to opposition parties.
The so-called political liberalization in Uzbekistan, as such, has mainly focused on loosening control over the media. In May 2020, the government announced reforms aimed at “liberalizing” its media and election laws. However, in March 2021, Uzbekistan passed a law according to which insulting the president on the Internet is punishable by criminal punishment.
The British newspaper The Economist, speaking of weakening reforms in Uzbekistan, notes that one of the reasons for the slow pace of change is the intelligence services, which continue to resist the emergence of a genuine civil society.
One of Mirziyoyev’s first steps after coming to power was to curb the country’s security service by sacking its longtime boss and limiting the structure’s powers. But the legacy of the police state still lurks, and ghosts love to flex their muscles. They are behind several secret trials on false charges of treason and espionage that have alarmed human rights defenders.
Emboldened Uzbek media report unflattering news, and nowadays they raise topics that were previously taboo, such as corruption. But red lines remain for journalists, and some websites and social media are blocked. The imprisonment of an outspoken blogger on dubious corruption charges and the arrest of a social media leader on charges of insulting the president this year left journalists flinching.
The past elections are an important milestone, but it will take at least one generation for Uzbekistan to transition to a free democratic country. Key aspects of Uzbekistan’s commitment to making these changes were not actually tested in these elections, but they will be tested in the next presidential elections in 2026, when Mirziyoyev will not be able to run for a third term under the constitution and will have to step down.
Jamestown Foundation: Tajikistan-Afghanistan Tensions a Hurdle for Russia-Taliban Relations
The Jamestown Foundation writes that the governments of Russia and Pakistan are concerned about continuing tensions between Tajikistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan, and they urge both neighbors to show restraint.
Relations between Russia and the Taliban (a banned terrorist organization in Central Asia – ed.) were in the spotlight immediately after the fall of Kabul. Unlike many Western countries that closed their embassies, Moscow kept its embassy open when the Taliban took over the Afghan capital on August 15. The Taliban, in turn, assured the Kremlin that they would provide complete security for the Russian embassy and its diplomatic staff in Kabul.
Despite maintaining contacts with the Taliban long before the US left Afghanistan, as well as Tajikistan’s calls to resolve its dispute with the Taliban peacefully, the Kremlin itself has not yet recognized the Taliban government in Kabul. Russia remains in a “wait-and-see” regime, evidently in order to leave its options open, depending on the further development of the situation in Afghanistan. Officially, the Taliban are still banned by law as a terrorist group in Russia. And Moscow held several demonstration military exercises at its base in Tajikistan after the fall of the Afghan capital.
Sooner or later, Russia will definitely recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan, except for unforeseen events. But tensions between Tajikistan and the Taliban have already highlighted potential regional obstacles to Russia’s steadily growing relationship with this radical Islamist entity. The big problem for Moscow is how astutely it can defend its strategic interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan, while averting possible confrontation between Dushanbe and Kabul with the help of Islamabad. With sufficient strategic foresight, Russia and Pakistan can ultimately persuade Tajikistan to recognize the Taliban government. But the road ahead will not be entirely within Moscow’s capabilities.
Il Figlio: Tajik President fights Taliban and meets with Macron to garner support
The Italian newspaper Il Figlio dedicated an article about Emomali Rahmon’s visit to France in October 2021, where he met with French President Emmanuel Macron. The publication reports that the leader of the Central Asian republic usually keeps away from international radars, but with the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul, he has become their toughest opponent.
However, the reason for Rahmon’s confrontation with the Taliban regime lies much more in the internal stability of Tajikistan than in the actual fight against terrorism. Some observers suspect that the dictator is not acting this way out of fear of infiltration by terrorists from Afghanistan or reports of the Taliban government’s lack of transparency. After all, inclusiveness is a term that has never been heard of in Tajikistan during the decades of Rahmon’s rule. The Tajik leader is reportedly fomenting the clash in order to attract international attention and tangible results, such as financial or military aid.
In addition, an increase in the level of combat readiness on the border may allow him to further strengthen his control over the country, including taking into account the dynastic succession, which in his plans should lead to his son’s power. This is a completely different line from other Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, which instead requires international diplomatic recognition.
So far, the Taliban are simply responding to the next attacks emanating from their northern neighbor. The publication notes that neither Tajikistan, which has to deal with an endless internal economic crisis, nor Taliban-led Afghanistan, which is still at a delicate stage of consolidation, will really benefit from the explosion. They will not be received by China, which is a partner of both, and which does not intend to revise its grandiose infrastructure projects in the area downward.
Non-military base: why is China building an outpost in Tajikistan?
The Italian Institute for International Policy Studies reports that in late October, China committed itself to building a military base in Tajikistan, increasing the number of its overseas military bases to two. China will reportedly fund the construction of a Tajik outpost rather than a military base located at the intersection of Tajikistan’s eastern Gorno-Badakhshan province, China’s northwestern Xinjiang region, and Afghanistan’s eastern Badakhshan province.
Indeed, China’s military presence in Tajikistan will not increase dramatically at this point. Indeed, the outpost will be operated not by the Chinese army or military police, but by the Tajik police.
China’s interest in financing the Tajik military outpost raises several questions: first of all, why is there and why now. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan certainly violated the security scenario in Central Asia; leading some observers to argue that it is time for China to take on the role of guarantor of security in the area.
However, this argument remains only wishful thinking. The China-funded Tajik outpost is a response to China’s growing concern about the spread of an Afghan-fueled wave of regional instability, rather than its willingness to take over what the US has left behind.
China is still not interested in taking a more active role as a guarantor of security in Central Asia. This became clear from Beijing’s hasty attempts to mend relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, abandoning decades of internal narratives of violent Taliban terrorism, and portraying the Taliban to Chinese audiences as legitimate politicians.
Despite the beginning of a dialogue with the Afghan Taliban leadership, China quickly became aware of the existing tensions between the internal Taliban factions and, in particular, reports that some of these subgroups were divided in support of the Chinese Uighurs. Thus, the outpost in Tajikistan should be viewed from the perspective of China’s awareness of the fact that Afghan Taliban leaders have neither extensive legitimate political power nor control over all Taliban factions.
The Russian-Chinese paradigm of security and economics has become popular in scholarly work on the Great Game in Central Asia as a way to explain the apparent lack of regional rivalry between the two powers. In short, this explanation attributes to Russia a security role in Central Asia versus China’s economic role. Indeed, these proposals indicate that complementary roles have emerged between the two powers, at least at the institutional level. This argument does not imply that only one player has historically responded to security interests in their relations with Central Asian countries, but that strategic considerations have pushed Russia and China to develop their respective regional roles in accordance with balancing principles. Both countries, however, crossed these pencil-drawn lines at one point or another, as exemplified by Russia’s creation of the Eurasian Economic Union and China’s recent funding of a Tajik outpost.
Nikkei Asia: First year of Japarov’s presidency: expected “severe winter” in Kyrgyzstan
Japanese business newspaper Nikkei Asia notes that October 2021 marks exactly one year since the current President of Kyrgyzstan, Sadyr Japarov, took the reins into his own hands during those difficult times for the country and has not yet loosened his grip.
More recently, Japarov appointed a new cabinet with a chairman similar to that of prime minister, widely seen as another step towards consolidating his power. Legislative changes, which came into force the day before, put the president at the head of the executive branch. The restructuring of the government is one of the big visible measures since October last year, when an impoverished Central Asian country was rocked by a wave of protests following controversial and rigged parliamentary elections. The riots led to the fact that Japarov was released from prison and became president in a matter of days.
Last year, Japarov and his administration made sweeping changes – they changed the old constitution, reduced the size of parliament and detained opponents, often on trumped-up charges. Observers in Kyrgyzstan are concerned that too much power is now in the hands of the president and that state institutions are weakened.
However, the events of the first year of Japarov’s presidency did not seem to have affected his popularity. According to a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in July, 32% of respondents called him the most reliable politician in Kyrgyzstan, while his comrade, head of national security Kamchybek Tashiev, scored 24%.
Many in Kyrgyzstan hope for greater stability in the second year of Japarov’s presidency as the long-delayed parliamentary elections take place in November. However, stability may still be a long way off, given the “perfect storm of crises” now approaching Kyrgyzstan. The skyrocketing prices for FMCG products, the looming energy crisis with fuel shortages and power outages create an ominous picture as the winter months approach. Political unrest and the COVID-19 pandemic have severely damaged the country’s economy.
The World Bank projects gross domestic product growth of 2.3% in 2021, after falling 8.6% in 2020. The ongoing dispute over control of the Kumtor mine with former Canadian operator Centerra Gold, which is currently subject to international arbitration, could also serve as a potential time bomb for the government budget.
At the moment, when the opposition in Kyrgyzstan is fragmented and demoralized, the Japarov regime seems to be in a strong position. However, the country has a very difficult winter ahead, which will be the main test – whether this regime will survive and whether their political opponents will be able to benefit from their failures next year.
OCCRP: Turkmen state factories export products through opaque companies linked to the president’s nephews
The investigation by OCCRP and its partners focuses on carbamide, a mineral fertilizer produced at a state-owned plant in Turkmenistan, which is exported through a controversial Scottish company. The key role in the enterprise is played by the president’s nephew Khadzhimurat Rejepov.
The investigation builds on the Pandora Archive, the leaked millions of documents from offshore corporate service providers that the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has shared with partners.
Khadzhimurat is not the only Rejepov in the leaked documents. Apparently, his younger brother Shamurat used a similar scheme and played a similar role in a British company that calls itself the leading exporter of petroleum products at a large Turkmen oil refinery.
The new state-owned carbamide plant has made Turkmenistan the region’s leading fertilizer exporter: according to documents from the UN Comtrade database for 2019 and 2020, the country exported over 1.6 million tonnes of carbamide.
There is no publicly available trade data revealing how important the Scottish company Caran Holdings was in this. However, various sources indicate that she got a large piece of the pie.
Argus Media, which provides information on prices for energy and other goods based on data from the government of Turkmenistan, called Caran “the largest supplier of Turkmen carbamide by river routes this year”.
The journalists also got documents containing Caran sales statistics. In 2020, the firm sold 213,000 tonnes of carbamide to a Russian trading company, which transferred the goods to US buyers.
Caran, controlled by Khadzhimurat, bought and sold fertilizers, and his younger brother Shamurat, apparently, was associated with the Delanore company, which sells products of the Turkmen chemical industry and petroleum products produced by state-owned enterprises of the oil and gas sector of Turkmenistan.
It is not known how much Khadzhimurat and Shamurat Rejepovs earned by exporting carbamide and oil products from Turkmenistan. Nevertheless, their condition can be judged by real estate in the UAE.
Comparing 16 of the Rejepovs ‘apartments with similar apartments in these complexes, which are now for sale, OCCRP journalists and partners have estimated the brothers’ property at about $ 5.5 million.