In March 2022, Central Asia was highlighted in the foreign press in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, in particular the statements of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; the negative impact of sanctions on the economies of the region; some restrictions on assembly rights in Kyrgyzstan; the first deaths of Central Asian nationals in the Russian army in Ukraine; the investment forum held in Tashkent.
Kazakh official: We will not risk being placed in the same basket as Russia
In an interview with the European media outlet Euroactiv, Timur Suleimenov, first deputy head of the Kazakh presidential administration, discussed the war in Ukraine, the impact of Western sanctions on his country, the pursuit of modernisation after the January riots and the changing geopolitical balance.
According to Suleimenov, the main purpose of his recent visit to the EU was to discuss the situation with the current geopolitical crisis, the military action taking place in Ukraine, the sanctions applied to the Russian economy and financial system and their consequences for Kazakhstan, as well as ways to mitigate them.
Secondly, to demonstrate to our European partners that Kazakhstan will not be a tool to circumvent sanctions against Russia by the US and the EU. “We are going to comply with the sanctions. Even though we are part of an economic union with Russia, Belarus and other countries, we are also part of the international community. So the last thing we want is secondary sanctions from the US and the EU to be applied to Kazakhstan.” And the third thing is to discuss ways of expanding our cooperation with the EU.
When asked if Kazakhstan has a problem calling the war in Ukraine a war, the Kazakh official parried that they have no problem calling things by their proper names. Russia has decided to introduce legislation banning the word “war”, they call it a special military operation. “But in Kazakhstan we call it what it is, unfortunately”.
The UN General Assembly adopted two non-binding resolutions calling for an end to the war, in which Kazakhstan abstained. The media inquired whether it had anything to do with treaty obligations with Russia. Mr. Suleimenov answered that Kazakhstan is indeed a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the CSTO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but the provisions of the treaties are not applicable to this particular case.
“Of course, Russia wanted us to be more on its side. But Kazakhstan respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine. “We have not recognised and will not recognise either the situation with Crimea or the situation with Donbass, because the UN does not recognise them. We will only respect decisions taken at the level of the United Nations”.
Kyrgyzstan: Repeal Protest Ban
The Kyrgyz authorities should immediately lift restrictions banning any gatherings in front of the Russian embassy in Bishkek, Human Rights Watch international human rights organisation has said. The authorities should also annul the fines imposed on the three human rights defenders detained on 17 March 2022 who protested peacefully in front of the Russian embassy.
The ban, which also applies to parliament, government buildings and the central square from 11 March to 11 April 2022, was imposed by a Bishkek district police department. The Pervomaisky district court upheld the ban on 16 March, ruling that all assemblies during this period should be held elsewhere in the city.
According to Human Rights Watch, the ban is disproportionate because it preemptively bans gatherings in these popular places, regardless of their nature. It is incompatible with the right to freedom of assembly, which is protected by Kyrgyzstan’s international human rights obligations and its own constitution.
The decision was not officially made public. It came to light later, on 11 March, when police in plain clothes detained two activists, Dinara Yerkimbayeva and Lesya Khmet, who were picketing outside the Russian embassy.
When they were detained for violating the ban, the activists asked to see the court decision, but the police officers were unable to produce it. Instead, police officers took Yerkimbayeva and Hmet to the Pervomaisky ROVD and accused them of disobeying police orders, but did not formally charge them.
Also on 17 March, three other human rights defenders, Aziza Abdirasulova, Dinara Oshurakhunova and Ondurush Toktonasyrov, held a picket outside the Russian Embassy to protest against the illegal restrictions on freedom of assembly and solidarity with Ukraine. Police officers detained them and took them to the district court to face charges of hooliganism and disobeying police orders, in breach of Articles 126 and 128 of the Contravention Code respectively.
The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) have also written about the case, strongly condemning and stating that it seems that the arrests only aim to silence and punish them for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The restriction of the right to freedom of assembly, namely the decision by Bishkek police to ban civil society protests at key gathering points in the capital from 11 March to 11 April 2022, is a gross violation of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, in particular Article 39, which guarantees the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, as well as Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Far from Putin’s Russia, Tajikistan’s people feel sanctions pain
Al Jazeera notes that remittances to the Central Asian republic have plummeted amid sanctions meant to hit Russia over the war in Ukraine.
Western sanctions designed to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine are hitting livelihoods in Tajikistan, where remittances from Russia account for more than a quarter of gross domestic product (GDP). As the Russian currency has fallen by more than 30% since last week, Tajik migrant workers have seen their remittances actually drop by a third overnight.
Many other Tajik migrant workers in Russia lost their jobs after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a “special military operation” against Ukraine, declaring the need to “denazify” the country and protect people from “bullying and genocide.
Remittances from Russia are a lifeline for families in Tajikistan, the poorest of the Central Asian republics, where the average monthly salary is less than US$250 and GDP per capita is less than half that of Bangladesh.
After the civil war that erupted after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajik nationals began migrating en masse to Russia to work, sending back funds that were a crucial support for economic recovery.
Russia’s Federal Migration Service estimates that more than one million Tajik migrants work in the country. Tajikistan’s Labour Ministry downplayed these estimates, saying about half a million Tajiks travel to Russia every year in search of work.
About 70% of Tajik families depend on remittances, while the remaining 30% rely on help from relatives and their own earnings, according to a 2019 survey by the Research Institute of the National Bank of Tajikistan. In 2019 alone, migrant workers sent more than $2.5 billion to Tajikistan, according to the Central Bank of Russia.
Remittances from Russia to Tajikistan fell to $1.3 billion in the first nine months of 2021, down almost 50% from the same period in 2019, according to the Central Bank of Russia, a result of the COVID-19 virus pandemic and stricter migration rules.
Despite the decline, remittances are estimated to account for 28% of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2021, according to the World Bank.
For most Tajik households dependent on remittances, the weakening ruble means less money for food and other basic necessities. While the official dollar exchange rate has remained relatively stable so far, it is rising on the black market, which is a worrying signal for the state of the economy and food and fuel prices in the country.
Other Central Asian republics are also preparing for the economic consequences of the Ukraine crisis.
Neighboring Kyrgyzstan is one of the largest recipients of remittances per capita on the planet, with remittances accounting for 30 per cent of GDP last year, according to the Migration and Development Brief World Bank. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is the largest source of migrant workers in Russia.
Presidential Elections and Change of Leadership in Turkmenistan
One of the leading sources of news, analysis and information on the Middle East, Al Bawaba, devoted an article to the new leadership in Turkmenistan. The inauguration of Turkmenistan’s new president, Serdar Berdymukhamedov, took place recently at the Palace of Spirituality in Ashgabat. Serdar Berdymukhamedov, son of Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, Turkmenistan’s long-time leader, began his term as president. According to the law, after being sworn in as part of the inauguration, the elected president officially takes office.
In fact, in the 12 March presidential election, Serdar Berdymukhamedov won 73 per cent of the vote. After an unusual delay in the vote count, a political dynasty and the transfer of power from father to son has emerged in one of the world’s most controlled countries.
Moreover, the process of leadership change in the country began when Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, 64, announced that elections would be held. Berdymukhamedov emphasised the need for early elections on 12 March (to pave the way for “young leaders”). Turkmenistan’s Central Election Commission then announced its readiness to hold early presidential elections. Three days later, Serdar Berdymukhamedov, the president’s son, announced his intention to run.
Eight other candidates stood as candidates, but, according to many dissidents, there was no real and widespread debate between the announcement of the early election and the day of the election. Under these circumstances, Serdar’s victory did not pose a serious problem. Officials therefore announced on 15 March that the leader’s 40-year-old son Serdar Berdymukhamedov had won the election.
Turkmenistan’s ruling party has nominated Serdar, President Berdymukhamedov’s son, to run in the presidential election on 12 March. The leadership transfer from father to son, the first of its kind in Central Asia, occurred with Serdar’s endorsement by the ruling Democratic Party.
While the state media considered the day a special turning point in its independent and neutral history and testified to the irreversibility of democratic developments in the country, some dissidents, critics and the opposition, mainly abroad, voiced accusations and criticisms about the short time between the announcement of the election and election day, the blocking of candidates, the severely limited media space and the lack of independent political activity inside the country.
According to the critics, no elections in Turkmenistan since 1991 have been considered truly competitive. But the government and many are also concerned about the endorsement of the elections by CIS observers.
What is clear is that after Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan is the second country to understand the handover of power from father to son in the region of Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the same time, the new president faces serious challenges.
From Ashgabat’s perspective, international observers confirmed the elections’ legitimacy. However, while the diaspora and exiled opposition leaders continue to exert pressure, the current increase in global hydrocarbon prices in the current situation may further strengthen social welfare, reduce food insecurity and widespread unemployment and benefit the government.
Furthermore, with the positive approach of China, Russia and many other players towards Turkmenistan, it is impossible to predict significant problems for the country’s foreign policy. However, rising gas prices and increased tensions between major world players could make it difficult for Turkmenistan to engage in economic diplomacy and choose its main political and economic partners.
Meanwhile, any radical change in Turkmenistan’s policy of permanent neutrality could provoke reactions from other players. It should therefore be noted that, given the nature of Serdar Berdymukhamedov’s words and approaches over the past two years, it appears that the country will stick to continuing past strategies in domestic and foreign policy, while making some tactical changes.
The Jamestown: How Uzbekistan Views the Russian War Against Ukraine
The US analytical media Jamestown Foundation has written an article about Uzbekistan’s position on Russia’s war in Ukraine. Uzbekistan decided not to take sides in Russia’s war against Ukraine, which was first announced by the Uzbek presidential administration when the war started, and then demonstrated by Uzbekistan’s evasion of the UN resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine. Not only all government officials took a neutral stance, but also Uzbekistan’s nascent independent media, which were “asked” not to side with either of the conflicting sides in their publications. At the same time, Tashkent acknowledges the dire humanitarian situation in Ukraine and demonstrates its support by sending medical supplies to the country. Overall, Tashkent’s current ties with Moscow have proven to be very important, and a neutral stance was the only way for Tashkent not to destroy relations with Russia.
Meanwhile, the Uzbek government does not remain indifferent to the situation in Ukraine, as evidenced by Tashkent’s sending 28 tonnes of medical supplies and medicines to Kiev. This suggests that Tashkent recognises the suffering of Ukrainian citizens and does not support the ongoing destruction and loss of life, but politically avoids taking sides in this conflict.
Uzbekistan’s participation in Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) initiatives over the past few years demonstrates Tashkent’s commitment to the organisation. Just one day after Russia’s attack on Ukraine and before Western economic sanctions against Russia were imposed, Tashkent announced that it had joined several economic projects of the EEU, further strengthening its economic ties and its desire to expand cooperation with Russia (Gazeta.uz, 25 February). The economic projects included climate issues, the digitalisation of freight rail transportation, e-commerce and the implementation of the Eurasian AgroExpress project to increase the transportation of agricultural products outside the EEU. Uzbekistan is not ready to jeopardise its economic relations with Russia at the cost of a pro-Ukrainian stance, condemnation of Russian aggression and political implications from Moscow.
The Korea Herald: Uzbekistan vows to become middle-income country by 2030 at Tashkent Investment Forum
The Korean Herald newspaper reported that Uzbekistan pledged to become a middle-income country by 2030 at the Tashkent International Investment Forum at the Tashkent City Congress Hall on Thursday.
Participants discuss the investment agenda at the Tashkent City Investment Forum at the Tashkent City Congress Hall in Tashkent. (Sanjay Kumar/ The Korea Herald)
Uzbekistan has made poverty eradication a major goal of state policy. A separate strategy has been adopted and a ministry to fight poverty established, which, according to Mirziyoyev, has taken more than half a million families out of the “needy” category in Uzbekistan.
The adoption of the strategy of action and the implementation of large-scale democratic reforms within the government five years ago has proved its worth. The strategy and reforms covered all spheres of the Uzbek state and society, including such areas as the rule of law, the development of competition and a determined fight against corruption.
The forum was attended by such important figures as European Bank for Reconstruction and Development President Odile Reno-Basso, Asian Development Bank President Masatsugu Asakawa, Minister of Investment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Khalid Al-Falih, World Trade Organization Deputy Director General Xiangchen Zhang, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Vice President Konstantin Limitovsky and International Finance Corporation Senior Vice President Stefanie von Friedeburg.
Mirziyoyev pledged to hold regular meetings of the Foreign Investors Council under his supervision and to practice direct communication with investors and entrepreneurs in all sectors and regions using crowdsourcing platforms and digital solutions.
“Overall, as a result of our reforms, we plan to increase gross domestic product to $100 billion and annual exports to $30 billion in the next five years,” the Uzbek president said, stressing the goal of bringing the share of the private sector in GDP to 80%.
Understanding Central Asia’s cautious approach to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
The US-based Foreign Policy Research Institute writes that Central Asian governments are cautious in their pronouncements on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Central Asia was also part of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, and as some Central Asians read the news from Ukraine, they may wonder about parallels to their own future. The same worrying thought must have crossed the mind of some officials in Central Asian governments.
Officials in Kazakhstan and, more recently, in Uzbekistan have stated that their governments will not recognise the independence of the Kremlin-backed separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which President Vladimir Putin announced on 21 February. Tashkent and Nur-Sultan also called for an end to violence in Ukraine, but avoided mentioning the aggressor.
There are reasons why the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – or Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or Turkmenistan, for that matter – will not criticise Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, mainly because their ties to Moscow are too important to risk. The Russian labour market is a vital source of employment for many Central Asians; Russia plays a key role in Central Asia’s energy and export sectors; Russia remains the guarantor of security in the region.
Dependence on remittances from Russian labour migrants
Several million Central Asian labour migrants work in Russia. Most come from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The money they send to their families is essential to the economies of these three countries, accounting for 31, 27 and 12 per cent, respectively, of their gross domestic product. These migrant workers have few options where they can legally find work, and Russia remains their main destination.
A sharp depreciation of the rouble after the Russian invasion would hit Central Asia hard. The World Bank predicts the value of remittances from Russia will fall 21 per cent in Uzbekistan, 22 per cent in Tajikistan and 33 per cent in Kyrgyzstan.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). For Kyrgyzstan in particular, this has been an advantage. Some 650,000 migrant workers in Russia come from Kyrgyzstan, almost a tenth of the country’s population. Citizens of EAEU member states find it easier to obtain a work permit in Russia – at least, it is assumed so – than citizens of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which are not part of the EAEU; Kyrgyz also have access to the Russian healthcare system. The work that Kyrgyzstanis do in Russia also counts towards a pension under EEU law. And Bishkek appears to have reached an agreement with Moscow to exempt Kyrgyzstan from Russia’s recent ban on exports of essential goods, which was imposed in response to international sanctions. According to Kyrgyzstan’s Economy Minister Eldar Alisherov, Kyrgyzstan will continue vital imports of Russian grain in line with EEU guarantees to ensure the food security of member states, despite the ban announced by Moscow on March 14 on exports of wheat, rye, barley, corn and sugar to EEU countries.
Dependence on Russia for security
Russia has long been seen as a guarantor of security in Central Asia. After the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August 2021, this role became even more important. Russian troops have participated in joint military and anti-terrorist exercises in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Most Central Asian governments have established a friendly dialogue with the Taliban, but in Afghanistan there are also Central Asian citizens in fighting groups that the Taliban have little or no control over, or in the case of the Islamic State of Khorasan.
Tajikistan has not engaged with the Taliban and maintains a cold, and at times hostile, stance towards the Afghan militant group. Both sides have reinforced their troops along the Tajik-Afghan border, and Tajik officials claim that there are several thousand foreign (non-Afghan) fighters across the border in north-east Afghanistan. The Tajik government’s unique position on the Taliban is almost certainly reinforced by the presence of the 201st Russian division, which continued to be stationed in Tajikistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia and Tajikistan signed a lease agreement in 2012 that allows the 201st Division to remain at its bases in Tajikistan until 2042.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). The CSTO base under Russian command is located in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, about 40 kilometres from Bishkek. The CSTO has conducted exercises with Central Asian states since the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, including one in Tajikistan near the Afghan border.
The CSTO deployed troops to protect strategic facilities in Kazakhstan in January 2022, when unrest broke out and an attempt appeared to have been made to overthrow President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev. This deployment was the organisation’s first during the conflict and served as a reminder to Central Asian states of the importance of the Russian-led organisation.
Reliance on Russia for political legitimacy
Russian support for regime change is also important in Central Asia. Turkmenistan has just held a presidential election on 12 March, in which the son of incumbent President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, Serdar, won. This was the first post-Soviet dynastic transfer of power in Central Asia, and it came after Serdar made several visits to Russia to get to know its officials better.
Tajik President Emomali Rahmon is similarly grooming his eldest son Rustam Emomali to succeed him as president. The corruption in Rahmon’s family over the last 30 years has been such that the public does not support the transfer of power from father to son. Russia’s support will be crucial to Rustam’s successful presidential appointment.
The support of the CSTO for Tokayev in January demonstrates the importance of Russia in supporting the government of a member of the organisation who is in trouble.
To provoke Russian anger – to loudly and openly condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine – could have devastating consequences for Central Asia, and the region’s leaders understand this dynamic. That is why they are acting so cautiously.
Whether or not Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine is successful, Central Asia will be closely tied to Russia for the foreseeable future, and this makes expressing an opinion on Russia’s attack on Ukraine a very delicate proposition.
Ukraine war: Is Central Asia loosening ties with Russia?
The online magazine The Diplomat has written an article about the dead Central Asians who fought as part of the Russian army in the war with Ukraine.
Media outlets in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan recently reported on the deaths of ethnic Central Asians in Ukraine. The bodies of those killed in Ukraine were reportedly returned to their native villages for burial in March, bringing the war – whether local media call it that or not – closer to the region.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Central Asians have been granted Russian citizenship, although exact figures are elusive. In 2018, for example, Kyrgyz authorities said more than half a million Kyrgyz had acquired Russian citizenship since independence. At the time, officials noted that the pace at which Kyrgyz people were acquiring Russian citizenship had slowed due to the country’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union, which has simplified the process of labour migration to Russia. Meanwhile, the number of Tajiks wishing to acquire Russian citizenship seems to have grown in recent years. In 2021 alone, according to Russian authorities, more than 100,000 Tajiks were granted Russian citizenship, up from about 30,000 in 2016. Kyrgyzstan does not recognise dual citizenship, but Tajikistan does.
The Tajik service of Radio Freedom reported that the bodies of four Tajik men were brought back to the country after being killed in the fighting in Ukraine. The service, known as Radio Ozodi, was able to identify two of the men, a 50-year-old and a 38-year-old, who were returned to the Hamadoni district in southeastern Tajikistan by officers from the 201st Russian base based in Tajikistan. The area borders Afghanistan, and Russian troops patrolled the border until the early 2000s.
In Kyrgyzstan, 24.kg, which adheres to Russian language in its reporting, calling the conflict in Ukraine a “special military operation”, reported that the body of the 20-year-old man will soon be returned to Issyk Kul, his birthplace. The young man’s mother, who works in Russia, was reportedly informed of her son’s death as early as March 8, and Russian authorities confirmed the death in a statement dated March 22, in which he was described as “a Russian citizen, a native of Kyrgyzstan”.
The exact number of ethnic Central Asians serving in the Russian armed forces is unknown, as is the exact number of those killed in the Ukrainian conflict to date. Russian authorities said in early March that just under 500 Russian servicemen had died; NATO officials put the total at between 7,000 and 14,000. There appear to be at least a few Central Asians among the dead, and there could be even more, given reports of Central Asian migrants joining the military in exchange for salaries and promises of Russian citizenship.
The Uzbek service of Radio Liberty tracked down an Uzbek driver who made a viral video of himself driving a Russian army truck into eastern Ukraine. The “driver from Fergana” said he agreed to a three-month contract as a driver in exchange for Russian citizenship, housing and a salary of 50,000 rubles per month. He allegedly found a job advertisement on the migrant employment website UzMigrant and said there were other Central Asians who had made similar deals.
Meanwhile, migrants still in Russia may feel pressure to join the conflict through recruitment attempts: from tents in the Moscow metro advertising vacancies in the “Volunteer Army of the Donetsk People’s Republic” to suspicious phone calls offering accelerated citizenship for a service contract. It is unclear whether these are real efforts by the Russian government, fraudulent opportunists or something in between.
The economic consequences of the war will weigh on the Central Asian economies: through a currency that rises and falls along with the rouble, a spike in food prices (the product of trade links with Russia), and a lack of jobs and income for Central Asian migrant workers in Russia. This may make the salaries reportedly offered for contract work in (or near) the Russian armed forces even more attractive.
War in Ukraine: Is Central Asia weakening ties with Russia?
Qatar’s Al Jazeera news agency writes that following Uzbekistan’s unexpected pro-Ukraine statement, analysts believe the traditional regional dynamics may change.
On March 17, as Moscow’s war against Ukraine intensified, Uzbekistan made a statement that few expected. Speaking to the Senate plenary, Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov said: “First, the hostilities and violence must cease immediately. The Republic of Uzbekistan recognises Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. “We do not recognise the Luhansk and Donetsk republics.”
While far from a complete condemnation, it marked a significant shift; Central Asian countries are among Russia’s traditional allies and rarely oppose the Kremlin’s actions.
And since Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power as president in 2016, relations between the two countries have improved significantly, so much so that Russia overtook China as Uzbekistan’s main trading partner last year.
Mirziyoyev has also been linked to Russian businessman of Uzbek origin Alisher Usmanov, a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
“Before the war, Uzbekistan was one step closer to joining the Eurasian Economic Union, and Mirziyoyev even participated in a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation,” Temur Umarov, a research fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Centre, told Al Jazeera. But I think Uzbekistan will now try to distance itself from Moscow”.
“I think Usmanov is thinking about his own future. His business was mostly able to thrive in the former Russia, now things have changed because of sanctions. Perhaps he is looking to change his main location and transform himself from a Russian oligarch with Uzbek roots into an Uzbek oligarch.”
Through years of isolationist policies, Uzbekistan has managed to build more independent economic and political systems than other Central Asian countries.
But perhaps no other country in the region can afford to distance itself in a similar way.
Surrounded by Russia, China, Afghanistan and the Caspian Sea, the Central Asian region, which includes Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, is subject to volatile geopolitical and security developments.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, these countries have remained in the Russian orbit, and although many of them have tried to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, their dependence on Moscow has remained strong.
However, the war could be a watershed moment and change regional dynamics. “The way Central Asia thinks about Russia has changed. Where once Russia was seen as a source of stability, now it seems that its presence in the very sensitive dimension of security has become a weakness for regional stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Umarov said. “I think Central Asian governments will seek to minimise Russia’s influence, which will not be easy to do, but they have no choice because it has become an unpredictable power.”
According to observers, the move marked a new era in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, where dependence on Russia will become even greater. “When it comes to Kazakhstan, as usual, there are calls for diplomacy. Kazakhstan abstained in the UN vote on the Ukraine issue, but we haven’t seen open support for Russia’s position,” says Professor Edward Lemon of Texas A&M University, whose research focuses on the transnational aspects of authoritarianism.
In the future we could see more concerted pressure on Kazakhstan to adopt a tougher stance. Just yesterday news came in that Kazakhstan can no longer export its oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, part of Russia’s original plan to cut off oil supplies to the West.”
However, he added that Kazakhstan had allowed an anti-war demonstration of about 3,000 people to take place, a notable step given that protests must be approved by the authorities before they can take place.
In the long term, Lemon said, Moscow’s actions could push Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan away from the Russian orbit and towards other regional players.
Kyrgyzstan will have a harder time weakening Moscow’s influence. “Kyrgyzstan’s foreign minister told a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Countries that Kyrgyzstan favours a peaceful solution to all issues and that it firmly adheres to all UN norms and the principle of territorial integrity in particular,” Emil Juraev, a Kyrgyz political analyst, told Al Jazeera.
“There are serious concerns in Kyrgyzstan about the possible consequences of open criticism of Russia, both in terms of security and politics. However, regardless of whether or not such criticism occurs, the consequences of Russia’s economic downturn are already being felt here. Inflation is rising, and we can expect shortages of basic goods in the coming months”.
Meanwhile, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have chosen neutrality and made no official statements about the war in Ukraine.