“The sixth convocation of Kyrgyz Parliament is no more. While in force, however, it served as an entity rather conforming to the authorities” – coming from Tansuluu Matieva, a participant of CABAR.Asia School for Young Analysts.
Follow us on LinkedIn
Brief overview of the article:
- The sixth convocation of the Jogorku Kenesh almost unanimously accepted all laws proposed by the authorities
- In some cases, the parliament completely ignored negative public sentiments towards the legislation
- The parliamentary opposition was de facto non-existent;
- Lack of the opposition in the parliament was among the escalating factors for the October events in Kyrgyzstan.
Back in June, the main legislative body of Kyrgyz Republic the Jogorku Kenesh (The Parliament) approved the infamous law “On manipulation of the information”. The new regulation enabled the government to block fake accounts in social media.[1] Wave of public protests immediately followed the decision, as, according to civil society, human rights lawyers, expert community and the public, the new law was a threat to a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech.[2]
Further, the President did not accept the law that afterwards was withdrawn for revision. Nonetheless, the disputes on Parliament’s decision-making logic behind this law were still going.[3] Journalists pointed on various violations during the reading of law’s project,[4] but it wasn’t the most surprising fact.
Despite public objections, 79 out of 89 deputies voted in support of this initiative.[5] It demonstrated that elected officials ignored public opinion during the decision-making. From another point of view, enactment of the law that contradicted constitutional norms, with numerous procedural violations has invoked huge doubt about overall competency of the Kyrgyz Parliament.
Therefore, arrives the question: “Why, regardless its anti-popularity, the majority of deputies balloted for of the law On Manipulation of the Information?” and “How does the voting go in other cases?”
Consolidarity of voting inside the Jogorku Kenesh
In order to identify how unanimous the Jogorku Kenesh is when airing a new law, we gathered official data from the Parliament’s website on the results of each parliamentary voting from 1 September to 31 December 2017-2019. As we can see, in three years there were only 2% of votes “against” the considered draft bills.[6]
Thus, 98% of 100 law drafts received parliamentary approval. It is a very high indicator, which implies that:
- A) There was almost no opposition in the Kyrgyz Parliament, notwithstanding the presence of formal coalition of opposition parties, that was supposed to hold the balance in the parliament
- B) Deputies were weary considering law drafts, paying insufficient amount of attention to details and avoiding thorough scrutiny
Comparing the Jogorku Kenesh with parliaments of democratic countries
98-percented unanimity among the deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh tells a lot about the absence of alternative point of view in the parliament. If compare it with the same data from democratic countries such as The United States or The United Kingdom, then imbalanced voting in the Kyrgyz Parliament becomes even more visible.
In four months, the data from The United States Congress showed that countervotes constituted 31% of overall votes, considering all performance data extracted from both House of Representatives and the US Senate.[7] In order to make an objective comparison, we did not include the data on procedural and nominative voting in The US Congress, because official sources related to the parliaments of Kyrgyzstan and the UK do not contain corresponding information.
The situation where 31% of votes in the US Congress are “against” indicates the existence of tangible opposition, even though the Republicans comprise the majority of the US Senate.
In the UK, the homeland of the Westminster model of government, the Parliament rejects 46 out of 100 law drafts that go through readings.[8] It shows that parliamentary opposition possess enough power in a legislative branch, to hamper the approval of possibly detrimental legislation.
What role does the opposition play in a parliament?
The role of the opposition is to represent and control, which is embedded in the very essence of the Parliament as an entity. In most countries with parliamentary system, representatives of opposition do not participate in forming of ministerial cabinet and therefore do not hold executive positions.[9]
Ruling parties while holding the majority of parliamentary mandates, provide full support to the government. The parliamentary majority represents the major part of the population, while the opposition protects the interests of the minority. The other important role of the opposition is to serve as a deterrent for the actions of the pro-government coalition and the government itself.[10]
The Parliamentary opposition suggests alternatives to the solutions proposed by the majority coalition; critically screens law initiatives through objections and debates during regular parliamentary sessions.
As you can see, the opposition is supposed to be a counterweight to the parliamentary majority. Every state identifies the necessary power equilibrium between the ruling majority and the opposition. However, two crucial conditions must be accommodated before composing the parliament.
First, in terms of number of deputies, the opposition should not exceed that of the ruling party, as state governance is not included in the basic functions of the opposition.[11] The party that represents the majority of the population formulates key decisions and it must hold enough number of deputies in the parliament in order to form the effectively performing government.
Second, the number of the opposition deputy should also be enough to effectively influence the decision-making.[12] Week parliamentary opposition can result in public commotion, which can further grow into violent street protests. If there is no opposition at all, the quality of decision-making in the parliament dramatically decreases and leaves no room for effective governance. Presence of reasonable opposition is one the key criteria for democracy. The Kyrgyz Parliament in that respect fails to fulfill this principle and existence of the opposing parliamentary coalition is merely a formality. Therefore, the second condition for composition of the parliament is not provided.
Recent events in Kyrgyzstan is an example of growing public discontent that evolved into violent clashes. The parliamentary elections that resulted in a complete defeat of opposition parties became the main reason of the October protests in Kyrgyzstan. The results were no different from the previous convocation. New Parliament would have similar traits such as lack of debate, inability to function as a controlling entity for the government and disregard for public opinion. Dissatisfied with the dominance of pro-government parties in the seventh convocation, the population peacefully demanded to cancel the results of the parliamentary elections. Failed to meet the demands, the authorities eventually had to cope with massive protests and demonstrations.
Issues with legislative process in the Jogorku Kenesh
The media these days frequently report about the occasions of procedural violations during the parliamentary sessions. News outlets were reporting that the parliamentary quorum was not full enough, noting that deputies that were present during the session also voted instead of their absent colleagues.[13]
It is not the only what is wrong with legislative process in Kyrgyzstan. The deputies, according to media, sometimes deny the very fact of voting for whatsoever law initiative, or even do not accept that some particular project of the law was initiated, despite it is usually mentioned in the protocol of each session.[14] All these cases raise many questions regarding the quality of the work inside the Kyrgyz Parliament.
For example, just in one day on 25 June 2020 the Jogorku Kenesh managed to discuss and hold voting on 100 law drafts.[15] From 28 October 2015 to 24 June 2020 the Kyrgyz Parliament initiated 1232 laws.[16] 56% of the whole number of the law drafts eventually received president’s signature.[17] It is a high entry level for the law draft to go through all procedures and to be finally approved, while in the UK it is 17%[18] and in the US – 4-6%.[19]
Also unlike the UK parliament, the Jogorku Kenesh has a substantial role proposing legislation: the deputies of the Kyrgyz Parliament are responsible for 40% of overall law drafts produced in higher echelons of power.[20] Most of the time, the laws are proposed by the fraction with the highest number of representatives in the parliament.[21]
Based on the acquired data, it evident that the Kyrgyz Parliament is very active when it comes to initiating laws. However, it is commonly believed that the oprimal proportion of the proposed law drafts between legislative and executive branches of power is 30% and 70% respectively. Data shows that the Jogorku Kenesh is more focused on increasing the number of accepted laws. It is rooted in the belief that the effectiveness of the deputies’ work in the Jogorku Kenesh is measured by the amount of initiated laws, with no regard for how the legislation with further function.
How to interpret the data?
The analysis of the voting in the Jogorku Kenesh confirms the ongoing discourse regarding the parliamentarism in post-soviet countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
- Absence of actual opposition, given the formally existing opposing coalitions[22]
- High institutional fragmentation residing in deputies’ affiliation with other state agencies and functional committees[23]
- Direct correlation of the passivity of formal coalition of parliamentary minority with its inactivity[24]
- High law-proposing activity of majority coalition[25]
These particular traits defers the democratization process and ensures the longevity of the authoritarian regime. These countries failed to create a parliament that would meet democratic standards.
Usually the activity of parliament is counterpoised to the authoritarianism. It is believed that active legislative function of the parliament is a marker of democratic development. But in Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan parliament is an instrument used to support the authoritarian regime. Why so?
First, high percentage of introduced law build up impression of legitimacy of the established regime. The opposition remains passive; no attention to details of law drafts and no debates – all of this contributes to dominance of the pro-government party.
Second, pursuing high performance rates, the parliament may neglect public opinion. Active opposition can prevent it by controlling the ruling coalition.
Third, excessive lawmaking provides the room for co-opting between president’s office, the parliament and the government, which minimizes the risk of revolt by individual politicians who struggle for access to power.[26] [26] The authoritarian ruling is excersised through high number of officials working in state agencies.
Kyrgyzstan was always a standtout in terms of democratic development in Central Asia, but according to Freedom House ratings, it has lost the status of hybrid regime country, instead becoming an authoritarian state.[27] The data shows that generally the activity of the last convocation of the Kyrgyz parliament had little difference from other countries of the region.
Recommendations
Soon the sixth convocation of the Kyrgyz Parliament will have to resign. In order to ensure development of democratic parliamentarism in Kyrgyzstan, the new seventh convocation will have to consider the following:
First, parties that achieved the vote threshold should unite based on similarity of ideologies and political outlook, rather than on personal benefit. Based on their electorate, the parties need to form a major or minor coalition.
Second, the Parliament must not exclusively focus on lawmaking
The parliament should attentively scrutinize law drafts and make decisions with accordance to public opinion. If the law reaches the ratification stage, the parliament must assume the role of a supervisor over how the government implements it.
Third, the opposing coalition must something more than just a formality. It has to evolve into an influential fraction that deters and regulates the decision-making process, while promoting public interest. The parliament is not supposed to approve the legislation that contradicts or threatens citizen’s rights, as it did in the case of the law on Manipulation of the information.
This material was prepared within the framework of the project “Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Project”
[1] Айдай Токоева, “ Депутаты одобрили законопроект «О манипулировании информацией» во втором и третьем чтениях,” Kloop.kg, июнь 25, 2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/06/25/deputaty-odobrili-zakonoproekt-o-manipulirovanii-informatsiej-vo-vtorom-i-tretem-chteniyah/
[2] Перед зданием ЖК проходит пикет против принятия законопроекта «О манипулировании информацией»,” Радио Азаттык, июнь 25,2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30689588.html
[3] Дарья Подольская, “Закон о манипулировании информацией вернули в парламент. Возражение президента,” 24.kg, август 3,2020, https://24.kg/vlast/161462/
[4] Камила Баймуратов а, “Голосовали друг за друга: Как депутаты принимали законопроект «О манипулировании информацией»,”Kloop.kg,июнь26,2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/06/26/golosovali-drug-za-druga-kak-deputaty-prinimali-zakonoproekt-o-manipulirovanii-informatsiej/
[5] Айдай Токоева, “ Депутаты одобрили законопроект «О манипулировании информацией» во втором и третьем чтениях,” Kloop.kg, июнь 25, 2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/06/25/deputaty-odobrili-zakonoproekt-o-manipulirovanii-informatsiej-vo-vtorom-i-tretem-chteniyah/
[6] Результаты голосований, http://kenesh.kg/ru/article/list/11
[7] Протоколы голосований, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes#session=303
[8] Голосования в парламенте, https://votes.parliament.uk/
[9] Европейская комиссия за демократию через право, «О роли оппозиции в демократическом парламенте» (Страсбург, 15 ноября 2010 года), https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)025-ru
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Камила Баймуратова, “Голосовали друг за друга: Как депутаты принимали законопроект «О манипулировании информацией»,”Kloop.kg,июнь26,2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/06/26/golosovali-drug-za-druga-kak-deputaty-prinimali-zakonoproekt-o-manipulirovanii-informatsiej/
[14] Руслан Харизов, “Сразу несколько депутатов заявили, что не голосовали за закон о манипулировании,”24.kg,июнь 18, 2020, Ссылка: https://24.kg/obschestvo/156584/
[15] Анализ законодательной деятельности Жогорку Кенеша VI-созыва, Гражданская платформа, https://platforma.kg/our-priorities/parliamentarism-in-kr/analiz-zakonodatelnoj-deyatelnosti-zhogorku-kenesha-vi-sozyva/
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Парламентские законопроекты, https://bills.parliament.uk/?SearchTerm=&Session=0&BillType=&CurrentHouse=&BillStage=&BillSortOrder=0&Expanded=True
[19] Статистика и историческое сравнение, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics
[20] Анализ законодательной деятельности Жогорку Кенеша VI-созыва, Гражданская платформа, https://platforma.kg/our-priorities/parliamentarism-in-kr/analiz-zakonodatelnoj-deyatelnosti-zhogorku-kenesha-vi-sozyva/
[21] Ibid.
[22] Геррит Крол (Gerrit Krol), “Парламентская инициатива в авторитарных режимах:
разделение власти в евразийских законодательных органах (Parliamentary initiative in authoritarian regimes
power sharing in Eurasian legislatures),” The Journal of Legislative Studies26,no.2(2020):248-274, https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2020.1738671
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] https://freedomhouse.org/country/kyrgyzstan
This material was prepared within the framework of the project “Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Projec