“Despite similarities, the content of the “5+1″ format differ from each other, which is derived from the competition within the geopolitical triangle Russia-China-US” – Farrukh Khakimov, head of department of Development Strategy Center (Uzbekistan) analyzes the dynamics of regional development in Central Asia.
Central Asia has always been the focus of global and regional powers by virtue of its rich natural resources, strategic location, economic, transport, and logistic opportunities for development.
Uzbekistan having a shared border with all the Central Asian states (CAS), including Afghanistan, possesses a unique geopolitical advantage that allows it to influence political, security, and economic processes in the heart of Eurasia. Consequently, the Central Asian region has always been the main priority of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, as regional security and development are directly related to the country. Under the Strategy of Actions for 2017-2021, Uzbekistan has been actively implementing its regional policy to create a “security, stability and good neighborliness belt around Uzbekistan”[1] by shifting Central Asia into a region of opportunities.[2]
At the beginning of the global pandemic, the leadership of Uzbekistan has again demonstrated its commitment to regional cooperation and called for the joint response to COVID-19 in Central Asia. During the pandemic, CAS has supported the exchange of experience and information sharing to combat coronavirus infection, demonstrating regional solidarity against common challenges. Humanitarian assistance from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and then from Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan, has promoted regional cooperation and its benefits.[3]
The new dynamics of regional development in Central Asia
Since coming to power, the President of Uzbekistan Sh.Mirziyoyev has initiated extensive reforms in the country and also prioritized strengthening regional connectivity and international cooperation. Such a proactive regional strategy created a friendly climate of diplomacy among CAS. President Sh.Mirziyoyev’s initiative at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2017 to hold consultative meetings of Central Asian leaders was supported by his colleagues and two of such consultative meetings were held in Astana (March 2018) and Tashkent (November 2019). The third meeting due to the pandemic was postponed to 2021 and will be hosted by Turkmenistan.[4]
Because of Uzbekistan’s open and pragmatic policy towards Central Asian countries, regional connectivity and borders reopened; air, bus, and rail routes re-established and enriched with new directions; people-to-people connections were also facilitated, encouraging regional economic and trade relations.[5] As a result, the level of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region has notably improved. For instance, during 2017-2019, Uzbekistan’s total trade with CAS grew annually and reached $ 5.2 billion. According to the statistics, the amount was $ 5 billion in 2020 despite the global pandemic, whereas the share of CAS in the total trade turnover of Uzbekistan grew from 12.4 % (2019) to 13.6 % in 2020.[6]
At the same time, due to certain factors Central Asian countries apply different trade regimes to each other and their trade relations, including labor and capital movements are different. Consequently, dissimilar trade regimes affect and hinder more intensive cooperation and interaction between them.[7]
For example, current state of trade regimes as follows:
– Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as members of the Eurasian Economic Union benefit the common customs area;
– Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the World Trade Organization;
– CAS (except Turkmenistan) are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ free trade zone.
Although CAS practice bilateral agreements on regulating and stimulating mutual trade, there is high demand for unification of inter-regional trade regimes and economic relations, which subsequently would deepen regional trade and economic cooperation.
From this perspective, regional cross-border initiatives and projects such as the International Center for Trade and Economic Cooperation “Central Asia” (ICTEC) between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC), the Central Asia Investment Partnership have a potential to improve and boost bilateral trade-economic realtions and support multilateral efforts to strengthen regional engagement and cooperation. It is notable that the Central Asia Investment Partnership which has been launched by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and United States in January 2021 will attracte at least $ 1 billion over five years to increase economic connectivity in the region. Through the “C5+1” platform, the initiative will also advance opportunities for increasing trade, development, and connectivity to make each country in Central Asia stronger and more prosperous.[8]
Strengthening intra-regional trade and economic relations through above-mentioned regional initiatives and programs increase the attention of the world’s leading powers, interested in developing diversified relations with the countries of Central Asia as a single regional partner.
Emerging multilateral platforms of cooperation: 5 + 1
Following the recent positive changes in CAS with growing economies and increasing political strength and autonomy, the key international powers have increased their focus on Central Asian affairs.[9] For instance, the United States and the European Union have reviewed their strategy for Central Asia. On the other hand, traditional players such as Russia and China have also been striving to strengthen their cooperation through Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is worth mentioning that Central Asia is not only the subject of interest for global powers, and others like Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Iran, India and etc. All these external actors engaged in Central Asian geopolitics have their own and coinciding interests in the region.
The so-called “5+1” format of multilateral meetings includes the five Central Asian states (“5”) and an external partner country (“1”). The format serves as a diplomatic platform for regular dialogue through ministerial meetings at the foreign ministers’ level and expert-level forums that are occasionally organized.
The U.S. initiated “C5+1” format for cooperation was launched in Samarkand in November 2015 by five foreign ministers of CAS and the U.S. Secretary of State. Since then, several meetings have been organized, and the last two were virtual summits due to the global pandemic. During the previous virtual “C5+1” meeting on April 23, 2021, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized continued U.S. commitment to the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the CAS. He also highlighted the fifth anniversary of the “C5+1” and the 30th anniversary of the C5 countries’ independence. The U.S. Secretary of State and Foreign Ministers of CAS also discussed the Afghanistan peace process, COVID-19 recovery, and climate change.[10]
Basically, Japan was the first country to institute the “Central Asia – Japan” – “5+1” cooperative format at the ministerial level in 2004, followed by South Korea (2007), the E.U. (2008), and later on by others. Meanwhile, since 2017, external actors have also increased their attention to CAS through the “C5+1” multilateral platform. For instance, India in 2019, Russia, and China since 2020 have launched the “5+1” format.[11] Contrary to widespread assumptions on Russian and Chinese disfavor of such “5+1” platform, two have demonstrated their intention to enhance not only bilateral relations with CAS but also consider Central Asia as a single subject of international relations. By that time Moscow and Beijing had been implementing various multilateral cooperation projects through regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, EAEU, BRI, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, where some Central Asia countries were involved but not all-inclusive.
“The joint statement of foreign ministers of the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation on strategic areas of cooperation”[12] followed by “5+1” meetings can be viewed as a program document consolidating Russia’s somewhat modified approach to the region.[13]
In turn, on May 12, 2021, the second “Central Asia – China” (C5+C) foreign ministers meeting was held in Xi’an, China. Ministers discussed strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation, promoting transport interconnectedness and ensuring uninterrupted trade, deepening economic relations to ensure regional security, and jointly counter challenges. Special attention was also given to the situation in Afghanistan and the restoration of its socio-economic infrastructure.[14]
Although Central Asia has relative priority in the foreign policy strategy of the new administration, “over the past 30 years, with traceable consistency, US policy towards Central Asia was based on recognizing and supporting the independence of the region in its unity”[15] therefore “C5+1” can serve as an effective mechanism of cooperation with CAS for coming years to promote economic, investment, security, humanitarian and regional cooperation.
Whereas Chinese and Russia “5+1” format has been recently launched and is at the initial stage with more declarative and less practical results, however, it may bring positive outcomes depending on readiness of all sides for effective cooperation.
At the same time, the projects supported in the framework the “C5+1” format such as the CASA-1000 project and Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan – India Pipeline project have not been realized yet due to financial matters and security risks in Afghanistan.
Worth mentioning that Uzbekistan’s role and efforts in peaceful reconciliation processes in Afghanistan are essential based on its location, political and economic advantages. Despite political uncertainty following U.S. and NATO decisions on withdrawal of troops, Uzbekistan actively collaborates with regional and global partners to ensure regional stability. Moreover, Uzbekistan considers Afghanistan an integral part of Central Asia and promotes the country into regional economic processes and infrastructure projects by making sizeable achievements.[16] In this vein, “Uzbekistan – United States – Afghanistan” Trilateral meetings, “Uzbekistan – Japan – Afghanistan,” “Uzbekistan – China – Afghanistan” official discussions, and also involving Afghan delegations to important events such as a high-level international conference “Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity. Challenges and Opportunities,” “India – Central Asia” Dialogue,[17] and others highlight Uzbekistan’s constructive role in Afghan issues and Central Asian affairs. Indeed, today there is a need for a joint regional strategy and support for a peaceful settlement of the situation in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
The new format of multilateral cooperation of CAS – “5+1” format is considered a suitable mechanism for regular dialogue between CAS and their foreign partners to improve cooperation, consequently serving regional stability, economic and inclusive development.
At the same time, the formation of new formats and dialogue platforms between the regional and external actors increase the geopolitical and economic importance of Central Asia. On one hand “5+1” format is very convenient diplomatic platform for cooperation on other hand within the theoretical framework of “balancing regionalism” which also includes informal multilateral platforms and dialogues,[18] “5+1” is shared understanding of pursuing multi-vector foreign policy and the mechanism of balancing external influence of great powers. Furthermore, under current geopolitical developments and conditions, for CAS maintaining multipolar and balanced cooperation with foreign partners are essential. In this context, deepening regional collaboration is the crucial factor in enhancing the importance of Central Asia and addressing economic and security challenges for the region’s benefit.
[1] Official web-site of the President of Uzbekistan. The State Program for implementation of the National Action Strategy on five priority development areas 2017-2021 in The year of active investments and social development. Retrieved May 15, 2021, from https://president.uz/en/pages/view/strategy?menu_id=144
[2] Burnashev, R. (2021, April 26). Uzbekistan’s new course and the construction of Central Asia. Cabar.asia. https://cabar.asia/en/uzbekistan-s-new-course-and-the-construction-of-central-asia
[3] Rafiq, M. (2020, June 29). Post-Pandemic Central Asia: Opportunities and challenges, Daily Times. https://dailytimes.com.pk/633392/post-pandemic-central-asia-opportunities-and-challenges/
[4] Kun.uz. (2020, October, 23). Third meeting of Central Asian leaders may be postponed. https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/10/23/third-meeting-of-central-asian-leaders-may-be-postponed
[5] Uzdaily.uz. (2020, July 15). Central Asia – priority of foreign policy of Uzbekistan. https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/58469
[6] State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on statistics. (2020, January 22). Foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Uzbekistan. https://stat.uz/images/uploads/docs/tashqi_savdo_uz_22012021.pdf
[7] Kutbitdinov, Yu. (2020, June 19). Trade and economic cooperation of Central Asian countries during the pandemic, Review.uz. https://review.uz/post/centralnaya-aziya-v-prioritete-vneshney-politiki-uzbekistana
[8] Tulyakov, E. & Khakimov, F. (2021, May 13). Friendly Cooperation with Central Asian States – A Priority Direction of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=6023&lid=4147
[9] Hoagland, R., Wolkov, N., Schulz, D., & Cohen, J. (2021, April 28). Balanced Geopolitics: International Actors in Central Asia. https://www.caspianpolicy.org/balanced-geopolitics-international-actors-in-central-asia/
[10] U.S. Department of State. (2021, April 23). Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with the C5+1. https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-the-c51/
[11] Uza.uz. (2020, July 17). The First Central Asia – China Foreign Ministers Meeting. https://uza.uz/en/posts/the-first-central-asia-china-foreign-ministers-meeting-17-07-2020
[12] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2020, October 15). Statement by foreign ministers of the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation on strategic areas of cooperation. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4390973
[13] Djoomart Otorbaev, D. (2021, January 12). Do Russia and China Have Coordinated Strategies Towards Central Asia? https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/do-russia-and-china-have-coordinated-strategies/
[14] Kun.uz. (2021, May 12). Abdulaziz Kamilov takes part in second China – Central Asia Ministerial Meeting. https://kun.uz/en/news/2021/05/12/abdulaziz-kamilov-takes-part-in-second-china-central-asia-ministerial-meeting
[15] Tolipov, F. (2020, November 7). 5+1: The Math of Geopolitics in Central Asia. Cabar.asia. https://cabar.asia/en/5-1-the-math-of-geopolitics-in-central-asia
[16] Burnashev, R. (2021, April 26). Uzbekistan’s new course and the construction of Central Asia. Cabar.asia. https://cabar.asia/en/uzbekistan-s-new-course-and-the-construction-of-central-asia
[17] Embassy of Uzbekistan in New Delhi. (2019, January 15). Joint Statement on the outcome of the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Dialogue “India – Central Asia” with participation of Afghanistan. http://www.uzbekembassy.in/joint-statement-on-the-outcome-of-the-first-meeting-of-the-foreign-ministers-of-dialogue-india-central-asia-with-participation-of-afghanistan/
[18] Tskhay, A., & Costa Buranelli, F. (2020). Accommodating revisionism through balancing regionalism: The case of Central Asia. Europe-Asia Studies, 72(6), DOI:10.1080/09668136.2020.1779184