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ASEAN’s Relative Success in Regionalism Could Serve as one Model for Central Asia. An Interview

“A region-to-region dialogue mechanism, such as a C5+ASEAN, should therefore be set up for both regions to learn and understand more about each other, explore ways to expand cooperation, and help promote peace and prosperity in their respective regions” – says Dr. Paradorn Rangsimaporn in an interview to CABAR.asia analytical platform.


Dr. Paradorn Rangsimaporn

Dr. Paradorn Rangsimaporn is a Thai diplomat and independent researcher. He is Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission at the Royal Thai Embassy in Nur-Sultan, Republic of Kazakhstan, which also covers relations with the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan. He was also an Associate Research Fellow at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. He has published articles in peer-reviewed journals and policy briefs on Russian foreign policy towards Asia and Central Asia-Southeast Asia relations, as well as a book entitled “Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). He is currently working on a book on Central Asia’s relations with Southeast Asia, also to be published by Palgrave Macmillan. He holds a DPhil in International Relations and an MPhil in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford.

Which Southeast Asian countries are most interested in building partnerships with Central Asia? What unites the two regions, and how are they similar?

After the Central Asian states gained independence from the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, there was a surge of interest from both the newly independent Central Asian countries and the Southeast Asian countries to establish diplomatic relations and explore trade and economic opportunities. Countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia led the way in forging new ties with Central Asian states, viewing them as fellow Asians and, in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia, fellow Muslims that could be the base for forming special bonds between them. During the 1990s, Central Asian leaders, particularly Kazakhstan’s then President Nursultan Nazarbayev, were interested in learning from the “Asian” model of socio-economic development that was successfully implemented by Southeast Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia.

The Singaporean “economy first, politics second” developmental model resonated well with Central Asian leaders who tried to emulate it, albeit to varying success, the closest perhaps being Kazakhstan.
Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is also highly regarded as a role model by Central Asian leaders and elites, and is still held in high esteem. Later, in the 2000s-2010s, Vietnam (2008) and Thailand (2012) also showed growing interest in the region and opened up embassies in Kazakhstan, their only embassy located in Central Asia.

Despite both being sub-regions in Asia, Central Asia and Southeast Asia have not only been physically distant but also culturally and mentally. The Central Asian states’ long history of being part of the Soviet Union and before that the Russian Empire has meant that they have been very much exposed to Russian/Soviet culture and influence, which is very unfamiliar for most of the Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of Vietnam that had been close to the Soviet Union during the Cold War and had, and still have, several students studying in Russia and knowing the language. So, there is a large physical and cultural gap between the two regions that both sides are trying to bridge.

However, geopolitically they have much in common which both sides have perhaps yet to fully realise. Both regions consist of small to medium-sized states, or even arguably middle powers like Kazakhstan and Indonesia, that neighbour with great powers – Russia and China in Central Asia, and China in Southeast Asia. Both regions are also arenas for great-power competition, which has increasingly been the case in Southeast Asia where the US and China have become engaged in geostrategic competition and rivalry. Russia’s role in Southeast Asia is much less limited, being more of a distant power though it has tried to make inroads, most recently in Myanmar after the military coup in February 2021. Central Asia and Afghanistan, has also historically been seen as where the “Great Game” was played between the British and Russian empires and the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War. Post-Cold War, the term “Great Game” is still often used, or even overused, to describe the geostrategic situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan with new players arriving on the scene. With the recent US military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the collapse of the elected Afghan government, and the Taliban poised to take control over the whole of Afghanistan, the policies and roles of the great powers in Central Asia are being recalibrated in response to the Afghan situation. 

So, amidst these geostrategic competition between great powers in both Central Asia and Southeast Asia, the small to medium-sized states of both regions are united in how best to respond or survive in such circumstances. There have been several International Relations academic literatures on the Southeast Asian countries pursuing a hedging strategy – of neither balancing against nor bandwagoning with a particular power – although their success varies according to their size, resources, capabilities, intentions and circumstances. One could argue that the situation is similar in Central Asia where several of the region’s states are pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy to varying degrees; of trying to engage with all the great powers and players in their region, particularly in energy politics and security, by seeking multiple partners and pipeline routes to provide some strategic balancing and leverage vis-à-vis the great powers. The states of the two regions thus share the same aim of seeking to diversify their foreign relations to secure as many security, political and economic benefits as they can. They also seek to maximize their bargaining position while minimizing potential threats and challenges. The degree of success, of course varies, with larger more resourceful countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, and Indonesia, Vietnam and even small but highly resourceful Singapore, having arguably more success, while smaller and less resourceful states like Kyrgyzstan and Laos perhaps forced to be closer to a particular power.  

However, there are also important dissimilarities. In Southeast Asia, and particularly following the COVID-19 crisis, US-China rivalry is increasingly clear. But in Central Asia, the two main regional powers of Russia and China have strategic convergence and shared interests in resisting US global power, and have mostly cooperated with each other in Central Asia, including under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) framework. With the US role in Central Asia diminishing following its withdrawal from Afghanistan and potential overall retreat from the region, it remains to be seen whether Russia and China could still maintain their accommodation of each other’s interests in Central Asia, particularly in light of China’s growing economic influence and even security role in the region.        

What are the obstacles to building economic and other partnerships between the two regions? Do Southeast Asian countries have a conceptual vision of cooperation with Central Asian countries?

The main obstacles as noted above are the vast physical and cultural distances between the two regions. This has a significant bearing on the development of economic relations. The lack of good and economical transport and logistics links between the two regions has prevented trade from expanding and reaching its full potential.

The differences in business culture and the difficult business and investment climate in Central Asia, even in Kazakhstan which is the most developed economy, are further obstacles to economic partnerships.
 This is particularly true for countries like Thailand whose businesses are more risk-averse than Malaysia or Singapore that have been more successful in making economic inroads and investments in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Vietnam has also been successful in expanding trade with Kazakhstan after its conclusion of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015. Singapore became the second Southeast Asian country to sign a FTA with the EAEU in 2019, though it is still too early to see the results. Other Southeast Asian countries are trying to follow suit with Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia all signing a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), which is the EAEU’s regulatory body. Out of the three, Indonesia is poised to become the next country to sign a FTA with the EAEU due to its attractively large market of more than 270 million people.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also providing an opportunity to expand trade between the two regions. In 2019, Vietnam again led the way by transporting its goods for the first time by train through China, Kazakhstan and onwards to Europe, ending in Duisburg, Germany, taking 22 days. Vietnam and Kazakhstan have also successfully utilized Kazakhstan’s special terminal at China’s Lianyungang port, which is connected to Kazakhstan’s Khorgos dry port on the border with China, to transport their products. Other Southeast Asian countries like Thailand are interested in exploring this route as well, though Thai businesses that have tried to use this route have often experienced problems on the Chinese side of the border with Kazakhstan, with preference given to Chinese goods, thereby delaying Thai shipments which are often perishable products like fruits and vegetables. It may be therefore necessary to explore other alternative routes, the potentially nearest is India’s proposed North-South transport corridor. But this runs through Afghanistan where the deteriorating situation has made this route less attractive and feasible.     

Southeast Asian countries do not yet have a shared conceptual vision of cooperation with Central Asian countries and might even compete in some areas of trade and investment. Nearly all the Southeast Asian countries (except for Timor-Leste) are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and try to act together within this body in managing relations with other major external partners such as China, Japan and South Korea within the ASEAN+3 framework, as well as other dialogue partners such as the US and Russia. However, there is no such dialogue framework with Central Asian states, though this should be seriously explored. The five Central Asian states themselves have similar dialogue formats – the C5+1 – with external partners such as the US, Japan, South Korea, India and even recently Russia and China. Indeed, the first C5+1 dialogue format was proposed by Japan in 2004 and was based on the ASEAN+3 model. So, both sides are familiar with such a mechanism and should initiate establishing it as a framework for enhancing region-to-region cooperation.      

One of the most important tasks for Central Asia is to build its own regional cooperation. In what areas can Central Asia learn from the successful experience of ASEAN?

The geostrategic similarities of the two regions have already been noted. ASEAN was established in 1967 to accelerate socio-economic development of the region and to promote regional peace and cooperation, but was also prompted by the common fear of communism. With the end of the Cold War, ASEAN gradually expanded in the 1990s to encompass all the then remaining Southeast Asian countries. ASEAN had proven adept at engaging with all the major powers involved in the region and to avoid being seen as overly dependent on one particular power. It had also been a key driving force for Asia-Pacific regionalism such as the forming of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asian Summit (EAS). ASEAN’s relative success in regionalism could therefore serve as one model for Central Asia. There has been increasing movement towards an exclusive Central Asian regionalism, which does not involve the role of external powers, since the change in Uzbekistan’s leadership in late 2016 that ushered in a new era of openness and engagement with its regional neighbours. To date, three Central Asian “Summits” have been held, the latest in Turkmenistan this August, signaling greater dialogue and cooperation between the region’s leaders. Some Central Asian experts have highlighted ASEAN’s suitability due to the two regions’ similarities, namely both being composed of small to medium sized states with varying levels of economic development and political authoritarianism that have to deal with great-power competition and dynamics. Central Asian leaders also subscribe to the ASEAN principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, principles of consensus-based decision-making, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

ASEAN’s relative success in regionalism could therefore serve as one model for Central Asia.

Therefore, the ASEAN experience can help Central Asian states develop their own form of regionalism namely by the following. Firstly, by providing a model for the Central Asian states to act together in dealing with external powers and to withstand their pressure. Indeed, the C5+1 format was modelled on the ASEAN experience and is already used by the Central Asian states with several major powers. Secondly, as a model for community building and socio-economic cooperation and joint development. The ASEAN countries are much more diverse than Central Asian states in terms of socio-economic development, historical experience, ethnicity, culture, religion and political structures. But, despite this, they have achieved a certain level of community building and integration, at their own pace. Thirdly, the so-called “ASEAN way” or principles mentioned above can readily be applied to the Central Asian states whose leaders are comfortable with such principles and already familiar with them in the context of the SCO that has similar principles in its Charter. This can therefore be another area for engagement and cooperation between the two regions.             

As you know, the CA region, bordering China, is heavily influenced by its eastern neighbor. How are Southeast Asian countries building relations with China and what kind of approaches are used in this regard?

As noted earlier, the Southeast Asian countries are seen as trying to pursue a “hedging” strategy vis-à-vis the great powers by both accommodating and resisting them in accordance with their interests. But their success varies according to their size, resources, capabilities, intentions and circumstances. Some countries have found it difficult to maintain a balance in its relations with all major powers, notably China and the US. They have found it easier to move closer to China which has provided more economic incentives through its BRI project and, unlike the US, also conveniently refrained from political criticism of those more authoritarian Southeast Asian states. The US under President Trump had also mostly neglected Southeast Asia while ratcheting up the tension and competition with China, thereby creating a situation wherein Southeast Asian states are increasingly forced to choose sides. It remains to be seen whether Southeast Asia would move up in President Biden’s list of foreign policy priorities, especially given his focus on China.

But Southeast Asia is a key theatre for US-China geostrategic competition and some analysts have seen the US military withdrawal from Afghanistan as leading to possibly greater commitment to Southeast Asia instead.

Like in Central Asia, each of the Southeast Asian states have different interests and approaches to China. While Southeast Asia plays a key role in China’s BRI, particularly its “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” component, not all Chinese investments and influence are necessarily welcomed in all countries. Moreover, the issue of the South China Sea is a particularly contentious one for China’s relations with the Southeast Asian states that are also claimants, and is an area where US-China tensions can heighten. Most mainland Southeast Asian states, on the other hand, are less concerned and more welcoming of Chinese trade and investments, particularly in transport infrastructure. Growing US-China rivalry, and recently the Myanmar issue, have posed challenges to ASEAN unity and centrality that Central Asian countries can draw lessons from in their pursuance of regional cooperation and regionalism and in how they manage their relations with China.      

As you know, the countries of Southeast Asia are quite successful in terms of modernization, building secular political systems, including in the fight against corruption. Can the two regions build bridges in these directions?

Not all Southeast Asian countries have been successful in these areas but the ones that have can certainly assist the Central Asian states in these directions. As noted earlier, the Singapore model has often been seen by Central Asian leaders and elites as the model to emulate. Kazakhstan, in particular, has tried to follow Singapore in socio-economic reform and development, education and human resources development. Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna wealth management fund was created based on Singapore’s Temasek holding company, while Nazarbayev’s idea of granting “Bolashak” (the future) scholarships to gifted Kazakhstani students to study abroad also came from Singapore’s experience. However, due to significant differences between the two countries, not least Kazakhstan’s non-diversified economy that relies heavily on energy resources, Kazakhstan’s emulation of Singapore’s socio-economic development model achieved at best mixed results. On its part, Singapore has also been very active in the field of education and training in Central Asian states, notably in Kazakhstan but also in Uzbekistan and recently in Tajikistan where a branch of the Management Development Institute of Singapore (MDIS) is being set up in Dushanbe.

Are there any promoted projects that can enhance the cooperation between Central Asia and Southeast Asia?

There are no substantial promoted projects as such on the part of both Central Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Both sides are more focused on promoting bilateral ties rather than on region-to-region cooperation. The projects of external powers, namely China’s BRI and Russia’s EAEU, can serve to attract greater interest and cooperation between the two regions, particularly in the economic sphere as already noted. While the countries of both regions see each other’s region as large and untapped markets for each other’s goods, weak transport and logistics links, and the relatively unstable and unfavourable business climate in Central Asia remain the biggest obstacle to further trade and investment. Southeast Asia is also not a priority foreign policy direction for Central Asian states, and vice versa. While the Central Asian states are keen to diversify their foreign partners and lessen their dependence on China, particularly in the economic field, within Asia, they look more towards Japan, South Korea, India, and the Gulf states than to Southeast Asia. More Southeast Asian trade and investments in Central Asia would certainly be welcomed, but there remain too many obstacles and perhaps a lack of political will and interest on both sides. This is a pity as there is much potential benefits from enhancing cooperation between the two regions and both can share their experiences and learn from each other given their similar geostrategic and geoeconomic circumstances. A region-to-region dialogue mechanism, such as a C5+ASEAN, should therefore be set up for both regions to learn and understand more about each other, explore ways to expand cooperation, and help promote peace and prosperity in their respective regions.


The views expressed herein are his own and do not represent those of the Royal Thai Government or any other organization.


 

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