Tajikistan-Iran: New Trends Against the Background of a Change of Government in Afghanistan

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After the Taliban (an organization banned in Tajikistan) came to power in Afghanistan, the focus in the geopolitics of all of Central Asia shifted, which led to an increase in Iran’s role in the region, mentioned Rustami Sukhrob, candidate of political sciences. In his opinion, the Tajik authorities should take this factor into account and strengthen cooperation with Tehran.

The United States and its Western allies who have left the region do not want to return to Afghanistan under any pretext. The Western world has come to terms with the ineffectiveness of a twenty-year period of huge financial infusion and human losses on both sides.

In this regard, Iran’s influence in the region will grow at an accelerated pace, and Dushanbe will take this trend into account. Without a doubt, Iran will establish itself among those regional powers that decide to take the place of the United States in the new Afghanistan. Thus, with a possible new aggravation of relations between Iran and Tajikistan, Tehran will most likely be able to use its influence in Kabul to exert pressure on Dushanbe.

The rise to power of the Taliban in Kabul has the following consequences for the Central Asian countries in general, and Tajikistan, in particular:

– Due to its geographical location near Afghanistan, Tajikistan has become an object of discussion among world and regional powers and has attracted international attention around it. One of the reasons for this attention is the longest state border with Afghanistan among the Central Asian countries. The problem is that this border is very vulnerable and poorly defended. In addition, the Tajik army is practically not equipped with modern weapons. Given the fact that it is impossible to predict how the Taliban will behave in relation to their neighbors, Tajikistan must be ready to develop various scenarios.

Therefore, Tajikistan should strengthen its relations with Iran and find a compromise with it on Afghanistan, considering the fact that Tehran has a certain influence in Afghan society and leverage over the new authorities in Kabul:

1) more than 3 million (9-10% of the country’s population) Shiites-Hazaras live on the territory of Afghanistan, who have a common faith and language with Iran.

2) Iran is Afghanistan’s largest trading partner in 2019 and ranks first in imports of goods to Afghanistan with 1.24 billion USD.

3) To promote “soft power” among the youth of Afghanistan, Tehran began to build universities and open branches of its leading universities in Afghanistan. For example, the largest Islamic university in Kabul “Islamic University of Hatam al Nabi’in”, a branch of Azad University. In addition, at the end of 2018, 19 thousand Afghan students studied at the universities of Iran.

4) Iran finances and controls popular print media in Afghanistan such as Ensaf, Roshd, Ansar, TV companies Tamadon, Nur, Rah-e Farda and Negah.

The president of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon at a meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Mahdum Kureishi announced his refusal to recognize Taliban rule in Afghanistan. President Rahmon argued his refusal by the fact that there are no ethnic Tajiks in the new government. In this regard, the Tajik leadership stressed the need to create an inclusive government in Afghanistan, including representatives of Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and other nations living in the territory of this country.

The situation with Iran’s position on the above issue is even more complicated. On the one hand, Tehran is forging relations with the Taliban, on the other, it speaks out for creating an inclusive government. This approach of the Iranian authorities complicates mutual understanding with the Tajik leadership. The best solution to this issue is negotiations at the highest level. Iran needs to take into account the position of Dushanbe on the issue of non-recognition of the new government in Kabul. By recognizing the Taliban, the Tajik leadership can set a precedent for the radical part of the Tajik opposition, which has long wanted the creation of an Islamic republic. In addition, support from the Tajik leadership of the Northern Alliance headed by Ahmad Masoud is also directly related to the country’s security (the Northern Alliance is a buffer zone between Tajikistan and the Taliban movement).

What can the authorities of these countries offer to each other 

At the political level:

1. a) Tajikistan can contribute to the integration of Iran into various regional and international organizations where “entry” for Tehran is prohibited for various reasons (Western sanctions, the disagreement of some Arab countries). A positive example can be Tajikistan’s support  for Iran’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

It should be noted that back in 2005 Iran received observer status in the SCO, and in 2008 applied for full membership in this organization. According to the SCO charter, a country under sanctions cannot join the organization and therefore the door to the SCO was closed for Iran. In 2015, the sanctions against Iran were lifted and it seemed that Tehran would soon become a full-fledged member of the SCO. Unexpectedly for Iran, the next obstacle was Tajikistan, which began to pursue an anti-Iranian policy and in every possible way prevented Iran from joining the SCO (a more detailed description is given below).

1. b) In addition, Tajikistan can become a driver for closer cooperation between Iran and the Central Asian countries. Although, the possibilities of Tajikistan, considering its economic potential and its degree of influence in the region, cannot be exaggerated. 
2. c) Also, Tajikistan can become an important partner in the UN, supporting Iran. In exchange, Iran can become a guarantor of Tajikistan’s security (by the example of Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan). Tajikistan on favorable terms can provide its uranium deposits to Iran, with the proviso that uranium will be used only for peaceful purposes and with the participation and control of representatives of the IAEA.

at the economic level:

1. a) countries need to restore trade when Iran was one of the five importing countries of Tajikistan.
2. b) Tajikistan needs to stop the practice of creating artificial barriers for goods imported from Iran. In 2015, Tajikistan urgently suspended the import ofalmost all types of goods from Iran. The Customs Service of the Republic of Tajikistan argued its decision as follows: 1. the restrictions are associated with the low quality of Iranian products (dry tea, poultry, and minced chicken); 2. Absence of markings in the Tajik language (Cyrillic) on the goods. In this case, the question arises, why, for so many years, the Customs Service of the Republic of Tajikistan did not make claims against Iranian manufacturers and did not require marking of goods in the Tajik language?
3. c) Tajikistan can provide a special free trade zone for Iranian investors who are interested in setting up various kinds of enterprises in the country. In turn, this will lead to the creation of new jobs and the development of many industries in the country, as well as competition with Chinese investors, which will also have a positive effect on the country’s economy.

Iran has all the necessary resources for the construction of enterprises on the territory of Tajikistan in the mining sector. If we compare the economic potentials of Iran and China, then the comparison will not be in favor of the former. It is clear that at the first stage Iran will not be able to impose competition on China, but the very fact of Iran’s economic presence in Tajikistan can become a positive impetus towards reducing China’s role as an economic hegemon in the country.

1. d) Tajikistan can use Iranian ports as one of the alternative routes for transporting its goods to the countries of the Middle East and the EU.
2. e) in the long term, it is possible that Iran and Tajikistan will agree on the construction of the Iran-Tajikistan gas pipeline. Thus, Dushanbe will have an alternative from Uzbek and Russian gas.

 at the citizen level: a) countries can establish a visa-free regime, thereby simplifying the entry/exit of citizens of both countries. Since this summer, flights to Iran have resumed, now the Iranian airline Voris operates one flight a week from Dushanbe to Mashhad.

Thus, a visa-free regime will lead to the development of civil aviation and an increase in air flights between countries. b) Iran may become an attractive country for Tajik labor migrants.

Table 1 below shows a comparison of the GDP of both countries, where Iran surpasses Tajikistan by all parameters by a clear margin. The Ministry of Labor, Migration and Employment of the Population of Tajikistan, together with colleagues from Iran, needs to prepare a roadmap for Tajik labor migrants wishing to work in Iran; c) in the field of education, countries can conclude agreements on the allocation of quotas for admission to universities in both countries.

Trade turnover between Tajikistan and Iran 

The main trading partners of Tajikistan are Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Italy, Turkmenistan, and the USA. In 2020, Tajikistan’s exports to Iran amounted to only 6.2 million US dollars, while imports were 29.1 million USD. In general, trade with Iran accounted for 1.1% of Tajikistan’s total trade turnover.

To what has been mentioned earlier, it should be added that in the period from 2007 to 2019, investments were attracted from 63 countries of the world in the economy of Tajikistan. Paradoxically, China takes the first place in terms of investments – 2 billion 863.6 million US dollars (types of services: communications, construction, financial services, geological exploration and production, installation of technical equipment, industry, and others). Iran occupies a modest eighth place – 281.8 million US dollars (types of services: industry, construction, financial services, trade). In percentage terms, Beijing’s share is 29%, and Tehran’s share is 2.9% of the total percentage of investments in the Tajik economy.

Internal and external factors that are constraining the cooperation

• Different political regimes – in Iran, a theocratic regime of the Muslim spirituality (Islamic republic) has been established, and Tajikistan, according to the Constitution, is a secular republic with a democratic regime. The heterogeneity of political regimes complicates relations between countries, in particular Dushanbe, having a sad experience of civil war, where a violent attempt was made to create an Islamic republic. Tajik authorities have periodically accused Iran of supporting the Tajik opposition and training anti-government militants. As a result, the leadership of Tajikistan is wary of the influence of the Iranian regime on the citizens of their country.
• One Islam, different streams – the population of Iran for the most part professes Shiite Islam. As for the citizens of Tajikistan, they are Sunni Muslims (with the exception of the residents of GBAO, where the majority of the population is Ismaili). The Tajik authorities declare support for the ideology of moderate Islam of the Sunni trend – Hanafiya. The country’s leadership, like many other states in the region, does not want other Islamic currents to enter the country. The aim of most of them is to undermine the current state system and create an “Islamic Caliphate”.
• The factor of Saudi Arabia, which has its influence in Tajikistan. Riyadh is the enemy of Shiite Iran. The Saudis are not interested in improving relations between Dushanbe and Tehran, so Riyadh is making every effort (financing the construction of mosques, providing grants, loans, etc.) to prevent the strengthening of Iran’s role in Central Asia.
• Visa regime – established between Iran and the Republic of Tajikistan. This factor is a serious obstacle in bilateral relations between countries, in particular for business representatives and ordinary citizens. Until 2016, there was a so-called “airport visa” between the countries, when citizens of both states had the opportunity to apply for a visa upon arrival at the airport. However, since 2016, the Tajik side has changed the format for obtaining a visa for Iranian citizens. Further, Iranian citizens could obtain a Tajik visa directly at the embassy or consulate of Tajikistan in Iran. Reception in Iran of the leader of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan – worsened relations between Dushanbe and Tehran. The leader of the IRPT, Muhiddin Kabiri, has been in exile abroad since 2015. This is due to the fact that the Supreme Court of Tajikistan recognized his opposition party as a terrorist organization and banned its activities on the territory of the republic. In December 2015, Muhiddin Kabiri was invited by the official Tehran to the international conference “Islamic Unity”. Subsequently, Muhiddin Kabiri met with the spiritual leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Soon Dushanbe accused Tehran of supporting and recognizing terrorist organizations and their leaders banned in Tajikistan.

Recommendations

In conclusion, we offer small recommendations (roadmap), which, in our opinion, will help to remove barriers and strengthen relations between Iran and Tajikistan:

• RT and Iran should begin work on the introduction of a visa-free regime on a reciprocal basis. There are reasons to assume that this may carry certain risks, primarily for Tajikistan, especially given the fact that the population of Iran is several times larger than the population of Tajikistan. However, let us note that the Iranians have been able to enter Armenia and Azerbaijan without visas for several years and this does not create any special problems for the latter countries.  
• Both countries should not hinder bilateral trade, but rather encourage and offer benefits and preferences for entrepreneurs of the two countries.  
• Tehran is recommended to cooperate only with the official government of Tajikistan and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country.
• It would be advisable to re-discuss the idea of creating a joint television and radio channel;
• Iran can be recommended to invest in the economy of Tajikistan and resume participation in the construction and implementation of large-scale projects in Tajikistan, considering the positive and negative experience of previous projects (Istiklol tunnel, Sangtuda-2 HPP).
• NGOs and civil society (writers, poets, athletes, artists, etc.) of both countries need to conduct joint activities for cultural integration between Tajikistan and Iran.
• Iran, on mutually beneficial terms, can provide Tajikistan with unhindered and duty-free access to its ports on the Persian Gulf (Chabahar, Bandar Abbas and others).
• It would be advisable for both countries to coordinate their further actions regarding Afghanistan.

Dushanbe and Tehran should not forget about the previous experience of cooperation and centuries-old cultural ties. Including the fact that Iran was one of the first to recognize the independence of Tajikistan and the first to open an embassy on the territory of Tajikistan. Iran, along with Russia, was a guarantor country during the conclusion of a peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, represented by president Emomali Rahmon, and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), represented by Said Abdullo Nuri.

Main photo: Press service of the President of Tajikistan.