In the foreign press lately, the Central Asian countries have been increasingly mentioned in the context of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. However, in the region itself, no less important and interesting processes are taking place.
Spying on high-ranking Kazakh officials and oligarchs
The OCCRP article tells about an Israeli-made spyware program that was used to spy on world leaders, including top officials in Kazakhstan. Among them are the current President of Kazakhstan Kassym Zhomart-Tokayev, the former Prime Minister of the country Bakytzhan Sagintayev, and the current Prime Minister Askar Mamin. In addition to them, the list also includes the names of at least four major Kazakhstani politicians, including the name of a close friend of Nazarbayev.
Politicians’ phone numbers were among 92 of the 2000 leaked numbers associated with Kazakhstan. Experts believe the numbers were chosen for tracking by “Pegasus”, a sophisticated spy tool developed by the Israeli surveillance company “NSO Group”. The operator of the software appears to be the government of Kazakhstan.
Among the most famous names chosen for surveillance is Bulat Utemuratov, once the richest man in Kazakhstan and a close friend and advisor to Nazarbayev. His number appears in the data – along with his wife, two sons and several employees.
The list also includes Alibek Kulibayev, the nephew of Nazarbayev’s son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, and two of his personal assistants.
Among the names chosen is Mukhtar Ablyazov, a fugitive opposition leader and former head of Kazakhstan’s BTA Bank, who is accused by the government of embezzling billions from the treasury. A well-known opponent of the regime has been living in France for nine years.
The list for Kazakhstan also includes telephone numbers belonging to a number of other high-ranking officials, including regional governors, former and current ministers and heads of state-owned companies.
Dozens of figures indicate that the state practically spied on the entire Nazarbayev regime from top to bottom, and, most likely, from their own security services.
NSO Group constantly states that their software is sold only to national governments and only for the purpose of spying on criminals. The company declined to confirm or deny whether the Kazakh government was their client and said it did not have access to its clients’ records except in cases of abuse.
Cosmetic reform of akim elections in Kazakhstan
On July 25, in many villages of Kazakhstan, elections were held for akims of cities of district significance, heads of local executive bodies of settlements and villages. The online magazine The Diplomat told about the features of these elections.
Earlier on May 25 this year, the President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev, issued a decree allowing direct elections of akims of villages throughout the country. The decree marks the latest step in a long, slow process of loosening of helm of state of local government in Kazakhstan. Back in April 2013, the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, achieved the election of akims of villages indirectly by local representative bodies, and the candidates were selected by the heads of districts. Prior to this, village akims were appointed from the center, as in the case of akims of large cities and higher administrative units.
The author of the material notes that in Kazakhstan, where the Nur-Otan party has long dominated the sphere of controlled competition, these local elections say little about the viability of opposition parties. Although only 38 percent of candidates from political parties ran, many independent candidates had problems with registration. As a result, about 85 percent of the winners of local elections – 627 candidates – are members of the ruling Nur-Otan party. The ruling party posted on its Facebook page that another 65 independent candidates who won the elections are affiliated with the party, which means that the Nur-Otan party almost completely won the local elections.
As the author notes, direct elections of rural akims are another example of cosmetic reform carried out in the name of Tokayev’s “hearing state”. Similar to the reform of the law on peaceful assembly, passed in June 2020, which only slightly eased restrictions while maintaining the state’s ability to restrict the freedom of assembly of Kazakhstanis, direct elections of rural akims look like an important step towards democratization without actually changing the essence of local governance and political participation.
Moscow concerned about Ankara’s neo-Ottomanism
The Iranian outlet Javan writes about Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions, influence and shadow cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. In particular, the Iranian media gives an example of the disappearance in Bishkek in May 2021 of Orhan Inandi, a citizen of both Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, director of a network of Turkish educational institutions. The incomprehensible disappearance of Inandi and the lack of any information about him caused a wave of discontent and protests in Bishkek and in other countries. His fate was unknown until the Turkish security service announced on July 5 that the abducted person had been taken to Turkey. A little later, Turkish President Erdogan also confirmed that Inandi was forcibly returned to Turkey as a result of a special operation.
After that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan handed a note of protest to the Turkish Ambassador to Bishkek. Many started talking about the fact that Turkey’s activities on the territory of the “junior partners of Ankara” in the Central Asian region have too many shadow sides, they went “too far” and should be very thoroughly investigated, if not stopped at all. In fact, after all the official statements and comments that appeared, as well as the protests that took place in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, many questions arise about what happened.
In other words, “Turkey shady role” in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan, has already become so noticeable that the country does not even consider itself responsible for the incident with Inandi. Some analysts believe that this shadow role will only deepen in the future, and will undoubtedly pose a serious challenge to traditional Russian influence.
The last phase of the Karabakh conflict also showed other member states of the Cooperation Council of the Turkic-speaking countries of the Central Asian region that they, like Azerbaijan, could more actively develop military cooperation with Ankara in the hope of obtaining relatively cheap, but at the same time sufficiently modern weapons. This already poses a tangible threat to Moscow, whose privilege throughout the past years has actually remained the only supplier of weapons to these states. A number of commentators and analysts are inclined to interpret the recent meeting in early April 2021 between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Turkmen counterpart, Rashid Meredov, precisely in this vein – as an attempt by Moscow to prevent Turkey’s new opportunities to strengthen its influence in Central Asia, this time through arms export. That is, indirectly, in fact, the latest events in Nagorno-Karabakh and the situation with the “abduction” of a Turkish and at the same time a Kyrgyz citizen can become the very bridge to a new strengthening of Turkey’s influence “on the other side of the Caspian”, which it had recently had to abandon in favor of China.
However, there is another circumstance, which in this connection should also not be forgotten: the relationship between the elites can really be so “trusting” and “special”, but the protests in Bishkek in connection with the kidnapping of Orkhan Inanda, which were discussed at the beginning of the article, show that that not everyone in the republic is satisfied with the “shadow role of Turkey”, which experts say. To this we can add something else: Moscow, no less than Ankara, has leverage over the political elites of the Turkic-speaking states of the region, which it also has the opportunity to use if it feels that some other force will pose a threat or challenge its traditional interests in Central Asia.
Wave of COVID-19 hits the elite of Tajikistan
The Washington Post in an article about the epidemiological situation in Tajikistan, tells about the surge in the incidence of COVID-19 in the country. The article says the latest wave of coronavirus, initially denied by the authorities, has hit wealthy and powerful families in Tajikistan.
The Washington Post, citing the Tajik media, writes that the disease has even affected family members of the country’s president. In particular, after the sister of the President of Tajikistan died in hospital from the COVID-19 virus, her three sons attacked and beat the country’s Minister of Health and a senior doctor. Their indignation was aroused by the conclusion of foreign experts that the method of treating the patient by Tajik doctors was wrong. The incident came just weeks after the death of President Emomali Rahmon’s mother-in-law, who was also reportedly infected with COVID-19.
The government has faced criticism for denial and inaction following the spread of the coronavirus in the country last year, as well as for the authorities’ failure to stem a new catastrophic wave of infections. When COVID-19 spread across the region early last year, health authorities denied for months that the disease was even present within Tajikistan.
In recent months, the government has said it has won the battle against the coronavirus, despite reports of an increase in cases increasing on social media. When authorities denied a new spike in incidence before mid-June, some in Tajikistan began posting their positive test results online, while clinics reported dozens of positive cases daily.
At the end of July, the United States delivered 1.5 million doses of Moderna vaccine to Tajikistan. According to the Tajik health authorities, 460,000 of the 9.3 million people in the country have already been vaccinated.
Tajikistan on the front line
The Washington Post wonders why the growing chaos in Afghanistan worries the leaders of Tajikistan and Russia. In the wake of a spike in fighting in northern Afghanistan, the country’s Central Asian neighbors are struggling to prevent the conflict from spreading across borders as the US withdrawal draws to a close. Russia is also watching with dismay the region that Moscow views as part of its sphere of influence.
Tajikistan’s 1,350-kilometer border with Afghanistan has long been a problem. For decades, it was the main drug smuggling route, with traffickers plying through narrow mountain passes or bribing low-paid border guards.
For years, Russia has been worried about the influx of Islamic State extremists and drugs into the region. Russia deployed its forces along the border until 2005 and, according to some analysts, wants to regain its grip.
Russia regards this region as its legitimate political orbit. Putin is likely to resist any new US military presence in Central Asia after leaving Afghanistan amid reports that Washington hopes to deploy its forces there.
The Biden administration has already asked the leaders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to temporarily house Afghan families with members who have worked with the United States as translators, drivers, or others.
The Russian outlet Octagon Media devoted the material to the same topic, which claims that the authorities of Russia and Tajikistan no longer express duty concerns, but, on the contrary, in recent days, have directly stated about the threat emanating from the Afghan side. The problem lies not so much in the direct attack of the militants on the border territories, which, incidentally, is also not excluded, but in the uncontrolled passage of tens of thousands of refugees, among whom various terrorist elements can creep in. However, according to the Russian edition, refugees are only part of the trouble. The main reason for the serious worries of the Tajik leadership is the factor of domestic Islamism. Against the background of the successes of the reviving Afghan caliphate, the population of not the most prosperous Tajikistan, with its policy of opposing various Sharia norms, is watching with interest the “mujahideen” on the other bank of the Panj River. Moreover, in a literal sense, since the Taliban have already seized almost the entire Tajik-Afghan state border.
Central Asia and Afghanistan: old fears and actors, new games
The analytical outlet RUSI writes about the role of the SCO in achieving peace in Afghanistan. It is noted that despite the fact that the SCO was created as a tool that could, among other things, help in coordinating the search for answers to the problems emanating from Afghanistan, the organization ultimately failed to cope with this task.
Beijing sought to nudge the SCO into action in Afghanistan by including that country as an observer member and facilitating the creation of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Ultimately, Beijing switched to establishing bilateral relations with different partners in Afghanistan rather than through the SCO.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent tour of the region underscored this approach. He attended the SCO summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, stopped in Tashkent for a regional security conference, and ended his trip in Ashgabat. In each country, the Chinese minister held high-level bilateral talks and spoke in vague terms about joint work on Afghanistan, paying special attention to border security and cooperation with this country. No clear or new answers were offered in the SCO format.
At the same time, the United States participated in a number of events in the region. On the eve of the Tashkent Conference on Central and South Asia, the United States held its last C5 + 1 session, which was attended by the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries and a senior US representative who attended the conference. The final statement adopted at the meeting focused on Afghanistan, emphasizing the desire to encourage trade ties, improve regional ties with Afghanistan and ensure that this country does not pose a threat to C5 + 1 or other states.
Seeking to underline its special foreign diplomacy, Uzbekistan has also been able to forge ties with the United States in creating a new Afghanistan-Pakistan-US-Uzbekistan regional quadrangle grouping to support the Afghanistan-Peace Process and Post-Settlement. However, what this means in practice remains unclear, as many of the statements repeat what has already been stated earlier. The United States is a major investor in Central Asia, but the Americans have not yet shown much strategic attention to the region.
Not to be left out, Russia has also stepped into the game, generously offering the United States access to its bases in the region – a move that underscores Moscow’s habit of forgetting that Central Asian states are now independent.
But at the same time, Russia announced military exercises with Uzbek and Tajik forces near the borders of the two states with Afghanistan, which was met with enthusiasm by the Central Asian countries. Following the recent escalation of hostilities in Afghanistan, Tajikistan has called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian structure that seeks to preserve some of the security ties that existed in Soviet times, to come to its aid. While it is unclear whether the organization will respond on its own, Moscow has shown a willingness to help Dushanbe by increasing its capabilities, particularly at its military base in the country near the border with Afghanistan.
Unique kleptocracy
The Western outlet Inkstick in the longread “Unique Kleptocracy of Turkmenistan” describes the models of toxic kleptocracy in Turkmenistan and how the international is involved in it. For example, Deutsche Bank, the largest bank in Germany and one of the leading financial institutions in the world, owns bank accounts in Turkmenistan and, despite requests, refuses to provide information on why the bank does business with one of the most violent and repressive regimes in the world.
Until recently, international financial institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, played along with the financial fictions of Turkmenistan. They published economic statistics such as annual GDP in dollars and data on the Turkmen government’s hydrocarbon sector exports, without critically analyzing the data. According to 2015 statistics, Turkmenistan’s foreign exchange reserves amounted to $ 35 billion. This does not explain the serious ongoing economic crisis in the country, in which basic consumer goods are difficult to obtain and the foreign exchange market has collapsed.
China’s new dominance in Turkmenistan
The American think tank Jamestown Foundation reports that Turkmenistan’s long-standing neutrality excludes the country from Russia’s regional security mechanisms, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which limited the level of influence Moscow could have in this closed Central Asian republic.
However, there are signals that China is now emerging as the dominant foreign power in Turkmenistan. The reasons for Beijing’s growing influence are varied. Firstly, this is China’s active participation in the gas sector of Turkmenistan and transit routes through this country between China and Europe. Other factors include the rapidly growing Taliban threat to the Central Asian region; Ashgabat’s readiness to support China in Xinjiang, because, unlike other Central Asian countries, the country does not have a persecuted diaspora there; and Beijing’s growing interest in expanding its economic participation in the region through security cooperation.
China’s new role in Turkmenistan was confirmed by the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Ashgabat in mid-July 2021. The agenda of the visit, which had been planned well in advance, quickly shifted from economic issues to security measures.
The long-standing division of labor between Russia and China in Central Asia, where Russia still provides security and China offers investment, appears to be undergoing fundamental changes, and this shift suggests that China is now becoming the main external power in Turkmenistan. This trend reflects the convergence of interests between them. From the point of view of Turkmenistan, since Ashgabat is not a member of the SCO or the CSTO, the country cannot count on Moscow for its protection; and now, faced with a growing threat from the Afghan Taliban, Turkmenistan is interested in supporting another country. Given that China is unwilling to risk its already large economic investment in Turkmenistan, but also seems willing to play the role of a dominant foreign power, Beijing is more than eager to satisfy Ashgabat’s wishes.
Development of Pakistani-Uzbek relations
Relations between Uzbekistan and Pakistan have been developing recently, and cooperation between the two important countries of South and Central Asia is on the rise. The Eurasia Review writes that the recent visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan to Uzbekistan is evidence that the two states are expanding their multifaceted mutual cooperation. During his two-day visit, Imran Khan spoke at the Uzbek-Pakistani business forum “Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity. Challenges and Opportunities”, where Khan expressed his hope for establishing communication between the two states through air, road and rail links.
In February of this year, an agreement was signed on the construction of a railway through Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar. The project will increase trade between the three states and connect two important regions, in addition to linking Uzbekistan and Afghanistan to Pakistani seaports. The project is designed for five years and its length is 600 kilometers. Tashkent seeks to diversify its option of access to the sea in addition to Iranian ports. On the other hand, Pakistan will also gain access to Central Asia and beyond, which the country has sought since the Central Asian states gained independence in the early 1990s. The railway will reduce Pakistan’s transport costs to Russia by 15-20 percent.
Uzbekistan prefers the Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway for two main reasons: it is the shortest and connects the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China corridor with Europe and South Asia.
Among other reasons, the struggle between the United States and Iran is also a factor in Uzbekistan’s search for an alternative. Tashkent has invested heavily in the transport sector to connect Iranian ports to Uzbekistan, but fears that escalating Tehran’s relationship with Washington could cost Tashkent dearly. However, peace in the region and especially in Afghanistan is essential to any trade, investment and communication initiative.
Legendary Uzbek gymnast retired
The British newspaper The Guardian writes about the Uzbek gymnast Oksana Chusovitina, who at the age of 46 took part in the Tokyo Olympics. As a gymnast in a sport that was dominated by teenagers for so long, Chusovitina was already at a relatively old age two decades ago, and by the age of 30 she was considered a complete aberration. Nonetheless, Tokyo 2020 marks the eighth Olympics in her three-decade career. After completing her podium training, she told reporters in Tokyo that this would be her last training session.
Chusovitina was 16 years old when she broke into the international arena at the 1991 World Cup 30 years ago, arriving with a Soviet team in Indianapolis as a substitute. She was called to replace the injured teammate Elena Grudneva.
Chusovitina’s career spanned four national teams: the Soviet Union, the United Team in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, her native Uzbekistan, Germany and then Uzbekistan again. At the height of her thriving career, she moved to Germany in 2002 after her son Alisher was diagnosed with acute lymphocytic leukemia, and she ended up representing the country.
At the end of her career, Chusovitina won 13 world and Olympic medals together, including a record nine medals in the World Vault Championship, as well as silver in Beijing in 2008. In fact, she was one of the eight best jumpers in the world for most of her career, most recently finishing fourth at the 2018 World Championships at the age of 44. However, no matter how her international career ends, she has demonstrated 30 years of excellence and excellence. Her legacy is guaranteed.