“Despite the rather important steps to intensify discussions on gender issues and the creation of numerous structures, a strategic vision and a systematic approach have not yet been observed,” notes Nozima Davletova, a gender consultant and adjunct professor at Webster University in Tashkent, in her article, prepared specifically for analytical platform CABAR.asia.
Gender equality is a relatively new phrase in the circulation of the official discourse of Uzbekistan at a high level. In the early 2000s, the concept of “gender equality” was pronounced in a whisper in expert circles – the term could only be found in the reports of international organizations, and for the general public it was practically unfamiliar.[1] Nevertheless, over the past two years, a number of steps have been taken to improve the status of women, including in the legal field, the women’s agenda has officially been elevated to the rank of priority issues of state policy. However, a number of systemic challenges remain that, over the long term, will impede the achievement of tangible results in the empowerment of women and girls in the country, as well as the reduction of gender-based violence.
In 2019, just before the submission of the sixth periodic report by Uzbekistan to the UN CEDAW Committee (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), two laws were adopted: “On the Protection of Women from Oppression and Violence”[2] and “On Guarantees of Equal Rights and opportunities for women and men”.[3] The first law defines all types of violence: sexual, physical, economic, psychological and workplace violence, the concepts of “victim” and “protection order” are regulated. The second law regulates the concepts of gender, gender discrimination, gender statistics and gender legal examination. These two laws in themselves are a significant step in the legal field, but a number of provisions are not supported by the corresponding articles in the administrative and criminal codes. Some provisions on gender-based violence are supported by reference norms in legislation and often have no practical meaning.
Give road for gender to every ministry!
In early 2020, the Women’s Committee of Uzbekistan was abolished[4] – a structure with an ambiguous legal status under the Cabinet of Ministers, which was responsible for almost the entire set of problems in the social and cultural life of women. The organization caused extremely negative reactions both within the system and among citizens. If the leaders were dissatisfied with the abundance of long-standing problems and frankly unsuccessful decisions, the latter accused the organization of incapacity and harmful rhetoric. According to a number of specialists, the structure has outlived its usefulness, was not adapted to a quick response to problems due to overload, turnover, and bureaucracy. Formally, it was a non-governmental organization (in fact, it was SONGO – a state-organized non-governmental organization), however, it was expected to function as a full-fledged institution.
After the abolition, part of the functions was transferred to the newly formed Ministry for Support of Mahalla and Family, part – to structures under the Senate of Uzbekistan – the Committee on Women and Gender Equality, and the Commission on Ensuring Gender Equality of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The mahalla ministry is a self-governing body elevated to the rank of a ministry. From the point of view of public administration, the decision is controversial, however, the logic behind its creation most likely consisted in strengthening the structure of the mahalla and increasing funding to improve efficiency in the implementation of its functions: social and supervisory. It is noteworthy that the two key leaders of the ministry are former representatives of the security forces.[5]
Mahalla is the main channel for the distribution of social benefits, in particular to women. The system of “women’s notebooks” was introduced at the beginning of 2021 and allows women to receive loans and one-time financial assistance to women of socially vulnerable categories: the unemployed, who have lost their breadwinner, women with disabled children, etc.[6] It is carried out through the mahalla system, and the selection is carried out using a questionnaire. The system itself is not new – those in need of assistance were traditionally identified by the leaders of the mahalla committees, often on the basis of their subjective beliefs.
The Committee on Women and Gender Equality is a structural division of the Senate that is responsible for legal documents on gender. Within the framework of the Senate structures, in May this year, the Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in Uzbekistan until 2030 was adopted. The document envisages the creation of departments for gender equality in each of the ministries and institutions. The main problems here can be personnel training and the very mechanism for achieving goals. The most difficult questions still remain open.
The Gender Commission under the leadership of the Chairman of the Senate Tanzila Narbaeva is aimed at international cooperation and the implementation of joint projects with international organizations. In March of this year, the Republican Public Women’s Council was created,[7] responsible for a number of measures to strengthen the socio-economic role of women. In general, the new structure is aimed at working with the economic problems of socially vulnerable women.
This abundance of quasi-state structures with sometimes repetitive tasks undermines the credibility of real changes in the sphere of gender among the concerned population. Discussions of women’s rights on social networks often lead to criticism of existing structures, however, it seems impossible to name one specific structure responsible for solving certain problems. Due to the lack of a single coordinating body within the executive branch (from a legal point of view, it would be correct to assign this responsibility to the Cabinet), many problems do not find systemic solutions and can only “put out a fire” in the event of certain problems. Due to the lack of a clear mechanism for the protection of women’s rights and the distribution of narrow tasks for each of the departments, gender policy does not seem to be integral to this day.
Among the obvious positive changes can be called more effective cooperation between government agencies and international organizations and NGOs (although new organizations are still registering with difficulty). This guarantees a more critical look at existing problems, the introduction of international standards in the protection of women’s rights, and the promotion of the adoption of the necessary legal documents. This collaboration has contributed to the development of standard operating procedures for responding to violence against women, which are to be adopted shortly. The final approved document will become a litmus test indicating the readiness to change the status quo in the prevention and fight against violence. Obviously, the most difficult thing for change is the low and medium level of decision-making in this matter. It is at this level that the greatest influence of traditionalist views with regard to women is concentrated and from the formal sphere passes into informal practices, including nepotism, corruption, negligence, and connivance of crimes against women.
Imperfect system of legal protection orders
An obvious shortcoming in protecting women from violence remains the lack of criminal responsibility for domestic violence. The system of protection orders (a document that provides protection to the victim of harassment and violence, entailing the application of certain measures of influence against a person or group of persons who harass or commit violence against women),[8] introduced in 2020, is only partially effective.
Due to the lack of an article in the Criminal Code that holds a close relative of a woman accountable for violence against her, working with an aggressor, even in cases of repeated violence, is reduced to a preventive conversation by preventive inspectors who are accountable to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Mahalla and Family. At most, the offender can be brought to administrative responsibility and a fine in favor of the state, which imposes an additional burden on the family’s budget and the victim herself. The so-called corrective work on the aggressor, often the victim’s spouse, is ineffective and leads to repeated violence. According to some reports, recurrence of domestic violence after the issuance of a protection order occurs in 20% of cases. In practice, the ratio of repeated violence may be higher, however, to this day, there is no working mechanism to track troubled families. Although this responsibility is in practice entrusted to representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a full-fledged system should include interdepartmental coordination with a single oversight body and not be limited to the powers of one institution.
Due to the lack of a clear mechanism for responding to violence, sometimes cases of severe violence against women lead to criminal prosecution only after condemning posts by high-ranking officials: for example, Senate Chairperson Tanzili Narbaeva and President’s eldest daughter Saida Mirziyoyeva.[9] One such case was the case of Mustakhkam , an orphan and mother of two, whose husband used systematic violence against her in an extremely humiliating manner.[10] The case became resonant after the publications of blogger Akida Khanum[11] – her husband received 6 years in prison. However, according to the blogger, the wife, who, in addition to general sympathy, was bullied online, began to visit her husband in prison and even accused the blogger of putting pressure on her. Earlier, Mustakhkam announced the threats she was receiving.
Protection from the aggressor is provided for a period of one month, if necessary, it is extended. Isolation from the aggressor in local conditions occurs in a common house or by moving the victim to rehabilitation centers. Some experts believe that it would be fair to expel the aggressor from the house for the duration of the protection order, however, in the patriarchal order, this is still impossible. The legal framework for rehabilitation and adaptation centers for victims of domestic violence does not regulate individual classifications according to international standards. For example, shelters for victims of violence should not advertise their address in order to protect the persons under care from the aggressor. In Uzbekistan, according to the organizers of the shelters, there were cases of attacks by the husbands and relatives of women while they were there.
Funding is a significant problem in maintaining rehabilitation centers. Non-governmental centers are quite effective in cooperation with international donors; they have a positive experience in submitting applications and achieving practical results of activity, which cannot always be said about state ones. In May of this year, it was announced that out of 197 announced rehabilitation centers for women, 29 normally functioning organizations would be formed.[12] The Ministry of Mahalla Affairs is responsible for this event; it is obvious that the process will be long-lasting and difficult due to the existing problems in the field of financing and training.
The property factor in the fight against gender-based violence
A significant disadvantage in the system of responding to violence is that after the issuance of a protection order, the woman often leaves the spouse’s home with her children, and, as a rule, is subsequently left homeless. Some women live in rehabilitation centers for several months without the opportunity to find work or rent a house. The problem of housing for women remains key and obviously plays an important role in the fight against violence by the state.
According to ADB, the number of women-owned properties (including but not limited to housing) is about 30%. According to the same report, “cars, agricultural machinery, equipment, and livestock are also traditionally owned by men (author’s note: father-in-law, spouse, male blood relatives).”[13] Housing, as a rule, is registered for a woman as an exception or as an additional property for a man. Even in such cases, a woman is not always able to dispose of property, among other things, due to legal illiteracy and poor access to legal assistance.
When inheriting property, preference in the family is given to the male part, while the daughter is considered to belong to the husband’s family, and it is assumed that kelin (the traditional institution of a daughter-in-law in Uzbekistan) must remain in the husband’s house. In practice, women cannot get away from aggressive husbands and dysfunctional marriages, including because of the lack of housing. When returning to their parents, many women do not find their place there. It is not uncommon for parents to return their daughters to husbands who systematically use violence. Some victims of violence refer to a saying that close relatives told them: “flesh belongs to them, bones belong to us,” suggesting that a woman should not return to her parental home after marriage. In April of this year, a 20-year-old kelin was found hanged in her husband’s house. According to her father, she repeatedly complained of violence and harassment, but received no support. Data on the criminal case under article 103 of the Criminal Code “Driving to suicide” are still lacking.
Such cases are justified by traditions and the concept of a strong family. According to some reports, there have been informal restrictions on official divorce for a long time. Semi-formal procedures were carried out by the local mahalla committees (a self-government body, from 2020 elevated to the status of the mahalla and family ministry), which were supposed to issue a certificate for further judicial dissolution of marriage, although there was no legal basis for this. In turn, there were so-called conciliation commissions in mahallas, which in most cases put pressure on women in order to keep the family alive. In rural areas, such commissions consisted of women activists from the mahalla and otyn (atyn, a female religious Islamic title), who reconciled spouses in most cases, sometimes despite the objective danger to the life and health of a woman. Conciliation commissions have been abolished, but the practice of reconciliation with the aggressor, while not coercive, is still considered the most acceptable and desirable.
Obviously, attempts at reconciliation and fixation on the preservation of families are associated not only with ephemeral concepts of national values. Women who traditionally have a lower socioeconomic status and rarely have their own housing are a socially vulnerable category of people not only for their families, but also for the state. Given the general economic situation in the country and the high level of unemployment, as well as the low representation of women in higher education and more profitable positions, divorce (loss of an official place of residence and running a joint household with her husband) will automatically mean a large number of women are included in the socially vulnerable categories. Further steps by the state should be related to providing women with jobs, affordable housing and benefits, recovery, and socialization in the event of violence, for which there are obviously no resources.
At the same time, the growth of traditionalism entrenches the belief that for women the role of mother and wife is central to the detriment of professional development and prospects. In difficult socio-economic conditions, the number of women involved in the informal labor sector, as well as in human trafficking, is growing (138 women out of 150 cases of human trafficking published by official statistics, including 89 involved in sexual slavery in 2020).[14]
The apogee of the conciliatory practice is the marriage of the rapist with the victim. It is also the result of highly traditionalist attitudes, where the victim of sexual assault becomes the target of social condemnation and the stigma of “uyat” (shame). One of the resonant examples was the marriage of the singer Jasur Umirov with an underage girl, whom he had previously raped and received a 5-year prison term. The media quoted the victim’s father, who dropped his claims against the singer for agreeing to “wash away the shame” by marrying. Umirov was released after 4 months of imprisonment.[15]
Responsibility for the moral character of the nation in public discourse is assigned mainly to the woman, this is supported by the displacement of secular views by religious ones among a significant part of the population. Thus, public discourse about the limited roles of women is supported at the state level and in the media. The official discourse, broadcasting assurances of adherence to the universal human values of equality (as enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan), plays along with conservative beliefs regarding women’s rights.
The dominance of informal practices in public life, to the detriment of the rule of law, manifests itself especially clearly in matters of women’s rights. For example, polygamy is an acute social problem with serious consequences for women and children. According to some reports, the number of unregistered religious (through the Islamic religious rite of nikoh) marriages in the presence of an official marriage reaches several tens of thousands. Polygamy is a criminal offense[16] however, criminal prosecution is extremely rare in practice. First, it is difficult to prove the violation, since the religious ceremony takes place with the participation of the participants themselves and their relatives, and often they are not interested in making public the facts of violation of the law. Secondly, the wording in the article states that “cohabitation with two or more women on the basis of a common household” is considered a violation of the law, which is extremely difficult to prove, and with social approval and the dominance of informal practices, it is almost impossible.
There is no criminal liability for the conduct of a religious ceremony by a representative of the faith, although they can be brought to administrative responsibility for violating the family code of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In practice, imams, who in Uzbekistan are always formally affiliated with religious institutions registered with state bodies, are rarely brought to justice, which is partially due to their authority and established social ties.
In turn, bigamy becomes the reason for frequent scandals and domestic violence in an official marriage, and for informal wives – the lack of legal guarantees in inheritance and division of property for both women and common children. The motives for polygamy among women can be socio-economic insecurity, low access to quality education, poor prospects for full-fledged relationships among divorced and widowed people in traditional circles, patriarchal foundations in everyday life that limit access to certain resources and services.
Conclusion
The political will to change the status quo for women in Uzbekistan has led to a number of positive changes.
Often, egregious cases of gender-based violence force law enforcement agencies and other relevant departments to respond only after a public outcry of activists (Irina Matvienko,[17] Akida Khanum, etc.). This indicates that there is still no systematic approach to protecting women’s rights, as well as there is no deep understanding of what women’s rights mean for modern Uzbekistan. Obviously, the priority is to improve the living standards of women and to try to prepare them for independence. However, even the official discourse, along with public discourse, does not contribute to the development of gender sensitivity and compliance with constitutional priorities, giving preference to an extremely traditional view of women’s roles. The question of women’s rights, like many other issues of social importance, is reaching a dead end under the influence of systemic problems of public administration and the incompetence of certain local cadres.
[1] Caution in the use of the term “gender” was associated with concerns about the need to recognize concepts outside the binary gender system. Today, the concept of gender in Uzbekistan is used only to denote the rights of men and women.
[2] https://www.lex.uz/docs/4494712
[3] https://lex.uz/docs/4494873
[4] https://vesti.uz/komitet-zhenshhin-uprazdnili-v-uzbekistane/
[5] https://moqqv.uz/ru/leadership
[6] https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/01/12/women/
[7] https://adolat.uz/ru/uzbekiston/postanovlenie-prezidenta-respubliki-uzbekistan-o-merah-po-dalnejshemu-sovershenstvovaniyu-sistemy-podderzhki-i-obespecheniya-aktivnogo-uchastiya-zhenshin-v-zhizni-obshestva
[8] https://iibb.uz/ru/news/ohrannyj-order
[9] The president’s eldest daughter stated that it is impossible to simultaneously imprison for responding to an insult, but to “punish” with reconciliation for eight years of bullying
(https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/09/11/mirziyoyeva/)
[10] https://www.bbc.com/uzbek/uzbekistan-54211700
[11] https://www.facebook.com/aqida.hanum
[12] https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/05/21/shelters/#!
[13] https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/495911/uzbekistan-country-gender-assessment-update-ru.pdf
[14] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/TIP_Report_Final_20210701.pdf
[15] https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/06/10/umirov-case/
[16] Article 126 of the Criminal Code. “Polygamy, that is, cohabitation with two or more women on the basis of a common household, is punishable by a fine from fifty to one hundred minimum wages or correctional labor up to three years, or imprisonment up to three years”: http://fmc.uz/legisl .php? id = k_ug_22