Experts on Central Asia share opinions about the angles in which they see the armed conflict on the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that took place on September 14-17, 2022. How can this conflict affect projects within the SCO and regional cooperation? What peacebuilding mechanisms can Astana and Tashkent offer? – these questions are discussed in an article, specially for CABAR.asia.
On September 14-17, 2022, armed clashes took place on the border of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Both countries blamed each other for starting the conflict. As of September 20, according to official data from Kyrgyzstan, 59 Kyrgyzstanis died, the total number of victims is 198 people, and a total of 136,770 citizens were evacuated. The Tajik authorities reported the death of 41 people during the armed conflict on the border with Kyrgyzstan.
The editors of CABAR.asia provide an analysis of experts’ views on the conflict: professor of the Kazakh-German University Rustam Burnashev from Kazakhstan and director of the non-state scientific and educational institution “Bilim Karvoni” Farkhod Tolipov from Uzbekistan.
How is the conflict on the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is considered in Kazakhstan?
Rustam Burnashev: In my opinion, the assessment of this conflict among specialists has been fixed for a long time and is already considered as “shared” knowledge.
The conflict is seen as long and multi-level, both in terms of the level of its participants, and in terms of controversial points. It has been going on for quite a long time, at least since the beginning of the active phase of border delimitation in the region, that is, since the late 1990s. Some experts push the start of the conflict to even earlier dates. The conflict develops in waves, passing from one open (often violent) phase to another, through periods of latent development.
The conflict is multidimensional and cannot be reduced to confrontation at the state level. The level of interstate confrontation has almost exclusively the issue of delimitation and demarcation of the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the ownership of some important economic objects related to water and transport infrastructure. However, even consideration of the practices of using these objects gives the conflict a second dimension – local, which also concerns the border regime and the development of disputed territories. It is significant that each acute phase of the conflict, as a rule, begins with the protests of local residents. Another dimension of the conflict is the activities in the border areas of groups engaged in smuggling and having a serious influence at least on the local population and authorities. Finally, in recent times, in my opinion, one can single out a dimension which Mary Kaldor proposed to refer to as “war of identities”, when the conflict begins to acquire a clear ethnic dimension. At the same time, each of the parties to the conflict positions itself as a kind of indisputable embodiment of Good, and its opponent – Evil.
Another aspect of the vision of this conflict is the analysis of the actions of its parties. Unfortunately, the development of the confrontation shows that no readiness to resolve the conflict is demonstrated at any of its levels. The main point is that there is no clear articulation of how each of the parties at each level sees the resolution of the conflict and what kind of compromise they see as acceptable. Moreover, not only different parties, but also different levels of the conflict simply do not hear each other. Without articulation and considering such points, the negotiation process to overcome the crisis is practically impossible.
Finally, there is an understanding of the structural conditions of the conflict. My analysis shows that both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan belong to the so-called “weak states”, where the country’s leadership is only one of the interest groups present in these countries, and, accordingly, does not have full control over the processes in his own country, what Max Weber called “a monopoly on violence.” As a rule, “weak states” do not have a system of governance, which Michel Foucault refers to as “governmentality”, which involves effective management of risks and contingencies. In such a situation, even if agreements are reached at the level of the leadership of the two countries, they remain unreliable, and the conflict regularly turns into a violent phase.
How does the conflict affect the image and agreements within the SCO?
Rustam Burnashev: For my part, the conflict does not have any impact on the image of the SCO. Conflicts of this type do not fall under the responsibility of this organization, and it has never positioned itself as a mechanism or tool for their prevention. Another issue is the implementation of the agreements connected in one way or another with the activities of the SCO. There are certainly difficulties here. For example, within the framework of the SCO summit, held in September 2022 in Samarkand, an agreement on cooperation was signed on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway construction project. The unsettled relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan creates serious challenges for the implementation of this project and its sustainable functioning.
How does conflict affect regional cooperation?
Rustam Burnashev: It seems to me that conflict resolution is the basis for sustainable regional cooperation. Such cooperation should be created not on the basis of some romantic notions about the “unity of history and culture” of countries related to the region, or something similar, but based on the development and effective implementation of solutions to real problems. Therefore, if at present it may seem to us that this conflict is detrimental to regional cooperation, then we must understand that this is not forever.
If the countries included in the region look for ways out of the crisis based on mutual compromise, create regional anti-crisis institutions and such, this will be the basis for building a real region, and not a geopolitical fantasy.
How can this conflict be resolved and what can Astana offer?
Rustam Burnashev: There is a lot of speculation and a desire to score points around the Kyrgyz-Tajik conflict.
This does not mean that there are no mechanisms or that the regional partners of the two countries have nothing to offer. This means that it is precisely the conflicting parties that should become the starting point for resolving the confrontation. It is they who can and should make the final decision based on an assessment of the situation “in the field”. There can be no abstract recommendations here.
In what angles and how is the conflict on the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan considered in Uzbekistan?
Farkhod Tolipov: The border incident between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is, on the one hand, a manifestation of an old and simmering conflict, the origin of which, like many similar incidents that have occurred before in the region as a whole, is associated with the incomplete process of delimitation of interstate borders. It is obvious. On the other hand, in such situations, hypotheses or assumptions of a geopolitical nature often arise, namely: that this incident was provoked from outside. Both explanations are related to each other, i.e., even if the true cause is in an unsettled boundary, external destructive forces can always take advantage of this situation. After all, the ancient principle: “Divide and rule” has not been canceled.
How does the conflict affect the image and agreements within the SCO?
Farkhod Tolipov: The incident is contrary not only to international law and the principles of the UN, but also to the agreements adopted by the SCO, whose summit was held a few days ago in Samarkand. It must be remembered that one of the first agreements in the SCO was on confidence-building measures in the border area, as well as on not holding military measures within a 100 km zone from the borders. Both of these agreements were signed by the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan back in 1996-1997.
Unfortunately, at the last Samarkand SCO summit, no official statements were made regarding this incident, and the Samarkand Declaration of the SCO also ignored it. Traditionally, every year the SCO Declarations mention various major international and global issues, including the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the war in Syria, and even the militarization of outer space. But what is happening, as they say, in the “zone of responsibility” of the SCO, was not reflected in the main document of the summit.
Of course, all this cannot but reflect negatively on the reputation of this organization. On the other hand, what would be the significance and power of a certain statement of the SCO summit participants for a real end to the conflict?
How does conflict affect regional cooperation?
Farkhod Tolipov: As it is known, in July this year in the Kyrgyz city of Cholpon-Ata, the fourth Consultative meeting of all five presidents of Central Asian countries, including the leaders of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, took place. It, among other things, adopted the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the 21st century, which the Tajik and Turkmen sides have not yet signed. Paradoxically, the next Consultative Meeting will take place next year in Dushanbe. Until now, Tajikistan has never refrained from signing a common regional document, so now it is vital that all five countries of the region do not deviate from the strategic course of unification.
Each Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders is a step towards the future integration of the region. It is appropriate to recall, in this regard, for example, the second Consultative Meeting of the Presidents of Central Asia in November 2019. Here are some excerpts from the adopted Joint Statement:
– Emphasizing the primary and key role of the states of Central Asia in solving urgent problems and pressing issues of the entire region through negotiations and consultations based on consensus, equality, respect for each other’s interests… (Preamble).
– Confirming the unanimity of opinions that the activation and strengthening of multifaceted cooperation between the states of Central Asia on the basis of friendship, good neighborliness and mutual benefit meets the fundamental interests of the fraternal peoples… (Preamble).
– The trend towards regional rapprochement that has developed in Central Asia is a historically conditioned reality (p. 3).
How can this conflict be resolved and what can Tashkent offer?
Farkhod Tolipov: By all means, we must urgently declare a moratorium on military operations. All Central Asian countries together could discuss new approaches to this conflict. After all, it will stop someday anyway… In the end, it’s time to create a mechanism for a quick response to such situations within Central Asia.
The presidents of the two states must show the courage to announce this moratorium!!! Yes, such an agreement on a ceasefire was reached recently, it could not have been otherwise. But we must now declare an indefinite moratorium on any military action in the border area. It should be noted that during all the past years of independence there were practically no serious territorial disputes between the two states; they were sporadic and have become more frequent only in recent years.
There is such a saying as ‘out-of-box thinking’, which means going beyond the usual clichés, prejudices, concepts, stereotypes, standards of thinking in search of new solutions. Until now, so to speak, ‘in-box thinking’ has operated with the concepts of sovereignty and nationalism, which, by definition, determine an uncompromising strategy on the issue of borders. The existence of cross-border geographic clusters in Central Asia, especially in the Ferghana Valley, was of secondary importance to the interests of protecting sovereignty and national interests. Such a clear feature of the countries of Central Asia as national-regional dualism, has been largely ignored or underestimated. Dualism means that in Central Asia it is often difficult to determine where the national ends and the regional begins, and vice versa.
From this point of view, innovative approaches to the border problem as a whole are needed.
Phone calls to the presidents of the conflicting parties, official statements, special diplomatic communications, visits, other actions, up to extraordinary Consultative Meetings, as well as the use of public diplomacy are just some of the proactive actions that Tashkent could and should take in such situations.