“The peculiarity of Uzbekistan’s position in understanding Central Asia is that it proceeds from the idea that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia and it should be actively involved in regional economic processes and infrastructure projects,” mentions Rustam Burnashev, professor at the Kazakh-German University in the article, written specifically for CABAR.asia
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Since the beginning of 2017, the time of the adoption of the Action Strategy for the five priority areas of development in 2017-2021,[1] Uzbekistan began to actively transform its regional policy, the goal of which, in accordance with the Strategy, was “to create a belt of security, stability and good-neighborliness around Uzbekistan.” The strategy does not fix the spatial content of this “environment”: whether it is only about the countries bordering with Uzbekistan or the coverage is wider and includes such actors as Russia, China, Iran, or Turkey. Despite the fact that back in September 2016, being the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev noted that “the main priority of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy activity is the Central Asian region” and singled out “Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan” as the country’s closest neighbors,[2] the line on the priority of Central Asia remains in the future. In this regard, the conference “Central Asia: One Past and Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity” held in November 2017 in Samarkand under the auspices of the United Nations is indicative. It can be assumed that the “belt of security, stability and good-neighborliness” means precisely Central Asia.
Nevertheless, the question of what is meant in this case by “Central Asia” itself and what, from the point of view of Uzbekistan, are the main structuring lines, remains open.
History of regionalization in the “Central Asian” format
Traditionally, when speaking about “Central Asia”, we are talking about the space uniting five post-Soviet states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – and fixed at the level of international documents in early 1993 within the framework of the summit held in Tashkent.[3]
The view of the regionalization of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as “Central Asia” remained dominant throughout the 1990s. Its institutionalization went through a number of structures: first, the Common Economic Space, then the Central Asian Economic Community and, finally, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization. However, already at that time it was clear that regionalization within the framework of the Central Asia project was primarily of an ideological nature.
First, from an economic point of view, Central Asia could not be considered as a single entity, since it included the republics that were part of the Soviet Union in different economic regions: Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
Second, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the specification of the Central Asian countries only grew – both because of their desire to ensure economic independence and because of the choice of various models of economic reform. The most striking manifestation of this specification was the accession of Kyrgyzstan to the WTO in 1998, which was not coordinated with other countries – Bishkek’s partners in the Central Asian Economic Community.
Third, from the point of view of security in the countries that are included in Central Asia, securitization of a number of key issues was carried out in different ways. First of all, this applies to such issues as the 1992-1997 civil war in Tajikistan, the situation in Afghanistan in the second half of the 1990s, the attitude of states to a number of internal political, economic, and societal issues.Regionalization in the format of five countries was complicated by the fact that, in parallel with regional projects, there were no less strong constructs that went beyond the borders of the five republics – for example, the Shanghai Five and the Collective Security Treaty. Equally important was the concept of an “expanded” region, built on the idea of ”Eurasian reintegration” and proposed by the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev in March 1994 – the Eurasian Union. On its basis, in 2000, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was created, comprising Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Taken together, the implementation of these initiatives clearly testifies to the dominant importance for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan[4] in the late 1990s – early 2000s of ties that go beyond “Central Asia”.
Taken together, the above-mentioned led to the fact that by the 2000s, the final regionalization in the format of Central Asia did not happen.
Moreover, in October 2004 Russia joined the Central Asian Cooperation Organization. In 2006, in connection with the accession of Uzbekistan to the EurAsEC, the two organizations merged, which de facto meant the liquidation of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization.
In the second half of the 2000s, an attempt was made to revive the Central Asian project in the form of the idea of a Central Asian Union, expressed by the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. However, this initiative did not receive support on a practical level. Moreover, for example, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, in response to this initiative, pointed out the impossibility of a union in the format of Central Asia, since “the policies and directions in which the leaders of the states
The final departure from the concept of Central Asia may be associated with the launch of the mechanism of a single customs space within the framework of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia in 2010, which clearly fixes the exit of Kazakhstan from the economic space of the Central Asian countries. The creation in the mid-2010s of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which, along with Kazakhstan, included Kyrgyzstan, further exacerbated this fragmentation.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the idea of the unity of Central Asia was not implemented, it was an effective political and ideological factor in the 1990s and 2000s. This concept remains such a factor at the present time. It makes sense to designate the corresponding position as a “quasi-region”, in other words, as a nominal region, which is organized more by an idea or term (in our case, the term “Central Asia”) than by regional structures. Moreover, for Uzbekistan, the issue of regional policy remained relevant, at least from the point of view of organizing joint water use in the basins of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, as well as building routes for entering world markets. This determined the transformation of the regional policy of Uzbekistan in the second half of the 2010s.
Regional policy of Uzbekistan in the second half of the 2010s
The first steps taken by Uzbekistan in the framework of changing its regional policy towards its activation were actions aimed at normalizing relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Until 2017, Tashkent’s relations with these two countries were burdened by a whole range of problematic points.
Relations with Bishkek were complicated both by the consequences of the interethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the main victims of which were ethnic Uzbeks living in the southern regions of this republic, and by the unresolved border issues. Nevertheless, already in September 2017, the Treaty on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz state border was signed between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, about 85% of the state border was agreed, and restrictions were lifted from a number of checkpoints.[6] The solution on border issues is considered by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as a complex task, which includes not only border delimitation, but also cooperation in such areas as the use of water and energy resources, the development of border areas and interregional cooperation, the development of transport infrastructure, in particular – a multimodal corridor Tashkent – Andijan – Osh – Irkeshtam – Kashgar. An indicator of the normalization of relations between the two countries was the participation of a Kyrgyz delegation in the elections to the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan in December 2019 as international observers, first time in the history of Kyrgyz Uzbek relations.
A similar pace of building bilateral relations is observed between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. If earlier there was a visa regime between the neighboring republics and there was practically no direct communication, with the exception of the border, then in 2017 flights between Dushanbe and Tashkent were resumed, the Galaba-Amuzang railway was restored, an international road was opened on the Samarkand-Penjikent section, as well as a number of checkpoints on the Tajik Uzbek border had resumed operation. In 2018, an agreement was reached on the resumption of supplies of Uzbek gas to Tajikistan, and an Agreement was signed on certain sections of the Uzbek-Tajik state border, which allowed the parties to almost agree on previously undivided sections of the border completely. One of the breakthroughs was the resolution of the territorial dispute over the Farhad hydroelectric power station.
Although bilateral relations between Uzbekistan, on the one hand, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, on the other, did not have difficulties comparable to relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and throughout the years of independence have developed progressively, since 2017, the intensification of cooperation has been recorded. Thus, the strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, enshrined in the relevant bilateral agreement in 2013, moved to a practical level after 2017, when regular contacts between the leaders of the two states were reinforced by the intensification of economic, social, and cultural cooperation.
It would seem that Uzbekistan is trying to return to the concept of “Central Asia” in the form it was consolidated back in 1993.
Uzbekistan proceeds from the fact that the Tashkent high-level conference on Afghanistan, held on its initiative in March 2018, has become one of the largest international events in the modern history of this country, and the Tashkent Declaration adopted at the end of the conference can be considered as a program to establish peace in Afghanistan. which expresses the consolidated position of the forum participants.[7]
The main mechanism of the multilateral format of regional cooperation was to be the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia, the idea of which was expressed by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly.[8] The first such meeting took place in the capital of Kazakhstan in 2018. The meetings were supposed to be regular. However, in the future, both due to internal events in some countries of the region (the announcement by the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev of his resignation in 2019) and international events (global quarantine measures introduced in 2020 in connection with the spread of COVID-19), the regularity of the consultation meetings was disrupted. Nevertheless, the very idea of such meetings remains relevant and is a significant element of the discourse about Central Asia as a region.
It is also important that although the terms “security” and “stability” remain in the rhetoric of Central Asia among the leaders of Uzbekistan, they are losing their dominance. The concepts of “cooperation” and “opportunities” come to the fore. This trend was already noticeable in the speech of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the conference “Central Asia: One Past and Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity”, where the concept of “security” is used 7 times, and the concept of “cooperation” – 10,[9] and in the statement made following the results of the Second Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia (2 and 7 references, respectively).[10] Thus, Uzbekistan begins to offer a new ideologeme – “Central Asia – a region of opportunities.”
The integrity of Central Asia for Uzbekistan is fixed through two factors. First, through emphasizing the commonality for the countries of the Aral Sea basin region and the resulting connectivity of all countries in Central Asia by common shared water resources. Secondly, through the factor of integration of Central Asia as a region into global transport and communication corridors.[11] It should be noted here that Uzbekistan is considering this issue precisely through the regional and not the national agenda.
Conclusion
Thus, it can be argued that the priority of the Central Asian direction for Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, declared at the end of 2016, turned out to be not a declaration, but an actively pursued policy. The initiatives of Uzbekistan, implemented over the past four years and aimed at normalizing bilateral relations with its neighbors, again raised the question of the possibility of constructing “Central Asia” as a region, however, not on an ideological basis, but on the principles of pragmatism, not through the prism of ensuring regional security, but through the implementation of existing capabilities. Uzbekistan is transitioning from a regional policy within the framework of the given a priori formal schemes (“Central Asia as five post-Soviet republics”) to a regional policy of a pragmatic nature, when the region includes countries not on a formal foundation, but on the basis of the presence of real interaction. At the same time, although the construction of the region is under the active influence of Uzbekistan, we are not talking about any special position of this republic in the space of Central Asia: in the official discourse of Uzbekistan, the term “regional leader” is practically not used, and, moreover, regional cooperation is not considered through the prism of any kind of interstate competition.
This article was prepared as part of the Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Project implemented with the financial support of the Foreign Ministry of Norway. The opinions expressed in the article do not reflect the position of the editorial or donor.
[1] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Decree of February 7, 2017 No. UP-4947 On the Strategy of Action for the Further Development of the Republic of Uzbekistan // National Database of the Republic of Uzbekistan LexUz // https://lex.uz/ru/docs/3107042
[2] Prime Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Speech at a joint meeting of the Legislative Chamber and the Senate of the Oliy Majlis on September 8, 2016 // Official website of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. – 2016. — September 8 // https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/5
[3] Levin L., Karimov A. Return to the old is impossible. The path of history – only forward! From the press conference of the heads of state of Central Asia and Kazakhstan // Pravda Vostoka. – 1993. — January 5
[4] Due to the neutrality of Turkmenistan, it is not considered in this context.
[5] Dubnov A. Karimov told Nazarbayev “once and for all” // Vremya novostei. – 2008 .– April 23
[6] In the future, the process of delimitation of the border between the two countries proceeded quite dynamically, which in March 2021 allowed the chairman of the State Committee for National Security of Kyrgyzstan Kamchybek Tashiev to declare that all controversial issues on the border with Uzbekistan were resolved (Kamchybek Tashiev: Now there are will not be any disputed areas on the Kyrgyz Uzbek border // K-News. – 2021. – March 26 // https://knews.kg/2021/03/26/kamchybek-tashiev-teper-spornyh-uchastkov-na-kyrgyzsko-uzbekskoj-granitse-ne-budet /)
[7] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Message to the Oliy Majlis dated December 28, 2018 // Official website of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. – 2018 .– December 28 // https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/2228
[8] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Speech at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly // Official website of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. – 2017 .– September 20 // https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/1063
[9] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Speech at the international conference “Central Asia: One Past and Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity” in Samarkand // Official Site of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. – 2017 .– November 10 // https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/1227
[10] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Statement at the briefing following the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia // Official Site of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. – 2019.- November 29 // https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/3111
[11] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Speech at the 75th session of the UN General Assembly // Official website of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. – 2020 .– September 23 // https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/3851