“Both Russia and China have shared, and individual, interests in Central Asia. The war in Ukraine has certainly changed the dynamic of the two powers in the region, challenging the notion that Russia can continue its role as security guarantor”, – writes Nigel Li in an article, exclusively for CABAR.asia
The roles of Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia have often been simplified into the phrase “Russia holds the gun, and China holds the wallet”. Indeed, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has been the undeniable security guarantor and provider in Central Asia. But its invasion of Ukraine has thrown its traditional role in Central Asia into question all while China’s increasing economic interests give rise to more security responsibilities. With the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia shifting at a dynamic pace, the Sino-Russian Central Asian symbiosis will be subject to change in the years to come. Searching for points of contradiction in the Sino-Russian relationship and hoping for clashes the likes of the Sino-Soviet Split during the Cold War is a fruitless hobby; rather, a better appreciation of the contemporary drivers of Russia and China’s interests in Central Asia can help us understand the reordering of regional responsibilities and that a clash remains unlikely.
Viewed as a whole, Central Asia is not a stable region and has demonstrated in recent years to be prone to flare ups that deteriorate the security situation. In the past two years alone Kazakhstan experienced internal strife that was thwarted by the intervention of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Uzbekistan faced widespread unrest in the region of Karakalpakstan after a proposed amendment threatened to remove its autonomy, and the Kyrgyz-Tajik border became the site of deadly skirmishes over disputed territory. The Taliban’s return to power after the hasty withdrawal of the United States has raised concerns that Afghanistan has once again become a haven for terrorist groups, threatening the security of not just Central Asia but the entire world. Despite these common challenges, both Russia have fundamentally different perceptions and approaches towards Central Asia.
Same region, different approaches
Moscow’s security interests can be distilled into three broad aspects: The Kremlin prioritizes the maintenance of its “traditional role” in the region, it has shown to adopt a “Kazakhstan First”, and it seeks to keep external players out of the region while mitigating Chinese influence. Russia retains the view that Central Asia falls within the “post-Soviet space” and therefore its natural sphere of influence. Moscow has made efforts to reconsolidate its influence over the years through initiatives like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the CSTO, and the Eurasian Economic Union.
It should be mentioned that Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian state Russia borders and has been described as its “soft underbelly” explains why Moscow was quick to respond to the January 2022 unrest, on top of the fact that ethnic Russians make up 16% of Kazakhstan’s population, a significant minority. Currently there are fears that Kazakhstan would become a target of Russia with the Kremlin using similar justifications as it has in Ukraine.
Russia is also skeptical of states external to its post-Soviet space. One early example can be recalled when fears of “color revolutions” swept the region and gave impetus for Uzbekistan to order the United States to vacate the K-2 Airbase in 2005. In this case, not only Moscow but Beijing lent Tashkent support and it was, in fact, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that set the timeline for American withdrawal. What began as a Chinese initiative, the SCO has matured to encompass a range of member states including belligerent ones like India and Pakistan. Iran’s recent inclusion into the organization and Saudi Arabia agreeing to join as a “dialogue partner”, paving the road to full membership, may seem like the SCO is capable of bringing adversaries together, but as an organization that depends on consensus-based decision making, widening membership may be detrimental to the SCO in the long run, which has served Russia’s interests to “act as a brake” to growing Chinese influence[1].
China’s security interests in Central Asia can be described in the following themes: The pursuit of a “Xinjiang First” policy, the maintenance of regional stability while keeping external players out, and the protection of Chinese nationals and business interests in the region. The issue of Xinjiang is sensitive to Beijing as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has sought to legitimate its rule through stability, harmony, and prosperity. Increasingly so since President Xi Jinping’s rise to power, the CCP has tirelessly sought to suppress separatist movements and indoctrinate the Uyghur population. It is for this reason that Beijing is deeply concerned about the Taliban’s return as Uyghur groups are known to operate and train in Afghan territory. China’s “Xinjiang First” policy also directs its approach to the other Central Asian states. Arguably, an objective of the Belt and Road Initiative is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the region which may present a “security-dividend” for Beijing.
A historical case can be revisited to provide perspective on what drives China’s interest to stabilize Central Asia. From 1405-1433, the Ming Dynasty boasted an impressive naval fleet that outcompeted its European contemporaries at the time. Led by Admiral Zheng He, the treasure fleet sailed as far as East Africa and brought back exotic goods through trade and tribute. The Ming Court later issued an edict to cease the voyages, isolating China from the maritime world. The widely cited reason for the Ming Court’s decision was to quell the growing merchant class. However, historians like Paul Kennedy have argued that pressures from the Mongol invaders at the time required the country to refocus its military resources in the north may have been an additional reason to the fleet’s end. China today is facing maritime pressure from the United States and its allies, and the only buffer it has between the Taiwan Strait or to assert its claims in the South China Sea is the growing People’s Liberation Army Navy. For the PLAN to face cutbacks for reasons similar to the fate of Zheng He’s fleet may not be the best option for Beijing.
Revisiting Central Asia
With Moscow’s attention drawn towards Ukraine and its “existential” confrontation with the so-called “Collective West”, there is a perceived void left by Russia in Central Asia. Since the war began, Moscow has made efforts to shore up its influence in the region such as its initiative to make 2023 the “year of the Russian language” in the CIS. In its recently updated Foreign Policy Concept, Russia – for the first time – directly referred to Central Asia as a region of its own in the context of harnessing the existing regional institutions for further integration and cooperation; whereas, previously, the region was alluded to as “partners within the CIS”. This could signal both Moscow’s retention of interest in the region and a nod to highlight that it distinguishes Central Asia beyond its “traditional sphere” euphemized by the institution of the CIS.
The leaders of Central Asia might also be expressing their readiness to maintain their relationship with Moscow. Though none of them have outright condoned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the heads of state of the five former Soviet republics attended the recent Victory Day parade in Moscow. In 2022, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon was the sole foreign guest in attendance.
In just over a week after the parade, the Central Asian leaders then attended the first China-Central Asia summit hosted in Xi’an, a city historically tied to the Silk Road. Beyond the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has further expressed its interests in Central Asia through its concept paper titled the “Global Security Initiative”. Of note, the document mentions the importance of leveraging the role of the SCO and the China+C5 mechanism to improve cooperation in Asia.
The outcomes of the China-Central Asia summit should not be downplayed. Not only has Beijing managed to secure support from the Central Asian states to operationalize the Global Security Initiative, it has also injected new life into the Belt and Road Initiative with new agreements to synergize efforts for further economic development pledging an additional 3.7 billion dollars in support. China has also managed to further anchor itself in the region with the parties inaugurating a biennial summit through the “China-Central Asia Summit Mechanism”. Two conclusions can be drawn from this move: First, China seeks to further institutionalize its partnership with the Central Asian countries outside of the existing Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia, thus giving itself more room for its arrangements vis-a-vis Central Asia. Second, it is taking the C5+1 format, pioneered by the United States, and moving it a step further with substantial economic pledges, consistent dialogue, and giving the C5+1 its own “Chinese characteristics”. Though Beijing hopes to strengthen people-to-people ties, this will remain a seemingly insurmountable challenge to overcome as Chinese skepticism remains prevalent in the region.
The New Symbiosis in Central Asia
Both Russia and China have shared, and individual, interests in Central Asia. The war in Ukraine has certainly changed the dynamic of the two powers in the region, challenging the notion that Russia can continue its role as security guarantor. China is concerned of potential regional instability becoming a detriment to its economic interests there, necessitating Beijing to increase its security responsibilities despite how reluctant it may be. Beijing has already been taking up its own responsibility by deploying private security companies, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. Yet, we should not be too eager to claim that China will soon displace Russia’s presence in Central Asia. Institutions like the CSTO and EAEU limit the maneuverability of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Perhaps, China’s ability to bring together all the five Central Asian republics is a sign that building up practices of regionalism may lead towards unity and cooperation – something Russia has been unable to achieve.
The inability for both Russia and China to fully wrest influence in the region possibly offers an opportunity for the capitals of Central Asia to assert their individual and regional agency as “great power competition” becomes the watchword of our times. Kazakhstan’s “multi-vector diplomacy” might prove a way out of being caught in the middle, but divisions between the Central Asian states will impede any hope for regional consolidation and making sovereignty mean something more than a flag that waves beside the Russian tricolor or China’s five stars.
[1] Pantucci, Raffaello, and Alexandros Petersen. Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire”. Oxford University Press, 2022. Pg 162.