Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the second president of Kazakhstan since independence, assumed office in 2019. In response to growing economic inequality and worsening socio-economic conditions, the government began moving away from its long-standing “economy first, then politics” approach. This shift included reforms to the electoral system, changes in party formation rules, efforts to strengthen parliament, and the decentralization of power to enhance local governance (Cornell and Barro, 2022).
Since 2021, Kazakhstan has introduced direct elections of akims (mayor) at the rural level. All akims of towns, rural settlements, rural districts, and cities of district significance are now elected directly by citizens (Zhumashov, 2023). As of January 1, 2021, the country had 2,345 akims (local governors), including 48 akims of towns of district significance, 1,993 of rural districts, 198 of villages, and 106 of settlements (CEC, 2021). That year, rural akim elections were held on a rolling basis: 730 were elected in July, followed by another 134 between August and December (CEC, 2021).
A closer look at the 2021 election reveals a more nuanced picture. According to the Central Election Commission, 55.6% and 70.1% of incumbent akims were re-elected in towns of district significance, villages, settlements, and rural districts in July and August 2025, respectively (CEC, 2021). However, female representation among akims remains low, and a significant number of elected officials continue to represent the pro-presidential “Nur Otan” party (renamed “Amanat”). As of July 2021, out of 730 elected akims, 562 were affiliated with Nur Otan, 32 with Auil, 15 with Adal, 11 with Ak Zhol, 15 with the People’s Party, and 1 with the Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (Table 1).
Table 1. 2021 election of rural akims in Kazakhstan
Source: compiled by authors based on data derived from the Central election Committee of Kazakhstan (2021).
There is a certain level of criticism to these reforms, the executive branch’s tight control over election administration and vote counting remain. According to a public opinion survey by Demoscope and the Paper Lab Center, nearly 63 percent of citizens believed that none of the parties participating in the elections represented their interests (Freedom House, 2024). Likewise, aul akims are still dependent on higher governments in various areas and cannot make crucial decisions without the approval of higher authorities (Zhumashov, 2023).
Nevertheless, there is some progress to mention. V-dem’s “Local government index” demonstrated minor improvements from 0.02 in 2022 to 0.15 in 2024 (V-dem, 2024). This shows that elected governments at local levels increased their scope of operation without interference from unelected bodies.
Despite some progress, grand challenges persist in rural governance of Kazakhstan – uneven level of local budget; weak civil society and citizen engagement; problems in management of state funds.
Figure 1. V-dem Local government index
Source: V-dem (2025). Note: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?
Different capacity for independent budget leads to uneven growth
The government introduced an independent fourth level budget for rural settlements in 2018, initially for those with a population of more than 2,000, and extended it in 2020 to include all rural units, regardless of population size (Zhumashov, 2023). Local budgets are primarily funded by five types of taxes: individual income tax, property tax for individuals, vehicle tax, land tax, and fees for the placement of outdoor advertising, along with fines and other sources of revenue. However, this system has further exacerbated inequality across rural areas.
The average budget of a rural district is approximately 107 million tenge, but there is a significant disparity depending on factors such as population size and the local economy (Alzhanov, 2022). For instance, the smallest local government budget is just 2.8 million tenge, while the largest can reach as high as 2.5 billion tenge (Adilet, 2021). This inequality is largely driven by factors such as population size, geographical location, and proximity to urban centers. This leads to uneven development of rural settlements within regions.
Weak civil society to monitor public goods provision
Along with the election of rural akims (village mayors), they are expected to be actively engaged with citizens and community members. However, some village akims report a lack of citizen engagement when it comes to addressing local issues. This has led rural akims to involve active and loyal community members in local meetings, which function as consultative bodies at the rural level (Zhumashov, 2023).
There are, however, positive examples of civil society initiatives in rural areas. In the Kyzylorda region, for instance, the initiative group Dostyk, with the help of a 500,000 tenge grant, assisted residents of the Zhalagash district in tackling the widespread garbage pollution and preparing for the heating season (Zholdybalina et al., 2022).
Despite such examples, civil society and citizens remain largely passive when it comes to implementing social services and engaging with the rural akim. They are expected to oversee the provision of public goods and services at the rural level. This is crucial as the government has allocated substantial budgets to renovate infrastructure. The government has adopted a development concept for rural areas for the period 2023-2027, which includes programs such as Ak Bulak (clean water) and Aul El Besigi (Village Trust). Notably, the funding for the Aul – El Besigi program reached a staggering $415.6 million in 2023, aimed at renovating roads, building new schools and medical facilities, and upgrading water and sewage systems (Najibullah, 2023).
This ambitious program requires active citizen engagement and civil society involvement to ensure proper implementation by private providers and to mitigate risks of corruption and rent-seeking behavior.
(Mis) management of state funds
Although the state provides technical equipment and machinery to rural akim apparatuses, these assets are often transferred to private management under trust arrangements. The rural akim apparatus cannot retain such assets—such as tractors and vehicles—on its balance sheet due to a lack of qualified personnel to operate and maintain them. As a result, state resources are used inefficiently. The akim apparatus can only access these technical assets by leasing them from private partners, who typically prioritize their own interests and often use the equipment for personal benefit. Meanwhile, rural akims face chronic budget shortages, limiting their ability to regularly utilize these resources.
At the same time, responsibilities such as maintaining water pipelines and managing electricity networks are assigned to the rural akim apparatus, even though it lacks the necessary staff to perform these tasks. Akims are therefore compelled to hire personnel specifically to oversee these essential public services.
Another major issue arises from the rigid adherence to centralized planning by higher executive bodies, which often ignore local context and changing public needs. In northern rural settlements, for instance, out-migration is leading to population decline. Yet infrastructure projects—such as water pipelines—are implemented based on plans drawn up a decade earlier, without adjusting to current realities. Despite a shrinking population, significant state funds continue to be spent on these declining villages due to inflexible planning procedures. This misallocation affects not only water supply but also road construction and public education services. For example, the state may renovate schools in villages with a limited number of school students, while ignoring the needs of more viable and growing communities.
In sum, while there has been some progress in rural governance, significant challenges remain. Without addressing these issues, the introduction of direct elections at the rural level may exacerbate socio-economic disparities, deepen corruption, and fail to improve service delivery due to weak civil society and limited citizen engagement in oversight.
It is therefore recommended that business actors receiving substantial state subsidies and funding for agriculture be legally required to participate in corporate social responsibility initiatives. This could positively influence the fourth-tier rural budget and promote corporate involvement in monitoring and improving public service provision in rural Kazakhstan.
References
Alzhanov, D. (2022) Kazakhstan: The Visibility of Local Self-Government Reforms Only Multiplies Problems in the Regions
Adilet (2021) On the draft Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On approval of the Concept of development of local self-government in the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2030” https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P2100000420
CEC (2021) Central Election Commitee of Kazakhstan’s information booklet on elections https://www.election.gov.kz/upload/docs/2024/info_sbornik/%D0%98%D0%A1%20_%20%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81.pdf
Cornell, S. E. and Barro, A. (2022). “Kazakhstan’s June Referendum: Accelerating Reform.” The Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst. Caucasus. https://www.cacianalyst.org/resources/220531-FT-Kazreferendum.pdf
Freedom House (2024). Country Report for Kazakhstan. https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/nations-transit/2024
Najibullah, F. (2023) Kazakhstan Pours Money Into Rural Development To Try And Slow
Migration To Cities https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-rural-investment-migration/32638397.html
V-dem (2025) Local government index for Kazakhstan https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/
Zholdybalina, A., Akhmetzharov, S., & Toktarov, E. (2022). Local Communities in Rural Areas as a Form of Civic Engagement: Problems and Prospects. Kazakhstan-Spectrum, 104(4).
Zhumashov, Y. (2023). An Exploration of Vertical and Social Accountability in the Elected Tier of Local Government: Evidence from Kazakhstan. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 14(2), 179-193.