© CABAR - Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting
Please make active links to the source, when using materials from this website

New Realities of the Afghan Direction in Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy

“If we consider Afghanistan not as a neighbor of the region, but as a country in the region, then close cultural, trade and economic ties will contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in the country,” notes Umarbek Nuriddinov, a Senior student of the “International Relations” Department of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Tashkent) and a participant of the CABAR.asia School of Analytics, in an article written specifically for CABAR.asia


The coming to power of the Taliban (a banned terrorist organization in Central Asia – ed. note) in Afghanistan had a significant impact on the situation in Central Asia and on relations with Uzbekistan. It can be noted that over the past five years, Uzbekistan has seen in the Afghan direction of foreign policy rather economic prospects, from which Tashkent’s flexible and restrained rhetoric towards the Taliban is based.

Peculiar features of the Afghan policy of Uzbekistan from 2017 to the coming of the Taliban to power

President Sh. Mirziyoyev continued to adhere to the principles laid down under I. Karimov – multi-vector, refusal to join military-political blocs and prevent the deployment of Uzbek troops outside the country, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Seeing a number of areas for cooperation in Afghanistan, Sh. Mirziyoyev adapted them to new realities:

  • viewing Afghanistan as a potential opportunity to build bridges between Central and South Asia.
  • involvement of Afghanistan in trade and economic relations.
  • the use of soft power tools in Afghanistan in order to form a positive image of Uzbekistan.

This approach of Sh. Mirziyoyev is due to the fact that not Afghanistan itself is a threat, but the terrorist groups that have settled on its territory because of the civil war pose a threat to the regional security of Central Asia.

Another feature of Uzbekistan’s new Afghan policy is that Tashkent began to view Afghanistan as part of Central Asia. If one considers Afghanistan not as a neighbor of the region, but as a country in the region, then close cultural, trade and economic ties will contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in the country. At the same time, Uzbekistan took a course towards close cooperation with the countries of Central Asia, the creation of a security belt around the Central Asian region, which will help to resolve other issues in the region. In this way, the policy of Sh. Mirziyoyev is very pragmatic, which corresponds to the realities of today.

Currently, the Taliban are ready for dialogue with their neighbors in the region. On November 18 of the current year, following the meeting of the Uzbekistan-EU Cooperation Council, the recognition of the Taliban Movement by Uzbekistan was raised. Recognition of the Taliban should depend on the following conditions: the creation of a government based on a broad representation of all groups, ensuring fundamental human rights, pursuing a good-neighborly policy, combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime.

Accordingly, in the issue of recognizing the Taliban, Uzbekistan will rely on the position of the UN. The international community must come to a decision that the Taliban will be able to establish order in the country and fulfill their promises.

Economic, energy and transport-logistics cooperation

Uzbekistan’s interests in Afghanistan are focused largely on two aspects of cooperation: economic and transport-logistics. Given its landlocked status, Uzbekistan is focusing on a breakthrough to South Asia. As it is known, Afghanistan has prospects for connecting two large regions – Central and South Asia. In his Address to the Oliy Majlis of the  Republic of Uzbekistan in 2018, Sh. Mirziyoyev noted that stabilization in Afghanistan is directly linked to its economic development.

Table 1.

Source: State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics

Table 1 allows us to see that over the past three years, the trade turnover between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan has shown a slight increase. Afghanistan is one of the largest sales markets for Uzbekistan. If we compare the foreign trade turnover between the two countries in January – June 2020, it amounted to 333.0 million USD, while in the same period in 2021  it increased to 351.9 million USD.

The export goods of Uzbekistan are food products and live animals, drinks, tobacco, non-food raw materials, except for fuel, mineral fuel, lubricating oils and similar materials (including electricity), animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes, chemicals, industrial goods, and transport equipment. Imported goods are food products and live animals, as well as non-food raw materials, except for fuel.

In November 2020, the Resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On measures to further expand and strengthen economic cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” was adopted. In addition to the post of Special Representative for Afghanistan I. Ergashev, the post of Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was also introduced into the structure of the central office of the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade, and at the same time he was appointed Director of the Directorate of the Free Trade Zone “International Trade Center Termez”. This fact suggests that Uzbekistan is ready not only to intensify trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, but also harmonizes the activities of state structures for this.

Uzbekistan has been implementing its energy policy in Afghanistan since 2002, when the export of electricity to Afghanistan was restored and the supply of electricity to the largest city in northern Afghanistan, Mazar-i-Sharif, was established, and the capital of Kabul was supplied with electricity twenty-four seven. An advantage in this direction is the supply of energy by Uzbekistan, even in winter.

On October 20 of the current year, an agreement was signed between the ADB and Afghanistan in the presence of an Uzbek delegation on financing the power transmission line – Surkhan – Puli, the construction of which has not yet been completed. If the project is implemented, Afghanistan will be provided with electricity, which will contribute to the development of industry. Also, this power line will unite the power system of Afghanistan and Central Asia. For Uzbekistan, the implementation of the project brings additional financial benefits, and for Afghanistan – the possibility of uninterrupted supply of electricity to its facilities.

Uzbekistan is taking decisive steps to implement infrastructure projects. On February 2 of the current year, representatives of Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan discussed the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway.

Uzbekistan faced two choices: designing the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat-Mashhad and Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railways. The development of the first railway is beneficial for Uzbekistan due to gaining access to 11 international ports. The second direction Mazar-i-Sharif – Kabul – Peshawar (Kabul corridor) will become a link between Central and South Asia. The choice fell on the second project, which was due to the fact that the first infrastructure, if built, would pave the way to Iran, which is under US sanctions. And in the case of the Kabul corridor, this is the shortest path that will save funding and act as a connecting bridge with Russia, Pakistan, and India. If the Kabul corridor is implemented, Uzbekistan will enter South Asia, and will also achieve diversification of trade and transport routes.

The project promises economic benefits not only for Uzbekistan, but also for all countries of Central Asia. However, the ongoing political uncertainty in Afghanistan, in the first place, prevents Uzbekistan from realizing its project of the century.

The state of cultural and humanitarian cooperation between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan

In the era of globalization, in addition to military power, states also use soft power, which is dictated by the fact that in Afghanistan, Uzbeks are the fourth largest ethnic group. Relative data on the number of ethnic groups in Afghanistan differ due to the lack of a census among Afghans against the backdrop of the outbreak of war. So, according to the data given by Britannica, there are about 2 million Uzbeks in Afghanistan. In an article published by the Italian Institute for International Policy Studies (ISPI) in 2021, the number of Uzbeks in Afghanistan is 4 million. In this connection, the initiatives of Tashkent on the implementation of educational projects, in particular the study and development of the Uzbek language, find their support among the Uzbeks in Afghanistan.

At the Tashkent high-level international conference on Afghanistan “Peace process, security cooperation and regional interaction”, which took place from 26 to 27 March 2018, the head of Uzbekistan put forward an initiative to create an international fund to support education in Afghanistan, which is aimed at combating with the ideology of extremism and radicalism through education. This approach looks much more effective in comparison with the forceful methods of resolving the situation.

On a practical level, the following initiatives stand out:

  1. An Educational Center for training Afghan citizens has been established in the city of Termez. The main task of the Center is to train qualified personnel in educational programs of higher, secondary specialized and vocational education, improve the qualifications of specialists in various fields. In 2018-2019, 96 students were educated at the Center in the direction of “Uzbek language and literature”, who were awarded bachelor’s degrees from the Tashkent State University of Uzbek Language and Literature named after Alisher Navoi. Despite the internal political ambiguity in Afghanistan, 35 Afghans returned to study at this Center in September this year, including many 3rd and 4th year students. This is due to the fact that Afghan students have multiple entry visas, which make it easier for them to cross the border.
  2. At the end of 2020, a technical and vocational education and training (TVET) program in the field of agronomy was launched, which involves training women from Afghanistan in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as part of the regional project “Supporting the economic empowerment of Afghan women through education and training in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan”, funded by the European Union (EU) and implemented by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). On December 14, 2020, the first group of 10 women arrived in Uzbekistan. However, in connection with the recent events in Afghanistan, it is not yet clear how the issue of training Afghan women in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will be promoted.

After the Taliban came to power in Kabul, reports spread in the mass media that the Uzbek language was deprived of the status of the state language. However, all doubts about this were dispelled by the special representative of the President of Uzbekistan I. Irgashev, who in his interview to RIA-Novosti (news agency company) stressed that the Taliban are now busy developing a new Constitution, and before its adoption they are using the Constitution, which was in force until 2001. It prescribed two official languages: Pashto and Dari. The reaction of the Uzbek Foreign Ministry was balanced, since interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan could cause discontent among the Taliban, and possibly even negatively affect bilateral relations. In this aspect, two scenarios for the development of events can be considered:

  1. The Taliban will end cooperation with Uzbekistan on education. In this case, the Afghan policy of Uzbekistan will be limited only by economic, energy, transport and communication ties, and cultural ties will be terminated.
  2. Uzbekistan will finance educational projects to study the Uzbek language and literature, which will contribute to the formation of a favorable climate and a positive image of the country in Afghanistan.

Thus, while against the background of the current political uncertainty in Afghanistan, the implementation of educational projects between the two countries has been suspended.

Geopolitical analysis

The new updated foreign policy of Tashkent in the Afghan direction found support among the Afghan people. It should be noted that Uzbekistan is not burdened with a negative historical legacy in Afghanistan and has a positive image among the main Afghan forces and the general population.

The role of Tashkent in the Afghan direction also depends on how global players react to its role. The Afghan conflict is so multifaceted that the interests of both international and regional actors are intertwined in it. In this context, the peaceful, constructive foreign policy pursued by Uzbekistan, including in Afghanistan, does not affect the interests of other actors. Uzbekistan, moving closer to one of the centers of power, will not move away from the other, and vice versa. Therefore, the participation of Uzbekistan in the peaceful regulation of the Afghan conflict is welcomed by the world community, in particular, the United States, Russia, China and Pakistan.

The United States welcomes the initiatives of Tashkent, which are aimed at involving Afghanistan in the economic life of the Central Asian region. Thus, the United States tried to shift the role of the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan onto the region itself. The creation in July of this year of a group from the US-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan-Pakistan is aimed at resolving the Afghan conflict. The entry of Uzbekistan into this row, along with Pakistan and the United States, increased its importance in the settlement of the Afghan conflict.

In the foreseeable future, the importance of Uzbekistan to the United States may increase. This is evidenced by the visit of congressmen to the United States in October this year. Officials of the United States claim that Uzbekistan stood up on the priority list after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is seen as a country uniquely positioned to help the United States address regional security issues in the future.

The participation of Uzbekistan in the Afghan field is positively perceived by Russia since the positions of the two states are largely similar. First, both states place an emphasis on ensuring regional security, curbing the threats of terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and the influx of refugees. Both Russia and Uzbekistan are interested in preserving the security of the region. Secondly, as noted by the expert in Afghanistan studies A. Knyazev, in the short term, the role of Russia as a guarantor of the security of the Central Asian region will remain. In this regard, it can be argued that the similarity of positions and common interests between Russia and Uzbekistan allows Tashkent to actively participate in the peaceful resolution of the Afghan conflict.

In this context, the PRC also has a positive attitude to Uzbekistan’s participation in the peaceful resolution of the Afghan conflict. The PRC has a positive attitude to the infrastructure projects put forward by Uzbekistan. In particular, the PRC agreed to join the development of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway project. Thus, we can state that China welcomes the steps of Uzbekistan aimed at the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Regarding Pakistan, in the 1990s, its position on the situation in Afghanistan differed from that of Uzbekistan. If Uzbekistan supported the Northern Alliance, then Pakistan supported the Taliban. From 2017 until today, the positions of the two countries on the settlement of the Afghan conflict have come closer. In this connection, Pakistan is not irritated by the participation of Tashkent, since its economic initiatives promise benefits to Pakistan, which is extremely interested in establishing trade and economic ties between the two regions. The long-awaited goal of Pakistan is that since the 90s of the last century it has been trying to find way into the Central Asian region, which is rich in natural and energy resources.

Within the Central Asian region, Tajikistan has a “special” position towards the Taliban. However, despite the rhetoric of Dushanbe condemning the actions of the Taliban, one can note similarities in the positions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in relation to Afghanistan: these are calls for the implementation of the Doha Agreements, in particular, the creation of an inclusive coalition government in this country, and observance of human rights.

Summing up, we can say that the peaceful, balanced, constructive foreign policy of Tashkent, which also manifests itself in the Afghan direction, is conducive to being in the circle of the participants in the Afghan conflict. These interrelated tasks are reflected in the Action Strategy for the five priority areas of development of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2017-2021. Tashkent’s Afghan policy can help end the conflict in the long-suffering country.

Conclusions

During the period of Sh. Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan is realizing opportunities for establishing long-term peace in Afghanistan and developing economic cooperation. The use of diplomatic contacts, initiatives, conferences initiated by the head of state, contacts with the Taliban allowed Uzbekistan to play the role of a participant interested in resolving the Afghan issue. The renewed policy and initiatives of Tashkent in the Afghan direction found a response within Afghanistan. This is evidenced by the established relations, regular contacts with representatives of the Taliban government. It is important that Uzbekistan is not burdened with negative historical experience of destructive interaction and has a rather positive image. The role of Uzbekistan is very positively assessed by the world community, which once again forms a positive image in the international arena.

Thus, Tashkent should continue the course it has begun with regard to Afghanistan. In addition, the integration of Afghanistan into the Central Asian region and the promotion of its economic development will give impetus to strengthening regional cooperation and minimizing threats from Afghanistan.

At the same time, Uzbekistan should continue to conduct a dialogue between the CSTO and the SCO. Flexible and soft rhetoric with the Taliban will allow Tashkent to agree on the construction of both power transmission lines and railways. Currently, Uzbekistan should continue economic, energy, transport relations, including to prevent the transformation of Afghanistan into a rogue state.

 

Spelling error report
The following text will be sent to our editors: