“The only factor that makes the likelihood of increased terrorist attacks is the ineffective manner in which the Central Asian governments deal with radicalization and violent extremism. The issue has been misdiagnosed and consequently has been mistreated for many years.”, – states independent researcher Nurbek Bekmurzaev in his article for CABAR.asia.
The most important news of August 2021 in the world was the swift collapse of the Afghan government and the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban. As immediate neighbors of Afghanistan, the Central Asian countries found themselves in a precarious security situation similar to that of 1996, when the Taliban took over Afghanistan for the first time and turned the country into a hotbed in international terrorism. As the result, Central Asia became a target of numerous terrorist attacks and bore the dire consequences of the first Taliban rule. Thus, the return of the Taliban raised significant security concerns over the threat of spillover of extremist ideology and increased terrorist attacks in Central Asia.
This article addresses this particular security concern and seeks to answer the following question: Will Central Asia experience an increase in terrorist activity as the result of the Taliban takeover and rule over Afghanistan?
Will the history repeat itself?
Three Central Asian countries, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan share a land border with Afghanistan, which is 2,387 km long.[1] The porous nature of this border was felt between 1996 and 2001, when the Taliban ruled over Afghanistan and provided a safe haven for terrorist organizations linked to Central Asia. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) took advantage of this poorly guarded borders and launched terrorist attacks in early 2000s in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[2] The memories of those attacks are still fresh, and the return of the Taliban has raised legitimate concerns over the threat of another series of menacing terrorist attacks in Central Asia.
It has been only half a year since the Taliban came to power, and it is too early to make any definitive remarks in this regard. Indeed, the easiest thing to do in this situation would be to look at the past and state that the Taliban takeover will surely have adverse effects on Central Asia in terms of increase of extremist ideology and terrorist activity.
However, making any decision based on this easily available answer would mean ignoring the time period of twenty years (2001-2021), during which the Taliban, terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan, Central Asia, geopolitical landscape in the region, and the security situation have all considerably changed. The situation has altered to the point where expecting the repetition of the events from twenty years ago would be a grave mistake with regards to forecasting possible developments.
Providing realistic and grounded answer to the above-mentioned question and accurate forecast of the situation requires adopting a comprehensive approach that looks at various factors. In this regard, there are three main factors that will define the threat of increased terrorist activity in Central Asia emanating from the Taliban ruled Afghanistan.
Threats emanating from terrorist organizations in Afghanistan
First, much will depend on the terrorist organizations with links to Central Asia that are currently based in Afghanistan. According to the 2021 UN report, there are over 10,000 foreign fighters in Afghanistan, belonging to various terrorist organizations such as the IMU, Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), al-Qaeda, Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad (KTW), and Jamaat Ansarullo (JA) (All of them are officially recognized as terrorist organizations by the Central Asian states; their activity is banned by the law).[3] The presence of such a large group of foreign fighters in a loosely controlled territory, which is ruled by their ally terrorist organization, has indeed increased the scale of concerns over the possibility of increased terrorist activity in Central Asia.
However, their mere presence in Afghanistan is not enough to draw sensible conclusions. Their experiences, agendas, membership bases, operational capacities, and relations with the Taliban are important variables in configuring the degree of threat they pose to the governments and peoples of Central Asia. What is required in this case is the analysis of all the terrorist organizations with the prior history and current day capacity, autonomy, and agenda to launch terrorist attacks in the region. Specifically, the subjects of analysis are the IMU, IJU, JA, KIB, KTW, and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP).[4] Indeed, these organizations have transformed, their leaderships have changed, and their agendas have shifted according to their operational capacities and opportunities available to them. Understanding if the Taliban ruling over Afghanistan will wreak havoc in Central Asia requires a deeper understanding of all these terrorist groups.
The most notorious Central Asian terrorist organization, the IMU, now finds itself in a position of reclusion and frailty. The IMU is no longer a formidable force it was twenty years ago when its members wreaked havoc in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with the series of bombings, armed incursions, and kidnappings in the early 2000s.[5] Its initial founders, Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namanganiy are long dead. In 2015, the Taliban murdered its leader Usman Ghazi and several hundred IMU members for pledging allegiance to the IS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and thus siding with their fiercest enemies.[6] Without leadership, a small membership base of only 150 people, including women and children, and under strict control of the Taliban, it seems unlikely that the IMU will be able to regroup and restore sufficient capacity to mount any serious attacks on Central Asia.[7]
Some terrorist organizations with links to Central Asia do not pose an immediate threat to the region, albeit having the capacity and membership base for such purposes. These groups are KIB, KTW, and ISKP. In contrast to the IMU and JA, which were driven by the hatred towards the Karimov and Rahmon regimes and pursued their collapse, the al-Qaeda linked KIB and KTW, consisting of mostly ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Uyghurs, are ideologically and physically integrated into the global jihad, with goals of establishing a global caliphate and currently fighting the Assad forces and Iranian militias in the Syrian province of Idlib.[8] As of now, these terrorist organizations are focused on grandeur jihad aimed at building a transnational state and engaged in military conflicts abroad. Central Asia does not seem to be a priority battle ground for these groups now.
This does not mean that Central Asia will not be a target of these organizations, but to highlight the fact that launching terrorist attacks in the region does not rank high among its priorities. The ISKP, which has also had a considerable number of Central Asian foreign fighters, since its establishment in 2015, has been under heavy attack both by the Afghan army and the Taliban. Its members are now scattered, operational capacity is severely limited, and the prospects of gaining traction are gloomy. These factors limit the ISKP’s ability to mount any serious terrorist attacks in Central Asia in the near future.
The IMU’s spinoff organization, the IJU, has much better relations with the Taliban. When the IMU switched sides in the 2015, the IJU leaders went in opposite direction and renewed their allegiance to the Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.[9] Also, the IJU forces have helped the Taliban to defeat the Afghan army and claim control over the strategic point in the north that is Mazari Sharif.[10] Over the years the IJU has accumulated a sizeable number of trained fighters who have extensive experience and skills to launch pretty much any kind of terrorist attacks. The IJU shot into global prominence in 2004, when its members launched multiple terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan, including bombing of the US and Israeli embassies in Tashkent.[11] As a terrorist organization with roots in Central Asia and history of multiple terrorist attacks, its presence in Afghanistan and close relations with the Taliban should certainly worry the Central Asian governments.
Similar can be said about the JA, which has roots in Tajikistan. It has launched multiple terrorist attacks in Tajikistan, including car bombing in Khujand and shootout with the government forces in the Karategin Valley.[12] The JA, also called the Tajik Taliban, is another terrorist organization that is close with the Taliban. In fact, in return for its aid in defeating the Afghan army, the Taliban has appointed the JA responsible for the control of the five northern provinces along the Afghan-Tajik border, prompting a great deal of distress from the Tajik officials.[13] Indeed, the JA is worrisome for Central Asia, and Tajikistan in particular, for the organization’s main goal has been ousting the government there. The IJU and JA have very close ties with the Taliban, which is indicative of the fact that they will be based in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future, where they will continue to receive support for training its fighters and advancing their terrorist agendas. This will certainly have adverse effect on the security situation in the region. The IJU and JA presence in Afghanistan paints a gloomy prospect with regards to potential increase of terrorist attacks in Central Asia.
Central Asian governments shooting themselves in the foot
Second, the governments of Central Asia do have an agency in shaping the future landscape in the security field. A lot will depend on the regional governments’ ability to diagnose issues, identify factors leading to radicalization and violent extremism, and develop as well as continuously implement a comprehensive set of PVE/CVE measures.
Of course, the Taliban’s arrival to power, which is seen by extremists around the world as the victory over the infidels and taken as inspiration, will certainly have its effects on radicals and extremists in Central Asia. Even before they ousted the Afghan government, it was a source of great inspiration for extremists in the region, as it was the case with the homegrown terrorist organization in Kyrgyzstan, Jaishul Mahdi, which pledged allegiance to the Taliban’s Mullah Omar.
However, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the local context, especially when looking at the threat of spillover of extremist ideology. Radicalization and recruitment to extremist organizations takes place against the background of social, economic, and political situation, and Central Asia is no exception to this rule. People in Central Asia are not idle zombies or brainwashed individuals ready to receive commands from some terrorists based in Afghanistan and commit atrocities in their home communities. The way how Central Asia governments address people’s everyday grievances in social and economic spheres as well as how comprehensively they tackle the issue of PVE/CVE will be another deciding factor in forecasting the frequency and intensity of terrorist activity in Central Asia.
So far, the Central Asian governments have done a poor job of properly identifying radicalization factors and addressing them in comprehensive manner. Thus, it would not be a farfetched conclusion to state that the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan is more likely to ramp up radicalization and recruitment to extremist organizations. There are several reasons for such a claim.
First, one of the main factors of radicalization has been the authoritarian nature of regimes in the region and repressive methods used by the security services in application to unsanctioned forms of religious activity. More often than not the authorities conflate religiosity and piousness with radicalism and threat. This has led to the persecution of numerous individuals whose practice of religion did not correspond to the state drawn frame of what religion was and how it should be practiced, a practice inherited from the heavily intrusive and atheistic Soviet system.
This radicalization factor has been on display in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, although the situation with religious freedom in Uzbekistan seems to be improving under Mirziyoyev. The case on point is the Jaslyk prison in Uzbekistan, which was closed down in September 2019, a penitentiary institution used for locking up political prisoners and those whose practice of religion did not align with the government interpretation of faith – they served lengthy sentences for religious extremism. For many years Jaslyk was infamous for the extended and routine use of torture. Additionally, the Central Asian regimes have learned to exaggerate and manipulate the issue of radicalization and violent extremism in their schemes to eliminate opponents.
Secondly, none of the Central Asian states has implemented reforms that would bring transparency and accountability to government processes and introduce mechanisms for genuine inclusion and representation of all ethnic, regional, and social groups. The latest research on radicalization suggests that poverty and lack of education are not the main factors. Instead, what seems to be more important is whether citizens trust their governments and can see themselves having a voice and opportunity to bring change in their communities.[14] Sadly, these factors have been vastly absent with the promotion of strictly nationalist nation-building agendas, which excluded ethnic minorities, and the establishment of corrupt and nepotist systems across Central Asia, which has created and cemented widespread injustice. None of the PVE/CVE national strategies adopted by the Central Asian states recognizes these issues as factors of radicalizations and tries to tackle them.
The combination of such ineffective PVE/CVE measures with the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, which promises to be an even bigger inspiration for radicals in the region in the years to come serves as an alarm of likely increase in radicalization, recruitment to violent extremist organizations, and eventually terrorist attacks.
Engagement with the Taliban as a key to mitigating the threat of terrorism
Third, the level of terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan will be determined by the geopolitical landscape and the engagement of the Central Asian states and other powerful actors in the region and beyond with the Taliban. The governments of Central Asian states can shape their own security situation by continuously engaging with the Taliban in political and economic spheres.
What is equally important is how the regional powers view the Taliban rule and how much political and economic support they are ready to provide and stabilize the regime, in order to prevent another civil war in Afghanistan. With the US seemingly out of the picture, Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan will be the biggest actors in the new geopolitical landscape, who will decide on the fate of the Taliban regime and Afghanistan overall in terms of it becoming either a hotbed of international terrorism or stable country apt of providing its neighbors with security guarantees.
In contrast to the first time the Taliban took over Afghanistan when viewed the organization strictly as foes, a much different approach has been exercised by the Central Asian governments since the Taliban came to power in August 2021. Although none of the regional states has officially recognized the Taliban, all Central Asian states, except for Tajikistan, have been engaging and making it known that they are interested to cooperate with the Taliban. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been particularly keen to carry on the political and economic engagement, for Afghanistan provides them with strategic opportunities for trade and transit routes connecting Central and South Asia. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have vested interests in Afghanistan via the major electricity CASA-1000, which would allow these two countries to export electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Uzbekistan has bet on Afghanistan to overcome its double landlocked dilemma by gaining access to ports in Karachi, Pakistan, for trade and transit purposes. Turkmenistan is also interested in stable Afghanistan, since the major gas pipeline TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) project will allow the country to reach new large markets and diversify its energy exports.[15] Thus, it is in in the best interests of all these Central Asian countries’ to continually engage with the Taliban and ensure the stability of its regime.
In addition to Central Asian governments, Russia, main security guarantor of Central Asia, and China, who is starting to ramp up its military presence in the region, have also been engaging with the Taliban, in order to better control the situation. Of course, such engagement and support come at the price of the Taliban promising to remove terrorist organizations from the territory of Afghanistan and not to allow any terrorist organizations to launch terrorist attacks from the Afghan territory.
However, it is not engagement alone that promises to keep the terrorist organizations at bay. Russia operates two military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China operates a military base in Tajikistan, it is now in the process of building the second base.[16] These hard security measures are present for scenarios if the Taliban turns their back on the promises and opens the door for terrorist organizations to launch terrorist attacks in Central Asia. The previous experience shows that demonizing the Taliban and distancing from Afghanistan is most likely to have significant adverse effects on the security situation. This time around the Central Asian states, backed by the regional powers, have chosen to engage with the Taliban, carving out themselves an agency for mitigating the terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. This is a pragmatic and promising development that should make the region less prone to terrorist attacks.
Conclusions and recommendations
In conclusion, it is too early to ring the bell and claim that the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan will necessarily lead to increased terrorist activity of unprecedented scale in Central Asia. The terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan with the capacity to launch terrorist attacks seem to be well under control of the Taliban, who will not jeopardize their standing and relations with their northern neighbors by letting them loose and blessing terrorist attacks in Central Asia.
Political and economic engagement with the Taliban promises to yield positive results with regards to being in touch with the main actor in the country and having renewed guarantees from the Taliban to tame various terrorist organizations with an eye on Central Asia. Central Asian and regional powers are exchanging economic engagement for security guarantees with the Taliban.
The only factor that makes the likelihood of increased terrorist attacks is the ineffective manner in which the Central Asian governments deal with radicalization and violent extremism. The issue has been misdiagnosed and consequently has been mistreated for many years. Instead of addressing the widespread corruption, increasing transparency and accountability, and building inclusive and participatory government practices, the authorities in Central Asia have continued to violate human rights, restrict civic freedoms of the population, and alienate ethnic minorities.
In this regard, following recommendations are made to the governments of the Central Asian states:
- Revise the national strategies for preventing and combatting violent extremism at home. The current day PVE/CVE mechanisms are largely divorced from the nature and driving factors of radicalization and violent extremism.
- Continue political and economic engagement with the Taliban and cooperate with the organization to keep taps on the security situation while exerting pressure to retain tight control over terrorist organizations with links to Central Asia.
- Pursue security policy from the position that Taliban has been a military insurgency group with no prior record and experience of long-term peaceful and stable rule. Its leaders may have transformed in the last twenty years and may seek to peacefully rule over the country, but its main body consists of war hardened fighters and its territory is filled with terrorist organizations whose members have done nothing but wage war for the last twenty years. In practice, for the Central Asian countries this would translate into strengthening border patrol units and enhancing capacities of national counter-terrorism agencies.
[1] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Securing Central Asia’s Borders with Afghanistan,” August 2007, https://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20yellow_paper__no%20maps_16.09.17.pdf
[2] Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and State in Post-Soviet Central Asia, 2007, Berkeley: University of California Press.
[3] Uran Botobekov, “Implications of ISIS-Taliban Rivalry for Central Asian Jihad,” 5 November 2021, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/11/05/dilemma-of-central-asian-jihadists-between-isk-and-taliban/
[4] All of them are officially recognized as terrorist organizations by the Central Asian states; their activity is banned by the law.
[5] Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “What is Left of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan?” 1 September 2020, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/whats-left-of-the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan/
[6] Uran Botobekov, “Implications of ISIS-Taliban Rivalry for Central Asian Jihad,” 5 November 2021, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/11/05/dilemma-of-central-asian-jihadists-between-isk-and-taliban/
[7] Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “What is Left of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan?” 1 September 2020, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/whats-left-of-the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan/
[8] Uran Botobekov, “How the Taliban Victory Inspired Central Asian Jihadists,” 17 September 2021, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/17/how-taliban-victory-inspired-central-asian-jihadists/
[9] Uran Botobekov, “How the Taliban Victory Inspired Central Asian Jihadists,” 17 September 2021, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/17/how-taliban-victory-inspired-central-asian-jihadists/
[10] Ibid.
[11] Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright, “The Evolving Role of Uzbek-Led Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” August 2009, Combating Terrorism Center, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-evolving-role-of-uzbek-led-fighters-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/
[12] Igor Rotar, “Islamic Extremist Group Jamaat Ansarullah Overcomes Tajikistan’s Inter-Tribal Conflicts,” 25 September 2012, Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-extremist-group-jamaat-ansarullah-overcomes-tajikistans-inter-tribal-conflicts/
[13] Uran Botobekov, “How the Taliban Victory Inspired Central Asian Jihadists,” 17 September 2021, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/17/how-taliban-victory-inspired-central-asian-jihadists/
[14] Anna Matveeva and Antonion Guistozzi, “The Central Asian Militants: Cannon Fodder of Global Jihadism or Revolutionary Guard?”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 29:2, 189-206.
[15] Richard Weitz, “Central Asia’s Taliban Surprise,” 16 September 2021, MEI@75, https://www.mei.edu/publications/central-asias-taliban-surprise
[16] Uran Botobekov, “The Deadliest Enemies: China’s Overseas Military Bases in Central Asia and Uygurs’ Turkestan Islamic Party,” 9 December 2021, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/12/09/the-deadliest-enemies-chinas-overseas-military-bases-in-central-asia-and-uyghurs-turkestan-islamic-party/