What motivated the snap presidential elections in Kazakhstan? How did the recent military conflict affect social consolidation in Kyrgyzstan? What will happen to Tajikistani citizens who have been repatriated from Syria? Why is the importance of Uzbekistan for China growing? These and other questions on Central Asia have been discussed by foreign press articles in the past month.
Snap Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan: Democratization or Autocracy?
An article by the Jamestown Foundation analyses what prompted Tokayev’s decision to hold early presidential elections in November and change the constitutional five-year terms of presidency into a single seven-year term, which will allow him to stay in power until the end of the decade.
The first motivation for Tokayev’s decision, according to the author Nurbek Bekmurzaev, is to use the “reserve of political trust” that he and his team still have before it might be too late. Tokayev’s handling of the January protests and his efforts to distance himself from Nazarbayev, including arresting or replacing high-level officials loyal to the former president, has provided him with much-awaited political legitimacy. To further increase his popularity, he promised to raise the minimum wage and open bank accounts for all children, which will accrue half the income of the Kazakhstan National Fund until they turn 18 years old and renamed the capital back to “Astana”.
Secondly, Tokayev pushed for early elections based on the growing uncertainty he faces both at home and beyond. The fast pace and unpredictable nature of such developments—including the war against Ukraine and Astana’s falling out with Moscow—did not bode well for his chances to win the presidential elections in 2024. Regional experts generally agree that “tight timeframes will prevent competitive alternative candidates from challenging the incumbent’s rule”.
Bleak political careers and public standings of other presidential candidates suggest the strictly formal and ambitionless nature of their bids. Therefore, these elections seem to have been scheduled early to negate the threat of a different, more competitive opponent. Tokayev’s reign after the events of January 2022 has consisted of dismissing high-level officials and trials over oligarchs who have made their political careers and fortunes under Nazarbayev. Thus, the elections have been re-scheduled for this fall because of “the risks associated with the possibility of the return of the Nazarbayev clan to the political field”, the author states.
Why Kazakhstan is betting on cryptocurrency
La Tribune, a French weekly financial newspaper, published an opinion article by Jean-Louis Guenego discussing Kazakhstan’s rapid rise in the global crypto market. In October, Binance, the cryptocurrency exchange, has obtained its license to operate in the territory of Kazakhstan. The Financial Services Authority of Astana granted Binance the status of a regulated platform, which can now operate as a provider of digital assets.
In a few years, Kazakhstan has indeed established itself as one of the world leaders in bitcoin mining, with no less than 18% of the hashrate (the hash rate, or mining speed, which depends on the computing power of computers concerned) of the planet – which positions the country in the second place behind the United States – and ahead of China which, in September 2021, banned mining when it previously represented 65% of the global hashrate. A substantial proportion of Chinese miners then moved to Kazakhstan.
Aware of the potential of this new market, the Kazakh authorities have since been promoting the development of this sector. The government has developed regulations that are increasingly favorable to the sector, for example by authorizing cryptocurrency exchanges to open bank accounts. Last September, President Tokayev expressed his readiness to legalize a mechanism for converting cryptocurrencies into cash. And in July, he had already enacted new tax rates for crypto miners: a way to institutionalize this activity without imposing deterrent taxes on it.
According to the article, these developments testify to the growing interest of the Kazakh authorities for an activity which, in the long term, needs stability and visibility more than uncertainty and volatility. By framing the sector, Kazakhstan is thus promoting its sustainable expansion and establishing itself as “the” crypto hub in Central Asia and among the former USSR countries, the article states.
Kyrgyzstan: Coming together in times of crisis
International Politics and Society (IPS) journal discussed the role of military conflicts and crises in the consolidation of Kyrgyzstan’s civil society. The article states that civil society became a trusted refuge during clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, during the national revolutions and protests, as well as during emergencies such as the Covid-19 pandemic.
During the recent military conflict with Tajikistan, within just a few hours, the Kyrgyz people had consolidated their efforts to organise help, united by shared pain and suffering. More than 3,000 Kyrgyz citizens became involved in the work of the special headquarters to provide aid for the people of the Batken district. Through united effort, 393 tonnes of humanitarian aid were distributed to the victims and 287 million soms (around 3.3 million euros) were collected. Other members of the population collected money for military supplies, with ordinary citizens purchasing nine high-quality drones and training specialists in their use. More than 5.5 million soms (around 60,000 euros) were collected to provide the army with the necessary means of defence and first aid equipment.
In this light, the article states that in today’s Kyrgyzstan, there is still no structure form of cooperation between the government and society. This makes it difficult to create a genuinely united community of citizens in the country. Consequently, the weak governmental control in many areas of life, especially the economy, has meant citizens have to survive on their own without being able to rely on governmental support. This has had a negative impact both on the authority of state institutions (sometimes resulting in their status dramatically deteriorating) and on the tendency towards social fragmentation along regional, ethnic, and other lines.
The article also notes that the young people of Kyrgyzstan also play an important role in the process of consolidating civil society. According to research conducted from 2020 to 2021, a total of 85 per cent of Kyrgyz youth (aged 14–28 years) considers it extremely important to serve the community. Because of the increasing bureaucracy, the declining transparency of the mechanisms of participation in the government, young people prefer to participate in spontaneous voluntary activities and protests. It also provides young people with a sense of solidarity with their fellow citizens.
The authors conclude that institutionalised consolidation of society should be developed, which would in turn facilitate the effective development of statehood in Kyrgyzstan.
Mass Arrests of Government Critics in Escalating Crackdown on Dissent
Several human rights organisations led by the International Partnership for Human Rights (Belgium) has published a statement for the authorities in Kyrgyzstan to immediately release and drop the charges against people arrested without credible reason after speaking out against a controversial draft border agreement with neighbouring Uzbekistan.
On 23-24 October 2022, Kyrgyzstani law enforcement authorities arrested close to 30 people, among whom are civil society activists, journalists, bloggers, and human rights defenders. They have all criticised a government-negotiated draft agreement with Uzbekistan on the demarcation of parts of the border between the two countries, which have previously been un-delimitated. They have, in particular, objected to what they consider an unacceptable transfer of the territory of the Kempir-Abad water reservoir to Uzbekistan in exchange for other land. While the government has argued Kyrgyzstan will be able to co-manage the water reservoir with Uzbekistan, critics fear that the agreement might jeopardise access to water for local communities.
Those arrested face charges of preparing mass riots (under articles 36 and 278 of the Criminal Code) and risk five to ten years’ imprisonment if found guilty. Following remand hearings, most of them were placed in pre-trial detention for up to two months, while one person was placed under house arrest for health reasons. The mass arrests were marked by numerous procedural violations, as documented by the Ombudsperson’s office and NGOs. The Kyrgyzstani Ministry of Interior has claimed that those under investigation were involved in preparing and organising riots aimed at the ‘’illegal seizure of power’’. This is supposedly backed by recorded excerpts from the conversations between some of those arrested, which were circulated on the internet. However, human rights defenders pointed out that the recordings appear to have been cut, edited, and presented so as to make it sound as if the speakers were discussing plans to overthrow the government, although they were only talking about holding peaceful rallies.
As such, the human rights organisations call the government to respect the international obligations, ensure strict compliance with due process and fair trial guarantees, and allowing the Ombudsperson’s office and the public to monitor the criminal cases and the Kempir-Abad reservoir’s issue.
Small conflicts with big impact: The Tajik-Kyrgyz war no one talks about
An article from the European Journal of International Law studies the linguistic and legal implications of the Kyrgyz-Tajik military conflict in September 2022. The article questions whether the escalation of violence on the border could be qualified as an international armed conflict and whether any party could invoke the right to self-defence.
The article highlights that the narrative used by those few international actors that talk about the conflict is built around the term “border clashes”. While the use of this term might well be a policy-driven decision in order to avoid the escalation of the situation, there should be more clarity with regard to its international legal qualification. The author bases her analysis on the investigation of scarce available data to investigate whether the use of force rose to the level of armed attack as Kyrgyzstan insisted that it used retaliatory measures solely for the purpose of self-defence, invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter. Yet, neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan sent an official Article 51 letter to the President of the Security Council justifying their military actions.
The threshold for acknowledging that the situation between two (or more) states has reached the level of an international armed conflict is low. The Geneva Conventions do not provide for the definition of an armed conflict. However, the Commentary to the Geneva Conventions explains that “[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2.” It further adds, “[i]t makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces […].” Therefore, there is little doubt that at least April 2021 and September 2022 events on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border could be qualified as an international armed conflict. Yet, given that both parties sought ceasefire, concluded peace agreements (both in 2021 and already in 2022) and it seems that combat-related manoeuvres have ended, the international armed conflict between them might have already ended.
Nevertheless, the author argues that labelling the Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict merely as “border clashes” or “border skirmish” might pose some risks as the incorrect qualification creates an illusion that the situation does not require a serious reaction from the international community, which might transform sporadic and rapid escalations of violence into “unstoppable cycle of force and counterforce.” Folding the conflict and its 2021 and 2022 escalations into a narrative of “clashes” implies that the tensions between the two states will inevitably continue as no international organization or other states try to condemn the violence. The term “clashes” also suggests that it is normal to use heavy weapons and an official army to destroy civilian infrastructure to resolve local disputes. Most importantly, the wrong classification fails to hold those who authorized the use of force accountable – a very dangerous practice (as seen in the situation with Russia). Lastly, the existence of an armed conflict has an important impact on the operation of international law, namely the application of international humanitarian law. This could, for instance, give those fleeing the conflict region the right to asylum, the author explains.
Roles flip as Russians become ‘migrant workers’ in Tajikistan (for now)
Open Democracy article describes the situation in Tajikistan amidst the inflow of Russian citizens after the announcement of partial mobilisation on September 21. According to the article, while Russians have been surprised by the positive reception they’ve found in the Central Asian country, their sudden arrival has provoked different reactions among locals, including some flashbacks. While Russians say they have “relocated”, locals tend to refer to them as “guests of the capital” – but also, in a sad twist of irony, using the same derogatory term (ponaekhavshie) frequently used in Russia towards labour migrants from Central Asia. As in other Central Asian countries, the new arrivals also brought skyrocketing prices for hotels, apartments, taxis and other services.
However, as the article states, the reaction to the incoming Russians among locals was mostly positive. Locals created a guide to Dushanbe specially for their “Russian friends”, from using public transport to ordering food deliveries. Local media says that some Dushanbe residents paid for purchases made by Russians in markets and shops or provided free accommodation in their homes.
These attitudes may also in part be a legacy of the Soviet era. At a roundtable discussion in early October on employment procedures for Russian citizens, the author heard the moderator passionately comparing the recent arrivals to, first, the expansion of the Russian Empire and then the establishment of the Soviet Union in Tajikistan. These initiatives are also presented as acts of hospitality – an important element of Tajik culture. There is also hope that if the newcomers feel welcome in Tajikistan, in the long run this may change discriminatory attitudes towards Tajik labour migrants in Russia.
However, there are also Tajiks who are recentful badly Tajik migrants are treated in Russia compared to the welcome Russians have had in Tajikistan. “Many here say that Tajiks have some sort of debt towards Russians, and that we need to return it. There is this saying: ‘Russia gives us bread and salt’,” said an interviewee in the article. “But in reality we do not owe Russia anything; migrants are working hard for low salaries and in bad conditions.”
Promises and Pitfalls of Tajikistan’s Latest Repatriation Program for Islamic State Families from Syria
An article by Jamestown Foundation discusses Tajikistan’s repatriation policy in light of the repatriation of 146 of its citizens from Syria, including 42 women and 104 children on July 25. This initiative became the country’s first operation that brought back adults who traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State (IS). Previously, Tajikistan repatriated only children from Iraqi prisons in April 2019. The article explores the prospects for the prosecution, rehabilitation, and the reintegration (PRR) of these returnees based on an analysis of Tajikistan’s prior approaches in dealing with returnees from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq.
In terms of the takeaways from previous repatriation experience, the article notes that the rehabilitation process will take significant time. It has been more than three years since the last returnees came back, and the authorities insist that they remain in specialized care facilities and assert their families cannot provide the necessary specialized support. However, some reports suggest they are kept away from society out of fear of their spreading violent extremist ideas, and the majority of families have refused to accept the children out of fear of attracting unwarranted attention and harassment from security services. The newly arrived children repatriates may face a similar fate of seclusion and uncertainty as the 2019 group.
There have also been adult self-returnees, who returned on their own and took advantage of pardons, which are issued to everyone who returns to Tajikistan from conflict zones and surrenders to the authorities. The article states that, first, the decision to issue pardons was popular among Tajikistani foreign fighters who did not engage in serious crimes and feared prosecution at home, which they deem disproportionate to the actions they have committed. It is likely that there is a sizable portion of Tajiks who regret leaving for conflict zones and some may have had minimal engagement with terrorist organizations even while abroad. Second, the most self-returnees can hope for with regards to their PRR is to receive a pardon instead of serving prison sentences. The government has abstained from providing them with any serious support and civil society does not seem to have access, means or the desire to work with them. Managing mental trauma, stigma and discrimination, employment and educational opportunities, and constant surveillance and harassment from the security services falls on the shoulders of self-returnees. If the authorities apply a similar approach to the newly repatriated women and children, the prospects of success for their PRR are not high.
The article concludes that Tajikistan faces a new and yet similar challenge of PRR for repatriates from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. The government understands that traveling to conflict zones does not automatically make someone a threat to national security and that disproportionate punishments may do more harm than good. In addition, there is ample knowledge to make better informed decisions and a comprehensive plan to follow. Whatever awaits the newly repatriated women and children, Tajikistan should have at least a basic framework to develop and implement a more effective and successful reintegration program than during the first repatriation operation in 2019.
Turkmenistan: The Americans are coming
The Eurasianet article gives an overview of the current economic and political development in Turkmenistan focusing on how Ashgabat has been assiduously courted by Russia and how it is looking at other options too. The article starts off with economic indicators of Turkmenistan such as the cost of bread in government stores which has quadrupled. Nonetheless, the article mentions the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development which has stated that Turkmenistan has a healthy fiscal balance, supported by elevated gas revenues and low public debt. While official estimates are not available, inflation is likely to remain in low double digits, below the 2021 level of 21 percent.
The article also talks about the trans-Afghan TAPI natural gas pipeline mentioning that a delegation of the Taliban-run government in Afghanistan visited Ashgabat to agree on an action plan on October 9. Then the article moves on to discussing Turkmenistan’s relations with Ukraine which does not seem to have cooled, according to the author, despite Turkmenistan receiving much attention from an increasingly friendless Russia in recent months and years. The interview of the Ukrainian ambassador to Ashgabat has been given as evidence, who talked about how Kyiv deems Turkmenistan a key partner in Central Asia.
The article argues that Turkmenistan is enthusiastic about doing more business with yet another Russia foe, the United States. A group of U.S. executives got on a videoconference call with several top Turkmen officials on October 5 for a routine meeting of the Turkmenistan-U.S. Business Council. The companies represented included several big-ticket names like John Deere, Case New Holland, Boeing, Exxon Mobil, General Electric, Coca-Cola, Caterpillar, and Visa. Discussions included a possible visit to Turkmenistan by a delegation of American businesspeople before the close of the year. Also on October 5, Deputy Foreign Minister Vepa Khadzhiyev, who has served as his government’s point-man on Afghanistan, met with Paul Dean, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the U.S. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, for talks.
The priority for Ashgabat seems to be diversification. Turkmenistan wants to be seen as an investment destination in areas other than just energy. Berdymukhamedov traveled to Kazakhstan for a state visit on October 15. The president is also being awaited in Qatar. The Foreign Ministry in Ashgabat and the chargé d’affaires at the Qatari Embassy met on October 8 to discuss preparations for that upcoming visit. No date has been announced.
Turkmenistan Orders Students Studying Abroad to Return Home to Serve in Army Despite Exemption
The Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty reports that the Turkmen government has ordered Turkmen students studying abroad to return home to serve in army despite exemption. Military service is mandatory in Turkmenistan for many conscription-age men, who must serve up to two years. The article states that many men aged between 18 and 27 try to evade conscription as the Turkmen Army is notorious for bullying and appalling conditions. Therefore, officials ordered university students studying abroad to return home to perform their service to fill the ranks of the national army. That is despite university students being exempted from military service by law.
The effort to draft university students in the army comes amid the autumn military call-up season. The authorities have also targeted university students who have returned to Turkmenistan from abroad to renew their passports. Some have been taken to local enlistment centers and forced to enrol in the army, according to their families. Hundreds of Turkmen students studying abroad only returned home this summer because the government had banned most international flights due to the coronavirus pandemic. Ashgabat has prohibited its embassies from issuing new passports for Turkmen citizens residing abroad.
The article reports that local military officials have said each administrative area must meet their conscription quotas and each area has a limit on how many exemptions it can grant. In a country where corruption is rampant, the limit on exemptions is forcing families who can afford it pay hefty bribes to exempt their sons from military service. Some parents told the Turkmen Service they paid around $5,700 to get deferrals for their children.
Postcard from Uzbekistan: Don’t mention the war!
A Politico article explores socio-political changes, risks, and opportunities for Uzbekistan considering the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to the article, recently, the state-funded Islamic religious authority, the mufti, instructed its imams not to speak about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in their normally non-political Friday sermons. As the article describes, this topic is acutely sensitive in Uzbekistan, which is still economically and geopolitically dependent on Russia.
More than 3 million Uzbeks, around 15 percent of the working age population, currently labor in Russia, mainly in poorly paid menial jobs in the construction and service sectors. At the same time, the inflow of Russian tourists and migrants have increased in the country as many countries have restricted Russian citizens and the partial mobilisation has proceeded. For his part, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has tried to open the economy to foreign investment since taking power in 2016, has been observing a studied neutrality when it comes to Russia’s invasion, calling for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. Uzbekistan was among the countries that abstained on U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning the invasion and annexation of swathes of Ukrainian territory, but it has also issued statements supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states.
At the same time, as the war continues and Russia’s economy declines, Uzbekistan has started looking at other directions. On the sidelines of the Samarkand summit, China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a landmark agreement to push ahead with building a railroad linking their countries, which — if completed — will establish a shorter route to Europe, bypassing Russia. Beijing overtook Moscow as the biggest source of foreign investment in Uzbekistan in 2021, and Uzbekistan now exports as much to China as it does to Russia, and its imports from China dwarf all other suppliers. The article states that some Uzbek officials now see greater opportunities to build economic, infrastructure and political relations with China, playing the field between Moscow, Beijing, and the West.
Growing Importance of Uzbekistan for China
Geopolitical Monitor piece also analyses the growing bond between Uzbekistan and China. Uzbekistan’s relative stability and stable relations with both regional and global actors create an opportunity for China to diversify its relations and pursue a more balanced approach to Central Asia. Tashkent is a key player for Beijing, not only in terms of bilateral relations but also because of its regional importance, which fits with China’s Central Asia strategy.
China already plans to increase trade volume with Uzbekistan, with a goal of reaching $10 billion. Two important factors can increase trade turnover in the future. For one, Uzbekistan has the largest population in Central Asia, and the increasing prosperity of the Uzbek population leads to greater consumption and greater demand for foreign goods. In this context, Chinese companies that increase their presence in the Uzbek market may foster stronger commercial relations between the two countries. Second, compared to other Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan’s economy is relatively diverse. In the future, Tashkent may not only exports raw materials, but also develop new opportunities to export industrial products to China and contribute to the overall trade volume.
Investments from China to Uzbekistan are also increasing. Three different factors are encouraging China to invest in Uzbekistan. First, regional development, especially strained relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, and growing uncertainty may force Chinese companies to diversify their investments in the region to reduce dependence on Kazakhstan. Second has to do with the liberalization of some of Tashkent’s state-owned enterprises, creating new opportunities for Chinese companies to invest and strengthen their market position. In addition, Uzbekistan’s recent trade agreements with the EU and the UK attract the attention of Chinese companies, because companies have the chance to export thousands of products duty-free to EU and UK. Finally, public opinion about China is also important factor that may determine future Chinese investment to Uzbekistan. According to the Central Asian Barometer Survey Wave 10, conducted in 2021, public opinion regarding China and Chinese investments in Uzbekistan is more positive than in other countries.
In addition to growing bilateral relations, Uzbekistan’s strategic importance is growing at the regional stage for China. Uzbekistan’s connectivity strategy and its policy toward Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) overlap with China’s foreign policy strategy in Central Asia. In terms of connectivity, Uzbekistan’s proactive policy to promote to construction China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway and its effort to realize the Trans-Afghan railway project overlap China’s connectivity strategy in Central Asia, the article explains.
Kazakhstan: Don’t Deport Activists to Uzbekistan
Kazakh authorities should not extradite four Karakalpak diaspora activists to Uzbekistan, where they would face a serious risk of politically motivated prosecution and torture, Human Rights Watch article stated. All four activists – who emigrated to Kazakhstan years ago – have advocated for protecting the sovereignty of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, in northern Uzbekistan, where protests erupted earlier this year over proposed constitutional amendments.
“Uzbek authorities appear to be targeting diaspora Karakalpak activists as part of their heavy-handed response to the July protests in Karakalpakstan,” said Mihra Rittmann, senior Central Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch.
Acting on information that the activists were placed on an international wanted list by Uzbek authorities, Kazakh police detained the four activists from the Karakalpak diaspora in Almaty, between September 13 and October 5, 2022. Koshkarbai Toremuratov, 47, a dissident blogger, and Zhangeldy Zhaksymbetov, 53, an opposition figure, were picked up by police at their homes the night of September 13. Raisa Khudaibergenova, 55, a cardiologist, was detained at her workplace on the outskirts of Almaty in the evening of September 16. Ziyuar Mirmanbetova, 46, another activist, was detained at her home in Almaty on October 4. While the individual criminal charges each activist faces in Uzbekistan have not been made public, another diaspora Karakalpak activist in Almaty, Akylbek Muratov, who has seen several documents pertaining to the charges, told Human Rights Watch that the four are wanted by Uzbekistan for alleged offenses against the state.
Within two days of their arrests in Almaty, local courts ruled that the Karakalpak activists should remain in custody, for an initial 40 days. Uzbek authorities are expected to formally request their extradition, said Denis Zhivago, a lawyer specializing in refugee and asylum issues at the Kazakhstan International Bureau of Human Rights and Rule of Law, a local human rights organization in Almaty. All four activists have applied for asylum with the Kazakh authorities. In Kazakh law, once the activists are registered as “persons seeking asylum” they will have an official status that affords them protection from forcible return to Uzbekistan as long as their claims are under review, Zhivago said.
Human Right Watch called Kazakh authorities to formally register Toremuratov, Zhaksymbetov, Khudaibergenova, and Mirmanbetova as asylum seekers as quickly as possible, referring to the international law principles of nonrefoulement not to extradite or otherwise forcibly return people to places where their lives or freedoms may be threatened or where they face a risk of torture, including the Convention against Torture and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol.
Central Asia in EU focus?
The Euractiv media outlet published a brief on the signs of the increased attention from the European Union on Central Asia. The article points out that in October, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen held a teleconference with the president of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Also, Council President Charles Michel was in Astana at Tokayev’s invitation to attend a meeting of the Central Asian leaders.
Von der Leyen, who had already met with Tokayev in New York in September, said on Twitter that the two of them welcomed the agreement on their Strategic Partnership on sustainable raw materials, batteries, and renewable hydrogen. This marks rapid progress after past November’s visit of Tokayev to Brussels, when he expressed his country’s interest in establishing a partnership with the European Raw Materials Alliance and the European Battery Alliance by ensuring reliable and sustainable access to raw materials, as well as integrating his country into the battery value chain. Von der Leyen also said that the two discussed better connecting Europe and Central Asia, for which the €300-billion Global Gateway, the EU’s response to China’s Belt-and-Road, can play an important role.
A recent conference organised by a German business organisation and held in Brussels was dedicated mainly to the Middle Corridor, a transport route connecting China and the EU. The corridor passes through Kazakhstan, thus bypassing Russia, as part of the Global Gateway. Participants said the European Commission needs to recognise the Middle Corridor as a top-priority project. Western institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are currently working on identifying the bottlenecks of this corridor crossing the Caspian Sea ahead of an EU-favoured meeting on connectivity in November in Uzbekistan. Such moves are significant, perhaps signalling the start of a more engaged approach of the EU with its neighbours, the article concludes.
Eurasia Is More Than Russia’s Backyard
Viewing recent conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia through the lens of Moscow’s political calculus overlooks important internal dynamics, argues an article published by Foreign Policy. Recent developments — primarily the resurgence of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus and between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Central Asia — show the limits of this framework. Focusing on Russia doesn’t explain conflicts where both sides have close relationships with Moscow, and, perhaps more concerning, it overlooks leaders’ own strategic agency.
Diplomatic relations with Russia do not explain the dynamics of either conflict. In the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Russia has military bases in both countries, and both are CSTO members. Their economies each depend heavily on remittances from labor migrants in Russia. Kyrgyzstan is part of the Eurasian Economic Union. Although Tajikistan is not a member, its trade with member states in the first half of the year amounted to some $1.2 billion, largely driven by trade with Russia and Belarus.
Looking to Russia to intervene in these conflicts, let alone serve as the main guarantor of any former colony’s security, is problematic: Eurasia is not just Russia’s backyard. Other powers have expressed interest in security dynamics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Throughout 2022, the European Council has mediated talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran and Turkey have contributed to an arms race between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan in 2013, so it is fitting that he started his first overseas trip since January 2020 in the country, where he articulated support for “safeguarding national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”
The first step to explore regional dynamics is to decolonize analysis of Eurasian politics, the author maintains. Ultimately, references to Central Asia and the Caucasus as Russia’s backyard serve the same linguistic end as Moscow calling the post-Soviet states its “southern borderlands.” Instead of looking first to Russia for explanatory power, researchers and analysts must approach these conflicts in terms of leaders’ own strategic calculations.