Analytical pieces in foreign press on the Central Asian region include the topics of the current instability in Afghanistan, hurdles for Central Asia in dealing with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, new restrictive laws against media and social networks in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and the constitutional reform in Uzbekistan.
How Western Media Framed Kazakhstan’s Protests
A Foreign Policy article analyzes the Western Media discourse on Kazakhstan’s January unrest. The authors, Emily Couch and Sher Khashimov, note that although protests had a peaceful nature initially, many foreign articles focused not on the causes of the protests, which include population’s deep-seated anger with corruption, lack of civil rights, and economic inequality and stagnation, but on the outburst of violence and destruction perpetrated by a minority unassociated with the peaceful protesters. The authors analyze the choice of the word “riots” and not “protests” by big media outlets, such as the BBC that ran the headline “Kazakhstan: Why are there riots and why are Russian troops there?”, Le Monde that wrote “Riots in Kazakhstan leave 225 dead”, Al Jazeera with “Kazakhstan: More than 160 killed, 5,000 arrested during riots,” and Deutsche Welle’s “Almaty picks up the pieces after riots.”
As the authors argue, focusing on the violence and descriptions of “riots” was a particular choice. “Using “protests” legitimizes the expression of discontent, presenting it as orderly and confined to socially acceptable boundaries. “Riots,” by contrast, shifts the focus away from the legitimate grievances of participants and implies chaos and illegitimacy while ignoring the fact that in repressive societies like Kazakhstan, where the government has spent the past 30 years curtailing civil rights and gutting the country’s civil society and independent media, aggressive acts of civil disobedience are often the only way to express popular anger.”
The article also compares how foreign perception of protests in Kazakhstan might differ from other past protests, such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004-2005 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, 2012 protests in Russia against Vladimir Putin, and the recent protests in Belarus. As the authors explain, these protests had aesthetic features that received much international attention (for example, ribbons, balloons, and flags with specific colors). “We can see the positive international perception of these protests as a response to the way they tapped into an established visual lexicon that represented pro-democratic—and therefore, in the minds of many, pro-Western—aspirations, while right-wing or nationalistic elements were ignored. The same happened with the Arab Spring protests, where the sweeping, shared aspirations to democracy got far more play in Western media than the complicated and often intensely local issues involved in particular countries,” the authors write.
Moreover, the article argues that the authoritarian regimes are learning and adapting to nonviolent challenges from below and have developed a repertoire of politically savvy approaches to repression. As the authors conclude, “given that authoritarian regimes are adapting, so too must the understanding of what constitutes legitimate resistance—and how the media should cover it. It is unrealistic to insist that protesting citizens unfailingly conform to the West’s peaceful ideal when the society in which they operate allows minimal avenues for being heard by those in power—and, indeed, when the latter themselves use violence as a means of repression.”
Sanctions Haven’t Made Clear What Counts as “Russian Oil”
As the Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, new questions and hurdles are arising for governments around the world. An article from The Washington Post analyzes the complexities of putting sanctions on and even defining “Russian oil”.
As the author, Julian Lee, explains, matters are relatively straightforward when it comes to Russian crude – sanctions will be applied to crude pumped put of oil fields located in Russia, from which the government derives revenue in the form of export duties and mineral extraction tax. However, even this area is not without uncertainties: the Caspian Pipeline Consortium Blend crude, which is shipped from a terminal on Russia’s Black Sea coast, contains some molecules of Russian origin, but the 90% of it is Kazakhstan’s crude. As such, banning CPC crude would do immense harm to Kazakhstan, which exports 80% of its crude from the terminal, and almost none to Russia.
The U.S. Treasury published a guidance in mid-March, noting that CPC crude “is marketed and loaded with a certificate of origin verifying that the crude is of Kazakh origin” and that “U.S. persons may reasonably rely upon a certificate of origin”, which means that Russian oil will continue to leak onto the market.
The matters are even more complicated with refined products. While it is easy to target fuel products refined in Russia, it is difficult to mark products refined in other countries from imported Russian crude alongside with other suppliers. Classifying and banning such products is difficult but allowing such sales does not create economic incentive for other countries, such as India, to stop buying Russian crude, especially after Russia started to make steep discounts to such countries to offset higher shipping costs to Asia.
“Oil market dynamics, where diesel fuel is already in short supply and prices have risen to record highs, may make it very difficult to sanction products refined from Russian crude outside of Russia. Maybe that’s just something we have to live with, as the screws are tightened on Russia’s crude flows. Sanctions aren’t a failure even if they only reduce, rather than halt, Russia’s oil exports,” the author concludes.
Kazakh President Signs Controversial Law Aiming to Control Social Media Companies
The Diplomat discussed the new law signed by President Tokayev that will require foreign social media companies to set up local offices headed by a Kazakh national and register in Kazakhstan in order to operate. Companies which have a monthly user base of more than 100,000 have six months to comply with the new law. The bill, cast as amendments to the country’s law on protecting the rights of children, has been heralded by the Kazakh government as an effective measure to combat cyberbullying. The companies are obliged to respond to orders from the state to delete information deemed “cyberbullying in relation to a child” within 24 hours. The law attempts to define cyberbullying, identifying “actions of a humiliating nature, harassment and (or) intimidation” including efforts aimed at “coercion.”
The article analyzes what kind of content Kazakh authorities have viewed as problematic in the past. According to Google, out of 84 requests made by the government of Kazakhstan from January to June 2021, 34 requests were labeled by Google as “government criticism” and 43 as “national security.” Only three requests in that period were labeled “hate speech.” Of all the items named for removal in this period, Google took no action in 99.3 percent of cases.
The author, Catherine Putz, warns that the new law can lead to censorship and abuse, as it makes it easier for Kazakh authorities to influence the decisions of social media networks and other online platforms via locally based staff who would be easier to pressure in person to make decisions in the government’s favor, regardless of the content in question.
Kyrgyzstan: Restrictive legislation, criminal cases against media & bans on protests on Ukraine
On May 27, International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) published an update on the protection of the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly in Kyrgyzstan from December 2021 to April 2022. According to the report, developments during this period reinforced concerns about a worsening environment for media and civil society in Kyrgyzstan and growing restrictions on the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.
The report first discusses the international surveys which have confirmed the recent negative trends with respect to the state of freedom and democratic governance in Kyrgyzstan such as the annual Freedom in the World survey, published by Freedom House in February 2022, rating Kyrgyzstan as ‘’not free’’, the 2021 edition of the Democracy Index, released by The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in February 2022, designating Kyrgyzstan as an ’’authoritarian regime’’ for the first time and the 2021 edition of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index ranking Kyrgyzstan 99th among 139 countries and jurisdictions worldwide.
During the reporting period, IPHR states that the climate for free speech continued to deteriorate, with several criminal cases being opened against media outlets and journalists in apparent retaliation for their work, and several restrictive legislative initiatives advancing. For example, investigative journalist Bolot Temirov faced two sets of criminal charges believed to have been initiated in retaliation for his investigations into high-level corruption.
Moreover, there were new developments concerning legislative initiatives which threaten to undermine freedom of association, and concerns remained about the vulnerability of NGO representatives to intimidation and harassment. Particularly, the report mentions new calls for adoption of ‘’foreign agents’’ legislation, technical flaws preventing NGOs from meeting new reporting obligations, and continued court case against an NGO leader, Kamil Ruziev. Nonetheless, according to the report, people in Kyrgyzstan continued to exercise their right to assembly by holding peaceful protests on different issues. Among others, several peaceful protests against the war in Ukraine were held. However, in this context, authorities also issued controversial, temporary blanket bans on holding peaceful protests in central areas of the capital Bishkek.
Finally, despite the overall negative trends seen during the reporting period, as described above, the report states that there were also some positive developments concerning rights protection. In particular, there were several new government initiatives to improve the implementation of recommendations and decisions issued by international human rights bodies on human rights in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, in March 2022, the Ministry of Justice put forward for public discussion a draft Action Plan on Human Rights for 2022-2024, developed on the basis of recommendations made by UN human rights treaty bodies examining the situation in Kyrgyzstan, as well as in the context of the UN Universal Periodic Review of the country.
Chaos on Tajik-Afghan Border Could Make Russian Intervention More Likely
Several foreign press outlets discussed the escalation of conflicts in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region. The Guardian reports that at least 25 ethnic Pamiris were killed on May 18 by security forces during the protests and highlights that conflict between the central government and the Pamiri has continued for decades, with the cultural and linguistic minority ethnic group suffering human rights abuses, as well as discrimination over jobs and housing.
Paul Goble’s publication for the Jamestown Foundation Global Research and Analytics discusses the escalation of the situation in the autonomous region and the risk that conditions there might trigger a full-scale civil war. That risk, according to Goble, has led the Tajikistani leadership to launch yet another and far more massive “counter-terrorist” action in Gorno-Badakhshan in May. More importantly, Goble’s publication talks about how the escalation has compelled Tajikistan to publicly ask Moscow to be ready to send forces into the region, just as it did in Kazakhstan last January.
The article argues that the problems in Gorno-Badakhshan are long lasting and largely internal; a military intervention will not solve the situation but could, in fact, worsen things for Moscow. The eastern third of modern-day Tajikistan has always been a law onto itself, a place where the writ of Dushanbe has run only intermittently and where outside powers have repeatedly engaged in geopolitical competition. Tajikistan’s own use of force has not worked, some local analysts argue, pointing to the series of “counter-terrorist” actions that have failed to bring the restive region to heel; but if Moscow intervenes now, they contend, the conflict will likely grow rather than diminish. According to Goble, the Kremlin would face the awful choice of committing its increasingly scarce military resources (needed in Donbas) for the long term or having to withdraw with little to show for its efforts besides a more hostile Tajik population, a large number of whom are living and working in Russia itself. But Goble argues that a Russian military intervention in Tajikistan is now more likely than not, despite the pressures it would place on a Russian army already tied down in Ukraine because for Putin, worsening armed conflicts between Dushanbe and the population of Gorno-Badakhshan, on the one hand, as well as along the Tajikistani-Afghan border, on the other hand, would further erode his regional credibility and influence.
Russia’s Ukraine War Weighs Heavily on Tajikistan
The United States Institute of Peace published an analytical piece on the Tajik government’s challenge to meet Russian expectations of support from Dushanbe in the face of global outrage and condemnation. Barmak Pazhwak, the author of the article, states that Tajikistan has a particularly difficult balancing act to perform because it hosts an estimated 7,000 Russian troops and receives Russian security and economic assistance, among other forms of support. With Russia weakened by U.S. and allies’ sanctions, Tajikistan and its ruling elites will suffer because of the country’s intertwined economic, political, and security relations with Russia. Tightening economic conditions will push the top echelon of the ruling elite to grab whatever resources are left and squeeze out others. In this scenario, less and less benefit will trickle down to the general public fostering further discontent.
The central argument of the article is that the Tajik government should focus on securing greater domestic legitimacy as Russia remains mired in Ukraine. As the most vulnerable and poorest Central Asian country, Tajikistan must be prepared to face the consequences of the challenges posed by Russia’s war in Ukraine and should seize on Russia’s miscalculations as an opportunity to reconsider its relationships and embark on a path of political and economic reform. Rather than consolidating power among a narrow group of family and clan, the article invites the government of President Rahmon to replace Russian support with greater domestic legitimacy. A robust process of political and economic reform within the country along with a foreign policy that emphasizes strengthening regional cooperation and economic integration may provide the country a way out of its current predicament.
Pazhwak also suggests that the United States and the European Union should consider extending increased economic partnership and investment opportunities to support the reform process in Tajikistan and alleviate the pain caused by the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Yet, any new assistance package and investment initiative, according to the article, should be tied to progress on political and economic reforms and mechanisms that ensure accountability and transparency in the process.
Is Turkmen oil an alternative to Russia’s? A family of natural gas oligarchs has the country in its grip
Gerald Hosp from Neue Zürcher Zeitung in his analysis of the energy projects in Turkmenistan outlines the possible hurdles for Europe in the way of tapping the Turkmenistan’s gas supplies, as it searches new energy sources. He starts off by mentioning that no matter who comes to power in Turkmenistan, what always remained the same about the country was the cautious foreign policy: in view of the immediate neighborhood of Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as well as Russian, Chinese, Turkish, European and American interests, Turkmen rulers have always preferred a neutral course. This is unlikely to change under Serdar Berdymukhamedov, especially since his father will chair the People’s Council, the upper house of the Turkmen parliament.
The article highlights that European politicians and companies have been interested in supplying Turkmen natural gas to Europe via the Nabucco pipeline in order to alleviate Europe’s dependence on Russian gas since at least a decade ago. However, Russia has been successful at finding different ways to block such projects using the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea as an excuse or taking advantage of the legacy of the Soviet Union’s entire gas infrastructure which was initially geared toward exports to Russia.
Hosp also discusses the 2009 Turkmen breakthrough when for the first time, natural gas flowed to China through a newly built pipeline; but as a result the Central Asian country became dependent on Beijing as Russia imported less and less natural gas from Turkmenistan. The author further argues that in order to escape the Russian-Chinese predicament, the Turkmen elite has been looking for further export routes – also to secure power and revenue. One such route has been the TAPI pipeline project, a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. Although all the parties show a great interest in the implementation of the project, the problems that this project might potentially face in financing and security make the future of the project uncertain. Hosp also talks about an American project lobbied by the Trans Caspian Resources (TCR) company which visions a relatively short pipe that will connect a Turkmen oil field in the Caspian Sea with an Azeri oil field operated by the British company BP. Despite having low costs compared to the TAPI project, it is unclear whether and how quickly Turkmenistan will be able to expand natural gas production for this project.
Finally, the biggest hurdle for Europe, however, may be the repressive nature of the regime. Reliable economic data from Turkmenistan are scarce, but in recent times there have been increasing reports of price increases and supply shortages even for basic foodstuffs. Hosp concludes that whether Serdar Berdymukhamedov wants to and can change all this is not yet clear.
Uzbekistan Seeks to Engage Taliban Without Alienating West
VOA News reports that Uzbekistan has emerged as a key interlocutor with the Taliban, engaging with its southern neighbor across a range of issues while insisting that it will not formally recognize the interim government in Afghanistan before the world community. The author states that the nuanced position has allowed Uzbekistan to begin exploring opportunities for economic cooperation with Kabul without alienating the United States and other Western powers that have sought to isolate Afghanistan with asset seizures and other sanctions. In the short term, Uzbekistan has become a key hub for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, earning it the appreciation of donor nations.
The article is based on the interview of Ismatulla Irgashev, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s special representative on Afghanistan, who spoke to VOA News about the Uzbek relations with the Taliban. He stressed Tashkent’s commitment to moving ahead with formal recognition of the Taliban only in concert with the international community. At the same time, arguing for greater engagement with the Taliban in the meantime, Irgashev noted that the Taliban are in firm control of Afghanistan, their rule challenged only by minor resistance movements based mainly in the Panjshir Valley. It is clear that Tashkent’s thinking is colored by practical economic concerns, not least the prospect of securing a trade route from landlocked Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to Pakistani seaports on the Indian Ocean.
Where is Uzbekistan’s constitutional reform heading?
Eurasianet.org reports that Uzbekistan’s constitution is set to undergo unspecified changes, with speculation building that their main function will be to keep the head of state in office. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, 64, has now entered his second term as president – the last one permitted him under the current constitution. The article states that he has given no indication that he will not seek a third. It seems the President has signaled at least twice since his landslide electoral victory last fall that he thinks the constitution needs sprucing up. Moreover, so far, lawmakers from the two initiating parties have voiced only vague ideas that hardly justify an overhaul of the constitution. Farhod Zainiyev from Milliy Tiklanish said that Uzbekistan should be specifically identified as a “social state” in the basic law. His colleague Ilkhom Abdullayev argued that the reform should guarantee the rights and interests of youth “as builders of New Uzbekistan.” The article argues that the lack of imagination going into the process offers few hopes that the reform is about anything other than the president himself.
At the end, the article also posits that one undeniable trend under Mirziyoyev’s rule has been the emergence of an increasingly vocal chattering class, mostly in Tashkent and provides a quote from a blogger who expressed hope that Mirziyoyev will not seek to argue à la Karimov that a new constitution “resets” his term count or seek an exceptional status of the kind that has benefited leaders in neighboring Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.
Northern Afghanistan and the New Threat to Central Asia
Bruce Pannier for Foreign Policy Research Institute discussed how the contest for control of northern Afghanistan between the Taliban, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups poses a major security concern for the states of Central Asia. According to the article, the Taliban are losing control in northern Afghanistan to the Islamic State. In April 2022, the terrorist group carried out a series of bombings at Shia mosques in Kunduz and Mazar-i-Sharif, killing dozens, and the Islamic State released a video of a purported rocket attack from Afghan territory toward military targets in Uzbekistan, although the Taliban and Uzbekistan challenged the claim.
The article documented the dynamics within the Taliban, its relations with the Islamic State since the Taliban came to power in 2021, as well its historic relations with Central Asian states. As Pannier explains, so far Central Asian states have been favorable to the Taliban government guided by economic interests, such as construction of the TAPI pipeline and hopes for stability. But, as the author reflects, if the Taliban cannot stop the violence in northern Afghanistan, or if some group does succeed in launching an attack from Afghan territory on a neighboring Central Asian state or crosses the border into one of the countries to carry out terrorist attacks, it is difficult to see how that would not change the Central Asian governments’ policies toward Afghanistan and the Taliban.
Former Soviet States Are Distancing Themselves From Their Old Imperial Master
As Russia’s destructive war continues and the sanctions are being imposed, experts are pointing at Central Asian (CA) states’ distancing from their historic partner. Erica Marat and Johan Engvall’s article for Foreign Policy state that the unpredictable consequences of Russia’s war might leave these states no other choice but to diversify their diplomatic relations. The article discusses how several CA countries have shown greater independence from Moscow than expected since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
According to the article, Russian offense accelerated the former colonies’ reexamination of their Soviet past. “The more a country is politically free and allows space for the critical reappraisal of its past, the less its public is likely to support Russia’s regional dominance,” the authors state. Rather than be pawns that are moved around on the Kremlin’s chessboard, Russia’s neighbors are increasingly turning into active players in the international arena—and have not hesitated to play external powers against one another to extract maximum benefits. They prefer to maintain ties with many regional powers; Russia is becoming just another neighbor, along with the EU, China, Turkey, and Iran.
To understand the effectiveness of Russian power in the former Soviet space, it is no longer sufficient just to know the Kremlin’s intent. Former Soviet colonies are on the verge of breaking away from the last remaining legacies of Soviet rule. The war in Ukraine points at the need to consider countries formerly occupied by the Soviet regime as entities with their own complex domestic processes despite Russia’s efforts to direct and dominate them.
Putin’s Eurasian dream may soon become a nightmare
Similarly, Katarina Wolczuk and Rilka Dragneva wrote for Chatham House about the future of the EAEU in the context of the recent war and Western sanctions. The design of the EAEU ties it to Russia’s own fate, and so the impact of harsh sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine are in stark evidence across its member states. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are reeling from the adverse effects on their domestic currencies and remittances, and the trade bans of key commodities. And although the ban Russia imposed on grain export to EAEU members has softened, it shows the extent to which Russia was prepared to disregard the rules and sacrifice the EAEU to rescue its own economy.
The article argues that the war made it evident that the EAEU was a means to an end for Russia to establish its own economic power base in the new polycentric world order rather than an equitable institution within which Russia would accept constraints. As a result, Central Asian member-countries have been dragged into a geopolitical calamity over which they have no control, while incurring big costs.
Russia Downplays Negative Economic Impact of Ukraine War for Its Central Asian Allies
On the same topic, Fozil Mashrab of the Jamestown Foundation Global Research and Analytics also argues that in the absence of any meaningful assistance coming from the Russian government, regional countries are turning to the United States and the European Union for help to mitigate the negative consequences for their economies. As a result, senior Moscow officials’ hostile anti-Western rhetoric is not only falling on deaf ears in Central Asia but also causing muted irritation among regional leaders, who are increasingly dismayed by the Kremlin’s belligerent behavior in Ukraine and its seeming indifference to their own economic hardships.
The article also states that the Central Asian authorities have undoubtedly refused to accept Moscow’s entreaties to limit their commercial and political relations with the US and the EU. And that choice will surely solidify as long as crucial economic assistance and support to the region continues to come from the West rather than Russia.