Main themes surrounding Central Asia in foreign press in April involved the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war for Central Asian countries in the economic and geopolitical realms, as well announcement of reforms in Kazakhstan, changes in the public procurement process and human rights concerns in Kyrgyzstan, Berdimuhamedov Jr.’s first steps as a president, and Tajikistan’s dire economic situation.
Kazakhstan’s reforms should be more than just show
A Foreign Policy article analyzed the State-of-the-Nation address delivered by President Tokayev in March 2022 in the context of the country’s January unrest. According to the article, while Tokayev announced a wide-ranging and promising set of reforms aimed at democratization and decentralization of power, the genuineness of these initiatives is still under question.
In the Address, Tokayev stated that the investigation process of January events is being closely monitored by the human rights ombudsperson and the National Council of Public Trust to ensure proper treatment of detained participants. However, so far there have been 301 reports of torture and brutal interrogation, only 9 of which have led to detentions of law enforcement officers.
Similarly, Tokayev stated that the recently passed law on peaceful assembly will allow civil society to “freely hold rallies and freely express their opinions”; however, he also announced a policy of “no further concessions” and strict enforcement against violations by “provocative activists”, which suggests an intent to closely control protest activity.
Another proposal announced during the Address was reducing the party registration threshold from 20,000 to 5,000 signatures. However, the authors notice that the main challenge for parties in Kazakhstan is not the registration threshold but the registration process. The chair and two additional members of Kazakhstan’s Central Election Commission (CEC), a body responsible for party registration, are directly appointed by the president; the other four are appointed by each chamber of Parliament, which is dominated by Tokayev’s Amanat party (formerly Nur Otan).
Finally, Tokayev has proposed abolishing his right to “cancel or suspend actions of the akims (mayors – ed.) of regions and cities of republican significance,” as well as his right to “remove district and even rural akims from office.” However, the president can still remove regional and major city akims, which discourages autonomous decision-making. Furthermore, the prosecutor general, who is appointed by the president, can still cancel the actions of these akims, while the regional and major city akims can still remove district and rural akims from office.
These issues need to be addressed in order to regain domestic and foreign trust and produce truly meaningful reforms. The article also mentioned some proposals that offer potential to generate significant change if implemented effectively, such as the expansion of jury trial cases, reinvigoration of new regional capitals (Semey, Zhezkazgan, Kapshagai), local-level budget reforms, and ratification of the European Charter of Local Self-Government.
Kazakhstan experiences reductions in exports of oil and wheat
Bloomberg reported that the Kazakhstan’s major oil shipping terminal in the Black Sea has halted loadings from two of its three moorings in late March, citing damage from strong storms. About 80% of Kazakhstan’s crude exports are shipped from the facility, which is located on Russia’s Black Sea coast, and the country has been forced to curtail production as it waited for repairs.
Moreover, the value of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) crude, which was still being delivered from one operational mooring at the terminal, has suffered because of the Ukraine crisis, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Bolat Akchulakov said. It is trading at an unusual discount to benchmark prices because of shipping risks associated with Russian ports. With some countries, including the U.S. and U.K., banning imports of Russian oil, and many other buyers reluctant to deal with the country, it is vital that CPC crude isn’t affected, the minister said.
As Eurasianet reported on April 25, the pipeline resumed working after Akchulakov held talks on the situation with CPC General Director Nikolai Gorban on April 18. A few days later, it was agreed that the weather had improved sufficiently for repairs to proceed. As Kazakhstan’s Finance Minister Yerulan Zhamaubayev stated, according to a preliminary assessment, Kazakhstan experienced losses at up to 150 billion tenge ($337 million) because of this suspension.
The war is also affecting Kazakhstan’s and the whole Central Asia’s food situation as Russia banned grain exports to its fellow members of the Eurasian Economic Union – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Armenia in March. As a result, Kazakhstan, the largest buyer of Russian wheat in the EEU, who has been also reselling it to other Central Asian countries, has imposed quotas on wheat exports limiting them to 1 million tons and flour exports to 300,000 tons for three months starting from April 15. As Radio Free Liberty / Radio Liberty reports, this could be detrimental to Tajikistan, who imports 94% of its grain imports from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the largest buyer of Kazakhstan’s wheat, and Kyrgyzstan, who gets about 40 percent of its imported wheat from Kazakhstan.
Kyrgyzstan and Canada’s Centerra end gold mine dispute
Several foreign press outlets, such as Reuters and The Wall Street Journal, wrote about the out-of-court settlement of the year-long dispute over the Kumtor gold mine between Kyrgyzstan’s government and Canada-based Centerra Gold enterprise. As part of the agreement, state-owned gold miner Kyrgyzaltyn will own Kumtor and will retain the income it earned from the mine since it was seized. In exchange, Kyrgyzaltyn is to transfer its 26% stake in Centerra back to the Canadian company, which will also mean a cash payment totaling $86 million. The shares will be cancelled, and Centerra will completely exit activities in Kyrgyzstan.
“Today is a true turning point in the history of our country,” Kyrgystan’s president Sadyr Japarov said in a televised address Monday. “Our national assets are now exactly where they should be—in our own hands.” He also stated that “throughout this dispute, we have maintained that this is not about nationalization … It was about the specific issues with the management of (the) Kumtor mine. We have always said that Kyrgyzstan is open for business.”
Kyrgyzstan will hide public procurement information
Eurasianet informs that President Japarov has approved legislation allowing state-controlled companies to purchase goods and services without having to organize a public tender, a measure he says will save time and reduce bureaucracy. However, opponents of the move argue it will allow for a surge in corruption.
Previously, all purchases (except for confidential transactions involving security issues) made by entities with a 50 percent or more share owned by the government had to be advertised online and go through a bidding process. Although not without shortcomings, this system nevertheless provided certain degree of transparency and on several occasions allowed journalists and activists to reveal suspicious practices. Now, governmental entities will be required to advertise tender notices on a site viewable by only a limited array of suppliers.
One of the few opponents of this legislation in the parliament, Dastan Bekeshev, stated “Now we won’t know what they are buying, at what price and from whom. Because they [state companies] will cite commercial confidentiality. I as a lawmaker and citizens cannot find out what corruption is going on.”
“Stop Harassing Independent Media” – Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch pointed out the recent increase of criminal investigations against independent media in Kyrgyzstan. Namely, the ongoing cases against media outlets include investigations into Next TV’s repost of a commentary by a Ukrainian media outlet, which implied that Kyrgyzstan would lend its military support to Russian forces in Ukraine and investigation against Kaktus.Media for reposting of an article by a Tajik media outlet about the Kyrgyz-Tajik border skirmish on January 27, which incorrectly alleged that Kyrgyz soldiers fired the first shots. Representatives of these media outlets could be facing up to 5 and 7 years in prison respectively for “inciting interethnic hatred”, “propaganda of war”, and “distribution of information aimed at “provoking aggression of one country against another or igniting a military conflict”. There was also detention of journalist Bolot Temirov on charges of illegal drug manufacturing two days after Temirov published an investigation into dubious fuel export schemes related to the State Committee for National Security’s leadership. Human Rights Watch and Kyrgyzstan’s media activists call these cases a “massive attack” on freedom of expression.
With Russian Route Blocked, Uzbekistan Looks to Indian-Iranian-Afghan Chabahar Port Project
A publication from Jamestown Foundation, a Washington-based think tank, analyzes how the extensive Western sanctions against Russia and the possibility of European states’ blocking east-west transit corridors traversing Russian territory are affecting Central Asian countries, which have historically relied on road and rail corridors through Russia to reach international markets. One of the key alternatives in this regard is the north-south route via Iran, whose overland transit networks offer connections to Turkey and Europe as well as to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Of particular importance to Uzbekistan will be Chabahar, Iran’s only seaport with direct access to the Indian Ocean and its closest one to the Central Asian countries.
On May 24, 2016, India, Iran and Afghanistan signed a deal to develop the strategic Iranian port of Chabahar as a crucial node in a “Transit and Transport Corridor” through Afghanistan. Recently, Uzbekistan showed great interest in joining the Chabahar Port Transit Project, signing an agreement to gain access to the port in January of this year, just weeks before the start of the current Russo-Ukrainian war.
With about 80 percent of Uzbekistan’s exports and imports passing through Russia, it was reasonable for Tashkent to look for new transit routes in other directions even before Russia re-invaded Ukraine. The Chabahar port became a logical point of interest for Tashkent. Uzbekistan already has a rail connection to northern Afghanistan and plans to link up with the Iranian railway network via Herat in order to facilitate access to the port of Chabahar.
Security guards with their sniffer dogs patrol in front of a cargo ship during the inauguration ceremony of the newly built extension in the port of Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman, southeastern Iran, near the Pakistani border, Sunday, Dec. 3, 2017. Credit: AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi
Uzbekistan’s participation in the Chabahar project will be also beneficial for Iran and India, who will get easier and direct access to the 80-million-strong Central Asian market. In general, the war in Ukraine and restrictions on trans-Russian BRI transit routes to Europe will likely further sharpen Uzbekistan’s interest in the Chabahar Port Transit Project as well as draw the attention of other Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan. Clearly, however, this will require a further development of relations between Central Asian governments and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan—yet another unforeseen geopolitical consequence of the Kremlin’s unprovoked war on Ukraine.
Erdogan’s visit to Uzbekistan
Turkish Anadolu Agency reports about Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s official visit to Uzbekistan on 29-30 March. As a result of the visit, Uzbekistan and Turkey signed 10 agreements aimed at strengthening relations, set their new trade target at $10 billion, and promoted bilateral ties to the comprehensive strategic partnership level.
Will war change Tajikistan’s relationship with Russia?
Open Democracy article describes public sentiments in Tajikistan regarding Russia’s invasion in Ukraine. As the author, Karolina Kluczewska, points out, Dushanbe’s official position on Russia’s aggression has been silent – the state sources did not mention the war at all. This can be explained by Tajikistan’s dependence on the Russian market, where more than a million Tajik labour migrants live and send back money that composes around 30% of Tajikistan’s GDP. However, in stark opposition to the government’s silence, the author notes that the Tajikistan’s public has been very active in discussing the topic. “For the first time in my nearly decade-long experience in the country, I witnessed animated and open public discussions on burning political issues. All of a sudden, everyone around me was talking about why the war happened and what the implications for Tajikistan would be,” Kluczewska says.
According to the author, local perceptions of the war could be divided into three main groups. There are pro-Russian citizens who support Kremlin’s actions. What unites them is the fact that they are active consumers of Russian news outlets, whose rhetoric they mirror. The opposite view is shared by a group of people in their 20s and 30s from the urban upper-middle class, who studied in Europe or the United States, are fluent in English, and often work for international organisations in Dushanbe. And the third category, which comprises the majority of the people, take a balanced stance on the issue. They empathize with Ukrainian people, perhaps due to Tajikistan’s own experience of the 1990s civil war.
Regardless of the diversity of people’s opinions about the war, however, there is a general understanding on the ground that sanctions against Russia will have a massive economic impact on Tajikistan. Within the first weeks after Russia’s invasion, the prices of basic food items in the country rose by between 10 and 20%. With the collapse of the Russian ruble within 10 days of the start of the war, remittances sent from Russia by Tajik labour migrants depreciated by 35%, and the World Bank foresees an overall decline in remittances by 22% in 2022. Migrants are already losing jobs in Russia and salaries are decreasing, but many do not want to return to Tajikistan knowing that no jobs are waiting for them at home.
Tajikistan asks for help from IMF
Continuing the topic of Tajikistan’s dire economic situation, Eurasianet writes that Tajikistan would send a delegation to Washington to seek aid from international financial institutions. On March 30, it was announced that Tajikistan risks facing default in the nearest future. With all other options depleted, Tajikistan has to turn to the Western financial institutions. This past February, the IMF renewed its longstanding policy advice to Tajikistan – the same advice that has been ignored so many times before – to improve transparency, financial management and accelerate structural reforms. It even noted the Tajik “authorities’ interest in a potential arrangement with the Fund to support their reform agenda,” an indication that the IMF may be preparing to resume lending.
Small Shuffles in the Turkmen Cabinet of Ministers
Turkmenistan’s quick transfer of power continues to be the main topic of discussion for international publications. The Diplomat reports that mere weeks after taking over the presidency from his father, the younger Berdimuhamedov has begun to make some personnel changes. On April 6, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov dismissed the internal affairs minister and abolished the post of deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers for security, military, and legal affairs during a recent State Security Council meeting. These changes represent the first government shuffles under the new president, although Berdimuhamedov junior reappointed most of his father’s cabinet to their posts. The Diplomat also highlights that given that the older Berdimuhamedov has been on vacation when the appointments were announced, and it’s not clear if the former president approved the changes or not. The article acknowledges that there are very few avenues to observe the dynamics of Turkmen politics, and what we can be seen is only what is on the surface: who is appointed to what positions, who is reprimanded in public, and who hangs onto their seats.
The Russo-Ukrainian war and official response across Central Asia
International community continues to analyze the difficult spot the Central Asian region found itself in amid the Russo-Ukrainian war. On April 6, GlobalVoices published an analysis of the official responses of Central Asian countries to the Russo-Ukrainian war. It reports that under the circumstances of long-lasting economic, social, and political relations between Russia and post-Soviet Central Asian states, each state responded differently to the war — from ignoring it altogether to incorporating their national interests into it, adapting, in the meantime, to the changing course of the war, while trying to withstand Russian pressure.
A key focus, however, was put on two Central Asian countries who are the only two countries that are members of both the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-led military alliance, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The article highlights that the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan initially adopted an apologetic stance on the conflict referring to the West’s failure to duly respond to the Russian agreement proposals to the US and NATO and pointing at “the humanitarian crisis in the Donetsk and Luhansk republics.” As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continued to escalate, the rhetoric of the two countries turned neutral with both Presidents avoiding the usage of the word “war”. Nonetheless, on March 29, Timur Suleimenov, the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kazakh president, stated that Kazakhstan did not and will not recognize Crimea or Donbass, which was later officially confirmed by the Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi.
The article contrasts the official stance of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to that of Uzbekistan who, despite keeping a relatively low profile in global political debates, was the first Central Asian country to express its assurance of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and unwillingness to recognize separatist entities there, as was stated on March 17 by the Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov at the session of the upper house of the Oliy Majlis, the parliament of Uzbekistan.