In January 2023, foreign press analytical articles discussed Kazakhstan’s diplomacy, continuing attacks on the press in Kyrgyzstan, power shortages in Tajikistan, political shuffles in Turkmenistan, energy crisis in Uzbekistan, and other important topics in the region.
Kazakhstan’s Expanding Multi-Vector Foreign Policy
Jamestown Foundation article discusses Kazakhstan’s expanding foreign relations in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The article notes that Kazakhstan’s relations with China has strengthened during this period. Indeed, the two countries are expanding railway connections to boost transit and bilateral trade. Yet, Kazakhstan does not want it to turn into a toxic, one-sided relationship and become another junior partner of the Russian-Chinese “condominium,” preferring instead to diversify its foreign relations through building bridges with other ambitious actors in Eurasia, the article argues.
Kazakhstan’s connections with Turkey and the EU are also strengthening. A critical component of Kazakhstan’s new geopolitical vision is the expansion of the Middle Corridor. Amid Russia’s war against Ukraine, Kazakhstan has been subject to a number of intermittent closures of oil-exporting pipelines by Russia, which pushed Tokayev to officially declare the need to find new transit routes.
Astana’s multi-vector foreign policy, however, does not mean that Kazakhstan is wholly reconsidering its ties with Russia, the article notes. Rather, the Kazakhstani government is seeking greater guarantees and flexibility in bilateral relations.
Ultimately, the war in Ukraine has transformed Eurasia’s geopolitical landscape. Russia’s weakening position in Central Asia represents a potential boon for Kazakhstan.
After year of turmoil, Kazakhstan looks for reform to translate into closer Western ties
The EurActiv platform article also argues that Kazakhstan’s reform efforts after the recent presidential elections could position the country as a key partner for the EU, with the region increasingly slipping out from Russia’s thumb.
The early presidential election in November, moved up from the scheduled date in 2024, with Tokayev’s five opponents virtually unknown and none of them scoring double digits faced complaints by the international community about their fairness. An Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) election monitoring report stated that November’s snap election lacked “competitiveness” and showed the need for reforms.
Despite this, the EU had welcomed the “wider political and socio-economic reforms” in the country but urged to “increase political pluralism and citizens’ participation in political life” and to “implement fully” the recommendations of the OSCE.
Kazakhstan tightens visa rules, setting limits for Russians fleeing war duty
An article by Washington Post discussed a new legislation in Kazakhstan regarding entry rules for foreigners. Under the new rules, visitors who do not require a visa because they come from countries in the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Russia, will be prohibited from staying in Kazakhstan for more than 90 days in a 180-day period.
The new restrictions will target visitors who previously circumvented Kazakhstan’s migration rules through what are called visa runs — by crossing Kazakhstan’s borders and returning immediately, effectively resetting the clock on the 90-day maximum visa-free stay.
Foreigners who arrived in Kazakhstan with a visa or who were issued temporary residence permits will not be affected by the new rules.
As waves of hundreds of thousands of Russians entered Kazakhstan in the wake of the September mobilization, Tokayev not only promised to provide them humanitarian assistance but said publicly that those fleeing had been forced to leave Russia due to a “hopeless situation.” But the announcement of the new entry restrictions appeared to mark a bit of calibration, with Tokayev potentially adopting a more cautious approach.
Kyrgyzstan: What’s Next for the Kempir-Abad Dissenters?
An article by The Diplomat provides an update for the situation with the politicians and activists who were arrested in October for their opposition to the Kyrgyz-Uzbek deal on the Kempir-Abad reservoir.
In early December it was reported that as many as 19 of the arrested politicians and activists in Kyrgyzstan had begun a hunger strike. On December 12, a court in Bishkek ordered the extension of their pre-trial detention for two more months — to February 20 — a decision upheld later in the month. The hunger strike was also ended in late December.
The article states that we may expect some kind of sympathy from the country’s president Sadyr Japarov, who himself was freed from prison during a protest and was elected as a president. On the other hand, if anyone knows the power of a protest to unsettle a Kyrgyz government, it’s Japarov.
Nonetheless, it seems the Kyrgyz authorities are set on prosecuting the Kempir-Abad dissenters, prolonging and escalating the controversy from beyond a dispute over a specific policy choice to larger issues: How a state handles criticism and its most strident critics.
Kyrgyzstan: Lawsuit Seeks to Shut Independent Media Outlet
The Human Rights Watch issued a publication condemning the government of Kyrgyzstan for its attack on the press and specifically the “Azattyk Media,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Kyrgyz service. On January 23, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Culture has filed a lawsuit to try to terminate the operation of the media outlet. The ministry blocked access to Azattyk Media’s websites and froze its bank account in October 2022, following the outlet’s coverage of a border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Kyrgyzstan buys new batch of Turkish-made drones
The Eurasianet platform informs that Kyrgyzstan has bought a fresh batch of Turkish-made military drones, bolstering an aerial fleet that already includes Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles.
Writing in a post on Facebook on January 17, Daiyrbek Orunbekov, the press secretary for the presidential administration, linked the acquisition of the drones to the recent history of border conflicts with Tajikistan. Orunbekov identified the new purchases as Aksungur and Anka UAVs, but provided no details of either how many have been bought or how much was paid for them.
He did suggest, however, that the government was able to afford the drones through economies achieved by cutting salaries to civil servants. “It is clear that if the country cannot defend itself, then quarterly bonuses and additional payments to government workers have no meaning. That is why it is wholly out of place for colleagues to feel demeaned by the supposed ‘bonus cuts,’” Orunbekov wrote on Facebook.
Kyrgyzstan’s race to strengthen its military arsenal since the most recent spates of unrest on the Tajik border have not only been focused on airpower. In October, Defense Minister Baktybek Bekbolotov announced that Kyrgyzstan had bought a Belarusian-made Pechora-2BM anti-aircraft missile system.
This clamor for building up a powerful arsenal of weapons is playing out against a persistent frost in relations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan following hostilities in September that claimed more than 100 lives, mainly among civilians, states the article.
Tajikistan: Cold weather precipitates end to power rationing
The Eurasianet article reports that in an acknowledgement of a particularly cold winter, authorities in Tajikistan announced the suspension of an electricity-rationing regime. Previously, the state-owned electricity provider had been suspending supplies from 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. daily. President Emomali Rahmon had justified the electricity-rationing regime by arguing that the enforced blackouts were a necessary measure and that even developed countries were at present experiencing power shortages.
The article asks a question on where the authorities have found the spare capacity to supply people with electricity around the clock this year when they have failed to do so in previous years. The rationing regime has been in force for a number of winters now. When the temperature sinks below a certain level, output from the Nurek hydropower plant, which produces most of the country’s electricity needs, grinds to a near-halt. Lack of electricity has driven many in rural areas to rely on burning any available fuel, such as coal, wood and even dried dung, for warmth.
According to the article, one explanation may lie in the fortunes of the Talco Aluminium Company, which is said to be owned by Hasan Asadullozoda, the brother-in-law of President Rahmon. The metals company is experiencing a lean period of late. Aluminium output at the company’s plants reached a relatively meager 61,000 tons in 2021, as compared to 216,000 tons in 2013. The article concludes that diminished production at Talco means less energy consumption. And the less electricity Talco needs to use, the more is left for the rest of the population.
Tajikistan increases its counterterrorist readiness through military drills in Fakhrabad
An article by Special Eurasia analyses how the recent counterterrorism military drills in Tajikistan highlighted Dushanbe’s necessity to upgrade its readiness and expertise in facing terrorist threats inside the country and jihadist activities from neighbouring areas of Afghanistan. The Tajik Defense Ministry reported that special forces units attended counter-terrorist exercises at the Fakhrabad training centre of the Khatlon garrison. The military exercises were part of the Strategy for Countering Extremism and Terrorism in Tajikistan for 2021-2025.
The article argues that the recent military exercises matter for several reasons. First, Tajikistan could face domestic turmoil and protests, which might undermine the country’s stability and the central government’s authority. Therefore, Dushanbe seem to have decided to boost its military readiness and security cooperation with regional powers such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China to contrast any domestic and foreign threats. Second, Tajikistan must secure its borders with neighbouring Afghanistan. The establishment of Tehrik-e-Taliban Tajikistan (TTT) in July 2022 confirmed Tajik concerns over Afghanistan and pushed Dushanbe to enlarge its security cooperation and combat readiness against terrorist groups. Finally, Tajik authorities might use the terrorist threat to counter domestic political opposition, generating widespread disappointment and a fertile ground for jihadist propaganda.
Turkmenistan: Look who’s back
Eurasianet article analyses the unexpected comeback of Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, who stepped down as president of Turkmenistan last year. On January 21, the upper and lower chambers of parliament cancelled the senatorial upper house, known as the Halk Maslahaty, or People’s Council, which only came into being in January 2021. In its place will appear an eponymous but quite different Halk Maslahaty, and the legislature will revert to a single-chamber institution. Berdymukhamedov the elder has been appointed the head of this new Halk Maslahaty and been given the title of “national leader.”
Should the national leader be unable to perform his duties, the role passes to the president. That is to say, Serdar Berdymukhamedov. This is a crude switcheroo since it had until now been the case that if the president was unable for any reason to perform his duties, the chair of the now-scrapped upper house, who happened to be Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, would take over.
Turkmen political analyst Kumush Bairiyeva argued that these developments reflected “Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov’s hypertrophied vanity” and his dissatisfaction with the role of a mere chairman of the upper house of parliament.
Another credible explanation is that the Turkmen regime looked north to Kazakhstan and watched with dismay how badly the transition of power effected in 2019 turned out there. Ever since the political turbulence of January 2022, the standing of Kazakhstan’s former president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had couched himself with generous behind-the-scenes lifetime powers before agreeing to step aside, has been on a rapid and inexorable slide.
President Serdar Berdymukhamedov’s authority now looks desperately weakened, which means that if anything should happen to his 65-year-old father, a crisis of legitimacy could ensue, the article states.
Freezing Temperatures Complicate Turkmenistan’s Energy Exports
Caspian Policy Center reports that Turkmenistan is experiencing an unusually cold winter with temperatures dropping to a record –25 Celsius. There were reports of low pressure in Turkmenistan’s gas pipelines, causing the fire in heat-generating boilers to go out. As temperatures dropped well below freezing, at the Galkynysh gas field, gas hydrates began to form in the pipes and pumps, escalating the reduction of Turkmenistan’s gas exports. Because of the pipeline problems, gas exports to Uzbekistan were suspended, China and Afghanistan received reduced flows, and Iran’s eastern and northeastern regions experienced low gas pressure.
Uzbekistan, reported on January 12 that gas imports from Turkmenistan were suspended, causing mass gas outages in Tashkent. This is not the first time Uzbekistan has faced energy challenges in recent months. Early on January 16, Mirziyoyev dismissed Uzbekistan’s Energy Minister and Tashkent’s mayor, and put the heads of Uzbekneftegaz, Uztransgaz, and Regional Electric Networks on a three-month probationary period.
Although Turkmenistan’s gas exports to Uzbekistan have dwindled, exports to China, Turkmenistan’s largest consumer, have remained relatively stable. It seems that Turkmenistan has concentrated its efforts on maintaining its relationship with China and ensuring domestic supply, despite the energy challenges Uzbekistan, Iran, and Afghanistan are facing. However, with plans to increase gas export capacity and enhance energy technologies, Turkmenistan might, in the future, be in the position to ensure a stable energy supply for all of its partners, states the Caspian Policy Center.
Uzbekistan’s energy crisis reveals authoritarian habits die hard
Continuing the topic of energy shortages, an OpenDemocracy article discusses how the head of the presidential administration of Uzbekistan had energy official arrested without due process. According to the source of the openDemocracy, Sardor Umurzakov, the Presidential chief, ordered the immediate arrest of a senior energy official who was present at a high-level government meeting in December.
The openDemocracy cites various journalists and experts who argue that Sardor Umurzakov appeared to be taking on the role of the president’s “enforcer” – a role that Shavkat Mirziyoyev played when prime minister under Uzbekistan’s former hardline ruler, Islam Karimov. But the presidential administration seems to have rejected the ‘enforcer’ comparison and denied the OpenDemocracy sources’ allegations. The arrest, it said, was conducted by the General Prosecutor’s Office.
The article concludes with an expert opinion that Sardor Umurzakov’s role of the president’s “enforcer” might be tied to the president’s planned constitutional changes. Having an “attack dog”, as noted by Bruce Pannier, seem to be particularly important for Mirziyoyev’s personal image, as he is preparing to pass legislation that will allow him to run for two more seven-year terms as president.
Mirziyoyev Lands in Kyrgyzstan for Long Delayed State Visit
The Diplomat article analyzes the state visit of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Kyrgyzstan on January 26 and argues the reason for his visit and arguably the reason his arrival has been repeatedly postponed is the settling of an agreement regarding a stretch of border including the Kempir-Abad (Andijan) Reservoir.
The article argues that a border treaty in Central Asia is a monumental diplomatic achievement. However, Kyrgyz authorities swept up more than two dozen politicians and activists in a mass arrest triggered by their vocal opposition to (and efforts to organize against) the border agreement. The Kempir-Abad dissenters remain in pre-trial detention facing serious charges of plotting a coup. Their detention was extended in December into February, providing a new window for a state visit with the most vocal agitators behind bars.
As part of the Uzbek President’s visit, bilateral negotiations would be held in both narrow and expanded formats to discuss “a wide range of issues of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek strategic partnership” and a “number of bilateral documents” would be signed. The border agreement is expected to be among them.
Uncertain Political Consequences Hamper Proposed Russian-Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani Gas Union
The Jamestown Foundation publication discusses the possibility of establishing a trilateral natural gas union among Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which was proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to Russian officials, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have had a single gas transportation system since the time of the Soviet Union, and through the establishment of the proposed union, gas exports to additional markets, namely China, could be developed.
Though Astana and Tashkent initially expressed positive reactions to the project, more negative feedback has begun to be voiced officially in both countries relating to the lack of economic and political certainty regarding the project’s ultimate goals. According to the Kazakhstani Minister of Energy Bolat Akchulakov, the three countries involved have been discussing the technical capabilities of gas transmission systems only in bilateral formats, no trilateral discussions were held. Furthermore, Uzbekistani Minister of Energy Jorabek Mirzamahmudov asserted that gas imports should be carried out only through commercial trade agreements and not through any alliance or union.
The article argues that ultimately, it seems that the union idea was initially proposed to save Russia from Western sanctions. As it is known, Europe is ending its dependency on Russian gas, and Moscow’s ultimate goal may be to form this alliance as a means of still transporting its gas to Europe via Kazakhstani and Uzbekistani territory.
China’s Dominance in Central Asia: Myth or Reality?
An analytical piece by Yunis Sharifli for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) discusses the topic of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership in Central Asia right now. The author states that according to the popular narrative, China is increasing its power at Russia’s expense in Central Asia. Sharifli agrees that there is a visible decline in Russian influence in the region and China’s increased proactive diplomacy and provides evidence for it.
However, the article states that despite much evidence of the decline of Russia and the rise of China in Central Asia, Beijing ultimately cannot replace Moscow in the region. In the short and medium term, China has neither the capacity nor the intention to replace it. In addition, despite the reduction in Russian power, it is still a key security and economic actor and has powerful tools at its disposal that can affect the policies of countries in the region.
Moreover, the increasing attention of the US and recent engagement by the EU and European countries with Central Asia may also create challenges for China in expanding its influence in the region, the article concludes.
Geopolitical risk in Central Asia and AfPak: what to watch in 2023
Special Eurasia report highlights trends and challenges in Central Asia, as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. The report indicates a “medium” level risk for the Central Asia in 2023, with the main challenges for the regional stability being domestic protests, geopolitical competition among the regional and international actors, and the terrorist threat from Afghanistan.
Among regional problems, totalitarianism, corruption, and economic crises are the main challenges that the Central Asian government need to face to avoid local protests, political turmoil, and disappointment that might push young generations to look at jihadist terrorist groups and radicalisation as the only answer to their problem. In addition, military escalation due to border security, as happened between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in September 2022, might contribute to regional destabilisation.
The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) might be considered the main threat to regional security due to its violent attacks and jihadist propaganda to recruit local citizens. Russia, China, and Central Asian governments are constantly monitoring the situation in Afghanistan since the Islamic State has conducted jihadist propaganda to promote its ideology and recruit Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Uighur people.