February analytical articles in foreign press discussed the upcoming parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, the meeting of the president of Kyrgyzstan with his former counterparts, the “Belt & Road Initiative” and Tajikistan, energy crisis in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and the geopolitical dynamics in the region.
Kazakhstan’s Tokayev Is Playing with Fire at Home—and with Russia
Political analyst and author Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili discusses the snap parliamentary elections slated for March 19 in Kazakhstan for World Politics Review. She sees the elections as Tokayev’s attempt to consolidate his power, considering the combined pressure from the January 2022 protests and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet, the elections may end up having the opposite effect, by highlighting the fact that many of the reforms Tokayev is now promising to pursue are similar to ones he promised to make when he came to power in 2019, the author argues.
Tokayev has a keen idea of the reforms Kazakhstan must embark upon to withstand the external threats and future waves of protests. However, few expect that the snap elections will produce an independent parliament, because all the approved parties are loyal to the government. Nor will they produce the kind of open political competition Tokayev has long promised. Calls for reform are the signature of his government. But by holding parliamentary elections without allowing for greater participation by independent political parties, he runs the risk of setting the country up for greater disappointment.
Kazakhstan has displayed a newfound willingness to stand up to its Russian neighbor. To definitively turn the page on the past, Tokayev must now pursue his promised domestic political reforms with the same urgency, the article concludes.
Kyrgyzstan: Surprise ex-presidents meeting in Dubai keeps public guessing
An Eurasianet article discusses Sadyr Japarov’s startling decision to convene a secret meeting in Dubai of all the country’s ex-presidents, several of whom were ousted from power in unruly uprisings. Japarov is selling this as a bold gesture designed to cultivate unity. Critics have decried it as a populist move and a sign of disrespect to the victims of those former leaders.
“My only thought was for the supporters of each president, for the inhabitants of the seven regions [of Kyrgyzstan] to concentrate [their energies] in one direction, to leave politics to one side, to think about the development of the nation, of the economy,” Japarov stated.
However, particularly upsetting the public is the presence of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, whose forces killed dozens of demonstrators before he fled the capital, Bishkek, in April 2010. He was sentenced to 24 years in prison in 2013. Allowing Bakiyev to return to Kyrgyzstan could quickly rouse the public from its slumber, even though opposition activism has plummeted to historic lows amid a spate of repressive measures from the authorities, states the article.
It is presumed that the meeting must have happened after February 14, since a former president Almazbek Atambayev, having served less than two years of his 11-year sentence for corruption, was released from prison on that day. Atambayev was convicted and sentenced in 2020 for allegedly receiving a bribe to release a notorious criminal from prison, but the conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court and the case was sent back to the lower court for new hearings. Meanwhile, Atambayev left for Spain for medical treatment.
Political analyst Medet Tiulegenov believes that Japarov’s intention for the Dubai meeting was to draw a historic line in the sand. Aida Alymbayeva, a political scientist, also suggested that with inflation and other factors causing hardship among the general population, Japarov needed a big gesture that would shore up his popularity by presenting himself as man of generous spirit.
Tajikistan’s Opportunities and Development Progress Within the Belt & Road Initiative
Silk Road Briefing article examines the “Belt & Road Initiative” (BRI) from the Tajikistan perspective and analyses development trends and opportunities from the country’s participation within the Middle Corridor.
Reconstruction and expansion of infrastructure in Tajikistan is a strategic need, and without loans, the implementation of projects will be impossible. In 2020, the two sides signed five new loan projects worth US$459.5 million, and in 2021 announced plans to borrow an additional US$562 million. China’s advantage over other partners is the principle of non-intervention and lack of mandatory conditions and reforms, the article argues.
But certain political and security problems may jeopardize the complete and successful implementation of the projects. Considerations need to be made as how to minimize the environmental effects on large infrastructure projects.
The article highlights that BRI has been contributing to Tajikistan’s communication, transportation, economic integration, electricity, and information technology. It also has an important impact on increasing exports, foreign direct investment, and gross domestic product, and reducing financial risks.
All BRI-related projects in Tajikistan are scheduled to be implemented in the next several years meaning that Tajikistan’s role in regional Eurasian trade is highly likely, barring any serious issues, to rapidly expand, the article concludes.
Turkmenistan’s secret census reports
On December 17-27, 2022, Turkmenistan conducted a national census under the slogan “Census – 2022: Unity, Happiness, Bright Future”, a non-profit organisation “Progres Foundation” reports. The article demonstrates that access to credible data is deeply problematic in Turkmenistan. The results of the last census in 2012 had not been made public. For the last 10 years, government policies have been designed and implemented without the public’s and policymakers’ access to the basic and vital statistics such as how many people live in Turkmenistan, and the birth and death rates in the country. The census questionnaire was not made public. It was noted in the state media that the form had 53 questions.
President Serdar Berdimuhamedov highlights that “One should note that the complete population and housing census of 2022 is also the response of Turkmenistan for the call by the United Nations to conduct the census in the UN member countries and that also clearly speaks of readiness of our country for international partnership.”
According to the information shared on the state media “the preliminary results of the census will be summed up within six months.” However, there have not been any signs of political will by the government demonstrating that it will release the data and discontinue the tradition of silence and mismanagement. If it chooses not to share the results of the census, it will further widen the distrust between the government and citizens and alienate international investors, the article posits.
Six Arrests at Turkmengaz Over Suspension of Exports from Galkynysh
The Turkmen.news portal informs that six people have been arrested at the Turkmengaz state concern, including the head of the Department for Material and Technical Resources and Procurement, Shohrat Ajdarov, and the acting head of the Turkmengazakdyrysh association (Turkmen gas transmission), Shohrat Chopanov. The officials are held responsible for the breakdown at Galkynysh, the largest gas field in Turkmenistan, and the interruption to gas supplies to Uzbekistan.
According to preliminary calculations, just six days of forced interruption to gas supplies from Galkynysh to Uzbekistan caused losses of $59.7 million, inspections by the Prosecutor General’s Office revealed. Moreover, Turkmenistan expects to be fined for the shortfall in gas supplies to China.
The breakdown and interruption in gas supplies during the coldest period has shown Turkmenistan to be an unreliable partner, according to turkmen.news observers in Ashgabat.
Uzbekistan will no longer be a customer despite being compensated in the form of liquefied gas. From March 1, Russia’s Gazprom will start supplying gas to Uzbekistan, having already signed the relevant agreement with Kazakhstan too.
Overall it’s Gazprom that has gained from the situation, finding new supply markets during a period of sanctions against Russia, the portal reports. Observers think that Russia is hoping to gain access to the Chinese market through these countries, i.e. through the Central Asia – China gas pipeline. By interrupting supplies and lowering the quality of their output Turkmengaz is practically undermining itself and helping Gazprom.
Energy Crisis Exposes Deep Grievances in Uzbekistan
The serious energy crisis experienced by Uzbekistan this winter has been a subject for a number of foreign press articles. Voice of America (VoA) interviewed several citizens on the streets of Tashkent regarding the government’s failure to deliver gas and electricity, and the general mood in public was full of tension and anger.
The government admits this has been a brutal season, with low gas pressure, power cuts and fuel shortages. The Energy Ministry has blamed a long list of factors for the problems: supply not meeting demand, infrastructure failures, production reductions because of extreme cold, import halts, and political and economic challenges.
A February 9 investigative report by Radio Liberty exposed corruption in Uzbekistan’s oil and gas sector with hundreds of pages of documents, highlighting that the key beneficiaries “are opaque companies controlled by Uzbek and Russian political insiders, including a billionaire confidant of Russian President Vladimir Putin.”
Radio Liberty’s findings infuriated the public. The Uzbek government has refuted some parts of the report, claiming that it misinterpreted agreements with investors, specifically the terms and costs. Energy Minister Mirzamahmudov said the country’s more than 250 energy fields are run by the state-owned Uzbekneftegaz, not the Russian companies.
In light of Uzbekistan’s energy challenges, security analyst Wilder Alejandro Sanchez asks the question of whether a nuclear power plant would be a solution to the country’s problems.
In September 2018, an intergovernmental agreement was signed for the construction by Rosatom of two VVER-1200 reactors to be commissioned by 2028. An electricity generation strategy outlined by the Ministry of Energy in 2020 envisaged 15% of Uzbekistan’s electricity coming from nuclear by 2030.
While there is logic to promoting nuclear development, Uzbekistan’s energy plans are concerning, the author argues. Strategically, Uzbekistan has become dependent on Russia for natural gas, coal, and oil imports. The production of nuclear energy via Rosatom will further increase the dependence on this country. It can also make the West believe that Tashkent and Moscow have become energy allies.
There is also the problem of the location of the proposed nuclear power plant near a vital lake system and within a seismic zone. In a worst-case scenario, if there are problems or accidents at the nuclear facilities or the radioactive waste disposal site, neighboring Lake Tuzkan, underground sources of drinking water, nearby settlements, and even neighboring states could be affected. Nuclear power can be helpful, and already is, but it is not always the preferred choice, the author concludes.
The Role of PSCs in Securing Chinese Interests in Central Asia: The Current Situation and Future Prospects
The current geopolitical dynamics remain one of the most important topics in the regional political analysis. The Jamestown Foundation published an analytical piece by Dr. Sergey Sukhanin on China’s use of private security companies (PSCs) in Central Asian States. The employment of these companies within Central Asia have been confirmed on some occasions to protect Chinese nationals and property. In the future, China will most likely increase its reliance on these actors, the article supposes, especially Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, due to economic dependency and an exorbitant level of indebtedness. While China might attempt to increase the use of its PSCs in Central Asia, multiple risks are associated with this approach, including the danger of growing Sinophobia and anti-Chinese protests. As of today, Chinese PSCs in Central Asia should be viewed as being more of a “continuation of business by other means” rather than military-political tools or instruments of geopolitical competition.
The Sinica Podcast with Raffaello Pantucci by The China Project also discusses Chinese vision and plans for the region. Pantucci, a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the co-author of the book “Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire” gives his opinion on the Chinese role in region and deliberates on all important milestones in the Central Asia-China relations, such as the establishment of the “Shanghai Five”, the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure, the BRI, etc. Among other discussed ideas, Pantucci states that contrary to the popular conception, BRI is not an infrastructure or transportation project, but rather a big foreign policy idea of Xi Jinping. Its future is purposely left vague, because at the end of the day, that means the goalposts are malleable, argues the expert.
The Dawn of Turan: Eurasian Opportunity and Challenge for Turkey
An analytical paper by Halil Karaveli for the Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst provides a historical and present overview of Turkey’s relations with Central Asia. The article argues that Turkey is eager to exploit the opportunity to enhance its influence among the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and sees the “emergence of a new geostrategic force in the heart of Eurasia.” But it wants to avoid provoking a reaction from Russia, preferring to advance pan-Turkism without the grandiose rhetoric of the 1990s, and professing a faith in Eurasian multilateralism that in appearance defers to Russia. Yet this may change. Ultimately, how assertive Turkey will become in Central Asia depends on how wounded Russia will emerge from the Ukraine war.
Russia is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia
Finally, an article by Foreign Policy Research Institute analyses the situation with the arguably most influential outside actor in the region – Russia. In Central Asia, Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, states the author Maximilian Hess. China’s rise had already displaced it as the premier economic power in the region, but as the January 2022 events in Kazakhstan showed, Beijing was happy to let Russia remain the preeminent political actor. Yet just thirteen months on from his effectively unchallenged intervention in Kazakhstan—an event that Putin cast as the death knell for alleged pro-Western color revolutions—Russian influence has diminished dramatically.
The longer Putin’s war on Ukraine continues and the more stringent the international sanctions regime becomes, the greater its impact will be. The geography of the region means that its countries cannot move away from Russia entirely, of course, and some suspect that Central Asian trade has helped Moscow evade sanctions. The region may still be Russia’s backyard, but the gardener is absent—and it increasingly appears that there is little desire for him to return. A new era for Central Asia has begun, and the absence of a regional hegemon means that it is much more likely to be turbulent and possibly deadly, the article concludes.